Dileep Chandran v. Mahatma Gandhi University Quarters and Enrollment Committee

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN THURSDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF MARCH 2014/6TH CHAITHRA, 1936 WP(C).No. 7491 of 2014 (J) --------------------------- ## PETITIONER(S)/PETITIONER: ------------------------------------------------ DILEEP CHANDRAN, AGED 25 YEARS S/O.P N CHANDRAN, PENDANATHU HOUSE, ELAMPALLY P O KOTTAYAM PIN-686503 BY ADVS.SRI.DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN SRI.ADARSH KUMAR SRI.K.M.ANEESH ## RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENTS: ---------------------------------------------------- 1. MAHATMA GANDHI UNIVERSITY QUARTERS REP BY ITS VICE CHANCELLOR, PRIYADARSANI HILLS KOTTAYAM-686503 2. ENROLLMENT COMMITTEE, - BAR COUNCIL OF KERALA OFFICE OF BAR COUNCIL OF KERALA BAR COUNCIL BUILDING, NEAR HIGH COURT OF KERALA ERNAKULAM-KOCHI-31 BY DR.P.LEELAKRISHNAN, SC, M.G.UNIVERSITY THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 27-03-2014, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: WP(C).No. 7491 of 2014 (J) --------------------------- ## APPENDIX PETITIONER(S)' EXHIBITS ------------------------------------- P1:-ADDITIONAL MEMO DTD 10/2/2014 COMMUNICATED BY IST RESPONDENT TO PETITIONER P2:-APPLICATION UNDER THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT DTD 11/2/2014 P3:-ORDER ISSUED BY THE IST RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY DTD 30/9/1989 P4- NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY DATED 7.7.2012 //True Copy// P.A. To Judge ## **K.VINOD CHANDRAN, J** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - W.P.(C).No. 7491 of 2014 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated 27[th] March, 2014 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ## **JUDGMENT** The petitioner is a 3[rd] year Law student studying in a college affiliated to the 1[st] respondent University, having undergone the course, in the academic year 2010-13. Admittedly, the course has six semesters of which the petitioner failed to qualify in the 5[th] semester in two subjects namely 'Law of Arbitration' and 'Law of Taxation'. In the subject 'Arbitration', petitioner received 48 marks and in the subject 'Taxation', he received 39 marks winch marks are inclusive of external and internal examinations. The petitioner applied for revaluation which is permissible only for the external examinations; being the written test. The petitioner's contention with respect to the revaluation on 'Taxation', if upheld, he would stand to qualify in the 5[th] semester by virtue of the moderation which he is 2 ## **WP(C).7491/14** entitled to, is the contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In any event, no contentions are urged with respect to the marks awarded in the subject 'Arbitration' or the revaluation applied for, in that subject, which obviously did not yield any result. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urges that Ext.P4 Regulation is arbitrary and would result in absurd consequences, especially when compared with the earlier Regulations produced as Ext.P3. Ext.P3, which is valid for revaluation right from the year 1989, provides that on revaluation, if the marks awarded go beyond 10%, then, there would be a 2[nd] revaluation and the average of the marks obtained in the 1[st] and 2[nd] revaluations would be taken as the final marks. This procedure, simple in nature, was perfectly a workable and reasonable one, whereas the present one, **WP(C).7491/14** 3 according to the learned counsel, results in rank absurdity making the regulation irrational and arbitrary. 3. Before going into Ext.P4, it is to be noticed that the petitioner obtained 28 marks for theory in the subject of 'Taxation' and in the 1[st] revaluation, he obtained 40 marks which stood considerably reduced as 30 in the 2[nd] revaluation. The University took the average of the 2[nd] revaluation, being the lower of the two revaluations, and the original mark obtained. This necessarily does not enure to the benefit of the petitioner, since he does not get the required marks which, along with the moderation, would ensure that he is over the fence, insofar as qualifying the 5[th] semester is concerned. 4. The University Regulations as of now, provide that on revaluation, if the marks are between 5% and 9.99% then, the marks awarded on **WP(C).7491/14** 4 revaluation shall be taken as final. However, on the revaluation marks being equal to 10% or less than or equal to 25%, then, a 2[nd] revaluation is contemplated. After the 2[nd] revaluation, the average of the original marks and the nearest of the two marks obtained on revaluation, to that of the original are taken, to determine the final marks to be awarded. It is also stipulated that if the difference between the marks awarded in the original valuation and the 1[st] revaluation and that of the two revaluations happens to be one and the same, average of the highest of the two marks shall be awarded to the candidate. 