High CourtDivision BenchAppeals dismissed

COMMR. OF INCOME TAX v. VIKRAM COTTON MILLS

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 689692 (NT) of 1975
Neutral Citation:1988 SCR (2) 389

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • SABYASACHI MUKHARJI
  • S. RANGANATHAN
Judgment Date
1987-12-15
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals dismissed; High Court’s view that the income from letting the assets constituted business income was upheld; Special leave petitions dismissed with no order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeals dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Commissioner of Income Tax

Respondents

  • Vikram Cotton Mills Ltd.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • A. Subhashini

Counsels for Respondents

  • • D. D. Gupta

Case Synopsis & Summary

This case concerns whether income earned by Vikram Cotton Mills Ltd. from letting its assets during a reconstruction phase should be taxed as profits and gains of business (section 10) or as income from other sources (section 12) of the Income Tax Act. The respondent company, a textile manufacturer, had run into losses from 1949 and ceased manufacturing by December 1953. In 1956 a High Court scheme under insolvency provisions transferred management to a Board of Trustees and let the business assets to General Fibres Dealers (Pvt.) Ltd. for Rs. 2.5 lakh annually, for an initial ten years with renewal options. The lease proceeds were intended to pay creditors, enabling liquidation of liabilities and possible revival of the business. Income from the lease was initially assessed as business income (years 1957-58 to 1959-60) under section 10, but subsequent assessments treated it as income from other sources under section 12. The Income-Tax Tribunal directed that the income be treated as business income, and the Allahabad High Court upheld this view, holding that the lease was part of exploiting the company’s assets for its business. The Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court held that whether lease income is business income depends on how the assets are exploited and the intention inferred from the facts. It affirmed that a temporary lease of a commercial asset can still be business income where the asset is intended to be used in the business or to be temporarily utilized to sustain business operations. The appeals were dismissed with costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 10 of the Income Tax ActSection 12 of the Income Tax ActSection 24 of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913Section 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940Section lOA of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940Section 2(4) of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922Section 5 of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922Article 136 of the ConstitutionRule 4(4) of the First Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940Section 6 of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Continuous exercise of an activity (defined broadly as business)
  • Business income need not be tied to self-use of assets; a commercial asset can yield business income when exploited for the business
  • Intention, inferred from facts, governs the classification between business income and rental income
  • The ‘commonsense’ view of business: asset utilization should be judged in the context of the business’s ongoing activity, not merely by immediate use by the owner
  • Expressions like 'man on the top of the platform omnibus' and 'director’s arm chair' illustrating practical business judgment
  • In a season when an asset is temporarily not used in manufacturing, income from letting can still be business income if the asset remains a part of the business asset and is exploited for profit

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The Commissioner contends that the crucial question is whether the income arising from letting out assets constitutes business income. The determination should hinge on the manner of exploitation and the underlying intention. If the asset remains a commercial asset of the business and is exploited to earn profit, the income should be treated as business income, even if the asset is temporarily idle or leased out for a fixed period to meet financial exigencies. The decision in Lakshmi Silk Mills and related authorities support treating such income as business income, and the possibility of set-off of losses under Section 24 depends on the income being in the business stream.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent-assessee argues that the assets were let out primarily to liquidate colossal liabilities in a financial crisis and that there was no intention to discontinue manufacturing. The lease was a temporary, reconstructive measure, and the assets remained part of the business assets with the aim of reviving production. Therefore, income from the lease should be treated as income from other sources or at least not automatically as business income; the Tax Tribunal’s findings that the letting was a temporary step for liquidation support this view.

Cited Precedents (6)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Bombay City v. Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills Ltd.20 ITR 451PositiveCited to support a broad concept of business income arising from exploitation of a commercial asset.
Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Calcutta National Bank Ltd.37 ITR 171PositiveAffirms that ‘business’ is a wide term and income from letting can be part of business income under appropriate circumstances.
Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax26 ITR 765PositiveUsed to discuss the business nature and amalgamation concepts; supports broad interpretation of business income.
Inland Revenue Commissioner v Broadway Car Ltd.[1946] 2 All ER 609PositiveEmphasizes the test of ‘continuous exercise’ of an activity as the essence of business.
