Deepak S.P. v. Chancellor, University of Kerala and University of Kerala; Dr. Jayaprakash (Impleaded)

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT:** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE** **FRIDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2013/24TH KARTHIKA, 1935** ## **WP(C).No. 28829 of 2012 (C)** **----------------------------------------** **PETITIONER:** ## **-------------------** **DEEPAK .S.P, T.C. NO.30/1240, ROSE COTTAGE, PALLIMUKKU, PETTAH, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.** **BY SRI.P.RAVINDRAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE, ADVS.SRI.V.G.ARUN, SRI.NAGARAJ NARAYANAN, SRI.PRATHAP PILLAI.** **RESPONDENTS:** **-----------------------** **1. THE CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF KERALA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 005.** **2. UNIVERSITY OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 005.** ***ADDL. R.3. IMPLEADED:** ## **3. DR.JAYAPRAKASH,** **`JALARAG', T.C.26/2156, STATUE ROAD, TRIVANDRUM, PIN -695 001.** ***ADDL. R3 IS IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 23.07.2013 IN I.A.NO.9618/2013.** **R1 BY ADVOCATE GENERAL MR. K.P. DANDAPANI, GOVERNMENT PLEADER MR. P. FAZIL, R2 BY SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM,S.C, ADDL.R3 BY ADVS. SRI.P.K.IBRAHIM, SMT.K.P.AMBIKA, SMT. A.A.SHIBI.** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 14-08-2013, ALONG WITH W.P.(C).NOS. 9353/2013 & 13928/2013, THE COURT ON 15-11-2013 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **Prv.** **W.P.(C).NO.28829/2012-C:** ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:** - **EXT.P1: TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION DTD. 20/12/2010.** - **EXT.P2: TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION DTD. 23/7/2012.** - **EXT.P3: TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER DTD. 20/10/2012.** - **EXT.P4: TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNOR DTD. 26/11/2012.** - **EXT.P5: TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION DTD. 27/11/2012.** - **EXT.P6: TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE VICE CHANCELLOR DTD 10/9/2012.** - **EXT.P.7: TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION DTD. 17/12/2012.** - **EXT.P.8: TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DTD. 27/10/2012.** - **EXT.P.8.(A): TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DTD. 28/11/2012.** - **EXT.P.8.(B): TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DTD. 20/10/2012.** - **EXT.P.8.(C): TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DTD. 21/10/2012.** - **EXT.P.8.(D): TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DTD. 21/12/2012.** - **EXT.P.8.(E): TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DTD. 20/11/2012.** ## **RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:** - **EXT.R1.(A): TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO.GS3-1287/10 DTD. 18/12/2010 ISSUED BY SECRETARY TO GOVERNOR TO THE VICE CHANCELLOR OF KERALA UNIVERSITY INTIMATING THE NOMINATION OF PETITIONER AND OTHERS.** **EXT.R2.(A): TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION NO.ELECTION/VC/1/2012 DTD. 28/12/2012 ISSUED BY THE UNIVERSITY.** ## **//TRUE COPY//** **P.S. TO JUDGE.** **Prv.** A.M.SHAFFIQUE, J. ---------------------------------------------------- W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 -M --------------------------------------------------Dated this the 15[th] November,2013 **J U D G M E N T** These writ petitions are filed by a common petitioner and since the issues involved are connected matters, they are decided together. 2. W.P.(C) No. 28829/2012 is filed challenging Exts.P4 and P5, for a declaration that a person nominated to the Senate of the Kerala University prior to the date of commencement of the University Laws (Amending Act), 2012, is not holding the post during the pleasure of the Chancellor and he cannot be removed from office invoking proviso to sub- section 3 of Section 18 of the Kerala University Act. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Petitioner further seeks for a declaration that there is no order by the Chancellor terminating his membership in the Syndicate of the Kerala University and that he continues 2 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 to be a member of the Syndicate. Ext.P4 dated 26.11.2012 is a communication issued by the Secretary to Government to the Vice Chancellor of the University intimating him that in exercise of the powers under 4[th] proviso of sub- section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, the Chancellor has ordered to withdraw the nomination of the petitioner as the representative of the lawyers to the Senate. Ext.P5 dated 27.11.2012 is a notification issued by the University stating that the petitioner had ceased to be a member of the Senate of University of Kerala with immediate effect. 3. The facts involved in the case would show that the petitioner, who is a practising lawyer was nominated by the Chancellor to the Senate as per Ext.P1 , exercising the power under Section 17(2) of the Act. According to the petitioner by virtue of Section 18 of the Act a member nominated to the Senate is entitled to continue till reconstitution of the Senate and the term of office is four 3 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 years, thereby he is entitled to continue till 19.12.2014. As per Ordinance No. 58/11, the Act was amended as per Ext.P2 notification incorporating 4[th] proviso to Section 18 (3) indicating that “Provided also that the members in the Senate nominated by the Chancellor or the Government under the heading “ Other members “ shall hold their office during the pleasure of the Chancellor or the Government, as the case may be.