High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed

Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar & Orissa, Patna v. M/s Kirkend Coal Co.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 2456 of 1966
Neutral Citation:1969 SCR 986

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • J. C. Shah
  • A. N. Grover
Judgment Date
1969-03-12
Court Decision / Holding
The appeal is dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • A Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar & Orissa, Patna (Appellant)

Respondents

  • M/s Kirkend Coal Co. (Respondent)

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • D. Narasaraju
  • • S. K. Aiyar
  • • R. N. Sachthey
  • • B. D. Sharma

Counsels for Respondents

  • • C. K. Daphtary
  • • Narain Rao
  • • V. D. Narayan
  • • D. Goburdhun

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a Supreme Court judgment concerning the proper liability for a penalty under Section 28(1)(c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in a case where a business carried on by a firm underwent reconstitution rather than dissolution. The respondent firm, Kirkend Coal Co., was assessed for the year 1948-49; a penalty was levied on the firm after the original firm was dissolved and a new firm constituted in 1952. The Appellate Authorities and the Tribunal treated the matter as falling under Section 44, contending that penalties could be imposed only on the partners of a firm at the time of discontinuance. The High Court of Patna agreed with this approach. The Supreme Court, however, held that Section 44 applies only to cases where there is discontinuance of the business, not merely dissolution with continued business through a reconstituted or successor firm. The correct framework for reconstitution or succession is found in Sections 26(1) and (2). In such cases, penalties under Section 28 are to be pursued against the firm as constituted for the assessment, with income to be apportioned among partners as appropriate; if there is true discontinuance, penalties attach to the partners. The Court dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinction between discontinuance and reconstitution for purposes of assessment and penalties under Chapter IV. The judgment underscores the firm’s separate personality for tax purposes and the proper application of ss. 26, 28, and 44 in the light of reconstitution or succession.”

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 44 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922Section 26(1)Section 26(2)Section 28(1)(c)Section 28Section 25(1)Section 66Section 23(3) and (4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922Chapter IV of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • A firm has a separate personality for assessment; reconstitution or succession does not discontinue the business.
  • Section 44 applies to discontinuance of business, not mere dissolution without discontinuance.
  • The firm is recognised as an assessment unit; changes in ownership or constitution are governed by sections 25(1), 26(1) and 26(2).
  • Reconstitution or succession to the business is governed by ss. 26(1) and (2), and penalties under s.28 attach to the firm as constituted at the time of assessment; discontinuance attaches penalties to the partners.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The Revenue contended that penalties under s.28(1)(c) are levied as part of the firm’s assessment. In the year of account 1948-49 there was a dissolution followed by reconstitution; the power to impose penalty arises in the assessment and, where there is reconstitution under s.26, the penalty should attach to the firm as constituted at the time of assessment. Section 44 is applicable only to discontinuance, not mere dissolution. The Tribunal’s framing of the reference was overly broad and should be answered by applying ss. 26(1) and (2) and s.28, with the firm’s liability confined to its status at the time of assessment. The effect of reconstitution or succession is to make the successor liable in the firm’s capacity; the appeal should be decided in favour of the Revenue.

Contentions of Respondents

The Respondents urged that Section 44 governs penalties, as there was discontinuance of the business upon dissolution, which would make the liability rest on the partners at the time of discontinuance. They argued that dissolution with continued business through a reconstituted firm does not attract s.44, and that penalties under s.28 should, therefore, attach to the old firm or its partners, not to a new firm formed by reconstitution. They maintained that the High Court correctly held penalties could be levied only on the original firm and questioned the applicability of Section 26 to allow penalties against a successor.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Shivram Poddar v. Income-tax Officer, Central Circle II, Calcutta & Anr.51 I.T.R. 823PositiveCited to illustrate that Section 44 operates in two classes and that mere dissolution without discontinuance does not attract s.44.
C. A. Abraham v. Income-tax Officer, Kotttayam and Anr.41 I.T.R. 425PositiveCited as authority supporting the assessment framework under reconstitution/succession (Sections 26(1) and (2)).
Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S. V. Angidi Chettiar44 I.T.R. 739PositiveUsed to support interpretation of s.44 and the distinction between discontinuance and reconstitution.
S. M. S. Karuppiah Pillai v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras9 I.T.R. 1PositiveApproved; reinforces related principles on assessment of firms under ss. 25, 26 and 28.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

