High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeRevision petition allowed in part; discharge fo...

Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024

Case / Petition Number:CRL.REV.PET. NO. 6 OF 2024
Neutral Citation:2024:KER:59560

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • P.G. AJITHKUMAR
Judgment Date
2024-08-06
Court Decision / Holding
The revision petition is allowed in part: the petitioner is discharged only for the offence punishable under Section 363 IPC; the petitioner must face trial for the offences under Sections 376, 498A and 506 IPC. The impugned discharge order is partly set aside; the trial court shall proceed with the remaining charges while recording appropriate reasons for the discharge of 363 IPC.
Final Disposition
Revision petition allowed in part; discharge for Section 363 IPC; trial to proceed on Sections 376, 498A, 506 IPC.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • XXX

Respondents

  • State of Kerala represented by Public Prosecutor
  • The Inspector of Police, Ollur Police Station
  • YYY

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Shibin K.F.
  • • Seby Joseph Gison Aliyas

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Seena C., Public Prosecutor
  • • N.U. Harikrishna

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a Criminal Revision Petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC challenging an order dated 11.12.2023 by the trial court, which dismissed the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC in a case (SC No.1232 of 2022) pending before the Fast Track Special Court, Chalakudy. The sole accused is charged with offences under Sections 363, 376, 498A and 506 IPC. The prosecution alleges that the petitioner, while engaged to the second respondent, abducted her from college premises to a hotel, committed rape on 14.02.2019, and used her nude photographs to coerce marriage; post-engagement, the couple reportedly faced continuing harassment. The petitioner contends there is total dearth of materials to constitute any offence; the sole supporting evidence is the second respondent’s oral testimony, with no corroborative CCTV or electronic evidence. The court analyzed discharge standards, considering various Supreme Court authorities on framing charges or discharging at discharge stage, and noted the need to evaluate the evidence without ascribing guilty verdicts. The court ultimately allowed the revision petition in part: discharging the petitioner for the offence under Section 363 IPC, while holding that there are enough materials to proceed against him for offences under Sections 376, 498A and 506 IPC, thus directing trial on those counts.”

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 397 CrPCSection 401 CrPCSection 227 CrPCIPC: Sections 363, 376, 498A, 506

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Not a mere post office (court must sift through evidence, not merely receive it)
  • Grave suspicion vs mere suspicion (need grave suspicion to frame a charge)
  • Read in between lines (caution to read between lines when evaluating materials)
  • Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement (Explanation 2 to Section 375 IPC)
  • Discharge stage requires assuming material true and evaluating if ingredients exist (State Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The applicant submits that there is total dearth of materials to constitute any of the charged offences. The 2nd respondent was above 18 years, and the prosecution’s case hinges on the single oral testimony of the 2nd respondent regarding rape on 14.02.2019, with no documentary proof of her presence in the hotel (no CCTV or electronic evidence). The absence of corroboration and the lack of independent materials render the allegations unsustainable for offences like rape. The defence invokes settled principles that discharge is warranted when material does not disclose a prima facie case, emphasizes the need to protect innocent persons from vexatious prosecutions, and relies on authorities such as Mahmood Ali and others v. State of U.P. and others, and on the general principle that a discharge is not to be treated as a post office function. The plea also contends that there is no material for framing charges under Sections 363, 376, 498A, 506 IPC beyond the second offence.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent- State contends that the evidence proposed by the prosecution is enough to frame charges; the second respondent is reliable, and minor inconsistencies are ancillary. Relying on Section 114A of the Evidence Act, presumption can be used to support the charges. The prosecution argues that the judicial mind must consider the broad probabilities of the case and that strong suspicion, not mere suspicion, justifies framing a charge. The court should not be a mere post office and must sift through the evidence to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to try the accused. The respondent also relies on jurisprudence such as State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, Soma Chakravarty v. State through CBI, Vijayan P. v. State of Kerala, Yohannan M.M. v. State of Kerala, Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, and State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Madhusudhana Rao to support the process of charge framing and the pre-trial evaluation.”},

