Criminal Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316 of 2016 (Kerala High Court)

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT:** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.K.ABDUL REHIM & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.SUDHEENDRA KUMAR** **MONDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2016/28TH AGRAHAYANA, 1938** ## **CRL.A.No. 147 of 2016 ()** ## **------------------------(AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 20-01-2016 IN SC 2/2013 of SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES, ERNAKULAM)** ## **APPELLANTS/ACCUSED NOS.1 TO 21:** **-------------------------------------------** **1. ABDUL AZEEZ P.V. AGED 44, S/O. IBRAHIM.K.A, PUTHIYA VEETTIL HOUSE, SIVAPURAM MOTTA, MALOORAMSOM, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **2. FAHAD.P.C, AGED 30, S/O.MOOSA, PALLIKKACHALIL HOUSE, AYISHA QUARTERS, ECHOOR, KOTTAM ROAD, MUNDERIAMSOM, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **3. JAMSHEER.K.K, AGED 30, S/O.MOIDEEN, PAARAYATH HOUSE, MADATHILKOVVAL, PAMBURUTHI ROAD, NARATHAMSOM, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **4. ABDUL SAMAD.P.P, AGED 28, S/O ABU, PUTHIYAPURAYIL HOUSE, (PEEDIKAKANDIPURAYIL HOUSE) MAMMAKUNNUPALAM, KADAMBUR.P.O, KANNUR.** **5. MOHAMMED SAMREED.P, AGED 28, S/O.SAIDALAVI, "SHUKI", PUTHIYOTTIL HOUSE, KIZHUNNA.P.O, NEAR KANHANGAT MOSQUE, THOTTADA, EDAKKAD, KANNUR.** **6. NOUFAL.C, AGED 26, S/O.ALAVI, PURAKKAYIL HOUSE, KUNNIRIKKA, VENGADAMSOM, KOOTHUPARAMBA, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **7. RIKKAS.C, AGED 26, S/O UMMAR, BAITHULRAHA, CHANDRANKANTI HOUSE, KETTINAKAM, MUZHAPILANGAD, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **8. JAMSHEED.P, AGED 22, S/O.MUSTHAFA, AYISHA HOUSE, PALLIPPURA HOUSE, NEAR PACHAKKARA LP SCHOOL, KETTINAKAM, MUZHAPPILANGAD, KANNUR DISTRICT.** ## **CRL.A.No. 147 of 2016 ()** **-2-** **9. MOHAMMED ASHIQ.O.K, AGED 28, S/O.UMMER, NEW SAFAMANZIL, OTAKKANDATHIL HOUSE, KETTINAKAM, NEAR CHATHOTH MOSQUE, KOTTOOR, MUZHAPPILANGAD, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **10. MISAJ.A.P, AGED 24, S/O.HAMSA, BITHULHAMD (AVAL PEEDIKA VALAPPIL HOUSE, BEACH ROAD, MUZHAPPILANGAD, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **11. MOHAMMED ABSHEER V.P, AGED 24, S/O.ABOOBACKER, SHAREEFA MAHAL, VALIYAPARAMBATH HOUSE, NEAR KUNNOTHJUMA MASJID, GUYMTI, NITTOOR.P.O, THALASSERY, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **12. AJMAL.P.M, AGED 24, S/O.HASSAN, MARVA MANZIL, PAZHAYAMOOSAKKADA HOUSE, KIZHUNNAPPARA, EDAKKAD,KANNUR.** **13. HASHIM.K.C, AGED 27, S/O.HAMSA, KANIYAANTAVIDA HOUSE, VENDUTTAYI, PINARAYI, KANNUR.** - **FAISAL A.T., AGED 24, S/O.MASHHOOR, JAMEELA MANZIL, AVAL THAYYIL HOUSE, NEAR OLD JUMA MASJID, BEACH ROAD, MUZHAPPILANGAD, EDAKKAD, KANNUR.** **15. RABAH.K.P, AGED 30, S/O.ISMAIL, RUBAIDA VILLA, KAAKUNHIPUTHIYAPURAYIL HOUSE, NEAR EDAKAD POLICE STATION, MUZHAPPILANGAD.P.O, KANNUR.** **16. SHIJIN V @ SIRAJ, AGED 27, S/O.MAJEED, SHIJIN'S HOUSE, NEAR GOVERNMENT HIGH SCHOOL, MUZHAPPILANGAD, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **17. NOUSHAD.C.P, AGED 36, S/O.ABOOTTY, BAITHULALEEMA, CHANDROTH PULLAMPI HOUSE, KOZHOOR, PINARAYI, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **18. SUHAIR.A.K, AGED 25, S/O.MOHAMED, ZUHARA MANZIL, AVALILKOVVARKKAL HOUSE, BEACH ROAD, MUZHAPPILANGAD,KANNUR DISTRICT.** **19. AJMAL.C.M, AGED 24, S/O.SHAMSUDHEEN, SUBAIDA MAHAL, CHERIYAMELAD HOUSE, KELAPPANMUKKU, KOYYOD, CHALA, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **CRL.A.No. 147 of 2016 ()** **-3-** ## **20. SHAFEEQ P., AGED 28, S/O.UMMER, MAREENAMANZIL, PARAMBATH HOUSE, NEAR ANGANVADI, MUZHAPPILANGAD, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **21. RASHID.E.K, AGED 24, S/O.MOHAMMED.A.T SHARMINAS, EACHANAMKANTI HOUSE, KETTINAKAM, MUZHAPPILANGAD, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **BY ADVS.SRI.C.K.SREEDHARAN SRI.P.K.MOHAMED JAMEEL SRI.P.C.NOUSHAD SRI.M.P.ABDUL LATHEEF SRI.P.K.ABDURAHIMAN (POOLACKAL KARATCHALI)** ## **RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT & STATE:** **----------------------------------------------** **1. STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, KOCHI-682031.** - ***2. THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY** **REP. BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.** ## **BY SRI.M.AJAY, SPL. P.P FOR NIA** ***[R2 IS IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 17-02-2016 IN CRL.M.A No.930/2016 IN CRA No.147/2016]** **THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 19-12-2016, ALONG WITH CRA. 231/2016 & CRA. 316/2016, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** ## **AMG** ## **CRL.A.No. 147 of 2016 ()** ## **APPENDIX** ## **APPELLANTS' ANNEXURES** ANNEXURE-1TRUE COPY OF THE INVITATION CARD OF THE MARRIAGE. ANNEXURE-2TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN SLP (CRL) No.2587/2016 OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA. ## RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS NIL True copy P.A. To Judge AMG ## **C.K. ABDUL REHIM, J. & B. SUDHEENDRA KUMAR, J.** ------------------------------------------------- ## **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316 OF 2016** ------------------------------------------------DATED THIS THE 19[th] DAY OF DECEMBER, 2016 ## **J U D G M E N T** ## Abdul Rehim, J: All the above appeals are arising out of the judgment in S.C. No.2 of 2013 (N.I.A.) of the Special Court for N.I.A. Cases, Ernakulam, dated 20.1.2016. Crl.Appeal No.147 of 2016 is filed by accused Nos.1 to 21 against conviction and sentence imposed against them. Crl. Appeal No.231 of 2016 is filed by the Union Government, represented through the National Investigation Agency, seeking enhancement of the sentence imposed against the above said accused. Crl.Appeal No.316 of 2016 is also filed by the National Investigation Agency challenging acquittal of the 22[nd] accused. The court below had convicted accused Nos.1 to 21 under Sections 120B and 143 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 5(1)(a) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act 1959, Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosives **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -2- Substances Act 1908 and Sections 18 and 18A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 [hereinafter referred to as 'the UA(P) Act' for short]. The 1[st] accused was also convicted for offence under Section 153A, 153B(1) (c) of the I.P.C. Accused Nos.1 to 21 were sentenced for different periods of imprisonment and with fine. 2. The prosecution charge in brief is that, the accused are active members of the organisations named Popular Front of India (PFI) and Socialist Democratic Party of India (SDPI). In pursuance of a conspiracy hatched among themselves to acquire training in making and usage of weapons and explosives in order to retaliate against the alleged tortures faced by muslims in India from the other religions, especially from Hindus, the accused formed themselves into an unlawful assembly on 23.4.2013 in a building bearing No.1/576A of Narath Panchayat and attempted to promote feelings of enmity between different religions, especially between muslims and hindus by delivering a speech which is likely to disturb the public **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -3- tranquility