98~ A COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR & ORISSA, PATNA _v._ _MIS._ KIRKEND COAJ, COMPANY B ##### c D E F G H _March_ 12, 1969 [J. C. SHAH A~D A. N. GROVER, JJ.) _Indian Jnrome-tax Act,_ 1922, _ss._ 26, 28, 44 _and_ _66-Pena/ty_ _leviah/e_ _on_ _firn:_ _for assess1nent year_ _194849-Firin_ _reconstituted_ _in_ _later_ _years_ _but business not discontinued-Penalt,v_ _in_ _respect_ _of_ 1948-49 _whether_ _/eviable on reconstituted firm-Sect.ion_ 44 _not apjJlicable to such_ _Clllls-_ _Applicahility_ _of_ _ss._ 26 _and_ _28-Question_ _not_ _rc.·ised_ _before Tribunal_ _can-_ _not_ _he_ _raised_ _in_ _reference under_ _s._ 66. The respondent was a firm on which penalty under s. 28(1)(c) ot the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 was imposed by the Income-tax Officer in respect of the assessment year 1948-49. At the time when the penalty was imposed the cpnstitution of the firm had changed though the same business was continued by the reconstituted firm. The appeals filed by the respondent before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tri bunal were rejected. In reference the High Court held that penalty could be legally imposed upon the original firm constituted in the account year relevant to the assessment year 194849 and not upon the new firm constituted in 1952. In coming to their conclusions the Tribunal as well a! the. High Court proceeded on the assumption that the source and power of the Income-tax Officer to impose a penalty was in s. 44 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In appeal by the Revenue to this Court, HELD : (i) Section 44 only applies to those <ases in which· there has· been discontinuance of the business and not to cases in which the business continues after the reconstitution of the firm, or there is succession to the business. Cases of reconstitution _df_ the firm or succeso;ion to the business are covered by ss. 26(1) and (2~. The Tribun•l and the High Court were therefore in ctr.or in relying on s. 44 of the Act. [988 A; 985 D-E] (ii) Assessment in Ch. IV of the Income-tax Act 1922 includes a proceeding for imposition of penalty and the expression 'per~on' includes for the purpose of s. 28 a firm registered or unregistered. If there is recbn·stitution of the firm by virtue of s. 26, the Income-tax Officer will in imposing the penalty proceed against the firm. lf there is discontinuance of the business penalty will be imposed against the partners of the firm. [988 B-0] In the present case, however, this Court could not go into the question \vhether penalty on the respondent firm was leviahle under the terms of ss. 26 and 28 even though the question raised by the Tribunal was irt terms sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the enquiry. In a refetence under s. 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act. 1922, only the question which was either raised or argued before the Tribunal may be answered, even if the language of the question framed by the Tribunal may apparently include an enquiry into other matters which could have been but were not. raised or argued. [988 D-Fl _Shivr.m Poddar_ v. _lncom•-tax_ _Officer,_ _Central Circle_ _ll,_ _Calcutta_ ~ _Anr.,_ 51 I.T.R. 823, _C._ _A._ _Abraham_ v, _Jncom•-tax_ _Officer,_ _Kottav•m qnd_ 98.& Sl!PUM• OOUllT **llPOlln** [1909] 3 **S.C.L** _Anr.,_ 41 I.T.R. 425 and _Comml1Sloner_ _of lnco-.t=,_ _Madr01_ **A** _Anr._ v. _S._ _V. Angidl Chtttlar,_ 44. I.T.R. 739, applied, _S._ _M._ _S._ _Karuppl•h_ _Pillai_ Y. _Comml'11oner_ _qf_ _lncom<·t=_ _Madr01,_ _9_ I.T.R. 1, approved. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2456 of 1966. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 27, 1964 of the Patna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 299 of 1958. _D. Narsaraju,_ _S._ _K._ _A.iyar,_ _R._ _N._ _Sachthey_ .and _B._ _D._ _Sharma,_ - for the appellant. _C._ _K._ _Daphtary, Narain Rao, V._ _D._ _Narayan_ and _D._ _Gobur-_ _dhun,_ for the respondent. **A** **B** #### c The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. In determining the taxable income of the respon· dent firm for the assessment year ~948-49 the Income-tax Officer added to the income returned a sum of Rs. 1,60,000 as 'undis· closed rcc.~ipts'. The order was confirmed in appeal by the **D** Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and by the Tribunal. The Income-tax Officer had in the meantime commenced a proceeding for the levy of penalty and in exercise of the power under s. 28 ( 1 )( c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 he directed the res· pendent firm to pay Rs. 60,000 as penalty. The Appellate Assis### tant Commissioner in appeal confirmed the order. The Income- z tax AJ)pellate Tribunal rejected the contention of the respondent that the order imposing penalty upon the firm after the original firm was dissolved was without jurisdiction. ' The Tribunal referred at the instance of the respondent firm the following question to the High Court of Patna for opinion; "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of F the case the imposition of penalty under s. 28 ( 1 )( c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, upon the petitioner firm (respondent) as constituted at the time of levy of penalty was legal and, valid?" The High Court called for a supplementary statement of the case and pursuant thereto the Tribunal submitted a statement on G the specified points raised by the order of the High Court that : ( 1) The firm which carried on the business during the calendar year 1947 was dissolved on July 7, 1951 when Butta Kristo Roy, one of the partners, died. (2) During the previous year 1947 there was no **ff** instrument of partnership in existence, but the terms of the oral partnership were the same as set out in the. partnership deed dated October 17, 1949. C,I.T. _V._ KIRKEND COAL CO. _(Shah,_ _J.)