High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed.

Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd. v. Shri Rameshwar Dyal and Anr.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 353 of 1959
Neutral Citation:1960 SCR 806

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • P. B. Gajendragadkar
  • A. K. Sarkar
  • K. N. WANCHOO
Judgment Date
1960-11-22
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co., Ltd.

Respondents

  • Shri Rameshwar Dyal
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India
  • • S. N. Andley
  • • J. B. Dadachanji
  • • Rameshwar Nath
  • • P. L. Vokra

Counsels for Respondents

  • • G. S. Pathak
  • • R. L. Anand
  • • Janardan Sharma

Case Synopsis & Summary

This appeal concerns the legality of interim relief granted under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in an industrial dispute involving the Delhi cloth mill and an employee, Shri Rameshwar Dyal. Dyal, a dismissed workman, challenged his dismissal by filing under Section 33-A. The Industrial Tribunal granted interim relief directing that he be allowed to work in the mill and, if the management failed to reinstate him, his full wages be paid from the date he reported for duty. The High Court upheld this interim relief, and the mill obtained a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court. The central issue was whether the Tribunal could grant reinstatement or full wages as an interim measure before a merits hearing, and whether the amended provisions of the Act (effective March 10, 1957) altered the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to grant such relief. The Supreme Court held that the tribunal’s interim order reinstating the respondent or ordering full wages was manifestly erroneous in law because it pre-judged the merits and granted the very remedy the employee would obtain only if the dismissal were found unjust after a full inquiry. The Court noted that the 1957 amendments to ss. 33 and 33-A require expeditious disposal and caution against giving interim relief that amounts to final relief. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the interim orders were set aside, directing that proceedings under ss. 33 and 33-A be dealt with promptly on their merits.

Provisions of Law Cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 33, 33-AIndustrial Disputes (Amendment and Misc Provisions) Act No. XXXVI of 1956, s. 30Amendment to ss. 33 and 33-A (effective 10 March 1957)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Interim relief in industrial disputes should not amount to the whole relief the employee would obtain if the case succeeds.
  • In s. 33-A inquiries, the tribunal must decide on merits; interim orders cannot grant reinstatement or full wages before merits.
  • When actions are not connected to the dispute, employers may act with written permission, subject to one month’s wages if dismissal occurs; amendments in 1957 redefined the procedure.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain an application under s. 33-A after the amended provisions came into force, and that the interim order granting reinstatement or full wages was unwarranted as it prejudged the merits. They argue that the matter is to be decided on merits under s. 33-A, and that post‑amendment rules require the Tribunal to proceed expeditiously and not grant extraordinary interim relief. They contend that relief at the interim stage should be limited to preserving the status quo, with full relief available only if the employee succeeds after merits. They also urged that actions not connected to the dispute require express permission under the amended s. 33.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents urged that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the s. 33-A application and to grant interim relief to preserve the employee’s position pending adjudication. They maintained that the transfer and other acts were connected with the dispute and that interim reinstatement or full wages was appropriate to prevent prejudice while merits were decided, relying on precedents to justify interim protections.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' UnionA.L.R. 1959 S.C. 1342PositiveCited to support the proposition that interim relief should not amount to full relief prejudging the merits.
Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. All-India Punjab National Bank Employees' FederationA.L.R. 1960 S.C. 160PositiveCited to hold that, in s.33-A inquiries, relief cannot be granted merely for contravention of s.33; merits must be considered.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

