Darly Shajan v. Shajan Thomas and Others
Case Details & Bench
- Court
- High Court of Kerala
- Hon'ble Judges
- A.M. Shaffique
- Judgment Date
- 2016-07-01
- Court Decision / Holding
- There is no merit in the petition and the writ petition is dismissed. The court held that the SARFAESI Act provides a special mechanism for possession by the secured creditor and that a DV Act order cannot override the bank’s statutory right to take possession, though it acknowledged relevant tenant-protection jurisprudence.
- Final Disposition
- Dismissed
Parties to the Case
Appellants / Petitioners
- Darly Shajan
Respondents
- Shajan Thomas
- Shantu Thomas
- Wilson @ Shibu
- The Authorized Officer, Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd. (DHFL)
- Jinimol P.M.
Legal Representation & Advocates
Counsels for Petitioners
- • Sri M. Ramesh Chander (Sr.)
- • Smt. P. I. Shamlath
Counsels for Respondents
- • Sri Prasad Chandran
- • Sri P. Paulochan Antony
- • Sri G. Ajith Kumar
Case Synopsis & Summary
This writ petition challenges an order under the SARFAESI Act and seeks to restrain the secured creditor, DHFL, from dispossessing the petitioner's family from a house in RS No.95/7, Angamali Village. Petitioner Darly Shajan, wife of the first respondent and sister‑in‑law of respondents 2 and 3, has resided in the property since 1991. Respondent No.4, the Authorized Officer of DHFL, has initiated possession proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, and Respondent No.5, Jinimol P.M., is the Advocate Commissioner. The petitioner had obtained, through a Domestic Violence Act application, an order (Ext. P2) dated 7 August 2015 restraining eviction from the shared house. She contends that the Domestic Violence Act confers a right of residence and that the SARFAESI process cannot oust her without modification of the order by the court. The court notes that SARFAESI is a specialized mechanism allowing possession without court intervention (Section 13(4)) and that Ext. P2 cannot bar the bank's statutory remedy. Citing Vishal N. Kalsaria and Harshad Govardhan Sondagar, the court acknowledges that tenancy protections exist under Supreme Court jurisprudence, but distinguishes that the present case involves a mortgaged home and a right of residence that ceases once the mortgagor's right is appropriated by the secured creditor. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed.
Provisions of Law Cited
Legal Doctrines & Maxims
- Non obstante clause in SARFAESI Act (Section 35).
- Stultifying the statutory rights of protection given to the tenant (as cited).
- Tenant rights under Rent Control Act protected; due process in eviction considerations (as discussed with Vishal N. Kalsaria and Harshad Govardhan Sondagar).
Submissions & Arguments
Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners
The petitioner contends that Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act is in addition to, and not derogatory of, the Domestic Violence Act. Her status as wife of the first respondent and sister‑in‑law of respondents 2 and 3 gives her a right of residence in the shared home; Ext. P2 restraining eviction should be read to protect residence, and no steps by the secured creditor under SARFAESI should proceed without modification by the court. It was urged that the Domestic Violence Act creates a special right of residence and that the non‑obstante provision cannot override this. Reliance was placed on Vishal N. Kalsaria v. Bank of India (SC) and Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd for tenant protection doctrines. The petitioner argued that the bank’s rights must yield to the DV order only if the court modifies the right of residence.
Contentions of Respondents
The respondents contended that SARFAESI Act is a special remedy permitting possession of the secured asset by the creditor, and an order under the Domestic Violence Act cannot override this, especially where the property is mortgaged and the mortgagor’s right has vested in the secured creditor. They argued that Section 35’s ‘any other law for the time being in force’ cannot extend to all statutes and that alternate protection under Mary Jacob is not applicable on these facts. They asserted that Ext. P2 cannot impede the bank's possession under SARFAESI and that the possession order follows from the statutory remedy; the rights of tenants under Rent Control and related jurisprudence are acknowledged but not controlling in this mortgage‑foreclosure context."},
Cited Precedents (4)
| Case Name | Citation | Treatment | Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vishal N. Kalsaria v. Bank of India | 2016 (1) KLT 623 (SC) | Positive | Cited to underscore tenant protections and the principle that statutory rights are not to be easily overridden; the court relies on this line of reasoning in discussing the DV Act against the SARFAESI framework. |
| Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala & Ors. | (2009) 4 SCC 94; 2009 (1) KLT SN 53 (C.No.58) | Positive | Cited to illustrate interpretation of the non-obstante clause in the SARFAESI context and the limits of applying other laws in force within the same field. |
| Mary Jacob v. Elizabeth Jacob and others | 2015 (5) KHC 234 | Distinguished | Reliance by respondents on alternate accommodation under DV Act; however, the Kerala High Court distinguishes it on facts since the present case concerns a mortgaged property and Bank possession rather than a pure tenancy‑based protection. |
| Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd & Ors. | (SC) 2014 (3) KLT 357 | Positive | Cited to acknowledge Supreme Court tenant-protection jurisprudence, recognizing that tenants’ protections exist even in mortgage‑related contexts, which the present court aligns with while maintaining structural SARFAESI rights. |
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