“ The amended provision has been given retrospective effect from 16.8.2011. Petitioner therefore contends that since his nomination was prior to 16.8.2011 his tenure as a member of the Senate will continue till the expiry of the term for which he was nominated. That apart, it is contended that since his nomination is for four years, he is entitled to continue for the entire period which cannot be withdrawn by the Chancellor and the Doctrine of Pleasure does not apply to the factual situation in the case. It is further contended that 4 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 the power of termination of membership to the Syndicate has to be exercised in the manner provided by the enabling provision. Further there is no order of the Chancellor terminating the petitioner's membership. In so far there is no order under Section 18(3) of the Act, the petitioner is entitled for the reliefs sought for. 4. Counter affidavit is filed by the first respondent contending that in view of amendment to Section 18 of the Act the nominated members to the Senate shall hold the office during the pleasure of the Chancellor or the Government as the case may be and therefore the petitioner's nomination having been withdrawn, he is not entitled to continue in office. The said power had been invoked by the Chancellor after the amendment and therefore petitioner cannot contend that the 4[th] proviso to Section 18(3) cannot be invoked. It is further indicated that the Chancellor has taken the decision to withdraw the W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 5 nomination of the petitioner for valid and sustainable reasons and on consideration of all relevant materials and after due application of mind. 5. Counter affidavit is filed by the 2[nd] respondent inter alia contending that in so far as Ext.P4 is a communication issued by the Chancellor signed on his behalf exercising the power under sub-section (3) of section 18 of the Act, the nomination of the petitioner stood withdrawn and he ceased to be a member of the Senate. 6. W.P.(C) No. 9353/2013 is filed challenging Ext.P6, and for a direction to the respondents not to take any steps pursuant to Ext.P4 and P6. Petitioner seeks a further declaration that the election to the committee constituted under S. 10(1) of the Act, cannot be declared invoking Statutes 33 and 41. Ext.P4 is a notification dated 17.12.2012 issued by the University for electing a new member of the Senate to fill up the vacancy of a 6 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 representative in the Committee to be constituted under S. 10(1) of the Act, which had arisen consequent to withdrawal of membership of the petitioner. The election was to be held on 1.1.2013 and to be declared on the same day. Ext.P6 is a notification issued by the University on 28.12.2012 confirming that the 3rd respondent herein has been duly elected as the representative of the Senate to be constituted for recommending a person for appointment as Vice Chancellor under S. 10(1) of the Act. 7. According to the petitioner he was elected as a member of the Committee under section 10(1) of the Act by virtue of Ext.P3, he being a member of the Senate. Ext.P3 is dated 10.9.2012. Thereafter Ext.P4 dated 17.12.2012 was issued. In the meantime petitioner got information that no formal order has been issued by the Chancellor withdrawing the nomination of the petitioner. It is his contention that in view of the interim order passed by this 7 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 Court on 31.12.2012 as Ext.P5, no election could have been held on 1.1.2013. But by Ext.P6 the results were declared on 28.12.2012. It is the contention of the petitioner that there is no provision enabling the Registrar or Vice Chancellor to declare the results of the election before the actual date fixed for the same. Reference is made to Statute 3 of Kerala University First Statutes, 1977, in order to contend that since an election to a committee constituted under S. 10(1) is regulated by Statute 3 of Kerala University First Statute 1977, results of the election to the Committee cannot be declared other than on the date stipulated for the conduct of election. Petitioner also refers to Statutes 33 and 41 to indicate that the results are required to be published. 8. Counter affidavit is filed by first respondent inter alia stating that in the case of declaration of election of the 3[rd] respondent, it was observed that the procedure W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 8 prescribed under Statute 3 of Chapter 1 of the Kerala University First Statutes, 1977 is not complied with, whereas election was conducted as per the procedure prescribed under the Kerala University (Conduct of Elections to Various Authorities or Bodies) First Statute, 1974. Therefore the election of the 3[rd] respondent as representative of the Senate to be nominated to the Committee to be constituted under S. 10(1) of the Kerala University Act, being not in accordance with the procedure prescribed, on the recommendation of the Syndicate of the University and on the basis of the legal opinion obtained, a decision was taken to conduct fresh election, to elect a person as representative of the Selection Committee in accordance with the prescribed rules. Hence it is submitted that Ext.P4 election notification and Ext P6 notification are no more in force. W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 9 9. W.P.(C) No. 13928/2013 is filed challenging Ext.P10 and P11 and further seeking a declaration to cancel the election held to a committee under Section 10 (1) of the Act. 10. The facts of this case would disclose that a fresh notification as per Ext.P10 had been issued on 23.5.2013 to conduct a fresh election for electing a new representative of the Senate, to fill up the vacancies of representatives in the Committee. Election was to be held on 6.6.2013. Ext.P11 is the notification dated 24.5.2013. 