Commissioner of Income Tax v Shaw Wallace & Co.[1932] ILR 59 Cal. 1343PositiveDefines 'business' as a broad concept involving continuous activity; supports the reasoning.
New Savan Sugar and Gur Refining Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta14 ITR 7PositiveIllustrates that intention to part with the entire machinery for rent can still fall within business income depending on context.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, _v._ VIKRAM COTTON MILLS LTD. DECEMBER 15, 1987 [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.] _Whether the income_ _of the_ _assessee_ _company which_ _lets_ _out_ _its_ _assets temporarily_ is _liable to_ _tax_ _as_ _"profits and gains_ _of business" or_ _"Income from other sources"-Sections_ _10_ _and_ _12_ _of the_ _Income_ _Tax_ _Act._ A B c D E F #, The respondent, the assessee company, carried on business of manufacture of textiles. From the year 1949, the respondent started running into losses, resulting in the stoppage of its manufacturing acti· vity from December, 1953. In May, 1956, one of the creditors of the company filed a winding up petition in the High Court. One major creditor of the respondent company, in exercise of its powers under an English mortgage of the iv<ed assets of the company took actual possession of the immovable properties hypothecated to the creditor. The High Court, with the approval of the assessee company and its creditors, evolved a scheme whereunder the business assets of the company were let out on a rent of Rs.2,50,000 per year. The lease was for ten years with option of renewal for another ten years. The intention was that the various creditors wonld be paid out of the lease money. The lease money realised by the company for the assessment years 1957-58 to 1959-60 was assessed by the Income Tax Department under section 10 of the Income Tax Act under the head "Profits and gains of business". But in the subsequent assessment years, the Income Tax Officer held that income from the lease rent was liable to be assessed under the head "Income from other sources" under section 12 of the Act. The assessee company filed an appeal against the order of the Income Tax Officer. The Commissioner upheld the order of the Income Tax Officer. The assessee took the matter to the Income Tax Tribunal. The Tribunal directed the Income Tax Officer t0- treat the income arising out of the letting out of the assets as 'business income'. The matter then went to G the High Court. The High Court held that the income derived by the assessee company by way of the lease rent from the letting out of the assets during the years ending 3 lst December, 1959, 3 lst December, 1960, 31st December, 1961and3lst December, 1962, is assessible to tax under the head "profits and gains of business". Aggrieved by the deci- H sion of the High Court, the revenue appealed to this Court. 389 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R. A Dismissing the appeal (as also the connected petitions for special leave), the Court, HELD: Whether a particular income received by the assessee as a result of the activities carried on by the assessee is business income or B rental income depends upon the manner of the exploitation of the assets of the assessee. It only varies from the facts and circumstances of each case. In each case, the intention has to be gathered as to whether the commercial asset was intended to be exploited by the assessee or whether it was intended to be used by letting it out for a temporary, period. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that it -~ was a possible conclusion that the assessee intended that there should be ## C a temporary suspension of the business for the purpose of re-cons- l truction of the company and for that matter, there must be stopping of the user of the machinery by the assessee. It was a temporary lease though for to or 19 years on renewal, and after the expiry of the period, the property reverted hack to the assessee. It is pre-dominantly a mat· D ter of intention, which is an inference to be drawn from the relevant facts. All the relevant facts, it appears, have been considered by the Tribunal from the correct stand-point. The Tribunal found that the intention was not to part with the macltine but to lease it out for a temporary period as a part of exploitation. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that no business was carried on and the income derived from the machine letting out was only a rent income, and in the facts E and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that such a finding was perverse or not sustainable. The High Court was right in the view it took. [398F; 399E-H; 400A-BJ _Commissioner_ _of_ _Excess Profits_ _Tax,_ _Bombay City_ v. _Shri_ F _Lakshmi Silk Mills Ltd.,_ 20 ITR 451; _Commissioner_ _of Income_ _Tax,_ _West Bengal_ v. _Calcutta National Bank Ltd.,_ 37 ITR 171; _Narain_ _Swadeshi Weaving Mills_ v. _Commissioner_ _of Excess Profits_ _Tax,_ 26 ITR 765; _Inland Revenue Commtsisoner_ v. _Broadway car Ltd,_ [1946] 2 AER 609; _Commissioner of Income Tax_ v. _Shaw Wallace_ _&_ _Co.,_ [1932] ILR 59 Cal. 1343 and _New Savan Sugar and Gur refining_ _Co._ _Ltd._ v. G _Commissioner of Income Tax,_ _Calcutta,_ _14_ ITR 7, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 689692 (NT) of 1975. From the Judgment and Order dated 8.5.1973 of the Allahabad H High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 453 of 1971. COMMR. OFJNCOMETAXv. VIKRAM COTTON MILLS [MUKHARJJ,J.I 391 Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant. A , ..,, D. D. Gupta for the Respondent. The J udgment of the Court was delivered by **SABYASACHI** **MUKHARJI,** J. These appeals by special leave B arise from the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court at the instance of the revenue. