High Court of KeralaDivision BenchAppeals partly allowed

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam v. MAR GREGORIOUS MEMORIAL MUTHOOT MEDICAL CENTRE

Case / Petition Number:I.T.A.No.147 of 2011

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • K. Vinod Chandran
  • Ashok Menon
Judgment Date
2018-09-24
Court Decision / Holding
The appeals stand partly allowed. The Tribunal’s order is set aside to the extent it allowed the deduction of interest under section 37(1); the AO’s disallowance of interest paid to depositors is sustained. The findings on the protective additions are left consistent with the Tribunal’s conclusions save for the Sec.37(1) deduction. Costs allocated as per nature of proceedings.
Final Disposition
Appeals partly allowed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KOTTAYAM.

Respondents

  • M/S.MAR GREGORIOUS MEMORIAL MUTHOOT MEDICAL CENTRE, COLLEGE ROAD, KOZHENCHERRY - 689641.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • P.K.R. Menon
  • • Jose Joseph

Counsels for Respondents

  • • P. Benny Thomas
  • • Joson Manavalan
  • • K. John Mathai
  • • Kuryan Thomas
  • • M. Gopikrishnan Nambiar
  • • P. Gopinath
  • • Raja Kannan

Case Synopsis & Summary

A Kerala High Court division bench heard ITA Nos. 136, 140, 142 and 147 of 2011, along with related matters, concerning the Commissioner of Income Tax’s challenge to the ITAT’s orders. The core issue is whether the ITAT correctly (i) interfered with substantive and protective additions and (ii) allowed a deduction under section 37(1) for interest paid on deposits, where the assessees allegedly did not carry on a business of finance. The assessees, comprising a multi-specialty hospital and a real estate firm, had accepted deposits from the public and funded advances to partners and sister concerns, paying interest to depositors and receiving interest from partners. The AO and CIT(A) treated these arrangements as camouflage for financing, invoking Sections 144 and 145 to compute interest income, and disallowed the corresponding expense. The ITAT deleted the speculative interest computation, but allowed the interest deduction under Section 37(1), apparently on the premise of a finance-related business. The High Court ultimately held that the assessees did not carry on a business of finance; the advances to partners were not business income, and the interest paid to depositors could not be allowed as a deduction. The appeals were partly allowed, sustaining the AO’s disallowance and setting aside the ITAT’s relief on Sec.37(1).

Provisions of Law Cited

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 37(1)Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 144 and 145Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 143(3)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Not business in finance (doctrine)
  • Advances to partners/deposits not constituting a business activity in finance (doctrine)
  • Expenditure under section 37(1) allowed only for a business carried on by the assessee (doctrine)
  • Madhav Prasad Jatia v. C.I.T., [(1979) 118 ITR 200] (doctrinal support)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the ITAT erred in interfering with both substantive and protective additions and erred in allowing a deduction under section 37(1) for interest paid on deposits not used in the business. It argues the ITAT should have considered protective additions on merits in light of the reversal of substantive additions and that the assessees did not carry on a business of finance. It relies on the principle that deduction under section 37(1) requires actual business expenditures and cites Madhav Prasad Jatia v. CIT (1979) 118 ITR 200 in support. The appellant also contends the ITAT’s approach to best-judgment assessment under sections 144/145 and the treatment of deposits as camouflage should be corrected.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contend that the assessees did carry on a business of financing through deposits, with incomes and expenses reflective of a finance activity. They argue that the ITAT rightly deleted the speculative computation under a best-judgment approach but that the deduction for interest under section 37(1) is legitimate where there is a bona fide financing business. They maintain that protective additions require merits-based consideration and not mere reversal of substantive additions. They also argue withdrawals by partners can constitute business loans and support the ITAT’s findings on the existence of a finance-based arrangement.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Madhav Prasad Jatia v. C.I.T.[(1979) 118 ITR 200]PositiveCited to support the view that advances to partners or deposits do not constitute a business activity and hence not eligible for deduction under Sec. 37(1).

