High CourtDivision BenchAppeals allowed; High Court’s judgment set asid...

C.T.O. Moradabad v. H. Farid Ahmed & Sons.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal Nos. 95 and 96 of 1971
Neutral Citation:(1976) 1 SCR 778

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • V. R. Krishna Iyer
  • S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
Judgment Date
1975-09-12
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals allowed; High Court’s judgment set aside; provisional assessment under section 7A upheld; the parties to bear their costs; the order will not preclude the assessee from challenging the correctness of levy of penalty if timely pursued.
Final Disposition
Appeals allowed; High Court’s judgment set aside; provisional assessment upheld; costs to be borne by both sides; penalties, if any, may be pursued in accordance with law.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • C.T.O., Moradabad

Respondents

  • H. Farid Ahmed & Sons

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • S. C. Manchanda
  • • 0. P. Rana

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Promod Swarup
  • • S. Markendeya

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court of India decision concerns the interpretation of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act (UPSTA), focusing on section 7A and its relationship to section 7(3) and Rule 41(3) of the Rules framed thereunder. A sales-tax provisional assessment for the 1968 year was initiated by the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Officer (STO) based on the firm’s quarterly turnover, despite the dealer having filed a return. The Allahabad High Court quashed the provisional assessment, holding that section 7(3) conditions—triggered when no return is submitted or when a return is incorrect—were not met, and thus no provisional assessment could be made. The appellant STO challenged this ruling in the Supreme Court. The Court held that section 7A authorizes provisional assessments “in respect of the assessment year to the best of his judgment” and that Section 7A is to be read with the entire Act, including section 7(3). Rule 41(3) is to be read as supplementary, not an impediment to provisional assessment where the main Act authorizes it, irrespective of whether a return has been filed. The Court warned that adopting the High Court’s construction would enable dealers to evade final assessment by submitting incorrect returns. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed, the High Court’s judgment set aside, and costs were awarded. The decision preserves the option to challenge penalties if timely pursued.

Provisions of Law Cited

UP Sales Tax Act, Section 7AUP Sales Tax Act, Section 7(3)UP Rules, Rule 41(3)UP Rules, Rule 48UP Sales Tax Act, Section 3(2)UP Sales Tax Act, Section 3-D(2)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

Counsel for the appellants contended that section 7A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act clearly empowers the assessing authority to make a provisional assessment for a portion of the year to the best of his judgment, without requiring preconditions. They argued that the provision must be read in harmony with the entire Act, including section 7(3), which authorizes assessment to the best of one’s judgment when a return is not submitted or is incorrect. Relying on Rule 41(3), they submitted that the rule is supplementary to the Act and does not negate the power under section 7A if a return is filed. Interpreting Rule 41(3) to bar provisional assessment would enable dealers to evade final assessment by filing incorrect quarterly returns. The appellants urged reversal and upholding the provisional assessment order, while acknowledging penalties may still be pursued if warranted by law.

Contentions of Respondents

Counsel for the respondents argued that 7A’s provisional assessment cannot override the statutory conditions in section 7(3) when a return has been filed. They asserted that Rule 41(3) deals with cases where no return is submitted or where the return is incorrect; if a proper return is provided, there is no basis for provisional assessment. They contended that the High Court’s interpretation aligns with the statutory scheme, and permitting provisional assessment in such a scenario would undermine the final assessment process and the dealership’s right to be judged on the entire turnover for the year. The respondents urged maintaining the High Court’s decision and preventing a departure from the established assessment procedure, while leaving open the possibility of penalties if applicable under law.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