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, referred the following question of law for the opinion of the Allahabad High Court: (The question related to the assessment years 1960-61, 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64). c "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income derived by the assessee company by way of lease rent from the letting out of its assets during the years ended 31.12.59, 31. 12.60, 31.12.61 and 31. 12.62 is assessable to tax under the head 'Profits and gains of business' or under the head 'Income from other sources'?" D The assessee company was a limited company. It carried on the business of manufacture of textiles. From 1949, the assessee company started running into losses. At the end of December, 1953, the position was that as against the capital of Rs.11,00,000 the accumulated liabilities of the assessee company amounted to Rs.26,00,000. Because E of this the assessee company stopped its manufacturing activity from December, 1953. This state of affair continued till 21.5.56 when one of the creditors of the company filed a winding up petition in the High Court. M/s Industrial Finance Corporation, who was one of the major creditors of the company, had in exercise of its powers under an English mortgage of the fixed assets of the company taken actual F physical possession of the immovable properties hypothecated to them. Under Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act 1913, the High #, Court with the approval of the assessee company and the creditors evolved a scheme whereunder the business assets of the assessee company were let out to M/s General Fibres Dealers (Pvt.) Ltd., Calcutta on Rs.2,50,000 per year rent. The lease was for ten years with an G option of renewal for another ten years. The intention, it was contended, was that the various creditors would be paid out of the lease money. The management of the assessee company was transferred to a Board of Trustees appointed by the High Court. The lease money realised by the assessee company for assessment years 1957-58 to 195960 was assessed by the Department under Section 10 of the Indian H 392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 2 S.C.R. A Income· Tax Act under the head 'Profits and gains of business'. But in subsequent assessment years the Income-Tax Officer held that the income from the lease rent was liable to be taxed undet. the head 'income from other sources' under section 12 of the Act. The assessee company took the matter up in appeal. It was urged before the Com· missioner that the assets of the company were exploited and there was B no intention of the assessee to discontinue the business activities. The assets of the company, were let to the lessee with the principal object ).. of liquidating a colossal liability and extricating itself from financial crises. The Commissioner, however, upheld the finding of the IncomeTax Officer. The assessee company then took the matter to the tri· _J_ bunal. The Tribunal found: _A_ c 1. There was nothing on record to indicate that the assessee,.J company. was formed to let out its plant and machil)ery on hire. _.j r', _)_ #### ~ -+ D E F 2. On account of financial crisis, the assessee company found it advantageous to let out the machinery for a temporary period of ten years to the lessee. 3. The ass<..,J. e company was able to liquidate its liabilities at the end of such period and regain the physical possession of its assets. 4. The assessee company was able to persuade its creditors not to make any distress sale of the machinery taken over by the Industrial Finance Corporation with a view to salvage the company from its total e.ttinguishment. 5. At the end of the lease period, the assessee company did not dismantle the assets and did not sell away or otherwise dispose of the assets. It appears that the maintenance of the assets by the company meant that the company had intention to restart manufacturing of G textiles. The Tribunal inferred that the intention of the company in letting out its assets was to exploit the commercial assets for the purpose of its business. The Income· Tax officer was directed to treat the income arising out of the letting out of the assets as business income. H The High Court noted in the Judgment under appeal which inci· COMMR. OF INCOME TAX _v._ VIKRAM COTTON MILLS (MUKHARJI.J.] 393 dentally is reported in ITR Vol. 106 ( 1977) at page 829 that the assesA see's case was that the income received by it from the lease of the plant and machinery was business income and was liable to be adjusted .. against the unabsorbed loss of the preceding year. It is here that the question arises. If it was business income then the unabsorbed loss of the preceding year could be adjusted against such income. If on the other hand it was not, then such income could not be adjusted against B ~ the loss of