11. Counter affidavit is filed by the 2[nd] respondent inter alia contending that Ext.P10 and P11 will not affect the interest of the petitioner in any manner. The respondent also produced Ext. R2(a) issued by the Secretary to Government addressed to the Vice Chancellor of the University requesting to withdraw the membership of the petitioner from the Senate and to intimate another W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** name to be included in the selection committee. Ext.R2(b) is the notification for election. 12. Counter affidavit is filed by the 1[st] respondent supporting the stand taken by the University with reference to Exts. Ext.P10 and P11. 13. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri. P Ravindran appearing on behalf of the petitioner, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the Chancellor, Sri. George Poonthottam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the University and the learned Government Pleader Sri. P.Fazil. 14. Having regard to the nature of the contentions urged, the question to be considered is whether the petitioner is entitled to continue as a member of the Senate and the Committee constituted for appointing Vice Chancellor for a period of four years from the date of nomination. W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** 15. It is argued that the Chancellor is only a statutory authority under the Act and the Statutes framed thereunder as held by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in **Joti Prasad** v. **Kalka Prasad** (AIR 1962 Allahabad 128), another Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in **M. Kiran Babu** v. **Govt. of A.P. Road Transport** (AIR 1986 A.P 275, a Division Bench of this Court in **Gopalakrishnan** v. **Chancellor, University of Kerala** (1990 (1) KLT 681). I do not think that this proposition can be disputed. 16. The question therefore involved is threefold. When Ordinance 58 of 2011 is applicable only from 16.8.2011, whether the said provision can have any application to the petitioner who was nominated to the Senate even before the said date. Secondly, whether the “Doctrine of Pleasure” is applicable to Chancellor of University and it being a statutory authority, if at all the W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** petitioner is to be removed from his position as a member of the Senate, whether the procedure prescribed under the Act or the Statutes framed thereunder has been followed and thirdly whether the action of the University in conducting an election to a committee to be constituted for appointing Vice Chancellor without legally removing the petitioner from the said post is illegal. 17. Learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in **B.P. Singhal** v. **Union of India** (2010) 6 SCC 331) and specifically referred to paragraph 83 which reads as under: ## **83.** We summarise our conclusions as under: ( _i_ ) Under Article 156(1), the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President. Therefore, the President can remove the Governor from office at any time without assigning any reason and without giving any opportunity to show cause. ( _ii_ ) Though no reason need be assigned for discontinuance of the pleasure resulting in removal, the W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 13 power under Article 156(1) cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner. The power will have to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances for valid and compelling reasons. The compelling reasons are not restricted to those enumerated by the petitioner (that is physical/mental disability, corruption and behaviour unbecoming of a Governor) but are of a wider amplitude. What would be compelling reasons would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. ( _iii_ ) A Governor cannot be removed on the ground that he is out of sync with the policies and ideologies of the Union Government or the party in power at the Centre. Nor can he be removed on the ground that the Union Government has lost confidence in him. It follows therefore that change in government at the Centre is not a ground for removal of Governors holding office to make way for others favoured by the new Government. (iv)As there is no need to assign reasons, any removal as a consequence of withdrawal of the pleasure will be assumed to be valid and will be open to only a limited judicial review. If the aggrieved person is able to demonstrate prima facie that his removal was either arbitrary, mala fide, capricious or whimsical, the Court will call upon the Union Government to 14 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 disclose to the Court, the material upon which the President had taken the decision to withdraw the pleasure. If the Union Government does not disclose any reason, or if the reasons disclosed are found to be irrelevant, arbitrary, whimsical, or mala fide, the Court will interfere. However, the court will not interfere merely on the ground that a different view is possible or that the material or reasons are insufficient”. ## 18. Another judgment relied upon is **Brij Mohan Lal** v. **Union of India** (2012) 6 SCC 502. Reliance is placed on paragraphs 90, 91 and 96 which reads as under: “ **90.** The doctrine of pleasure, under our Constitution, deals with three different categories of posts. First, offices which are held during the pleasure of the President or Governor, as the case may be; second, offices held during the pleasure of the President or Governor but subject to some restrictions against removal; and third, offices held for a specified term but with immunity against removal, except by impeachment. The third category of posts is not 15 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 subject to the doctrine of pleasure. Having regard to the constitutional scheme, it is not possible to extend the type of protection against removal granted to one category of officers, to another category. In India, contrary to the law in England, even the doctrine of pleasure has limitations and restrictions. **91.