COMMR., CENTRAL EXCISE, BANGALORE v. M/S. MEYER HEALTH CARE PVT. LTD. & ORS.

(2011] 4 S.C.R. 794 A COMMNR., CENTRAL EXCISE , BANGALORE _V._ M/S. MEYER HEALTH CARE PVT. LTD. & ORS. (Civil Appeal No(s). 4052-4054 of 2003) B APRIL 07, 2011 **[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]** _Excise Jaws:_ c - - _Exemption Assignment Deed Case registered under_ - _the Excise Jaw against assessee Assignment of trade mark in favour of assessee subsequent to registration of the case_ - _Assessee claiming benefit under Exemption Notification on Whether or not the_ 0 _[the ][basis ][of ][Assignment ][Deed ]_[-] _Assignment Deed which was entered into between the assessee and the owner of the trade mark on 6. 10. 1998 would date back to period prior to 19.9.1998 when the trade mark was assigned and whether the assessee is entitled to take benefit of Assignment Deed to avail the benefit of Exemption_ E _Notification_ - _Held: The effect of making the registration certificate applicable from retrospective date is based on the principle of deemed equivalence to public uS'er of trade mark_ - _This deeming fiction is applicable to provisions of Trade_ - _Mark Act and cannot be extended to the excise laws As to_ F _whether or not the said Assignment Deed would relate back prior to a date of 19.9.1998 and consequence thereof was a_ - _matter which was not decided by the Tribunal Matter remitted to the Tribunal for consideration of the s:::iid issue by recording_ - _an effective and reasoned decision Trade Marks Act._ G _CCE, Ahmedabad v. Vikshara Trading_ & _Invest P. Ltd._ & _Anr._ **2003(58)RLT 604(SC);** _Meghraj Biscuits Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of_ C. _Ex., U.P._ **2007 (210) ELT 161 (SC)** ~ **referred to.** H 794 COMMNR., CENTRAL EXCISE , BANGALORE _v._ 795.t MEYER HEALTH CARE PVT LTD. & ORS. Case law reference: A 2003(58) RLT 604(SC) referred to Para 2 2007 (210) ELT 161 (SC) referred to Para 2 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 4052-4054 of 2003. From the Judgment & Order dated 22.11.2002 of the Customs, Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench, Bangalore in Appeal No. E/1873/99, E/ 1874/99, E/1875/99. B c Arijit Prasad, Arti Singh, D.D. Kamat, B.K. Prasad, Anil Katiyar for the Appellant. Alok Yadav, Pavan Agarwal, Rajesh Kumar for the Respondents. The following Order of the Court was delivered ## ORDER 1. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order of the Custom, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT), South Zone Bench allowing the appeal filed by the Appellant before the Tribunal and holding that since there is an Assignment Deed in favour of the respondent in the present case, therefore, the respondent shall be entitled to the benefit of the Exemption Notification. The aforesaid findings of the Tribunal are under challenge iri this appeal on which we have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that on the date when the case wa$ registered against the respondent, there was· no Assignment Deed executed in favour of the respor:ident and, therefore, the respondent is not entitled to take benefit of the aforesaid Assignment Deed to avail . benefit under the exemption notificaton. The counsel appearing E F G H [2011] 4 S.C.R. ## 796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - A for the respondent, however, refutes the aforesaid submission contending, _inter alia,_ that so far the brand name is concerned, the owner of the brand name has assigned the trade mark in favour of the respondent and, therefore, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in _CCE, Ahmedabad Vs. Vikshara_ - B _Trading_ & _Invest P. Ltd._ & _Anr._ Reported in 2003(58) RLT 604(SC) the respondent is entitled to avail the benefit of the Exemption Notification. However, our attention is drawn to another decision of this Court by the counsel appearing for the appellant in _Meghraj Biscuits Industries Ltd. Vs._ - C _CommissionerofC. Ex., UP._ Reported in 2007 (210) ELT 161 (SC) wherein almost a similar issue came to be considered by this Court and while dealing with the same, this Court observed thus: - "On reading the above quoted paragraphs from the above - D judgment, with which we agree, it is clear that the effect of making the registration certificate applicable from retrospective date is based on the principle of deemed equivalence to public user of such mark. This deeming fiction cannot be extended to the Excise Law. It is confined - E to the provisions of the Trade Marks Act. In a given case like the present case where there is evidence with the pepartment of the trade mark being owned by Mis. Kay Aar Biscuits (P) Ltd. and where there is evidence of the appellants trading on the reputation of M/s. Kay Aar - F Biscuit&- (P) Ltd. which is not rebutted by the appellants (assessee), issuance of registration certificate with retrospective effect cannot confer the benefit of exemption notification to the assessee. In the present case, issuance of registration certificate with retrospective effect from 309-91 will not tantamount to conferment of exemption benefit - G under the Excise Law once it is found that the appellants had wrongly used the trade mark of M/s. Kay Aar Biscuits (P) Ltd." 3. According to the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, for - H • ## COMMNR., CENTRAL EXCISE , BANGALORE _v._ 797 MEYER HEALTH CARE PVT. LTD. & ORS. getting registration of a trade mark, an application is required A to be filed in accordance with the provisions incorporated in the said Act. Such an application is required to be advertised and a detailed procedure is required to be followed before grant of a registration in favour of a claimant. Since a variety of procedural steps are required to be taken like issuing an B advertisement, hearing objections, if any filed, it becomes a lengthy procedure and, therefore, time consuming for grant of a registration in matters of trade mark. But once registration is granted in respect of a particular trade mark in terms of the application according to the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, c the registration dates and relates back to the date of application. However, the position appears to be different as has been held by this Court so far excise law is concerned. This Court has already held in the aforementioned decision that effect of making the registration certificate applicable from D retrospective date under the trade mark law is based on the principle of deemed equivalence to public user of such mark whereas such deeming fiction cannot be extended to the excise !aw and that the same is only confined to the provisions of the Trade Marks Act. E 4. Admittedly, in the present case, the assignment of the trade mark in question granted in terms of the agreement entered into between the parties was on 6.10.1998, which is subsequent to the date of registration of the case by the Department, which was done on 19.9.1998. As to whether or F not the effect and in fact, the aforesaid Assignment Deed which is granted in favour of the respondent would relate back prior to a date of 19.9.1998 and consequence thereof is a matter which is net decided by the Tribunal. Since the same is an issue which is relevant and relates to determination of the factual G aspects, it would be appropriate to have a decision of the Tribunal on the said issue. 5. We consider that it may not be proper for us to decide such a disputed question of fact by ourselves. We, therefore, 798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 4 S.C.R. - A remit back this matter to the Tribunal for consideration of the aforesaid issue as to whether or not the Assignment Deed which was entered into between the respondent and the owner of the trade mark on 6.10.1998 would cHso be applicable to the case in hand and would date back prior to a period of 1998 to - B be considered and decided by the Tribunal by recording an effective and reasoned decision. Therefore, we set aside the order of the Tribunal to the aforesaid extent and remit back the matter to the Tribunal for _de novo_ consideration of the aforesaid issue as expeditiously as possible, preferably within - c a period of six months. 6. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. 7. In view of the aforesaid order, IAs are also disposed of. We make it clear that this order is confined only to the D aforesaid issue and nothing more at this stage. D.G. Appeal allowed.