High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed.

Devji @ Deviji Shivji v. Maganlal R. Athrana & Others

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1961

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • A. K. Sarkar
  • Raghubar Dayal
  • J. R. Mudholkar
Judgment Date
1964-04-01
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Devji @ Deviji Shivji

Respondents

  • Maganlal R. Athrana and Others

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sarjoo Prasad
  • • D. N. Mukherjee

Counsels for Respondents

  • • R. C. Prasad

Case Synopsis & Summary

Devji, who held permanent leasehold rights over the Jealgora Govindpur Colliery, filed a suit to recover Rs. 57,000 from the respondents. He had granted a sub-lease of the colliery to respondent No. 4 for five years and joined respondents 1, 2 and 5 (who along with respondent 4 formed a partnership firm known as the Saurashtra Coal Concern) as defendants, contending that respondent No. 4 acted as a benamidar for the firm and that all partners were liable for the claim. Respondents 4 and 5 admitted the lease was obtained by respondent 4 on behalf of the firm but asserted that they surrendered their leasehold interest in 1950 and that the stock of coal and other dues were not the appellant’s liabilities post-surrender. The trial court decreed against all respondents; the High Court, on appeal, set aside the decree as against respondents 1–3 but affirmed it against 4 and 5. The core question is whether Section 22 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 binds a firm to acts or instruments executed by a partner on its behalf, and whether the sub-lease was executed in the name of the firm or with an express or implied intention to bind the firm. The Supreme Court held the sub-lease was not executed in the name of the firm and there was no intention to bind the firm; accordingly the decree must be limited to respondents 4 and 5 and the appeal was dismissed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Indian Partnership Act, 1932, s. 22Constitution of India, Article 133(1)(a)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Binding of a firm by a partner's act requires execution in the name of the firm or with an expression of intention to bind the firm (Section 22)
  • Benamidar doctrine (a partner acting as an intermediary for the firm)
  • Authority of a partner to bind the firm may be inferred from surrounding circumstances
  • Liability of partners depends on the nature of the transaction and the facts of the case
  • Privity of estate is not the sole test for holding partners liable in partnership transactions

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that respondent No. 4 was a benamidar for the partnership firm (Saurashtra Coal Concern). Since the sub-lease was obtained to and by respondent No. 4 in the course of the partnership business, all partners should be liable for the lease obligations under Section 22 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The appellant emphasizes that the firm possessed the demised colliery immediately after the sub-lease and that the transaction should bind the firm, regardless of formal naming, because the conduct and relationship show an intention to bind the firm. The argument relies on the precedents cited to support the notion that partners may be bound by partnership dealings even if the instrument is not explicitly in the firm’s name, provided there is manifest intention to bind the firm.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that the sub-lease was obtained and held in respondent No. 4’s personal capacity, not on behalf of the firm. They asserted there was no privity of contract between the appellant and the firm; the firm never acted as sub-lessee, and the transaction did not express or imply an intention to bind the firm. They contended that the plaintiff’s claim for royalties, commissions, and the loan balance cannot bind the firm post-surrender of the lease in 1950, and that the stock of coal and related dues were not properly proved or attributable to the appellant post-surrender. They also relied on authorities showing that liability depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and that not every partnership transaction binds all partners.

Cited Precedents (8)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Karmali Abdullah Allarakia v. Vora Karimji Jiwanji and othersAIR 1939 P.C. 14DistinguishedThe Privy Council decision does not apply to the present case as the sub-lease was not executed in the name of the firm, and there is no evidence of an intent to bind the firm.
Gowhaite v. Duckworth12 East 421DistinguishedUsed to illustrate a principle that would bind a partner or firm, but the facts do not align with the present transaction; thus it does not help the appellant.
Mathura Nath Choudhury v. Sreejkta Bageswari Rani46 CLJ 362DistinguishedHeld liability dependent on facts and circumstances; not controlling for the present non-name-of-firm sub-lease.
Pandiri Veeranna v. Grandi VeerabhadraswamiILR 19 Mad. 433DistinguishedAuthority to bind firm can be inferred from circumstances, but the case is not applicable here since the sub-lease was not shown to be on behalf of the firm.
Lakhminishankar Deoshankar v. Motiram Vishnuram6 BLR 1106DistinguishedLesson on firm liability for money borrowed by a partner; not applicable due to lack of naming the firm in the sub-lease.
Gordhandas Chhotalal Seth v. Mahant Shri Raghuvirdasji Gangaramji3 BLR 1137DistinguishedCase where the firm was bound by partner’s debts; fact pattern differs as the sub-lease here was not in the firm’s name.
Ram Kinkar Banerjee v. Satya Charan Srimani and others—Mentioned OnlyCited in context of lease assignment cases; not directly controlling for the present partnership liability issue.
Raja Sri Sri Jyoti Prasad Singh Deo Bahadur v. Samuel Henry Seddon—Mentioned OnlyUsed to discuss related lease assignment principles; not directly binding on the present question.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