and made assertions prejudicial to the national integrity and used country Bombs and Sword for the purpose of training youngsters for terrorist activities, imparted training on making of country Bombs and in the use of Swords on human body, with the specific intention of terrorist activities and thus acted in preparatory of the commission of terrorist acts endangering unity and integrity of the nation and thereby committed offences punishable under Sections 120B, 143, 153A and 153B(1)(c) read with Section 149 I.P.C., Section 5(1)(A) read with Section 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, Section 4 and 5 of the Explosives Substances Act and Section 18 and 18A of the UA(P) Act. 3. Case of the prosecution is that PW1, who was the Sub Inspector of the Police of Mayyil Police Station, while doing law and order patrol duty on 23.4.2013, got a secret information that PFI activists are engaged in training of weapons at a building near 'Falah English Medium School' in Narath-Pambuthuruthy Road. After preparing Ext.P1 search memo and after sending it to the court, he **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -4- proceeded to the said building on informing his superior officers and after ensuring the presence of the witnesses, PW25 and CW6 along with him. When they reached near the building, two persons who were allegedly guarding the building, ran away from the spot, who were subsequently identified as accused Nos.22 and 23. At that time a speech was going on inside the building and a country Bomb, glass pieces, iron nails, one roll of string etc. were seen kept on a table. Another country bomb was found on a flex sheet spread over floor of the hall. Accused Nos.1 to 3 were found standing faced towards south and accused Nos.4 to 21 were sitting in front of them hearing the speech. According to the prosecution the speech was about the need for acquiring training in weapons to defend the attacks, especially from the hindus. PW1 informed the matter to the Circle Inspector concerned and entered the hall. On questioning the accused they informed that 'Yoga' classes are going on. But they could not give any satisfactory explanation regarding the arms and explosives kept therein. **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -5- A sword was seen kept in the corner of the hall and one piece of brick tied with an iron string was seen kept immersed in a bucket filled with petrol. A human target made with wooden frame was also found. In the noon, at about 12.30 the Circle Inspector of Valapattanam Police came to the spot along with Police force. The police procured the presence of 5 local people and the accused were shown to them and the articles were seized from the table kept inside the hall. One flag of SDPI and a Banner and various Pamphlets were also seized along with 'Tejus Newspaper' and a Receipt Book of 'Tejus Fortnightly'. Members of the 'Bomb Squad' of the police came to the spot at 14.15 hrs. All the articles were seized on preparing Ext.P9 search list and accused Nos.1 to 21 were arrested. PW1 reached the police station by 19.30 hours and registered Ext.P10 FIR. On search of the body of the accused, various documents like Identity Cards, Driving Licenses, etc. were seized, which were marked in evidence as Ext.P11 to P42. The Bombs seized were taken by PW8 **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -6- and were kept in a pit near Mayyil police station, which were defused subsequently on 1.5.2013, after obtaining orders to that effect from the court. 4. PW20, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kannur, took charge of the investigation on 24-4-2013. He visited the scene on 25-4-2013 and seized a Scooter bearing Reg. No. KL 13 - V 9378, which was seen in an abandoned state near the building in question. He conducted search at the house of the 3[rd] accused on 25-42013 and seized certain CDs and Pamphlets. He had also conducted search at the house of accused No. 22 and seized weapons like Iron Rods, GI Pipes, Swords, Axe and Nanchack which were seen concealed in the house along with documents like Election Identity Cards and Certificates of the school athletic meet. PW20 conducted the investigation by questioning witnesses. Subsequently the investigation was taken over by PW26, Dy.S.P. of NIA, on 7-08-2013. He completed the investigation and laid the charge. -7- **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** 5. During the trial, the prosecution had examined PW1 to PW26 and marked Exts. P1 to P 109 documents and identified MO1 to MO38 material objects. On behalf of the defence, DW1 was examined and Exts. D1 to D10 were marked. 6. PW1 Sub Inspector of Police, when examined before the Court, testified that on getting information about training on weapons being conducted by the PFI activists in the building in question, he proceeded to the spot after preparing Ext. P1 Search Memo, which was forwarded to the Court through a Civil Police Officer, and after informing the Circle Inspector of Police, Kannur as well as PW20. On reaching Narath Town, he disclosed about the information to PW25 and CW26 and requested them to witness the search. Thereafter he proceeded to the spot with the police party along with the said two witnesses. When they were walking towards the building, two persons who were sitting on the northern side of the **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -8- building ran away from the spot towards south, on seeing the police party. The witnesses revealed that they were accused Nos. 22 and 23. When they reached near the building, they heard a speech being delivered from inside and it was noticed that the windows on the western side were covered with Newspaper and that the door on the northern side was seen party opened. When he along with the party peeped into the hall through the said door, they saw a table kept inside with a jute bag spread over it. They saw something like a Bomb, broken glass pieces, iron nails, and ash coloured powder kept in a plastic cover on the table. There were also some winding wire and a roll of jute thread. In front of the table on a 'flex sheet' spread over the floor, something like a Bomb was seen kept and on the southern side it certain persons were seen sitting and three persons were seen standing in front of the table looking towards south. The persons sitting in the flex sheet were facing towards north. According to PW1 a person who was standing on the northern side of the table, who **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -9- was later identified as the 1[st] accused was delivering a speech stating that, we the muslims in India are suffering various tortures from members of other religions, especially from hindus and that for preventing the same we have to gain training on weapons. According to PW1, he along with the police party had entered the hall by opening the door and at that time the speech was stopped. When questioned, the accused replied that 'Yoga' class was going on there. But when questioned about the articles seen on the table and on the flex sheet, they had no convincing reply and they were seen perplexed. He identified the persons who were standing around the table as accused 1 to 3. A sword was seen kept on the north-eastern corner of the hall and a brick