the previous year. The rub of the matter lies there. It is well-known that Section 24 of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922, deals with set off and carry forward of losses. Under Sub,section (1) where an assessee sustains a loss of profits or gains in any year under any of the head mentioned in Section 6, he shall be entitled to c have the amount of the loss set off against his income profits or gains ~ ~ ~ under any other head in that year. Sub-section (2) provides that where an assessee suffers loss in any business and the loss cannot be wholly set off under sub-section (1), the unabsorbed loss shall be carried _t_ forward to the succeeding year and shall be set off against the income from the same business. Before the loss could be carried forward it was D necessary that the income against which the loss has to be set off should be _income from any business_ (emphasis supplied). It was submitted before the High Court on behalf of the assessee that the plant and machinery of the factory were commercial assets and any income from the letting out of such an asset would be the business E income. In support, reliance was placed upon several decisions of this Court. One among them is the decision in the case of _Commissioner of_ _Commissioner of_ J,,. _i"_ _Excess Profits Tax, Bombay City_ v. _Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills Ltd.,_ 20 I.T.R. 451. This Court in _Commissioner of Income-tax West Bengal_ v. _Calcutta National Bank Ltd.,_ 37 I.T.R. 171 dealing with excess profit tax case, explained tha: the concept of profit and business was little wider under Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940. The High Court relied on the several decisions, namely, the decision in the case of _Commis-_ #, sioner of Excess Profits Tax, Bombay City v. Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills I.T.R. 451. This Court in _Commissioner of Income-tax West Bengal_ v. _Calcutta National Bank Ltd.,_ 37 I.T.R. 171 dealing with excess profit tax case, explained tha: the concept of profit and business was little F wider under Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940. The High Court relied on the several decisions, namely, the decision in the case of _Commis-_ _sioner of Excess Profits Tax, Bombay City_ v. _Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills_ _'Ltd.,_ (supra) and _Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills_ v. _Commissioner of_ _Excess Profits Tax,_ 26 ITR 765. In view of the above decisions, the ~ High way of Court lease rent from the letting out of its assets during the years held that the income derived by the assessee company by G r~ ended 31st December, 1959, 31st December, 1960, 31st December, 1961 and 31st December, 1962, is assessable to tax under the head profits and gains of business. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision revenue has come up H A 394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R. in appeal before this Court by Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. Whether a particular income received by the assessee as a rest.tit of activities carried on by the assessee is business income or rental income depends upon the manner of the exploitation of the assets of the assessee. It only varies from facts and circumstances of each case. B This question was discussed in detail by this Court in _Commis·_ _sioner of Excess Profits_ _Tax,_ _Bombay City_ v. _Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills_ _Ltd.,_ (supra) where this Court found that if a commercial asset was not capable of being used as such, then its being let out to others did not result in an income which was the income of the business but it could not be said .that an asset which was acquired and used for the purpose c of the business ceased to be a commercial asset of that business as soon as it was temporarily put out of use _or let out to another person for use in his business or trade. The yield of income by a commercial asset was the profit of the business irrespective of the manner in which that asset was exploited by the owner of the business. He was entitled to exploit it to the best advantage and he might do so either by using it himself D personally or by letting it out to somebody else. The view that in order to constitute business income the commercial asset must at the time it was let out be in a condition to be used as commercial asset by the assessee himself was not correct. In that case the assessee company was a manufacturer of silk cloth and as a part of its business it installed a plant for dyeing silk yarn. Dµring the chargeable accounting period, E Ist January, 1943 to 3 lst December, 1943 owing to difficulty in obtain ing silk yarn on account of the war it could not make use of this plant and it remained idle for some time. In August, 1943, it was let out to a person on a monthly rent. The question was whether such sum representing the rent· for five months realised by the assessee was chargeable to excess profits tax as profits of business or was income from F other sources and was therefore not chargeable to excess profits tax. It was held by this Court that it was a part of the normal activities of the assessee's business to earn money by making use of its machinery by either employing in its own manufacturing concern or temporarily