_1964_ _**April 1**_ 564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!J64-] DEVJI @ DEVIJI SHIVJI _v._ MAGANLAL R. ATHRANA & OTHERS [A. K. SARKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.J _Partner#.iip-Sub-lease granted to_ _partner_ _of_ _firm-No_ _intention_ _to bind to_ _firm-Can_ _other partners_ _of_ _firm_ be _liable_ _-Indian_ _Partnership_ _Act,_ 1932, _s._ 22. The plaintiff appellant instituted a suit agaim.t the defendants respondents for the recovery of a sum of Hs. 57,000/-. The appellant was holding permanent lease hold rights over a certain colliery. On January 31, 1949 the appellant granted a sub-lease of the colliery to respondent No. 4 ior a term of 5 years. He joined respondents 1, 2 and 5 as defendants to the suit on the ground that these three persons alcng with respondent **No. 4 formed a partnership** **firm** **knov..'n** **as Sa.urashtra Coal Con·** cern which was joined in the suit as defendant No. 5. The **appellant's case** **\Vas** **that respondent No. 4** **\\·as.** **a** _**be-nami.dar**_ "- **for the partnership** **firm** **and.** **therefore.** **all- the respondents** were liable for the claim. Hespondents 1 and 2 denied the ~ppellant's claim totally. According to them, respondent No. 4 **took the sub-lease in his personal capacity and not on behalf** **of the other respondents. Respondents 4 and 5 y:ho are father** and son, admitted the appellant's case that the lease was obtained b:,• respondent No. 4 on behalf of the partnership firm. The trial court passed the decree against all the respondents. **On** **appeal. the High Court set aside the decree as against res-** **pondents 1** to :{ **but affirmed the same against respondents 4** and 5. _Held:_ that Section 22 of the Indian Partnership Act, clear **ly provides that in order to bind a** **firm** **by** **an** ~l\ct **or** **an** **ins-** trument executed b;· a partner on behalf of the firm, the Act should be done or the instrument should be executed in the **name of the** **firm,** **or in any other manner expressing or imply-** ing an intention to bind the firm. The sub-lease was not exe**cuted in the name of the** **firm.** **On** **the facts of this case it** **\Yas** held that in obtaining the sub-lease. the parties to it did not intend to bind the firm by that transaction. and therefore the decree should be limited only against respondents 4 and 5. _Karmaii Abdullah Allarakia_ v. _Vora_ Karimji Jiwanji, I.L.R 39 Born. ~GI. _Gouthwaite_ v. _Duckworth._ (1810) 12 East 421. _**Mathui·a l\'ath Choudhuru**_ **v.** _**Sreej11kta BageS1vari Rani,**_ **46** **C.L.J.** **362.** _**Pandiri 1**_ _**[1]**_ _**eeranna**_ **v.** _**Grandi**_ _**11eerflbhadrastvami.**_ **I.L.R.** **-:i:l** **1\1.Iad .. J:.-7.** Lak~htnishankar _**Dei·shankar**_ **v.** _**Motiran1**_ _Vishn11rcon,_ 6 B.L.R. 1106 and _Gordhandas Chlwtalal_ _Seth_ v. _Mahant_ Slzri _Raghubirdasi_ Gangaramji. 3-l B.L.R. 1137, distin- •' guished. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1961. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 17. 1958 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 162 of 1952. _Sarjoo Prasad_ and _D._ _N. Mukherjee,_ for the appellant. _R._ _C._ _Prasad,_ for respondents Nos. 1-3. 7 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 565 April 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered _1964_ by _**Devji**_ **@** _**De!**_ _**iji**_ _SMvji_ MuDHOLKAR, J.-This is an appeal by a certificate v. granted by the High Court of Patna under Art. 133(l)(a) _ofMaganlalR.Alhrana_ ## · · d · f · · · tdb th andOtl1'rs the C onstitut10n, an anses out o a smt mstttu e y e appellant against the respondents for the recovery of a sum _Mudhalkw,_ _J._ of Rs. 57,000/-. / The appellant holds permanent lease-hold rights over a colliery called the J ealgora Govindpur Colliery and had worked the colliery himself for some time. On January 31, 1949, he granted a sub-lease of the colliery to respondent No. 4 for a term of five years. At that time, 2803 tons of slack and rubble coal was lying in the colliery, and under the terms of a separate agreement executed by respondent Nf<l. 4, he was liable to pay for this coal at the rate of Rs. IO/- per ton after selling it. According to the appellant, this coal was sold by respondent No. 4, but he was not paid its price amounting to Rs. 28,030/-. Further, according to him, royalty and commission were due to him from the respondents in respect of the coal extracted by them from the colliery, as also Rs. 1.355/8/3 on account of a loan taken by them from him on February 17, 1949. The total claim was tentatively valued by him at Rs. 57,000/-. He joined respondents I, 2 and _5_ as defendants to the suit on the ground that these three persons along with respondent