Cited Precedents (10)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
State of Bihar v. Ramesh SinghAIR 1977 SC 2018PositiveCited for the proposition that at the stage of framing a charge, courts should not undertake to assess the likelihood of conviction, focusing on whether there is a prima facie case to proceed.
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another(1979) 3 SCC 4PositiveCited to support the principle that grave suspicion, if not explained, justifies framing a charge.
Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia and another(1989) 1 SCC 715PositiveCited for the principle that an elaborate enquiry is not required at the stage of framing a charge.
Soma Chakravarty v. State through CBI(2007) 5 SCC 403PositiveCited for the rule that strong suspicion can justify framing a charge; mere suspicion is insufficient.
Vijayan P. v. State of Kerala and another(2010) 2 SCC 398PositiveCited to emphasize that the judge framing the charge must exercise judicial mind and not be a mere formality.
Yohannan M.M. And another v. State of Kerala(2019) 5 KHC 908PositiveCited to reinforce the need to test the sufficiency of evidence that would be admissible against the accused.
Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and anotherAIR 2021 SC 2351PositiveCited for the proposition that the court must sift through evidence to find sufficient grounds to try the accused.
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh RaoMANU/SC/1113/2023PositiveCited to support the approach that discharge considerations start with assuming material true and evaluating whether offences are disclosed.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Madhusudhana Rao(2008) 15 SCC 582DistinguishedNot found applicable to the facts; the court has distinguished its ratio in the present case.
Mahmood Ali and others v. State of U.P. and othersCrl.Appeal No.2341 of 2023PositiveCited to underscore the protective approach toward innocent persons against vexatious prosecutions and the need to examine surrounding circumstances.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