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT** # **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ASHOK MENON** **MONDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2018 / 2ND ASWINA, 1940** **I.T.A.No.147 of 2011** **AGAINST THE ORDER IN ITA.234/COCH/2010 OF I.T.A.TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH DATED 20-10-2010 [ASSESSMENT YEAR 2006-07]** ## **APPELLANT/S:** **THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KOTTAYAM.** **BY ADVS.** **SRI.P.K.R.MENON, SR.COUNSEL, GOI(TAXES) SRI.JOSE JOSEPH, SC FOR INCOME TAX** ## **RESPONDENT/S:** **M/S.MAR GREGORIOUS MEMORIAL MUTHOOT MEDICAL CENTRE, COLLEGE ROAD, KOZHENCHERRY - 689641.** **BY ADVS.** **SRI.P.BENNY THOMAS SRI.JOSON MANAVALAN** **SRI.K.JOHN MATHAI SRI.KURYAN THOMAS** **SRI.M.GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR SRI.P.GOPINATH SRI.RAJA KANNAN** **THIS INCOME TAX APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24.09.2018, ALONG WITH ITA.136/2011 & CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **I.T.A.No.136 of 2011 & - 2 - connected cases** ## **I.T.A.Nos.136, 140, 142 & 147 of 2011** ## **JUDGMENT** **The following questions of law arise in the above appeals filed from the orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal:** - **"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in interfering both with substantive and protective additions?** **2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case-,** - **(a) The ITAT is right in allowing the interest paid on deposits which were not taken for the purpose of business of the assessee, as a deduction u/s.37(1)?** - **(b) the Tribunal is right in law and fact in interfering with the addition made on protective basis without considering the issue on merits?** - **(c) should not the ITAT have directed the CIT(A) to consider the protective addition on merits in view of the reversal of the order of CIT(A), on the substantive addition?** **3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case-,** - **(a) The withdrawals from the firm by the partners partakes the character of a loan given for business purposes?** - **(b) the ITAT is right in law and fact in interfering with the protective addition?"** **I.T.A.No.136 of 2011 & - 3 - connected cases** **2. On facts, it has to be noticed that the respondent-assessee in I.T.A.Nos.136 and 147 of 2011 carries on a Multi Speciality Hospital and the respondent-assessee in I.T.A.Nos.140 and 142 of 2011 carries on Real Estate business. The Multi Speciality Hospital had a Resources Division and the Real Estate firm also had such a division which accepted deposits from the public. The amounts so deposited by the public were withdrawn by the partners and invested in other sister concerns which were doing business in finance. The partners, on their advances from the assessee-firms, paid 12% interest to the assessee-firms. The assessee-firms, on deposits from the public, paid 5 to 12 percent interest to such depositors. The assessee claimed set off, of the expenditure, being the interest paid to the depositors, under Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [for brevity "IT Act"] and there was only a negligible profit which was returned as income from the business of finance so carried on by the assessee.** **3. We have to immediately notice that the assessees were not carrying on any business in finance. The Assessing Officer [for brevity "AO"] issued notice to the assessee to explain the business carried on and found that the advance received by the partners and investment made in other sister concerns is a mere camouflage. On that basis, the assessees** **I.T.A.No.136 of 2011 & - 4 - connected cases** **were found to have earned interest income far in excess of that received by it from the partners. To compute such interest income received, the AO resorted to Sections 144 and 145 of the IT Act. The AO, on enquiry, found the interest received by comparable financial institutions and computed the income accrued in the hands of the assessee-firms at the average of 20%. This addition was made to the income and there was a dis-allowance of the expenditure claimed by way of interest payment to the public who had deposited amounts with the assessee-firms. The dis-allowance was on the count that there was no business of finance carried on by the assessee.** **4. The first appellate authority sustained the addition to the income; but, however, deleted the expenditure claimed. The first appellate authority found that the findings of the AO were mutually destructive. If the assessee was engaged in the business of finance and earned interest income far in excess of that received by the assessee-firms from its partners; then necessarily the expenditure by way of interest paid to the public who had deposits with the assessee-firms was to be allowed under Section 37 of the IT Act was the finding; with which we agree on principle.