tied on a winding wire was seen dipped in a bucket containing petrol. On the western side of the above articles, effigy of a human being made with wooden rafter and five sticks of different size were seen. On examination, a flag of SDPI, a banner of SDPI with respect to its branch conference at Naraath, a copy of Thejas **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -10- Newspaper and certain Pamphlets were recovered from the drawer of the table. At about 12.30 p.m., the Circle Inspector and his police party came to the scene. PW1 had identified all the articles seen inside the house as MO1 to MO13. The Pamphlets and the other documents recovered were marked as Exts. P2 series to P6. He had collected the name and address of all the persons who were seen inside the hall. Five persons, including PW2 and PW3, who were seen outside the building were called into the building and the accused as well as the objects seized were shown to them. PW1 deposed that the members of the 'Bomb Squad' came to the spot at 14.15 hours and examined the Bombs recovered. PW1 had seized all the material objects and documents recovered from the building by preparing Ext. P9 search list and they were taken to the police station along with the accused persons. It is testified that Exts. P11 to P37 were the documents of personal identification seized from the body of the accused. Ext. P38 to P42 are the Pamphlets and other documents **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -11- recovered from the body of the accused persons. The accused persons were arrested on 23-4-2013 at about 4.30 p.m. 7. PW2 & 3 are the two independent witnesses who deposed that they came to the spot on seeing the police party proceeding to the building. They testified of having witnessed the search conducted by PW1. According to them, they were called inside the building by the Circle Inspector of Police. Both the witnesses had identified accused 1 to 21 and MO1 to Mo13 material objects. PW8 is the Sub Inspector attached to the Bomb Squad. He testified that he went to the spot on the relevant date and examined the Bombs seized. He identified MO1 to MO13 as articles seized from the building. According to PW8, the two Bombs were kept in a pit near Mayyil Police Station on the same day itself and the Bombs were defused on 1-52013, after obtaining orders from the court. The remnants of the defused Bombs were collected and entrusted with the Investigating Officer on marking the same as X1 to X4. **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -12- PW4 is the Civil Police Officer who guarded the scene of occurrence and witnessed seizure of MO17 Scooter. He also supported the prosecution. PW10 had also supported the version regarding seizure of the Scooter from the scene of occurrence, on 25-4-2013. 8. From the evidence let in by the prosecution they succeeded in establishing that, on the relevant date and time accused Nos.1 to 21 had assembled inside the building in question and they were having possession and control over two Bombs, various materials used for manufacturing Bombs, MO1 sword, the effigy made out out of wooden rafters and 5 numbers of wooden sticks. The testimony of PW1 is that he heard the accused No.1 delivering a speech explaining about necessity of acquiring training on arms in order to prevent the tortures faced by muslims in India from members of other religions, especially from hindus. According to him, he heard the said speech when he along with his police party had peeped into the hall through the door on the northern side, which was kept partly opened. **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -13- He also deposed that, when they reached near the building they heard somebody delivering a speech from inside. When cross examined, PW1 conceded that the door was kept opened with a space of about less than one foot and the speech could be clearly heard from outside. According to him, he heard the speech for about one minute. He also conceded that he has not witnessed anybody handling any of the objects kept inside the room. He further conceded that articles seized were not sealed or labelled. According to him he has not seen anybody engaged in training of weapons. He only inferred that the arms and ammunition found kept there were for using in the camp itself. It is pertinent to note that, two persons cited to prove the search, PW25 & CW6, were attestors to Ext.P9 search list. Out of those two witnesses PW25 has not supported the prosecution. CW6 was not examined and the prosecution had filed a report stating that he is presently working abroad and could not attend the court, based on the fact that summons issued to the said witness was **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -14- returned with such endorsement. In Ext.P10 FIR it is mentioned that PW1 got the information when he was conducting law and order petrolling in the presence of 3 Civil Police Officers. It is stated that, advance search memo was prepared and forwarded to the court through one among the Civil Police Officer. His evidence is to the effect that he had arrived the scene and entered the building along with two Civil Police Officers. It is brought out in the prosecution evidence that the Circle Inspector of Police had arrived the scene along with his party. But the prosecution has not examined anyone of the above said police officers, other than PW1, who were admittedly present at the time of the search. Apart from oral testimony of PW1 that he along with the police party and the two independent witnesses, who were attestors to to Ext.P9 search list, had overheard the speech made by accused No.1, there is absolutely no other evidence to corroborate about the alleged speech made by the 1[st] accused. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that, the sole testimony of PW1 about the alleged **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -15- speech is not genuine and is not corroborated through any other evidence. Eventhough PW2 & PW3 have supported the prosecution case regarding seizure of the material objects and also about the arrest of the accused 1 to 21 from the scene, they have not spoken anything about the alleged speech. Question as to whether the court can accept the sole oral testimony of PW1 as a convincing evidence worth credence to find that the 1[st] accused had made a speech as alleged, at the relevant time. Learned Special Prosecutor appearing for NIA contended that there is nothing to discredit the evidence of PW1 about this aspect. It is contended that the evidence of PW1 in this regard cannot be rejected merely for lack of corroboration through evidence of other witnesses. 