_**November zz.**_ ### 590 StJPREME COURT REPORTS [1961) DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO., LTD. ##### _v._ SHRI RAMESHW AR DYAL AND ANR. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, and ##### K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.) _Industrial Dispute-Dismissed workman-Interim reinstate-_ _ment_ _by_ _Tribunal-If valid-The Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (I4_ _of r947)._ _s._ _33A._ One Sharda Singh, respondent, who was an employee of the appellant-mills was dismissed for disobeying the orders of the managing authority. He filed an application before the Industrial tribunal under s. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, i947, contesting his dismissal on various grounds, whereupon the tribunal passed an order to the effect that as an interim measure the respondent be permitted to work in _the appellant mills and if the management failed to take him back his full wages be paid from the date he reported for duty. The appellant mills then filed a Writ Petition before the High Court contesting the interim order of the Tribunal and the High Court held that the interim relief granted to the respondent was justified. On appeal by a certificate of the High Court, _Held,_ that the interim order passed by the tribunal reinstating the respondent was erroneous. Such an interim relief could not be given by the Tribunal as it would amount to prejudging the respondents' case and granting him tbe whole relief at the outset without deciding the legality of his dismissal after hearing the appellant employer. _The Management, Hotel Imperial_ _and-Ors._ v. _Hotel Workers'_ _Union,_ A.LR. 1959 S. C. 1342, and _Punjab National Bank_ v. _All-_ _India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation,_ A.LR. 1960 S. C. 160, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 353 of 1959. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 22, 1958, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Writ No. 257-D of 1957. ##### _M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. N._ #### Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. ##### V okra, for the A ppella.nt. _G._ _S. Pathak, R. L. Anand_ and _Janardan Sharma,_ for the respondent No. 2. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 591 ##### 1960. November 22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by _Ddhi_ _Cloth_ & ##### WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate General Mills granted by the Punjab High Court. Sharda Singh Co., ltd. (hereinafter called .the respondent) was in the service Shri R:·meshwar of the appellant-mills. On August 28, 1956, the res- Dyal & Another pondent was transferred from the night shift to the ##### day shift in accordance with par,a. 9 of the Standing w an&hoo J. Orders governing the workmen in the appellant-mills. ##### At that time an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant-mills and their workmen. The ##### transfer was to take effect from August 30, 1956; but the respondent failed to report for work in the day shift and was marked absent. On September 1, 1956, ##### he submitted an app.lication to the General Manager to the effect that he had reported for duty on August ##### 30, at 10-30 p.m. and had worked during the whole night, but had not been marked present. He had a.gain gone to the mills on the night of August 31, but was not allowed to work on the ground that he had ##### been transferred to the day shift. He complained that he had been dealt with arbitrarily in order to harass ##### him. Though he said that he had no objection to carrying out the orders, he requested the manager to intervene and save him from the high-handed action taken against hi~, adding that the mills would be res. ponsible for his wages for the days he was not allowed ##### to work. On September 4, 1956, he made an application to the industrial tribunal, where the previous dispute 4 was pending, under s. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes ##### Act, No. XIV of 1947, (hereinafter called the Act) and complained that he had been transferred without any ##### rhyme or reason from one shift to another and that this amounted to alteration in the conditions of his service, which was prejudicial and detrimental to his interest. As . this alteration was made against the ##### provisions of s. 33 of the Act, he prayed for nece8'8ary relief from the tribunal under s. 33-A. On Septemb~r ##### 5; 1956-, the General Manager replied to the letter of September 1, and told the respondent that his transfer from one shift to the other had been ordered on # • ##### 592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] ##### '9 [60 ] August 28, and he had been told to report for work in ##### D•lhi Cloth & the day shift from August 30; but instead of obeying General Mill• the order which was made in the normal course and _co .._ _Ltd._ report for work as directed he had deliberately disv. obeyed the order and reported for work on August 30 ##### Sh•i Ram.,hwa• in the night shift. He was then ordered to leave and Dyal & Another report for work in the day shift. He however did not _wanchoo_ _1._ even then report for work in the day shift and absent##### ed himself intentionally/ and thus disobeyed the order of transfer. The General Manager therefore called ## upon the respondent w show cause why disciplinary ##### action should not be taken against him for wilfully rJ:)fusing to obey the lawful orders of the departmental ##### officers and he was asked to submit his explanation within 48 hours. The respondent submitted his ex planation on September 7, 1956: ##### Soon after it appears the appellant-mills received notice of the application under s. 33-A and they sub- mitted a reply of it on October 5, 1956. Their case was that transfer from one shift to another was with##### in the power of the management and could not be said to be an alteration in the_ terms and conditions of service to the prejudice of the workman and therefore ##### the complaint . under s. 33-A was not maintainable. The appellant-mills also pointed out ~that a domestic inquiry was being held into the subsequent conduct of ##### the respondent and prayed that