High CourtSingle JudgeAppeals allowed; High Court’s judgments set asi...

Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority v. K.S. Narayan

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 8307 of 2002; Civil Appeal Nos. 8308/2002, 8309/2002, 8310/2002, 8311/2002, 8312/2002, 8313/2002, 8314/2002, 8315/2002
Neutral Citation:SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • G. P. Mathur
  • Lokeshwar Singh Panta
Judgment Date
2006-10-11
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals allowed. The Supreme Court held that the lands in question were covered by the notification, and the plaintiffs, having purchased after the notification, could not have been served with Section 17(5) notices. It rejected the High Court’s view that the acquisition proceedings were invalid for lack of notice and held that civil courts cannot examine the validity of notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the decrees of the trial court dismissing the suits were affirmed, and the High Court’s decrees were set aside; the appeals were allowed.
Final Disposition
Appeals allowed; High Court’s judgments set aside; Trial Court decrees affirmed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority

Respondents

  • K.S. Narayan

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Altaf Ahmed
  • • S.K. Kulkarni
  • • M. Gireesh Kumar
  • • Vijay Kumar

Counsels for Respondents

  • • S.N. Bhat
  • • D.P. Chaturvedi
  • • N.P.S. Panwar
  • • Sheela Goel

Case Synopsis & Summary

This appeal concerns a challenge to land acquisition under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, and the validity of the associated notifications under Sections 17 and 19. The respondent, K.S. Narayan, purchased the plaint scheduled property in 1985 and sought injunctive relief against interference and demolition by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA). He claimed that the property was not covered by acquisition proceedings since no notice of acquisition was served on him and no compensation award was made. The trial court decreed ten suits for permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. The Karnataka High Court, however, permitted amendments to the plaint and remanded for fresh decision, holding that the plaintiff’s possession on the date of suit was not established and that the acquisition proceedings could be questioned in a civil suit. The Apex Court reversed, holding that the lands in question were covered by the notification and that the plaintiffs, having purchased after the notification, could not have been served with Section 17(5) notices because their names would not appear in the assessment list. The Court also clarified that civil courts cannot adjudicate the validity of notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the relevant proceedings under the Bangalore Development Authority Act form a complete code. The High Court’s view was erroneous; the trial court’s decrees were affirmed and the appeals allowed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 – Section 17, Section 19Land Acquisition Act – Section 4(1), Section 6Land Acquisition Act – Section 30, Section 31(2)Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 96Constitution of India – Article 226Section 17(5) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • The Act is a complete code in itself (as reflected in State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar and Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia)
  • Public purpose becomes conclusive upon publication of the declaration under Section 19 and Section 6 of the LA Act
  • Conclusive evidence that land is needed for a public purpose upon publication of the declaration (Section 19(3))
  • Civil Court jurisdiction is barred to adjudicate the validity of statutory notifications under the Land Acquisition Act (State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar; Laxmi Chand)
  • Judicial remedy for challenges to LA notifications lies in constitutional courts (Article 226/Art. 32) and not in ordinary civil suits
  • Possession vesting under Section 16 and the non-withdrawable nature of the public purpose once intiated