No. 4 formed a partnership firm known as Saurashtra Coal Concern which was joined in the suit as defendant No. _5_ and is now respondent No. 3 before us. The appyllant's case was that respondent No. 4 was a _benamidar_ for the partnership firm and, therefore, all the respondents were liable for the claim. Respondents 4 & _5,_ who are father and son, admitted the appellant's contention that the lease was obtained by respondent No. 4 on behalf of the partnership firm, but their contention was that they surrendered their lease-hold interest to the appellant on November 1, 1950, which was accepted by him, and that he was, therefore, not entitled to the claim in respect of royalty and commission from them for the period subsequent to November I, 1950. Further, according to them, the coal which was lying in the colliery was not actually weighed at the time of the agreement and the figure of 2803 tons was put down only as a rough estimate. According to them, on the date of the surrP,nder of the lease by them, there was a stock of more than 2803 tons of slack and rubble, etc., as well as soft coke, including the stock left by the appellant at the time of granting the sub-lease, because that could not be sold, and the appellant took possession of the entire stock lying in the colliery in November, 1950, after promising to adjust it towards the dues. They, therefore, # _19G4_ _Dctji_ @ _Dev1ji_ 566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964} disclaimed all liability to pay the price of 2803 tons of coal. They also denied having taken a loan from the appellant as alleged by him. _Skilji_ v. _Maganlal R. Atltrana_ No separate written statement was filed on behalf of _and Otltccs_ d N 3 b d 1 h respon ent o., ut respon ents & 2, w o were defen_Jtadltolka.r,_ _.J._ dants 2 & 4 in the trial court, denied the appellant's claim totally. According to them, respondent No. 4 took the sublease in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the other respondents. They averred that there was no privily of contract between them and the appellant and that, therefore. he was not entitled to a decree against them. The real facts, according to them. are that the respondent No. 4 took a sublease of the property from the appellant and gave a managing agency of the same to the Saurashtra Coal Concern of which the first respondent is the financing partner and the second respondent is the working partner. This concern was, they say, never a sub-lessee of the appellant. They also denied having anything to do with the stock of coal which the appellant is alleged to have sold to the 4th respondent. The trial court negatived the claim of the appellant in respect of the loan but decreed the claim for Rs. 28.030 /- as the price of coal and commission thereon against all the respondents. It further passed a preliminary decree for ascertaining the precise amount of royalty and commission which would be due to the appellant on account cif the sub-lease. The trial court further said that the minimum amount under this head would be Rs. 26,000 _I·._ Respondents 1 to 3 preferred an appeal to the High Court and the High Court accepted it. Thus, the position now is that the de;:rce of the trial court stands only against respondents 4 & 5, but has been set aside as against respondents 1 to 3. In view of the fact that both the courts below have found concurrently that the sub-lease in question was taken by respondent No. 4 alone, the only point urged by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad in support of the appeal is that respondent No. 4 being a partner in the Saurashtra Coal Concern, all the partners of the firm are liable under the lease inasmuch as the firm admittedly came into possession of the demised colliery. He points out that even according to respondents 1 to 3, they came into possession of the demised colliery immediately after the execution of the sub-lease, .and wants this Court to infer from this Jhat the partnership had already come into existence before the lease was . obtained. This, however, has never been the case of the 'i1ppellant in the courts below. The only case which he put forward was that the lease was taken by respondent No. 4 on behalf of all the respondents. In other words, his case was that respondent No. 4 was a _benamidar_ for the partnership firm. It is only 7 S.C.R. SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS 567 this case which the respondents had to meet, and in our _1964_ judgment, it would not be proper to permit the appellant to _JJe1Ji@_ _Deviji_ make out an entirely new case at this stage. Apart from that, _Shi•ji_ s. 22 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, clearly provide£ _ilfoyvn1"1R._ At~rana that in order to bind a firm by an act