letting it to others for making profit for that business when for the time .being it could not it!;elf run it and that the dyeing plant had not ceased to be a commercial asset of the business and the sum.representing the rent for five months received from the lessee by the assessee was therefore income from business and was chargeable to excess profits tax. As mentioned hereinbefore, the question arose in the context of Excess Profit Tax Act; the con~equence will be the same in the case of Income-Tax Act. This Court observed·llJ¥litt lhat tht'1 yMd of income H by a commercial asset irrespective of the manner in which the assets _)_ c D E F # t COMMR. OF INCOME TAX _v._ VIKRAM COTTON MILLS lMUKHARJI, J.] 395 " ~ are exploited by the owner of the business would be income from A business. It was emphasised that the assessee was entitled to exploit it to the best advantage and he might do so either by using it himself personally or by letting it out to somebody else. This Court gave an example. For instance, in a manufacturing concern use of its plant and machinery could advantageously be made owing to the paucity of raw materials only for six hours in a working day, and in order to get the B best yield out of it, another person who has got the requisite raw materials is allowed to use it as a licensee on payment of certain consideration for three hours. The question was posed: could it be said in such a situation with any justification that the amount realised from the licensee was not a part of the business income of the licensor. The ~. Court noted that in that case the company was incorporated purely as a c manufacturing concern with the object of making profit. It had installo., led plant and machinery for the purpose of its business and it was part of it, if at any time it found that any part of its plant "for the time being" could not be advantageously employed for earning profit by the ~ company itself, to earn profit by leasing it to somebody else. In such circumstances, it would be improper to refuse it to treat it as such D being the advantage of business income. This Court noted the observations of the Court of Appeal in _Inland Revenue Commissioner_ v. _Broadway Car Co_ _Ltd.,_ [1946] 2 A ER 609. In that case the company had carried on the business of motor car agents and repairers on land l held company's business had dwindled under war conditions to such on lease from 1935 to 1956 at an annual rent of £750. By 1940 the an E extent that no more than one third of the land was required. In those circumstances the remainder was sublet for fourteen years at an annual rent of £1150. The General Commissioner of Income Tax decided that the difference of £400 between the outgoing of £750 for the land retained and the incoming of£ 1150 for the land disposed of was "income received from an investment", and business not being one within the F special categories mentioned in the Finance Act 1939 that £400 was not taxable. Lord Scott, J. held that the word 'investment' must be construed in the ordinary popular sense of the word as used by business men and not as a term of art to say that the Commissioners had erred in law in coming to the conclusion that the transaction resulted in an ~. investment. Lord Scott, J. emphasised on the point that after the G _!'_ business of the company had dwindled, it partitioned part of the land from the. rest and sublet it by iastalling a heating apparatus for the ~~ sublessee. It was found that war conditions had reduced the company's business to very small proportions and they cut their loss by going out of business in respect of the major part of their land and put it out of their power for fourteen years to resume business there. In such a H 396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 2 S.C.R. A situation, it could not be business any more. That was a peculiar circumstance when the assessee had a desire to part with that type of business. Therefore, whether a particular income is from business or from investment must be decided according to the general commonsense view of those who deal with those matters in the particular circumstances and conduct of the parties concerned. Has the assessee B evidenced any intention to switch over from exploitation of assets by itself and used the asset as a rented one? c D This Court in the aforesaid decision found that it was a part of the normal activities of the assessee's business to earn money by making use of his machinery by either employing it in his own manufactur- _,).,_ ing concern or temporarily letting it to others for making profit for that business when for the time being it could not itself run it. The High Court in that case was in error, therefore, in holding that the dyeing ~ plant had ceased to be a commercial asset of the assessee and the income earned by it and received from M/s Parakh & Co was charge- able to excess profits tax. This Court had again occasion to examine this question in _Narain_ _Swadeshi Weaving Mills_ v. _Commissioner_ _of Excess Profits_ _Tax,_ 26 ITR 765. That was a case under Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. It was observed by this Court that before the Excess Profits Tax Officer could embark upon an enquiry as to whether a transaction was effected for E. the avoid'ance or reduction of laibility to excess profits tax within