proceedings in the application under s. 33-A should be stayed till the domestic inquiry was concluded. No action seems to have been taken on this complaint under s. 33-A, for which the appellant-mills might be partly responsible ##### as they had prayed for stay of those proceedings. However, the domestic inquiry against the respondent continued and on February 25, 1957, the inquiry officer reported that the charge of misconduct was. proved. Thereupon the General Manager passed an order ##### on March 5, 1957, that in view of the serious miscon- duct of the respondent and looking .into his pa.st records, he should be dismissed; but as an industrial dispute was pending then, the General Manager order ##### ed that the permission of the industrial tribunal should be ta.ken before the order of dismissal was ##### 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 593 passed and an application should be made for seeking _1_ _960_ ##### such permission under s. 33 of the Act. Delhi Cloth .s. In the meantime, a notification was issued on March General Mills 1, 1957, by which 10th March, 1957, was fixed for the co., Ltd. coming into force of certain provisions of the Central v. Act, No. XXXVI of 1956, by which SS. 33 and 33-A Shri Rameshwar were amended. The amendment made a substantial _Dyal_ .s. _Another_ change ins. 33 and this change came into effect from _Wanchvo_ _J._ March 10, 1957. The change was tha.t the total ban on the employer against altering any condition of ser- ##### vice to the prejudice of workmen and against any action for misconduct was modified. The amended ##### section provided that where an employer intended to take action in regard to any matter connected with the dispute or in regard to any misconduct connected with ##### the dispute, he could only do so with the e:qiress permission in writing of the authority before which the dispute was pending; but where the matter in regard ##### to which the employer wanted to take action in accor~ dance with the Standing Orders applicable to a wo;rk" ##### man was not connected with the dispute or the mis- conduct for which action was proposed to be taken was not connected with the dispute, the employer could ##### take such action as he thought proper, subject only to this that in case of discharge or dismissal' one month's . wages should l>e paid and an application should be ma.de to the tribunal before which, the dispute was pending for approval of the action· taken against ·the ##### employee by· the employer. In view of this change in the law, the appellant-mills thought that as the misconduct of the respondent in the present ca.se wa.s ##### not connected with the dispute then pending adjudica- tion; they were entitled to dismiss him after paying him one month's wages and applying for approval of the action taken by them. Consequently, no applica tion was ma.de to the tribunal for permission in accordance with the order of the Genera.I Ma.na.ger of March 5, 1957, already referred to. Later, on April _2,_ 1957, ##### an order of dismissal · was passed by the General Ma.na.ger after tendering one month's wages to the ##### respondent and a.n application was made to the autho- rity concerned'for approval of the.action taken against the respondent. ' ##### 594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] _r96o_ Thereupon the respondent filed another application ##### Delhi Cloth ci;. under s. 33-A of the Act on April 9, 1957, in which he General Mills complained that the appellant-mills had terminated co., Ltd. his services without the express permission of the v. tribunal and that this was a contravention of the provi##### Shri Rameshwar sions of s. 33 of the Act; he therefore prayed for _Dyal_ ci;. _Another_ necessary relief. On April 18, 1957, an interim order ##### Wanchoo J. was passed by the tribunal on this application by which as a measure of interim relief, the appellant - mills were ordered to permit the respondent to work ##### with effect from April 19 and the respondent was #### directed to report for duty. It was also ordered that ##### if the management failed to take the respondent back, the respondent would be paid his full wages with effect from April 19 after he had reported for duty. On May 6, 1957, however, the application dated April 9, 1957, was dismissed as defective and therefore the interim order of April 18 also came to an end. On the same day (namely, May 6, 1957), the respondent made another application under s. 33-A in which he remov##### ed the defects and again complained that his dismissal on April 2, 1957, without the express previous ##### permission of . the tribunal was against s. 33 and prayed for proper relief. #### It is this application which is pending at present and has not been disposed of, though more than three #### years have gone by. It is also not clear what has happened to the first application of September 4, 1956, ##### in which the respondent complained that his conditions of service had been altered to his prejudice by his transfer from one shift to another. Applications under s. 33 and s. 33.A of the Act should be disposed ##### of quickly and it is a matter of regret that this matter is pending for over three years, though the appellant. ##### mills must also share the blame for this state of affairs. However, the a.ppellant-mil!&ga.ve a. reply on ##### May 14, 1957, to the la.st application under s. 33-A and objected that there was no breach of s. 33 of the Act, their case being that the a.mended s. 33 applied ##### to the order of dismissal passed on April 2, 1957. Further, on the merits, the appellant-mills' case was tha;t the dismissal was in . the circumstances justified. ##### 2. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS .595 ·The matter came up before the tribunal on May 16, x960 1957. On this date, the tribunal again passed an interim order, which was to the effect that as a. mea- _Delhi Cloth_ c!>o _General_ _Mills_ sure of interim relief, the respondent ·should be per- _co.,_ _Ltd._ mitted to work from May 17 and the respondent was v. ### directed to report for duty. It was further prdered Shri Ramsshwar ##### that in case the management failed to take him back, Dyal c!