**==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** ## 2024:KER:59560 # **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR** **TUESDAY, THE 6[TH] DAY OF AUGUST 2024 / 15TH SRAVANA, 1946** **CRL.REV.PET. NO. 6 OF 2024** **AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 11.012.2023 IN CRL.MP NO.449 OF 2023 IN SC NO.1232 OF 2022 OF THE FAST TRACK SPECIAL COURT, IRINJALAKUDA (NOW STANDS TRANSFERRED TO FAST TRACK SPECIAL (POCSO) COURT, CHALAKUDY) REVISION PETITIONER/PETITIONER:** ## **XXX** **BY ADVS. SHIBIN K.F. SEBY JOSEPH GISON ALIYAS** ## **RESPONDENTS/STATE:** - **1 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, PIN – 682031.** - **2 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, THE OLLUR POLICE STATION, OLLUR POST, THRISSUR DISTRICT, KERALA STATE, PIN – 680306.** - **3 YYY** **R1 & R2 BY SMT SEENA C., PUBLIC PROSECUTOR R3 BY ADV N.U.HARIKRISHNA** **THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 30.07.2024, THE COURT ON 06.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** 2024:KER:59560 2 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 ## **P.G. AJITHKUMAR, J.** **-----------------------------------------------------------** **Crl.R.P.No.6 of 2024** **----------------------------------------------------------Dated this the 6[th] day of August, 2024** ## **O R D E R** In this revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Code), the petitioner challenges the order of the trial court dated 11.12.2023 dismissing his plea for discharge. Crl.M.P.No.449 of 2023 filed by the petition in that regard was dismissed. 2. The petitioner is the sole accused in S.C.No.1232 of 2022 pending before the Fast Track Special Court, Chalakudy. This case was earlier pending before the Fast Track Special Court, Irinjalakuda, from where it was transferred to the Fast Track Special Court, Chalakudy. The petitioner is charged for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 376, 498A and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The case of the prosecution is as follows: The petitioner married the 2[nd] respondent on 16.06.2019. Their marriage engagement was held on 18.10.2018. Their relationship estranged since the 2[nd] respondent apprehended 2024:KER:59560 3 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 that the petitioner was maintaining an undesirable relationship with another woman. The petitioner on the pretext of clearing that misunderstanding took the 2[nd] respondent to Krishna Holiday Village at Adat Panchayat on 14.02.2019. At 9.00 a.m. on the said day, the petitioner committed rape on the 2[nd] respondent in a room. The petitioner took her nude photographs and making use of the same he coerced and intimidated her for the marriage. After the marriage, the 2[nd] respondent came to know that the petitioner was maintaining an illicit relationship with another woman. The petitioner on many occasions assaulted the 2[nd] respondent physically and used to harass her mentally demanding more money and gold. 3. The petitioner on entering appearance filed Crl.M.P.No.449 of 2023 before the trial court seeking discharge under Section 227 of the Code. The trial court, after hearing both sides and considering the prosecution records, held that there was a _prima facie_ case to proceed against the petitioner. Accordingly, Crl.M.P.No.449 of 2023 was dismissed as per order dated 11.12.2023. 2024:KER:59560 4 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the 2[nd] respondent. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there is total dearth of materials to constitute any of the offences alleged against the petitioner. Indisputably, the 2[nd] respondent was above the age of 18 years. On the basis of the allegation that she was taken from the college where she was studying to the hotel, the petitioner has been charged for the offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC. The facts of the case would not attract that offence. 6. Only evidence produced to prove rape allegedly committed on 14.02.2019 is the oral testimony of the 2[nd] respondent. The allegation is that she was taken to a hotel room and sexually abused in that room. No document to show her reaching in that hotel room is produced. The prosecution did not venture to collect any CCTV footage or such other electronic or scientific evidence. Therefore, the allegation concerning the rape is quite unsustainable. In regard to the offences of cruelty and intimidation also, there is no sufficient 2024:KER:59560 5 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 material to proceed against the petitioner. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the petitioner maintains that the order of the trial court dismissing Crl.M.P.No.449 of 2023 is incorrect and liable to be set aside. The learned Counsel cited a slew of decisions to explain the parameters and requirements of law for charging or discharging an accused. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the 2[nd] respondent, on the other hand, take the stand that the evidence proposed by the prosecution is enough for framing a charge against the petitioner. It is submitted that the 2[nd] respondent is reliable and the inconsistencies pointed out are concerning ancillary matters alone and her statements about the core of allegations are consistent. When the prosecution can have the aid of presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act, 1872 the plea for discharge cannot be entertained, it is urged. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner at the outset made a submission based on the law laid down by the Apex Court in **Mahmood Ali and others v. State of U.P. and others** [Judgment in Crl.Appeal No.2341 of 2023 dated 2024:KER:59560 6 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 08.08.2023] this Court is obliged to consider frivolous nature of the allegations against the petitioner at this stage itself. The Apex Court reminded that if a complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance, he/she would ensure that the complainant is drafted with all the necessary ingredients. Innocent persons implicated in such cases are to be protected against vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution and to look into attending circumstances emerging from the averments. If required, the court shall try to read in between lines. 