9. In this regard, learned Special Prosecutor had cited a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Praveen Kumar V. State of Karnataka ((2003) 12 SCC 199)** . But the issue dealt with therein is with respect to acceptability of evidence coming within the purview of **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -16- Section 27 of the Evidence Act. It is held by the hon'ble apex court that, normally in cases where evidence let in by the prosecution as to a fact depends solely on police witnesses, the courts seek corroboration as a matter of caution and not as a matter of routine. It is only a rule of prudence which makes the court to seek corroboration from an independent source in such cases, while assessing evidence of the police. But in cases where the court is satisfied that the evidence of police can independently be relied upon, there is no prohibition in law that the same cannot be accepted without corroboration. Learned Special Prosecutor also placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Vinod Kumar V. State of Punjab ((2015) 3 SCC 220)** . We are of the considered opinion that the acceptability or not of the sole evidence of police authorities, in the matter of any discovery coming within the purview of Section 27 stands on a different footing. There the disclosure made by the accused which lead to the discovery, stands fortified by the subsequent factum of the **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -17- discovery itself. But in the case at hand, question is with respect to acceptability of the sole oral testimony of PW1 regarding the speech, alleged to have heard by him. Such a version is not supported by the evidence of any other police officer or independent witnesses, who were admittedly present at the scene. It is pertinent to note that the version of PW1 was that when he reached the premises of the compound of the building along with the police party and two independent witnesses, they could hear the speech from outside and when he himself along with the police team and the witnesses reached near the door which was kept partly opened, he heard the specific portion of the speech delivered by the 1[st] accused. But no other witness had deposed to any such instance. Therefore it casts suspicion on the credibility of the evidence of PW1 in that respect. Further, the Pamphlets and other printed materials recovered from the building in question is not supportive of any version that the organisations which conducted the camp was propagating any idea to make protest against the **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -18- tortures faced by muslims from other religions, especially from the hindus; or to acquire training on weapons for the said purpose. Under such circumstances we are inclined to give benefit of the doubt arising out of the situation in favour of the accused. 10. Based on the above findings this court is of the considered opinion that, the prosecution could able to prove only regarding the search conducted in the building and the fact that accused Nos.1 to 21 were found to be present inside the building and that they were having possession and control over MO1 to MO13 material objects, which include Bombs, other explosives, substances used for manufacturing Bombs, MO1 sword, wooden sticks and the effigy. The prosecution had adduced evidence regarding searches conducted at the houses of accused Nos.3, 22 & 24 and about the recovery of some printed materials as well as weapons. The accused No.24 stands not yet chargesheeted in the case. Accused No.22 stands acquitted. The Pamphlets recovered from the house of 3[rd] accused is **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -19- not supportive of in any manner to prove that the accused 1 to 21 have organized the camp for the purpose of imparting training on manufacture of Bombs in order to protest the alleged tortures faced by members of the muslim community from other religions, especially from hindus. 11. Based on the above conclusions, we are persuaded to analyse sustainability of the conviction imposed for each of the offences. The prosecution had succeeded in proving that accused Nos.1 to 21 were found to be in possession and control of MO1 sword, two Bombs which were defused by PW8, MO 9 series glass pieces and MO11 series to MO13 substances used for manufacturing Bombs. Whether the possession of those material objects would attract any offence punishable under the Arms Act, 1959 and the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, is the questions to be examined. The court below had convicted the accused under Section 5 (1) (a) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Bombs in question recovered from the possession and control of the accused will definitely fall **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -20- within the definition of 'ammunition' coming under Section 2 (1) (b) of the Arms Act. From the description of MO1 sword brought out in evidence it is clear that the said object will fall within the definition of 'arms' defined under Section 2 (1) (c) of the Act. An offence under Section 5 (1) (a) of the Act could be made out only if it is proved that any arms or ammunition is used or manufactured or sold or transferred or converted or repaired or tested or proved. Learned Special Prosecutor contended that the accused had used the arms and ammunitions for the purpose of demonstration. But on an analysis, there is no evidence available on record regarding usage of the arms and ammunition. Therefore the conviction and sentence imposed under Section 5 (1) (a) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, is not sustainable. The court below has not convicted the accused under Section 25 of the Act, despite the specific charge framed of having committed offence under the said provision. There is no specific reason stated in the impugned judgment as to why the accused are not guilty **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -21- under Section 25. It is provided under Section 25 (1B) (a) that, whoever acquires or has in possession or carries any firearm or ammunition in contravention of Section 3 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. In the case at hand, evidence adduced by the prosecution would clearly establish that the accused were having possession of th ammunition (Bombs) in contravention of Section 3. Therefore this court is of the opinion that accused 1 to 21 are guilty of offence under Section 25 (1B) (a) of the Arms Act, 1959. Hence we alter the conviction and sentence imposed by the court below under Section 5 (1) (a) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act to one under Section 25 (1B) (a) of the Arms Act. 12. Next question to be considered is as to whether the conviction and sentence imposed by the court below under Section 4 & 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, is sustainable or not. As already discussed above, the prosecution was successful in proving that the accused 1 to **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -22- 21 were having possession and control over the material objects which were recovered from the scene. Going by the definition of 'explosive substances' contained in Section 2 (a) of the Act, it includes materials for making any explosive substances and also any material used or intended to be used in causing or aiding in causing any explosion. As per Section 4 (b) of the Act, having possession and control of any explosive substances with the intent to endanger life or to enable any other person by means thereof to endanger life or to cause serious injury to property, is punishable, despite whether any explosion does or does not takes place. Therefore the prosecution has made out a case against accused 1 to 21 making them guilty of offence punishable under Section 4 (b) (i). The prosecution had also succeeded in proving that, accused 1 to 21 were knowingly in possession and control of the explosive substances so as to give rise to a reasonable suspension that such possession and control was not for any lawful object. The accused 1 to 21 had failed to show that they had in possession and **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -23- control of the explosive substance for any lawful objects. Therefore those accused have committed offence punishable under Section 5 (a) of the Explosive Substances Act. Hence we are inclined to uphold the convictions imposed by the court below under Section 4 & 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. 