776 C.T.O. MORADABAD _v._ H. FARID AHMED & SONS. _September_ 12, 1975 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.J _U.P._ _Sales Tux Act, Section 7A and_ 7(3) _and rule_ 41(3) _of_ _the_ _Rules--_ _provisional best judgn1ent_ _assess1nc11t,_ _if_ _could_ _be_ _n1ade_ _when assessee filed a_ _return._ By an order dated 31st December, 1968, the sales-tax officer found from the turn-over .of the respondent firm as revealed from the quarterly returns filed by th~ assessec that it disclosed an assessable income. He proceeded to make a provisional assessment in respect o.f the portion of the assessment year 1968 concerned purporting to act under section 7A of the U.P. Sales Tax _A.ct._ The respondent challenged the same before the High Court prayjng that the sales..tax officer had no jurisdiction to make a provisional assessment, because. the assessee had in fact filed a return. The High Court of ~-'\.liah1bad accepted the contention and quashed the ord~r of the sales-tax officer. 'The High Court held that as conditions mentioned in section 7(3) did not apply to the facts of the case in as much as it was not a case in which the assessee had not filed a return at all, no assessment could have been made by the sales-tax officer. Allowing the appeal by special ]cave, HELD : Section 7 A clearly authorises the assessing authority to make 1, provisional assessment in respect of the assessment year to the best of his judgn1ent, and does not contain any pre-conditions at all. On the other hand. it applies the .provisions of the Act which includes the provisions of section 7 (3), which· is the provision that confers power on the assessing authority to make an assessment to the best of his judgment. It is true that sub-rule (3) of n1le 41 contains a provision that the provisional assessment to the best of the judgment can be made where no return is submitted, but this rule has to be read as supplemental to the provisions of the parent Act. What this rule implies is that whether the return is filed by the assessee or not, the assessing authority will have the pawer to make provisional assessment. There is no inconsistency between 5ection 7 A and rule 41 (3) of the Rules framed under the Act. [778-A-B, D-FJ CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 95 and 96 of 1971. From the Judgment and Order dated 3rd October, 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 351 and 462/69. _S._ C. _Manchanda_ and 0. _P._ _Rana,_ for the Appellants. _Promod Swarup_ and _S._ _Markendeya,_ for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAzAL ALI, J. These appeals by the sales-tax officer have come up to this Court by certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Allahabad. The appeals involve a very short point, turning upon the interpretation of rule 7 A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It appears that the respondent is a partnership firm, carrying on business in the--.district of Moradabad. The assessment quarters in question are two quarters of 1968. By an order dated 3 lst December, 1968, the sales-tax officer found from the A B #### c ##### + I> E F G #### + H s. T. 0. _v._ H. FARID AHMED & SONS _(Fazal Ali,_ /.) 777. turn-over of the firm as revealed from the quarterly returns !iled by the assessee that it disclose an assessable income. The sales-tal<'. officer, therefore, proceeded to make a provisional assessm"nt in respect of the portion of the assessment year concerned, purporting lo act under section 7 A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The assessee being aggrieved by this order, instead. of going in appeal against the order, challenging the same before the High Court praying that the sales-tax officer had no jurisdiction to make a provisional assessment, ·because the asscssee had in fact filed a return. This argument appears to have found favour with the High Court which quashed the order. of the sales-tax officer and held that the sales-tax officer could have made a provisional. assessment to the best of his judgment only if no return had been filed by the assessee. Mr. Manchanda appearing in support of the appeals bas contended that the High Court has completely overlooked the purport. and ambit of section 7 A of the Act, which does not exclude but in fact implies the provisions of the· Act, including section 7 (3). The sheet-anchor of the High Court's judgment is section 7 (3) which runs thus : "If no return is submitted by the dealer under subsection (1) within the period prescribed in that behalf or, if the return submitted by him appears to the assessing authority to be incorrect or incomplete, the assessing autho' rity shall after making such enquiry rn; he considers necessary, determine the turnover of the dealer to the best of his judgment and assess the tax on the basis thereof." Provided that before taking action under this sub-section the dealer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of any return submitted by him." The High Court was of the opinion that as conditions mentioned in section 7(3) did not apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch· as it was nor a case in which the assessee had not filed a return at all, no assessment could have been made by the sales-tax officer. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in taking this view. Section 7A **runs** **thus:-** # ' IC.,,. I A B ### c D E F G ##### **ll.** (1) "The State Government may require any dealer to submit return of his turn-over of a portion of the assessment year, and the assessing authority may, with.out prejudice to the provisions of section 7 may provisional assessment in respect of such portion of the assessment year in accordance with the j)rovisic;ns of this Act in so far as they may be made applicable 1f the turn-over of the dealer as determined by the assessing authority for such portion of the amount if any, specified in· or notified under sub-section (2) of Section 3 or sub·sectii>u (2) of Section 3-D, as ·the case may be, as the ·period under assessment years to twelve months. 19-L9?5SCI/75 778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1976] 1 s.c.R. (2) Where the assessing authority has made a provisional assessment under sub-section ( 1), it shall not, by reason of such assessment,, be precluded from redetermining in the turn-over and making the assessment for the whole **year .. "** This section clearly authorizes the assessing authority to make a provisional assessment in respect of the assessment year to the best of his judgment, and does not contain any pre-conditions at all. On the other hand, it applies the provisions of the Act which includes the provisions of section 7 ( 3), which is the provision that confers power on the assessing authority to make an assessment to the best of his judgment. The High Court was rather carried away by the language of rule 41(3) which runs thus: "(3) If no return is submitted in respect of any quarter or month, as the case may be, within the period or if the return is submitted without the payment of tax in the manner prescribed in Rule 48, the Sales Tax Officer shall, after **1naking** **such enquiries** **as** **he considers necessary, determine** the turnover to the best of his judgment, provisionaily assess the tax payable for the quarter or the month, as the case_ may be and serve upon the dealer a notice in Form XI and the dealer shall pay the sum demanded within the time and in the manner specified in the notice." A_. B ## _c_ D E F It is no doubt true that sub-rule ( 3) contains a provision that the provisional assessment to the best of the judgment can be made where no return is submitted, but this rule has to be read as supplemental to the provisions of the parent Act. We cannot interpret the rule in a way so as to come into conflict with the parent Act, in which case the Act will prevail. What this rule implies is that whether the return is filed by the assessee or not, the assessing authority will have the power to make a provisional assessment. In these . circumstances, therefore, we are not able to see any real inconsistency between section 7A and rule 41(3) of the Rules framed under the Act. For these reasons, we are clearly of the opinion that the sales tax authority, namely, the sales-tax officer in the circumstances was fully justified in making the provisional assessment under the provisions of section . 7 A of the Act and the High Court was wrong in quashing this order. We feel that if the interpretation given by the Hgh Court is accepted, it will amount to giving a licence to the assessee to escape final assess- · G ment by filing wrong quarterly retums and deflating the profits earned by them. The result is that both the appeals are allowed. The judgments and orders of the High Court are set aside, but in the circumstances we leave the parties to bear their costs throughout. The order passed by this Court, however, will not preclude the assessee !lrom challenging the correctness of levy of penalty before the statutory authorities in accordance with law, if he is in time. **H** V.M.K. _Appeals allowed._