the meaning of Section lOA of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 and to make such adjustments as he considered appropriate under that section there must be proof that the assessee was, during the chargeable ~ accounting period, carrying on business of kind referred to in Section 5 of the Act. There the assessee firm was carrying on a manufacturing F business consisting of three partners, N and his two sons R and G. In April 1940 a public limited company was incorporated with the' object of tal\ing over the business from the assessee firm. The Company was director-controlled and the directors were N, his three sons R, G and Sand a brother-in-law of G. the company purchased only the buildings and leasehold rights from the assessee firm but took over from it on G lease at an annual rent the plant and machinery. The assessee firm did " not thereafter manufacture anything and it had accordingly no further trading or commercial acitivity. In July, 1940 the company executed a ###### 1 managing agency agreement in favour of U & Co. consisting of Rand Gas partners. In January, 1941, the company appointed as its selling agent R & Co. consisting of R, G and Sas partners. In April, 1941, the H shares of the partners in the assessee firm were adjusted so as to COMMR. OF INCOME TAX _v._ VIKRAM COTTON MILLS [MUKHARJI, J .I 397 equalise, as far as possible, the share of N with the shares which his A sons got in the several firms. All the three firms were registered under ' whether Section 26A of the Indian Income-Tax Act, the Excess Profits Tax Authorities were justified in amal-1922. The question was gamating the income of U & Co. and R & Co. with the income of the a!iS~ssee firm under the provisions of Section lOA of the Excess Profits B Tax Act, 1940. It was held that in the facts and circumstances of the )( case the letting out of the plant and machinery by the assessee firm to the company could not be held to fall within the body of the definition of "business" under section 2(5) and as the assessee firm had, there. fore, no business during the relevant peri.od to which the Act applied, fore, no business during the relevant peri.od to which the Act applied, ~ Section lOA could not be invoked by the Excess Profits Tax Autho rities. It was further held that the application of Section lOA with a c ,,l view to amalgamating the income of the firms of U with the income of the assessee firm was not valid in & law. Co. and R & Co. ~ view to amalgamating the income of the firms of U & Co. and R & Co. with the income of the assessee firm was not valid in law. _1_ Dealing with this question, this Court noted that "business" as defined under Section 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act included amongst others, any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adven- D ture in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. The first part of this definition of a "business" in the Excess Profits Tax Act is the same as the definition of a business in Section 2( 4) of the Indian Income-Tax ~ Act, 1922. Whether a particulr activity amounted to any trade, cornmerce or manufacture or any adventure in the nature of trade, cornmerce or manufacture is always a difficult question to answer. The E Judicial Committee noted in the case of _Commissioner of Income-tax_ v. _Shaw Wallace_ & _Co.,_ [1932] l.L.R. 59 Cal. 1343 that the words used ~ _>_ in the definition are no doubt wide but underlying each of them is the fundamental idea of the _continuous exercise_ _of an_ _activity,_ (emphasis supplied). It was also emphasised by this Court that the word "business" indicated some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose. In that case, this #, Court pointed out the difference between Excess Profits Tax Act and ~ _>_ fundamental idea of the _continuous exercise_ _of an_ _activity,_ (emphasis supplied). It was also emphasised by this Court that the word "business" indicated some real, substantial and systematic or organised F course of activity or conduct with a set purpose. In that case, this Court pointed out the difference between Excess Profits Tax Act and the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922. So far as the question before us is concerned, this difference is not material. ~ Shri Manchanda, learned counsel for the revenue draw our at- G .ten.lion to _Commissioner_ _of_ _Income-tax, West Bengal_ v. _Calcutta_ _National Bank Ltd.,_ 371.T.R. 171. This Court reiterated that the term ### + "business" is a word of very wide, though by no means determinate, scope. There ihe assessee, which was a banking company in a large way of business, owned a six-storeyed building, where its offices were H located on the ground floor and a part of the sixth floor, while the rest # t A B c D E F G H 398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R. of the building was let out to tenants. The question was whether the income realised by the assessee by way of rent for the portion of the building let out was liable to excess profits tax and could be included in the profits of the business under rule 4( 4) of the First Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. It was held that the realisation of rental income by the assessee was in the course of its business in prosecution of one of its objects in the memorandum. It depends in the