13. We may proceed to examine the question as to whether the conviction imposed against accused 1 to 21 under Sections 120 B, 143 read with Section 149 of IPC and also the conviction imposed against 1[st] accused under Sections 153 A and 153 B (1) (c) of IPC are sustainable or not. It is pertinent to note that the prosecution has not adduced any evidence with respect to activities of the organisations, who allegedly convened the camp in question. There is no evidence forthcoming as to who had invited the participants for attending the camp and in what manner the invitations were sent or circulated. Nothing is brought out as to prove that accused 1 to 21 had assembled there on the basis of any call made by any of the alleged **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -24- organisations, namely PFI or SDPI. But it is clear from the evidence on record that accused 1 to 21 had assembled there on the basis of a conspiracy hatched, to have training on weapons and hence committed the offence punishable under Section 120 B of IPC. There is also evidence to the effect that the accused 1 to 21 had assembled in the building in question with an unlawful object of acquiring training in the manufacture of Bombs and in usage of weapons; and the said unlawful assembly had committed offences as mentioned above. Therefore, conviction imposed by the court below under Section 143 read with Section 149 of IPC is sustainable. But with respect to conviction imposed against the 1[st] accused under Section 153A and 153B(1)(c) of I.P.C., as already found in the forgoing paragraphs, the prosecution has not succeeded in establishing with any convincing and acceptable evidence that, at the place of occurrence accused Nos.1 to 21 were engaged in training on making weapons or explosives with an intention to use the same to protest against the tortures **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -25- alleged to have been met by the members of the muslim community from other communities, especially from the hindus. Even though the prosecution case is that the unlawful assembly of accused Nos.1 to 21 at the place of occurrence was with an attempt to promote feelings of enmity between religions, especially between muslims and hindus, by delivering a speech which is likely to disturb public tranquility and by making assurances prejudicial to the national integration and for that purpose they used the Bombs and Sword for training youngsters for terrorist activities and also imparted training in making of country Bombs, the evidence adduced has not supported any such allegations regarding creating of any communal enmity between muslims and hindus. This court had already found that the sole evidence adduced through PW1 with respect to the alleged speech made by the 1[st] accused is not acceptable to sustain a conviction. Further, the Pamphlets and other printed materials recovered from the place of occurrence as well as from the house of the 3[rd] accused, do **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -26- not disclose any thing to establish that the unlawful assembly or the possession and control of the arms and the explosives substances, was intended for any purpose to promote enmity between different communities or that it is to disturb public tranquility or to use it any manner prejudicial to the national unity and integrity. Therefore, this court is of the considered opinion that the conviction imposed against the 1[st] accused under Sections 153A and 153B cannot be sustained. 14. A more important and crucial issue on which the appellants and the respondent are in great controversy is regarding sustainability of the conviction and sentence imposed for offences punishable under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short 'the UA(P) Act'). The court below had imposed conviction against accused Nos.1 to 21 under Sections 18 and 18A of the UA(P) Act. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that, the accused Nos.1 to 21 had not committed any terrorist act nor any act preparatory for commission of a terrorist act. He **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -27- further argued that the accused Nos.1 to 21 have not organised or caused to be organised any camp for imparting training in terrorism. While examining the question, it would be beneficial to have a scanning of the relevant provision in the UA(P) Act, defining the terms, 'Terrorism' as well as 'Terrorist act'. Section 2 (k) of UA(P) Act provides that “terrorist act” has the same meaning assigned to it in Section 15, and the expressions 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' shall be construed accordingly. Section 15 of the UA(P) Act envisages punishment for Terrorist activities. It provides that, whoever does any act with the intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or with the intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in people or any section of the people in India or in any country by using explosive substances and arms mentioned under Sub Section (a) or by any other means to cause or likely to cause death or injuries to any person or persons or loss or damage or destruction to property, is punishable under the said provision. Therefore, **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -28- the ingredients to constitute a 'terrorist act' are mainly that there should be an act committed with an intention to cause threat or likely to cause threat to the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of the India or with an intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in people or any section of people in the country. Secondly, there should be usage of the explosives or arms with the above said intent in order to cause or likely to cause death or injury to person or loss or damage or destruction to property. Sub Clause (b) and (c) to Section 15 are not relevant in this context. The question to be analysed is as to whether the unlawful assembly of accused Nos.1 to 21 and their possession and having control over the arms and explosive substances was with any intention to commit a 'terrorist act' or was in any manner preparatory to the commission of a 'terrorist act'. Learned Special Prosecutor argued that the intention with respect to the unlawful assembly and their possession and control over the substances need to be inferred as one intended to strike terror among people, even assuming that **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -29- there is no evidence to prove that it is intended to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of the country. He further contended that, use of such explosive substances for the purposes of demonstration would satisfy the ingredients of the usage, contemplated under