** ## **5. Before the Tribunal, separate appeals were filed** **by the assessee and the Revenue. The Tribunal in the appeal** ## **I.T.A.No.136 of 2011 & - 5 - connected cases** **of the assessees, deleted the addition made finding that there could not have been a speculative computation of interest earned based on the investment made by the partners who had merely taken an advance from the assessee-firms. The resort to best judgment assessment relying on Sections 144 and 145 of the IT Act was found to be bad. The appeals of the assessee with respect to interest income was allowed, deleting the same. In the appeals filed by the Revenue, the Tribunal found that the assessee-firms had been doing the business of advancing loans to the partners and receiving interest from them. On that basis, there was found to be existing a business between the assessee and its partners and hence, the expenditure was found to be permissible.** **6. We agree with the Tribunal insofar as deletion of speculative computation of interest earned based on the investment made, but on different grounds. A camouflage or not, the assessee had arranged the affairs in such a manner as no interest being earned directly by the assessee firms through the investments made by its partners. The assessee had accepted deposits from the public and also made advances to its partners. In any event, the partners were entitled to take advances from the firm on payment of interest, which cannot be taken to be a business carried on by the assessee-firms. We do not agree with the Tribunal to that** ## **I.T.A.No.136 of 2011 & - 6 - connected cases** ## **extent.** **7. The investment made by the partners in the sister concerns and the income derived by way of more interest, than that they were paying to the assessee-firms could be assessed at the hands of the sister concerns or in the hands of the partners on which we need not give any specific opinion since that is not the subject matter of the present appeals. With respect to the present appeals and the assessments made on the assessee-firms, we are of the definite opinion that there could be no addition made under Section 145. We uphold the order of the Tribunal insofar as deleting the additions made. We answer the first question of law to the extent that it speaks of interference of substantive additions made to the interest income received by the assessee-firms, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We uphold the findings of the Tribunal on that aspect.** **8. The questions of law raised in addition to the interference with the substantive additions made on best judgment are with respect to the dis-allowance of expenditure under Section 37(1). There cannot be any dispute, insofar as allowance of expenditure can be allowed only in the case of a business carried on by the assessee. The respondent-assessees herein are respectively a Multi Speciality Hospital and Real Estate firm, which do not have any business of financing. The** **I.T.A.No.136 of 2011 & - 7 - connected cases** **advance taken by the partners also cannot be said to be a business, since as we have noticed, the assessee does not carry on any business on finance and the partners by their very status were entitled to avail such advances from the firm.** **9. We garner support from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in** _**Madhav Prasad Jatia v. C.I.T. [(1979) 118 ITR 200]**_ **. Therein the assessee carried on business in money lending and had various sources of income from shares, properties etc. It promised to donate Rs. 10 lakhs to set up an engineering college. The assessee also debited its capital account and corresponding credit was given to the account of the college. It then availed of an overdraft facility of Rs.5.5 lakhs from an account maintained for business purposes and disbursed it to the college. The balance was treated as a loan availed by the assessee from the College. The assessee paid interest to the bank on the overdraft and to the college for the loan, which were claimed as business expenditure. The overdraft facility was held to be not availed for business purposes and the so called loan from the college was held to be the assessees' own funds. Here too there was no business in finance carried on by the Firms and the partners had merely taken advances from the firm, the application of which was not the concern of the** ## **I.T.A.No.136 of 2011 & - 8 - connected cases** **firm.** **9. We, hence, find that the advances obtained by the partners were not in the nature of business carried on by the assessee and, hence, there could be no claim of business expenditure insofar as the interest paid to the depositors, the public. We, hence, answer the other questions of law framed against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We delete the order of the Tribunal insofar as the allowance of interest expenditure under Section 37. The order of the AO disallowing the expenditure on interest paid to the depositors is sustained on the grounds herein above mentioned as distinguished from the view taken by the AO. The appeals would stand partly allowed.** **Ordered accordingly. Parties are left to suffer their respective costs.** **Sd/-** **K.VINOD CHANDRAN** **JUDGE** **Sd/-** **ASHOK MENON JUDGE** **I.T.A.No.136 of 2011 & - 9 - connected cases** ## **APPENDIX** ## **[IN I.T.A.NO.147 OF 2011]** |**APPELLANT'S/S**|**ANNEXURES:**| |---|---| |**ANNEXURE A**|**ASSESSMENT ORDER U/S.143(3)**| ||**DATED 30.12.2008**| |**ANNEXURE B**|**CIT (A)'S ORDER IN APPEAL NO. ITA NO.**| ||**10/TVLA/09-10 DTD 30.12.2009**| |**ANNEXURE C**|**ITAT'S ORDER IN APPEAL NO. ITA NO.**| ||**234/COCH/2010 DATED 20.10.2010**| |**ANNEXURE D**|**ARGUMENT NOTE FILED BEFORE CIT(A).**| ## **' - RESPONDENT S ANNEXURES:** **NIL.** ## **Vku/-** **[true copy ]**