_ ( 3) The business of the firm was continued with effect from July 8, 1951 by the new firm as successor to the business of the old firm. l:he terms of the partnership were the same as set out in the deed dated October .17, 1949 and the partners and their shares were also the same except that Baidyanath Roy took the place of Butto Kristo Roy. (4) With effect from April 28, 1952, the business was carried on by a partnership constituted by Baidyanath Roy and Bijali Kanti Roy under an instrument dated August 27, 1952. There was no dissolution of the firm, which was carrying on the business; there was only a change in the constitution of the old firm from April 28, 1952. The High Court held that penalty could be legally levied only upon the original firm constituted in the account year relevant to the assessment year 1948-49 and not upon the new firm constituted under the deed dated April 27, 1952. The Tribunal and the High Court approached the problem before th.em on the assumption that the source of the power .of the Income-tax Officer to impose a penalty was in section 44 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In so assuming, in our judgment, they were in error. Section 44 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as it stood at the relevant date, in so far as it is material provided : "Where any business, profession or vocation carried on by a firm . . . . has been discontinued . . . every person who was at th.e time of such discontinuance . . . . . a partner of such firm . . . . . shall, in respect of the income, profits and gains of the ·firm . . . . . be jointly and severally liable to assessment under Chapter IV and for ihe amount of tax payable and ·all the provisions of Chapter IV shall, so far as may be, apply to any such assessment". The section is fairly plain _:_ it applies to cases of discontinuance of the business of a firm and not wh.ere there is dissolution of the firm but not discontinuance of.its business. In S. _M._ S. _Karuppiah Pillai_ v. _Commissioner_ _of Income-tax,_ _Madras(_ [1] ), in dealing with the effect of s. 44 ol' the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, before if was amended by Act 7 of 1939, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed _:_ - "This section (s.44) only applies when there has ###### been discontinuance of the business, ..., The section (I) 9,~.T.R, 1. ' ........... A ## _(_ B ##### c D E F G JI 986 SUPREME COU..T **RllPOJ.TS** (1969] 3 S.C.R. mys that if a business is discontinued the partners shall nevertheless be jointly and severally liable for the proli cs which had been earned". **A** In _Shivram Poddar_ v. _Income-tax Officer, Central Circle II,_ _Calcuca_ _oni_ _Anr._ (1) this Court examined the scheme of s. 44 (bfore it was amended by the Finance Act of 1958) and B its inter-relation with the provisions of ss. 25 (I), (2), 26( 1), (2) anJ 28(l)(c) in some detail. The Court observed : "Section 44 operates in two classes of cases; where there is discontinuance of business, profession or voca. ticin carried on by a firm or association, and where there is dissolution of an association. It follows that mere dissolution of a finn without discontinuance of the business will not attract the application of s.44 of the Act . The reason for this distinction appears from the scheme of the Income-tax Act in its relation to assessment of the income of a finn. A finn whether registered or unregistered is recognised under the Act as a m.it of assessment (sections 3 and 2(2) ), and its income is computed under clauses (3) and (4) of section 23 as the income of any other unit. Section 25 ( 1) relates to assessment in cases of a discontinued business-whether the business is carried on by a firm or by any other person. . . . . . Then there is the special provision relating to assessment when at the time of making an assessment it is found that a change has occurred in the constitution of a firm, or a firm has been newly constituted : section 26 ( 1). The date on which the change has occurred is immaterial; it may be in the year of account, in the year of assessment or even after the close of the year of assessment. The Income-far.: Officer has under section 26(1) to assess the !inn as constituted at the time of making the assessment, but the income. profits and gains _of_ the previous year have. for the purpose of inclusion in the total inCOIT'.e of the partners, to be apportioned between the nartners who were entitled to receive the same. Subsection (2) of section 26 relates to assessment in the case of succession to a person (which expression includes a fi•m) carrying on a business by another person in such