clause (a) of Section 15. It is also contended that such usage, when it becomes likely to cause death or injury, can be considered as usage coming within the purview of that sub clause, dehorse whether any death or injury has sustained to any person or any damage or destruction had caused to any property. As we already discussed, the prosecution has not established through any convincing evidence the aims and the objectives or the activities of the organizations or regarding the motives and objectives in convening the alleged camp and in imparting training in manufacture and usage of the arms and the explosive substances. Despite the specific allegation that the accused were seen engaged in imparting training in manufacture of Bombs and in usage of arms, no cogent or convincing evidence is forthcoming **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -30- with respect to any training being conducted at the premises, apart from the possession and control over the incriminating substances. Further, the prosecution has not succeeded in proving through any credible evidence their specific case that, the assembly and the alleged training was with a declared intention to protect members of the particular community from the alleged torture of the other community, especially from hindus. Under such context, this court is of the view that the conviction imposed under Section 18A of UA(P) Act cannot be sustained in any manner. 15. A further question mooted for consideration is as to whether there was any usage of the Bombs or the Sword for any purposes as contemplated under Section 15 of the UA(P) Act or as to whether the demonstration of those materials can be considered as one to strike terror among the people or as one likely to strike terror among the people. **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -31- 16. Learned counsel for the appellants had drawn our attention to a decision of the honourable Supreme Court in **Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v. State of Maharashtra and others [AIR 1994 (SC)2623].** While dealing with sustainability of a punishment imposed under Section 3 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 'TADA' for short), which is almost in pari materia to Section 15 of the UA(P) Act , it was observed by the apex court that, a terrorist activity does not merely arise by causing disturbance of law and order or public order. The fall out of the intended activity must be such that, it travels beyond the capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to tackle it under the ordinary penal law. Experience has shown that “terrorism” is generally an attempt to acquire or maintain power or to control by intimidation and by causing fear and helplessness in the minds of the people at large or any section thereof, and is a totally abnormal phenomenon. What distinguishes “terrorism” from other form of violence **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -32- therefore appears to be the deliberate and systematic use of coercive intimidation. Even though crime committed by a 'terrorist' and an ordinary criminal would be overlapping to an extent, but then, it is not the intention of the legislature that every criminal should be tried under TADA, where the fall out of his activity does not extend beyond the normal frontiers of the ordinary criminal activity. The hon'ble apex court further observed that, every 'terrorist' may be a criminal. But every criminal cannot be given the label of a 'terrorist', only to set in motion the more stringent provisions of TADA. It is held that the criminal activity in order to invoke TADA must be committed with the requisite intention as contemplated by Section 3(1) of the Act by use of such weapons as enumerated in Section 3(1) and which causes or are likely to result in the offence as mentioned in the said Section. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on another decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in **Bonkya alias Bharat Shivaji Mane and others v.** **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -33- **State of Maharashtra (AIR 1996 SC 257).** The hon'ble apex court observed therein that, the prosecution in the said case has not brought out any evidence nor any circumstances on record from which any inference can be drawn that the appellants intended to strike terror amongst a particular community. The court observed that, it was not proper for the designated court to draw an inference of intention from the mere consequence, i.e., the victim belonging to a particular community. The court observed that, the trial court had failed in considering the essential requirements enumerated in the decision **Hitendra Vishnu** (cited supra) and other binding precedents of the apex court. In another decision cited on behalf of the appellants, **Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya (1990 AIR SC 1962)** the honourable Supreme Court observed that, when the designating court was right in coming to the conclusion that the intention of the accused persons was to eliminate 2 others with a view of gaining supremacy in the underworld, **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -34- a mere statement that the show-off of such violence would create terror or fear in the minds of the people and none would dire to oppose them, cannot constitute an offence under Section 3(1) of TADA. The hon'ble Supreme Court proceeded by observing that, it may indeed be a fall out of the violent act, but that cannot be said to be the intention of the perpetrators of the crime. On the facts it was observed that, the intention of the accused therein was clearly to eliminate them and not to strike terror in the people or on a section of the people. It would have been a different matter if to strike terror against some innocent people who were killed. In that case, the intention would have been to strike terror and killing to achieve that objective. But in the case dealt with by the apex court, the intention was only to liquidate two persons and thereby to achieve the objective of gaining supremacy in the underworld. It was found that, consequences of such violence is bound to cause panic and fear, but the intention of committing crime cannot be said to strike terror in the people or section **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -35- of the people. 18. In a later decision of the honourable Supreme Court in **Pulin Das @ Panna Koch v. State of Assam [2008 (2) KLT Suppl. 