** It is believed that, where the rule of law prevails, there can be nothing like unfettered discretion or unaccountable action. The degree of reasoning required in support of the decision may vary. The degree of scrutiny during judicial review may vary. But the need for reasoning exists. As a result, when the Constitution of India provides that some offices will be held during the pleasure of the President, without any express limitations or restrictions, this power should, however, necessarily be read as being subject to the fundamentals of constitutionalism. (Refer _B.P. Singhal_ v. _Union of India._ xx xx xx **96.** It is a settled principle of law that matters relating to framing and implementation of policy primarily fall in W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 16 the domain of the Government. It is an established requirement of good governance that the Government should frame policies which are fair and beneficial to the public at large. The Government enjoys freedom in relation to framing of policies. It is for the Government to adopt any particular policy as it may deem fit and proper and the law gives it liberty and freedom in framing the same. Normally, the courts would decline to exercise the power of judicial review in relation to such matters. But this general rule is not free from exceptions. The courts have repeatedly taken the view that they would not refuse to adjudicate upon policy matters if the policy decisions are arbitrary, capricious or mala fide”. 19. On the other hand, learned counsel for the University relied upon the judgment in **Om Narain Agarwal** v. **Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur** (1993) 2 SCC 242. Reference is made to para 13 which reads as under: **13.** Thereafter Article 15(3) provides that “nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children”. This means that in case any special provision is made for women, the same would not be violative on the ground of sex which is prohibited under clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15 of the Constitution. Thus, the special provision W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 17 contained for nominating one or two women members as the case may be provided in Section 9 of the Act would be protected from challenge under clause (3) of Article 15 of the Constitution. It may also be worthwhile to note that the provision of pleasure doctrine incorporated by adding the fourth proviso does not, in any manner, take away the right of representation of women members in the Board, but it only permits the State Government to keep the nominated women members of its own choice. The High Court in _Dr Rama Mishra case_ took a wrong view in holding that the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act was violative of Article 15 (3) of the Constitution under an erroneous impression that this provision in any manner curtailed the representation of women members in the Board. We are not impressed with the reasoning given by the High Court that the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act in any manner deprived the fundamental right of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is well established that the right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution applies to equals and not to unequals. The nominated members of the Board fall in a different class and cannot claim equality with the elected members. We are also not impressed with the argument that there would be a constant fear of W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 ## 18 removal at the will of the State Government and is bound to demoralise the nominated members in the discharge of their duties as a member in the Board. We do not find any justification for drawing such an inference, inasmuch as, such contingency usually arises only with the change of ruling party in the Government. Even the highest functionaries in the Government like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney-General and the Advocate-General discharge their duties efficiently, though removable at the pleasure of the competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to become demoralised or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge their functions in a proper manner during the period they remain in the office”. 20. Further reference is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in **East Coast Railway** v. **Mahadev Appa Rao** ( 2010) 7 SCC 678). Reference is made to para 23 and 30 which reads as under: **23.** Arbitrariness in the making of an order by an authority can manifest itself in different forms. Nonapplication of mind by the authority making the order 19 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 is only one of them. Every order passed by a public authority must disclose due and proper application of mind by the person making the order. This may be evident from the order itself or the record contemporaneously maintained. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind by the authority making the order. And disclosure is best done by recording the reasons that led the authority to pass the order in question. Absence of reasons either in the order passed by the authority or in the record contemporaneously maintained is clearly suggestive of the order being arbitrary hence legally unsustainable. ## **xx xx** **“30.** We may hasten to add that while application of mind to the material available to the competent authority is an essential prerequisite for the making of a valid order, that requirement should not be confused with the sufficiency of such material to support any such order. Whether or not the material placed before the competent authority was in the instant case sufficient to justify the decision taken by it, is not in issue before us. That aspect may have assumed importance only if the competent authority was shown to have applied its mind to whatever material was available to it before cancelling 20 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 the examination. Since application of mind as a threshold requirement for a valid order is conspicuous by its absence, the question whether the decision was reasonable having regard to the material before the authority is rendered academic. Sufficiency or otherwise of the material and so also its admissibility to support a decision the validity whereof is being judicially reviewed may even otherwise depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast rule can be formulated in that regard nor do we propose to do so in this case”. 