>o Another they would pay him his full wages with effect from the date he reported .1: .LOr duty. Wanchoo ]. Thereupon the appellant-mills filed a writ petition before the High Court. Their main contention before ##### the High Court was two-fold. In the first place it was urged that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to enter##### tain an application under s. 33-A of the Act in the circumstances of this case after the a.mended sections 33 and 33-A came into force from March 10, 1957. In the alternative it was contended that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass an interim order of reinstate ment or in lieu thereof payment of full wages to the respondent even before considering the questions raised in the application under s. 33-A on the merits. The High ·Court held on the first point that in view of s. 30 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Mis##### cellaneous Provisions) Act, No. XXXVI of 1956, the present case would be governed by s. 33 as it was before the am~mdment and therefore the tribunal would have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint ##### dated May 6, 1957, under s. 33-A of the Act. On the second point, the High Court held that the order of the tribunal granting interim relief was within its ##### jurisdiction and was justified. In consequence, the writ petition was dismissed. Thereupon the appellant-mills applied and was granted a certificate by the ##### High Court tO appeal to this Court; and that is how the matter has come up before us. The ea.me two points which were raised in the High ##### Court have been urged before us. We a.re of opinion that it is not necessary in the present case to decide the first point because we have come to the conclusion that the interim order of May 16, 1957, is manifestly erroneous in law and cannot be supported. Apa.rt from the question whether the tribunal had jurisdiction #### 596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] ##### 1960 to pass an interim order like this without making an interim award, (a point which was considered and _Delhi Cloth_ & left open by this Court in _The Management of Hotel_ _**General Mills**_ _I_ _H_ _k_, _U_ _mperial_ v. _otel_ _War_ _ers_ _nion_ (')),we are of opinion ##### Co.,v~td. that where the tribunal is dealing with an application _Shri_ _Rameshwar_ under s. 33-A of the Act and the question before it is _Dyal_ & _Another_ whether an order of dismissal is against the provisions ##### of s. 33 it would be wrong in law for the tribunal to _Wanchoo_ _f._ grant reinstatement or full wages in case the employer did not take the workman back in its service as an ### interim measure. It is clear that in case of a complaint under s. 33-A based on dismissal against the provi##### sions of s. 33, the final order which the tribunal can pass in case it is in favour of the workman, would be ##### for reinstatement. That final order would be passed only if the employer fails to justify the dismissal before ##### the tr~bunal, either by showing that proper domestic inquiry was held which established the misconduct or in case no domestic inquiry was held by producing ##### evidence before the tribunal to justify the dismissal: See _Punjab National Bank Ltd._ v. _All-India Punjab_ _National Bank Employees' Federation('),_ where it was ##### held that in an inquiry under s. 33-A, the employee would not succeed in obtaining an order of reinstate- ment merely by proving contravention of s. 33 by the employer. After such contravention is proved it would still be open to the employer to justify the im- pugned dismissal on the merits. That is a part of the dispute which the tribunal has to consider because the complaint made by the employee is to be treated as an ##### industrial dispute and all the relevant aspects of the said dispute fall to be considered under s. 33-A. Therefore, when a tribunal is considering a com##### plaint under s. 33-A and it has fihally to decide whether an employee should be reinstated or not, it is not open to the "tribunal to order reinstate- ment as an interim relief, for that would be giving the workman the very relief which he could get ### only if on a trial of the complaint the employer ##### failed to justify the order of dismissal. The inte- rim relief ordered in this case was that the work <•> [•96<>1 - s.c.R. •76· (2) [•96<>] 1 S.C.R. 8o6, 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 597 man should be permitted to work: in other words he _I9_ _[60 ]_ was ordered to be reinstated; in the alternative it was _Delhi Cloth_ _and_ ordered that if the management did not take him back _General_ _Mills_ ##### they should pay him his full wages. We are of Co., Ltd. opinion that such an order cannot be passed in law as . v. an interim relief, for that would amount to giving the _Shri_ _Rameshwar_ respondent at the outset the relief to which he would _Dyal_ ~nother be entitled only if the employer failed in the proceed- _w_ _anchoo_ _J._ ings under s. 33-A., As was pointed out in _Hotel_ _Imperial's_ case( [1] }, ordinarily, interim relief should not be the whole relief that the workmen would get if they succeeded finally. The order therefore of the tribunal in this case allowing reinstatement as an interim relief or in lieu thereof payment of full wages is manifestly erroneous and must therefore be set aside. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as well as of the tribunal dated May 16, 1957, granting interim relief. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted to us ##### that we should grant some interim relief in case we came to the conclusion that the order of the tribunal ##### should be set aside. In the circumstances of this case we do not think that interim relief to the respondent is justified hereafter. As we have pointed above, applications under ss. 33 and 33-A should be dealt with ##### expeditiously. We trust that the applications dated September 4, 1956, which appears to have been overlooked and of May 6, 1957, will now be dealt with expeditiously and finally disposed of by the tribunal, . ##### as all applications under s. 33-A should be. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs. _Appeal allowed._ (1) (1960] 1 S.C.R. 47,6. 76