1200 (SC)]** , reference is made to the Supreme Court's decision which upheld validity of Sections 3 and 4 of TADA, the decision of the constitution bench reported in **State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (AIR 1952 SC 75)** and **A.R.Antulay v. Union of India (1988 2 SCC 764)** . Quotation of the relevant paragraph is that; “The Act intends to be very harsh and drastic containing the stringent provisions and provides minimum punishments and to some other offences enhanced penalties also. The provisions prescribing special procedures aiming at speedy disposal of cases, departing from the procedures prescribed under the ordinary procedural law are evidently for the reason that the prevalent ordinary procedural law was found to be inadequate and not sufficiently effective to deal with the offenders indulging in terrorist and disruptive activities.” **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -36- It is held by the honourable Supreme Court in **Pulin Das (supra)** that, activity which is sought to be punished under Section 3(1) of TADA has to be such, which cannot be classified as a mere law and order problem or disturbance of public order or disturbance of even tempo of the life of the community of any specified locality, but should be of the nature which cannot be tackled as an ordinary criminal activity under the ordinary penal law by the normal law enforcement agencies, because the intended extent and reach of the criminal activity of the 'terrorist' is such, which travels beyond gravity of the mere disturbance of public order even of a 'virulent nature' and may at times transcend the frontiers of the locality and may include such anti national activities, which throw a challenge to the very integrity and sovereignty of the country in its democratic polity. 19. The learned counsel had also placed reliance on a recent decision of the hon'ble apex court in **Ashrafkhan v. State of Gujarat [2012(4) KLT SN 30 (C.No.30) SC]** in **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -37- order to point out the observations contained therein that, while resorting to TADA, the safeguards provided therein must scrupulously be followed. In the country of Mahatma, “means are more important than the end”. Invocation of TADA without following the safeguards resulting into acquittal gives an opportunity to many and also to the enemies of the country to propagate that it has been misused and abused. District Superintendent of Police and Inspector General of Police and all others entrusted with the task of operating the law must not do anything which allows its misuse and abuse and ensure that no innocent person has the feeling of sufferance only because “My name is Khan, but I am not a terrorist”. 20. On the facts of the case at hand, learned counsel argued that, mere presence of the accused persons at the place of occurrence cannot be considered as preparatory for committing any terrorist act. In this regard, he had placed reliance on a decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in **Chaturi Yadav v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1412)** . **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -38- In the said case, while dealing with the question as to whether the presence of the accused at the particular time and place can be inferred as for the purpose of committing dacoity, it was observed that, the fact that they had assembled at a lonely place at 1 a.m. and they could give no explanation for their presence at that odd hour of the night cannot be inferred as for the purpose of committing dacoity or for any preparation of committing the same. The mere fact that those persons were found at that time, thus does not by itself, prove that they have assembled for the purpose of committing dacoity or for making preparation to accomplish that object, is the findings. On the facts of the case at hand it is contended that, the evidence adduced by the prosecution regarding assembly of the accused persons or their possession and control over the explosive substances and the arms, cannot be inferred as one intended for striking terror or as preparatory to commit any terrorist act. Nor it can be inferred that the possession of those substances are intended to endanger or likely to **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -39- endanger any person or property. Therefore no offence under the UA(P) Act is made out, is the contention. 21. Per contra, the Special Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the N.I.A. contended that, the accused persons failed in giving any proper or convincing explanation with respect to their presence at the place of the occurrence and also with respect to the possession and control over the explosive substances and arms. Therefore it is contended that, the court has to draw an inference that the unlawful assembly and the possession and the control of explosive substances and arms are preparatory to commit a terrorist act, coming within the purview of Section 15 of the UA(P) Act. He had placed reliance on a decision of the honourable Supreme Court **Munna Kumar Upadhyay v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2012)6 SCC 174** ]. It is held therein that, the statement of the accused can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admissions if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any inquiry or trial, but it is not strictly evidence in the **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -40- case. The provision of Section 313(4) explicitly provides that the answers given in the case may be taken into consideration in such trial and put in evidence against the accused in any other enquiry or trial for any other offence for which such answers may tend to show that he has committed. In other words, the use is permissible as per the provisions of the code, but has its own limitations. The courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him, let in by the prosecution. However, such statements made under this section should not be considered in isolation, but in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The decision further observes that, if the accused gave incorrect and false answers during the course of his statement under 313 Cr.P.C. , the court can draw an adverse inference against him. Referring to another decision of the honourable Supreme Court in **Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2014) 5 SCC 353]** it is pointed out that, the accused had a duty to **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -41- furnish an explanation in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. regarding any incriminating material which has been produced against him. If the accused has given the freedom to remain silent during the investigation as well as before the court, then the accused may choose to maintain silence or even remain in complete denial when his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is being recorded. However, in such an event the court would be entitled to draw an inference, including such adverse inference against the accused as may be permissible in accordance with law. Learned Special Public Prosecutor also placed reliance in support of the above dictum in the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in **Phula Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(2014) 4 SCC 9].** 22. In the case at hand, statements given by the accused Nos.1 to 21 under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is to the effect that, at the relevant place and time they were waiting outside at the building at the place of occurrence for having a meeting of a Trust named 'Thanal', for the purpose **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -42- of collecting funds for completing construction of the building which is owned by the said Trust. It is stated that, the said building was in fact remaining locked from outside at that time and the police authorities have entered the building by breaking open the lock. Even though some of the persons who were present there had left the scene on noticing the act of the police, accused Nos.1 to 18 remained there and the police have called them inside the room and taken them into custody. They have denied of having any connection with respect to the substances alleged to have recovered from the place of occurrence, and also denied the recovery of such material objects from the place. 