or an instrument exe- _and Olhcrs_ cuted by a partner on behalf of the firm. the act should be _Mwlholkar,_ _J._ done or the instrument should be executed in the name of the firm, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm. The sub-lease was not executed in the name of the firm, and it has been, found by the courts below that respondent No. 4 in obtaining the lease, did not _act_ 'On behalf of the firm. This in substance means :hat in obtaining the sub-lease, the parties to "it did not intend to bind the firm by that transaction. In support of his contention, Mr. Sarjoo Prasad has strongly relied upon the decision in _Karmali Abdulla Al/a-_ _rakia_ v. _Vora Karimji Jiwanji and others(')._ That was a case in which the question for consideration was whether one of the two partners is liable upon a _hundi_ drawn by one of the partners though the _hundi_ was not drawn in the name of the firm. The Privy Council following the decision in _Gowhwaite_ v. _Duck-_ _worth(')_ held that the other· partner would be liable though on the face of it the _hundi_ did not purport to be on behalf of the firm. That decision, however, does not help the appellant, because while the transaction in connection with which the _hundi_ was drawn, was admittedly a partnership transaction, in the case before us, it has been found that the transac tion, that is, the taking of the sub-lease, was not on behalf <if the partnership. The next case relied upon was _Mathura_ _Nath Choudhury_ v. _Sreejukta Bageswari Rani and others(')._ In that case, the question was whether the firm is liable for the money borrowed by one of its partners. The High Court pointed out that this is a question of fact and depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In that case also, it was found that the liability arose upon a contract entered into by one of the partners in connection with the partnership business. This case is, therefore, similar to the one just referred to above. The third case relied upon is _Pandiri_ _Veeranna_ v. _Grandi Veerabhadraswami(')._ In that q1se, the question was whether the fact tl;tat one of the several partners had authority to acknoWiedge liability to save limitation as against his partners, had to be established only by direct evidence or whether it could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The High Court held that it was (') ILR 39 Born. 261 at 274, etc. (') (1810) 12 East 421. (') 46 CLJ 362. (') ILR 41 Mad. 427 (Full Bench). ### 568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) _1964_ permissible to establish the existence of authority from the _Devji_ 1$ _Deviji_ surrounding circumstances. The case is thus of no assistance _Sh..,ji_ to the appellant. The next case relied upon was _Lakshmi-_ _M•,ganlal_ ~: _Athrana rhankar Devshankar_ v. _Motiram Vishnuram, etc.(')._ There, it _and_ _OU.era_ was held that where money borrowed by one partner in the _Mudholkar,_ _J._ name of the firm but without the authority of the co-partners has been applied to paying off the debts of the firm, the lender is entitled in equity to repayment by the firm of the amount which he can show to have been so applied and the same rule extends to money _bona_ _fide_ borrowed and applied for any legitimate purposes of the firm. It is difficult to appreciate how this case advances the present matter further, because here, the sub-lease has not been obtained in the name of the firm. The last case relied upon was _Gordhandas Ch/io-_ _ta/al_ _Seth_ v. _Mahant Shrj, Raghuvirdasji_ _Gangaramji(')_ That again is a case in which the firm was held to be bound by the debts contracted by the managing partner for the purposes of the factory run by the firm. All the partners were held liable, because the transaction was entered into by the managing partner for the purpose of the partnership business. This case is similar to the one just referred to above and is, therefore, of no assistance to the appellant. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad also referred to two other decisions in _Ram_ _Kinkar Banerjee and others_ v. _Satya Charan Srimani_ _and others(')_ and _Raja Sri Sri Jyoti Prasad Singh Deo Baha-_ _dur_ v. _Samuel Henry Seddon(')._ In these cases, the defendants sought to be made liable were assignees of a lease, but that is not the case here. Indeed, Mr. Sarjoo Prasad quite rightly conceded that respondents I to 3 cannot be made liable upon the ground that there was a privity of estate between them and the appellant. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that the decree should be limited only against respondents 4 and _5,_ and dismiss the appeal with costs. _Appeal dismissed._ (') 6 BLR 1106. ~~(')~~ ~~34~~ ~~BLR~~ ~~1137.~~ (') AIR 1939 P.C. 14. (') ILR 19 Pat. 433 at 459.