21. The first question is regarding the effect of the University Laws (Amendment Act 2012 (herein after referred to as the Amendment Act).' The main contention of the petitioner is that the Amendment Act can have application only from 16.8.2011, the date on which it is is supposed to have effect. It is true that the petitioner was nominated by virtue of Ext.P1 notification in writ petition No. 28829/12 on 18.12.2010. The 4[th] proviso to Section 18(3) has come into force on 16.8.2011. Section 18 relates 21 W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 to the reconstitution of the Senate. The provision indicates that the Senate shall be reconstituted every four years. Sub section (3) of section 18 indicates that every member of the Senate, other than ex- officio and life-members shall subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes, hold office until the next reconstitution of the Senate. First proviso indicates that no member nominated or elected in his capacity as a member of a particular Body or as the holder of a particular office shall hold office for a longer period than three months after he has ceased to be such member of that electorate. The second proviso relates to an elected or nominated member of the Senate who is appointed temporarily to any office. The third proviso relates to elected members under S. 17. By the Amendment Act the 4[th] proviso is incorporated effective from 16.8.2011 indicating that the members of the Senate nominated by the Chancellor under the heading other W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** members shall hold their office during the pleasure of the Chancellor. Definitely this provision will apply after 16.8.2011, the argument of the petitioner is that since he was nominated prior to 16.8.2011 the 4[th] proviso has no application. I do not think so. The 4[th] proviso applies to all “members of the Senate nominated by the Chancellor”. It cannot be given a restrictive meaning and does not anywhere indicate that it applies only for members of the Senate who are nominated by the Chancellor subsequent to 16.8.2011. It only means that the Chancellor could exercise the power only from 16.8.2011. Therefore if the Chancellor has nominated the petitioner as a member of the Senate, the Chancellor is entitled to withdraw the said nomination by exercising the power under the 4[th] proviso to S. 18(3) of the Act. 22. The next question is whether the Chancellor had passed any such order. The file in this connection had been W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** produced. I have perused the files as well. From the files it is evident to note that the detailed report is seen prepared by the Secretary and the Chancellor has indicated in the said report as “I agree” . When the Chancellor agrees to a report submitted by the Secretary which apparently indicates the cancellation of the nomination of the petitioner, it may not be possible for this Court to come to a conclusion that there was no order at all. That apart, by issuing Ext. P3 the Chancellor's office had informed the Vice Chancelloor of the University that the Chancellor has ordered to withdraw the nomination of the petitioner. This is sufficient indication of the fact that the Chancellor had indeed treated the endorsement made in the report as a valid order withdrawing the nomination of the petitioner. Hence I am inclined to take such a view. 23. One of the arguments raised by the learned counsel for petitioner is with reference to the “Doctrine W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** of Pleasure” to be exercised by the Chancellor. Reference is made to para 13 in Deepak's case. It is argued that “Doctrine of Pleasure” is not a license to act with unfettered discretion or to act arbitrarily, whimsically or capriciously. The argument is that there is no application of mind while withdrawing the nomination of the petitioner and the decision making process was arbitrary and whimsical. As already stated the file in this connection reveals a detailed report from the Secretary indicating the reason for withdrawing the nomination of the petitioner. Once it is accepted by the Chancellor and a formal order in that regard had been issued by the Secretary of the Vice Chancellor, I am of the view that there is no reason to state that the Chancellor had committed any illegality in the process. 24. The next question is regarding the re-election to the committee under S. 10(1) of the Act. As stated by the W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** Government, the notification issued as Exts. P4 and P6 in W.P.(C) No. 9353/2013 had already been withdrawn and a subsequent notification is seen issued as Exts. P10 and P11 in W.P.(C) No. 13928/2013. It is submitted by the learned standing counsel appearing for the University that so far no action had been taken in that regard. In that view of the matter, I do not want to express any opinion in respect of the said election. 25. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has ceased to be a member of the Senate and consequently the member of the committee he cannot have any locus standi to challenge the election of the 3[rd] respondent in W.P.(C) No. 9353/2013. The same is the position with reference to W.P.(C) No. 13928/2013. W.P.(C) Nos. 28829 of 2012 - C, 9353 of 2013 - T & 13928 of 2013 26 In the result the petitioner is not entitled for any relief in the writ petitions and hence the writ petitions are dismissed. Sd/- **A.M.SHAFFIQUE, JUDGE** rka /true copy/