23. Question to be considered is as to whether an adverse inference with respect to guilt of the accused can be drawn, because they have failed in establishing the version put forth by them through the statement made under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In the case at hand, the prosecution has not conducted any investigation with **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -43- respect to the source or procurance of the incriminating materials. There is no evidence adduced as to who had purchased those materials or from where it was purchased. The prosecution had also failed in bringing any evidence to prove that the possession and control of the explosive substances or the arms, was intended for the purpose of striking terror or likely to strike terror based on any communal rivalry or violence. Nor they have established that the accused persons were indulging any preparatory activity to commit any terrorist act. Therefore, the trial court has not put any specific question to the accused persons in this respect. It is true that the accused persons have failed in offering any explanation in their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., with respect to their presence at the scene. But that by itself cannot be used to fill up the lacuna in the evidence of the prosecution to find guilt on the accused with respect to any terrorist activity or with respect to preparation of committing any terrorist activity. For the said reasons, argument advanced on behalf of the **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -44- prosecution cannot be accepted. In the case at hand, provisions of the law contained in the respective statutes have adequately taken care to meet the situation and to convict the accused under the common law. We are not persuaded to accept that any offence under UA(P) Act has been established by the prosecution to sustain the conviction, in addition to those provisions of law under which conviction is imposed against the accused persons, which were already upheld by this court. 24. Crl.Appeal No.316 of 2016 is filed challenging acquittal of the accused No.22. Learned special prosecutor contended that, the evidence adduced by the prosecution through testimony of PW1 and PW3 would indicate that accused No.22 was present at the spot and he was guarding the premise where the training in the manufacture of Bomb was going on. It is contended that, there is evidence that he ran away from the scene on seeing the police party. It is also pointed out that, a scooter belonging to the said accused was seized from the place near the building in **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -45- question on 25.4.2013. It is also pointed out that in the search conducted at the house of the accused No.22 various incriminating materials as well as dangerous weapons were recovered. The said evidence available on record would only lead to an inference of participation of the said accused in the crime, is the contention. As pointed out by the trial court in the judgment impugned, the name of the 22[nd] accused does not find a place in the FIR. Evidence of PW10 is to the effect that, identity of the said accused was revealed to PW1 from the spot of occurrence itself, even before conducting the search. If that would have been the case, there was no reason to omit the name of 22[nd] accused in Ext.P10. It is evident from the records that the 22[nd] accused was implicated in the crime only through a report submitted on 26.4.2013, which had reached to the court only on 2.5.2013. With respect to seizure of the Scooter from a place near to the place of occurrence after 2 days of the occurrence, there is no clear evidence to show that he was using the vehicle during the relevant time. The **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -46- testimony of PW21 who is the brother-in-law of the brother of accused No.22 is that, he was using the vehicle during the relevant time. With respect to seizure of the weapons from the house of the 22[nd] accused, the prosecution case itself was that the building belongs to the mother of the 22[nd] accused and it was occupied by PW21 on rental basis. There is no evidence to show that the accused No.22 was present in the said house. There is no convincing evidence available to hold that accused No.22 was occupying the room from where recoveries were effected. For the above said reasons, the court below was correct and justified in acquitting 22[nd] accused, having found him not guilty of the offence alleged. 25. Result of the above discussion is that, the conviction rendered by the court below with respect to the appellants in Crl.A.147/2016 (Accused Nos. 1 to 21) under Section 120B, 143 read with Sec. 149 of IPC and Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, hereby confirmed. Conviction imposed by the court below under **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -47- section 5 (1)(a) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act will stand altered to Section 25 (1)(B)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959. The conviction and sentence imposed against the accused under Sections 153 A, 153 B(i)(c) of IPC stand set aside. The conviction and sentence under Sections 18 and 18A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act will also stand set aside. The appellants are acquitted of those offences. 26. Crl. Appeal No. 231 of 2016 is filed by the National Investigating Agency seeking enhancement of the sentence imposed by the court below. After hearing both sides at length on the question of inadequacy of the term of imprisonment imposed by the court below, we are of the considered opinion that the simple imprisonment of 5 years along with fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, imposed for both the offences are inadequate. We are inclined to enhance the sentence both under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, to a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six years and a fine of Rs. 1000/- each for accused Nos. 1 to 21, under each of the Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive **Crl. Appeal Nos. 147, 231 & 316/2016** -48- Substances Act; and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. Accused Nos. 1 to 21 are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-(Rupees one thousand only) each and in default to simple imprisonment for a further period of one month with respect to the offence under Section 25 (1)(B)(a) of the Arms Act. We are not persuaded to alter the term of sentence imposed with respect to other offences which are confirmed herein above. The substantive term of imprisonment will run concurrently. Appellants 1 to 21 are entitled to set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, Crl. Appeal Nos. 147/2016 and 231 of 2016 stands allowed in part, as mentioned above. Crl.Appeal No. 316 of 2016 is hereby dismissed. ## Sd/- ## **C.K. ABDUL REHIM, JUDGE** . Sd/- ## **B. SUDHEENDRA KUMAR, JUDGE** . **DL/AMG/** ani True copy ## P.A. to Judge