facts and circumstances of each case. In _New Savan Sugar and Gur Refining Co._ _Ltd._ v. _Commissioner_ _of Income Tax, Calcutta,_ 74 I.T.R. 7, this Court was dealing with a case, where the appellant-company was carrying on the business of crushing sugarcane and gur refining. Its managing agents wrote a letter addressed to its shareholders referring to the alarming increase of Government interference in the affairs of this sugar industry in Bihar and the increase of wages of the workers, the levy of a cess and deterioration in cane crops and advising the acceptance of an offer of the lease of the company as a running concern. Thereafter examination, it was found that the cumulative effect of different clauses of the deed suggested that the assessee would have no concern with the production of the company. It was therefore held that the terms of the lease deed that the intention of the appellant was to part with the entire machinery of the factory and the premises with the obvious purpose of earning rental income and not to treat the factory and the machinery as a commercial asset during the subsistence of the lease. In each case the intention has to be gathered as to whether the commercial asset was intended to be exploited by the assessee or whether it was intended to be used by letting it out for a temporary period. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The circumstances of the instance case were as follows as appears from the Statement of the case: "The assessee-company incurred losses in its business of manufacture of textiles from the year 1949. On account of heavy losses, its manufacturing activities were stopped from December, 1953. By 1956, colossal loss had accumulated. Its liabilities had amounted to Rs.26 lakhs as against the capital of Rs.11 lakhs. A winding-up petition was filed in the Allahabad High Court by the creditors. M/s. Jawala Prasad Radha Krishan in February 1954. The Industrial Finance Corporation was one of the creditors of the company and the company had a liability of Rs.12.5 lakhs to COMMR. OF INCOME TAX _v._ VIKRAM COTTON MILLS [MUKHARJI, J.] 399 that undertaking secured by the fixed assets in terms of a A mortgage deed dated 19.12.1950. The Punjab National Bank had advanced a loan of Rs.6.5 lakhs to the company by movable assets of the company such as cotton, cloth and yam. The Industrial Finance Corporation had taken physiea! possession of the immovable properties of the company on 12th July, 1954, on the company's failure to pay off its B debts to the I.F.C. The High Court thereafter approved a scheme, by an order dated 21.5.1956 whereby the assets and the entire business of the assessee-company were let - ~ out to M/s. General Fibres Dealers (Pvt.) Ltd., Calcutta, at a least rent of Rs.2,50,000 per year. The management of the assessee company was transferred to a Board of c Trustees appointed by the High Court pursuant to the ~ scheme referred to above. According to the terms of the ~ lease dated 7. 7. 1956 with the lessee, the General Fibres _i_ Dealers (Pvt.) Ltd., the assets of the company were let out for an initial period of ten years, with a right given to the lessee to exercise the option for a further period of ten D years. The assesse-company had maintained a skeleton staff thereafter." ##### _f._ **l** )' In the context of these facts, it appears that it was a possible conclusion that the assessee intended that there should be a temporary suspension of the business for the purpose of reconstruction of the E company and for that matter there must be stoppage of the user of the machinery by the assessee. It was temporary lease though for 10 or 19 years on renewal years and after the expiry of the period the property reverted back to the assessee. It is pre-dominantly a matter of intention. Intention is an infer- F ence to be drawn from the relevant facts. All the relevant facts, it appears have been considered by the Tribunal from the correct standpoint, i.e. ordinary prudent businessman or as in England it used to be **"man on the top of the platform omnibus.", or "director's arm chair".** If on that test a plausible conclusion has been drawn-no objection can _r_ be taken. G ;~ On that basis applying the correct principle the Tribunal found that the intention was not to part with the machine but to lease it out for a temporary period as a part of exploitation. In such a circumstance, it cannot be said that no business was carried on and their income derived from the machine letting was only a rent income. There H 400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R. A was a temporary suspension of business for a temporary period for an object to tide over the crisis condition. There was never any act indicating that the assessee never intended to carry on the business. ) 13 In the background of these principles and in the facts and circumstances of the case so found, we cannot say such a finding was either perverse or not sustainable. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the High Court was right in the view it took and the appeals must accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs. _).__ C In the view we have taken in the first matter, the special leave petitions Nos. 5324 and 5325 of 1978 are also dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs. S.L. Appeals & Petitions dismissed.