capacity. . . . . . · Discontinuance of business has the same connotation in section 44 as it has in section 2 _5_ of the Act; it does not 11) ~11.T.R. 823. ##### c **D** E # ' G 987 **A** ##### c **D** E F G **H** Two other cases decided by this Court mav be briefly noticed. In C. _A._ _Abrah'1m_ _"·Income-tax Officer, Kotrayam and_ _An-_ _other(')_ there was discontinuance of the business of the firm consequent upon dis<olution of the firm. s. 44 was held applicable, and it wns Jield that imnosition or penaltv beimt a nrc>cess of assessment the Tncnme-tax Officer was not incnmnetent to levv penaltv after discontinuance of the business. In _Commis•ioner_ _of_ Tnrnm~-tn~. _M11dra•_ _an-I_ _Anmher_ v. _S._ _V. AnviJ; Ch•t•iar(')_ this Court held th~t the Income-tax Officer coulcl exercise under s. 44 read with s. 28 power to impose penalty uoon the firm which discontinued its business on dissolution caused by the death of one of the partners. Ill 41 T. ~~T.lt~~ 42~. :l) .. **J.T.R.** 739. C.l.T. _v._ K!J.DND C.OA.L eo. _(Shah,_ _J.)_ cover mere change in ownership or in the constitution of the unit of assessment. Section 44 is, therefore, attracted only when the business of a firm is discontinued, _i.e._ when there is complete cessation of the busi ness and not when there is a change in the ownership of the firm, or in its constitution, because by reconstitu tion of the firm, no change is brought in the personality of the firm, and succession to the business and not discontinuance of the business results. . . . . But the Income-tax Act recognises a firm for purposes of assessment as a unit independent of the partners constituting it; it invests the firm with a personality which survives reconstitution. A firm discontinuing its business may be assessed in the manner provided by section 25 ( 1) in the year of account in which it discontinues its business; it may also be assessed in the year of assessment. In either case it is the assessment of the income of the firm. Where the firm is dissolved, but the business is not discontinued, there being change in the constitution of the firm. assessment has to be made under section 26 (I ), and if there be succession to the business assessment has to be made under section 26(2). The provisions rehting to assessment on reconstituted or newly c0wtituted firms. and on succession to the business are obligatorv. Therefore, even when there is change in the ownershio of the business carried on by a firm on reconstitution or because of a new constitution, assessment mmt still be made upon the firm. When there is succession, the successor and the oerson succeeded have to be assessed each in respect of his actual share. This scheme of assessment furnishes the reason for omitting reference to dissolution of a firm from section 44 when such dissolution is not accompanied by dis continuance of the business". 988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!969] 3 S.C.R· Section 44 therefore only applied to those cases in which there had been discontinuance of the business and not to cases in which the business continued after reconstitution of the firm, or there was succession to the business. Cases of reconstitution of the firm or succession to the business of the firm are covered by ss. 26(1) and (2). "Assessment'' in Chapter IV of the Income-ta-,: Act, 1922, includes a proceeding for imposition of penalty. Section 28 of the Act authorises the Income-tax Officer, if satisfied, in the course of any proceeding under the Act that any · person has, _inter_ _a/ia,_ concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, to direct that such person shall p~y by way of penalty, a sum of money not exceeding the amount specified therein in addition to the income· tax and super-tax payable by such person. The expression "person" includes for the purpose of s. 28, a firm registered or unregistered. If there is reconstitution of the firm, ·by virtue of s. 26, the Income-tax Officer will in imposing the penalty proceed against the firm. Tf there is discontinuance of the business penalty will be imposed against the partners of the firm. Before the Tribunal and the Higi\ Court the case was argued on the footing that s. 44 alone was applicable. Whether under the terms of s. 26 read with s. 28, penalty may be imposed upon the new partners for the failure of the partners of the firm constituted in the year of account relating to the assessment 1948-49 was never investigated. The question raised by the Tribunal is in terms sufficiently comprehensive to embrace an enquiry whether partners of the firm in existence on July 30, 1954, were liable to be assessed to penalty as successors in interest of the partners of the original firm in existence in the year of account relating to the assessment year 1948-49. But in a reference under s. 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, only the question which was either raised or argued before the Tribunal may be answered, even if the language of the question framed by the Tribunal may apparently include an enquiry into other matters which could have been, but were not, raised or argued. The aopeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will he no order as to costs in this Court. CT.C. _Appeal di.nnissetl,_ A B ##### c D E F G