5. The learned counsel would point out that arbitrariness is writ large insofar as the petitioner herein, in the 1[st] revaluation, obtained just above 10% and if it had been slightly lesser, then the petitioner would have stood to gain, since the Regulations mandate **WP(C).7491/14** 5 adoption of such revaluation marks, which are in excess of 5% but less than 9.99%. The learned counsel would also point out that again, in the case of the petitioner, if he had obtained 32 marks in the 2[nd] revaluation, then again the average of the revaluation marks would have been taken, since the difference between the original valuation and the 1[st] revaluation and the two revaluations would be the same viz: 12 marks. The learned counsel would also contend that clause (iv), which provides that, if the revaluation yield lesser marks than the original marks, the original marks would be taken into account, would in fact, be a premium on non performance. 6. The petitioner's case happens to be one which has the marginal specifications, which would, on a _prima facie_ consideration, look arbitrary when the Regulation is implemented in _toto_ . Primarily it is to be noticed that the **WP(C).7491/14** 6 Regulation is challenged, on the basis of the facts coming to fore in the petitioner's case alone; that too visualized on mere probabilities. It is to be emphasized that the academic body has exercised the authority conferred on it, by statutes, to arrive at a reasonable proposition, by which the grant of marks on revaluation is regulated. An amount of arbitrariness may definitely occur, insofar as certain circumstances are concerned. 7. Revaluation is an exercise attempted to efface any probable arbitrariness in evaluation, brought in by reason only of the personal convictions of individual examiners; which exercise by its very nature, is wrought with an amount of uncertainty. When regulations are made with respect to the general conduct of examination, the system of valuation and revaluation, there are bound to occur certain inequities in certain circumstances; which **WP(C).7491/14** 7 cannot be termed as palpable injustice. That alone cannot lead to this Court striking down the Regulations as such, since the reasonableness of the Regulation, on a total working of the same, is to be looked into, while considering the challenge on the grounds of arbitrariness and irrationality. “A law has to be adjudged for its constitutionality by the generality of cases it covers, not by the freaks and exceptions it martyrs” [Krishna Iyer in **R.S. Joshi v. Ajit Mills Ltd. (1977 (4) SCC 98)** . 8. **Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and Others(1984 (4) SCC 27)** was concerned with the challenge against a regulation which prohibited revaluation and disclosure of any information regarding answer books; treating them to be most confidential. The challenge before the High Court was on the **WP(C).7491/14** 8 grounds of (i).violation of principles of natural justice (ii). the clause being ultravires on the ground of the delegatee exceeding its powers and (iii) unreasonableness. The 1[st] ground was negatived by the High Court and the Honourable Supreme Court. The High Court found favour with the other two grounds; when examined in the backdrop of some past instances of tampering; leading to answer papers of brilliant students being passed off as those of students with inferior merit. The Honourable Supreme Court restated the law and the view of the High Court was overturned in the following manner: “In our opinion, the aforesaid approach made by the High Court is wholly incorrect and fallacious. The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the Legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body. It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated **WP(C).7491/14** 9 in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act. The Legislature and its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide what policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered by the Act and there is no scope for interference by the Court unless the particular provision impugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity, in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the regulation-making power or its being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the parent enactment or in violation of any of the limitations imposed by the Constitution.” 9. Time and again, it has been declared that this Court would not traverse into the field of academics, especially when a competent body decides the manner in which examinations are to be conducted and the marks are awarded, which would definitely take in a system of revaluation. The University by its constituted academic bodies is empowered to bring in such **WP(C).7491/14** 10 Regulations. No legal infirmity is decipherable. This Court on its own predicative reasoning, cannot supplement or supplant the Regulations unless glaring arbitrariness or irrationality is decipherable from the Rules. This Court, on an over all examination of the Regulations, does not find it to be glaringly unreasonable or irrational so as to force this Court's hand under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to strike down such Regulations, despite the manner in which, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has adroitly, argued the case. 10. On the above reasoning, the writ petition is found to be devoid of merit and the same is dismissed. The parties shall suffer their respective costs. ## **SD/-** ## **K.VINOD CHANDRAN, Judge** Mrcs