9. Law regulating powers of court to discharge an accused person under Section 227 of the Code is succinct. If the Court finds there is not enough evidence to proceed against the person accused of, after considering the prosecution records and hearing arguments from both the accused and the prosecution, the court shall discharge the accused. Of course, the court must record its reasons for doing so. 2024:KER:59560 7 Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** ## 10. In **State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [AIR 1977** **SC 2018]** the Apex Court held that at the stage of framing charge, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. At that stage, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence, which the prosecution proposes to adduce, are not to be meticulously judged. It is also unnecessary to weigh the probable defence of the accused. In **Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another** **[(1979) 3 SCC 4]** the Apex Court held that where the materials disclosed grave suspicion against the accused, which has not been properly explained, the court would be justified in framing a charge against the accused. 11. The view taken by the Apex Court in **Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia** **and another [(1989) 1 SCC 715]** is that the court need not conduct an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing of the evidence at the time of framing charge. It is also not necessary to delve into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record, if 2024:KER:59560 8 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. In **Soma Chakravarty v. State through CBI** **[(2007) 5 SCC 403]** the Apex Court held that when there exists a strong suspicion, a charge can be framed. It was also cautioned that a mere suspicion as distinguished from grave suspicion is not enough to frame a charge. 12. In **Vijayan P. v. State of Kerala and another [(2010) 2 SCC 398]** the Apex Court deviated a little from the trodden path by holding that the judge who considers a question where a charge is liable to be framed is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution. The judge is expected to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. Following the said principle of law, this Court in **Yohannan M.M. And another v. State of Kerala [2019 (5) KHC 908]** held that if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the 2024:KER:59560 9 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 offence, then it is a case of no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 13. In **Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another [AIR 2021 SC 2351],** the Apex Court dilated the principle further. It was held that a court at the stage of framing charge has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The observation in the above regard is the following:- “It is well settled that the trial court while considering the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The Court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on.” 14. A note of caution is sounded by the Apex Court in **State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao (MANU/SC/ 1113/2023]** . It was held that at the stage of considering an application for discharge, the court shall proceed on the assumption that the material which the prosecution has brought on record is true and evaluate such 2024:KER:59560 10 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 materials to determine whether the facts emerging from the materials taken on its face value disclosed the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offences alleged. 15. The variations in the statements of the 2nd respondent between F.I.statement and subsequent statement are not very conspicuous. They are only marginal variations. Of course, there is delay of about two years from the time when the 2nd respondent left her matrimonial home. But a plea of discharge cannot be accepted on the ground of delay alone, especially when the alleged offences are concerning a matrimonial relationship and the incident transpired prior to the marriage but after the engagement. 16. The marital relationship continued for more than six months. After falling out of the relationship, the 2nd respondent initiated the prosecution. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in such circumstances the allegation of rape that occurred on 14.02.2019 which the prosecution propound based only on the oral testimony of the 2nd respondent, cannot be acted upon. There must have been CCTV footages to prove her presence in the hotel on that day. 2024:KER:59560 11 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 Neither such footages, nor the mobile phone chat between them were collected and produced before the court. 17. Having their engagement been already held, it cannot be said that the petitioner and the 2nd respondent going together to the hotel was unusual. The 2nd respondent went to the hotel and identified the room. That confirms the statement she gave in police describing the details in the hotel room. Subsequent marriage despite reluctance of the 2nd respondent’s parents need to be considered in the light of her version that she was intimidated by the petitioner stating that the petitioner had her nude photographs. Thus the statement of the 2nd respondent regarding the alleged offence of rape stands natural and probable. The marriage took place thereafter and also the delay in launching the prosecution cannot be reasons to discharge the petitioner. 18. The assertion of the 2nd respondent that she was subjected to sexual act on 14.02.2019 without her consent has to be looked upon in the light of Explanation-2 to Section 375 of the IPC, which reads,- “Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement 2024:KER:59560 12 Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.” Considering the aforementioned aspects in the light of the law, which has been discussed above, the plea of the petitioner for a discharge from the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC cannot be countenanced. 19. As stated, the 2nd respondent was aged above 18 years during the relevant time and therefore no offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC would lie against the petitioner. In regard to the other offences, namely, Sections 498A and 506 of the IPC, the evidence of the 2 nd respondent is supported by versions of her father and mother. In the light of the said materials, it can only be said that there are sufficient materials to proceed against the petitioner for the said offences. His plea based on the law laid down by the Apex Court in **State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Madhusudhana Rao [(2008) 15 SCC 582]** is not able to be countenanced in the facts of this case. 2024:KER:59560 13 **==> picture [58 x 57] intentionally omitted <==** Crl.Rev.Pet.No.6 of 2024 20. Viewed so, the impugned order cannot be said to be incorrect. The petitioner is not entitled for a discharge except for the offence under Section 363 of the IPC. He has to stand trial for the offences under Sections 376, 498A and 506 of the IPC. Accordingly, this revision petition is allowed in part to the extent of discharging him for the offence under Section 363 of the IPC. Sd/- ## **P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE** dkr