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The BDA contended that the property falls within the notified scheme under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976. Since the sale deeds pre-date or post-date notifications in a way that reflects the property being within the notified area, and the appellants sought to challenge the validity of the scheme, it argued that civil suits cannot question such notifications under the Land Acquisition Act. It emphasized that the LA Act provides a complete code and the remedies lie in writ petitions under Article 226 or 32 petitions in constitutional courts; a notice under Section 17(5) is not required for those whose names wouldn’t appear in the assessment/list at the relevant time; the High Court’s directive to remand and allow amendments was improper; the trial court’s decree should stand.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that since they purchased after notification, they were not served Section 17(5) notices and thus their possession and title were improperly affected, making the acquisition proceedings invalid. They argued that the civil court has jurisdiction to examine the validity of notification and that the High Court’s remand was proper to allow amendment of the plaint to claim possession and title. They asserted that the authority had already taken possession and that compensation had been deposited, affecting their rights; thus, the suits should not have been dismissed on a mere technicality of non-service of notice.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar[1995] 4 SCC 229PositiveCited to support the proposition that civil courts cannot scrutinize the validity of LA notifications; the Act is a complete code and that public purpose becomes crystallized and conclusive.
Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia[1996] 7 SCC 218PositiveSimilarly cited as authority that civil Court jurisdiction is barred from examining LA scheme validity except through constitutional Courts.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## A # COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY _v._ ## K.S. NARAYAN ## OCTOBER 11. _1006_ ## B [G.P. MATHUR AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA. JJ.) _Land Acquisition Act; Ss.4. 6, 30 and 31/Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976; Ss. 17 and 19:_ C _Acquisition proceedings-Challenged on grounds that neither notice served to owners of the property in question nor compensation awardedTrial Court decreed all the suits-High Court granting liberty to the plaintiffs to amend the petitions since neither possession/ownership of the properties in question was established by the plaintiffs nor any relief was claimed by them_ D _in the petitions-Remitted the matter to trial Court for decision afresh-Trial Court dismissed the amended petitions holding that validity of acquisition proceedings cannot be questioned before a Civil Court-Appeal against allowed by the High Court-On appeal, Held: Property in question purchased by the plaintiffs after issuance of Notification for acquisition by the authoritiesSince the scheduled property did not appear in the assessment list/revenue_ E _records of the authorities concerned, Notices could not be served to the plaintiffs-Thus, High Court erred in holding the acquisition proceedings invalid for not serving the Notice-The question of validity of Land Acquisition Notification and its effect could only be examined in a writ proceeding by the High Court and not by the Civil Court-Hence, order passed by the High_ F _Court is set aside and the one passed by the trial Court affirmed-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 96-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226._ The plaintiff-respondent purchased the property in dispute by means of a registered sale deed. The plaintiff applied for mutation entries and the same was granted by the authorities in his favour. Allegedly, the G property in dispute was not covered by any acquisition proceedings as neither notice of acquisition had been received by the plaintiff nor any award for compensation regarding the said property was received by him. Though, the appellant-authority had no right, title or interest over the property but it was fryfn"g to dispossess the respondent on the ground of H 186 **J 87** I .. **COMMR .. BANGALORE DEVEWPMENT AUll{ORITY r. K.S. NARA YAN** . . . . . . . . ·. . .. alleged acquisition. Aggrieved, he filed a Suit . . ·- in the Civil Court praying\ . I A for a decree for permanent injunction against the defendant-Authority and others restraining them from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the plaint scheduled property and from demolishing any structure situate thereon. Nine other suits on similar issue were also filed. The trial Court decreed all the ten suits. The appeals preferred by the Authority were allowed by the High Court granting liberty to the plaintiffs to apply B for amendment of the plaint as plaintifrs did not claim any relief, and also remitting the matter to trial Court for decision afresh. The plaintiffs • applied for amendment ~fthe plaint. Amended petitions were considered. by the trial Court. Trial Court dismissed the petitions holding that validity or othenvise of the acquisition proceedings cannot be questioned before C the CivUCourt. Pl~intiffs preferred appeals before the High Court under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code. High Court held the acquisition proceedings invalid and passed a decree for declaration of title and also for possession in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence the present appeals. ## Allowing the appeals, the Court D HELD: I.I. In fact the plaintiffs in all the ten suits purchased the plaint scheduled property some time in the year 1985. The date of purchase of plaint scheduled property by the plaintiffs in all the ten suits is mentioned in the first judgment of the High Court remanding the matter E **to the trial Court. Thus, there was no occasion for serving any notice upon** _the plaintiffs as required by sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Bangalore . Development Authority Act as their names could not have appeared in · the assessment list of the Local Authority or in the land revenue register at the relevant time. Therefore, the whole basis on which the High Court held the acquisition proceedings to be invalid is erroneous and cannot be F sustained. [194-B, CJ · E / 1.2. The question, whether. a civil suit . is maintainable to challenge . the acquisition proceedings, is no longer _res integra.The_ Civil Court cannot. go into the question of validity or otherwi.se of the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. [194-DI G _State of Bihar_ v. _Dhirendra Kumar,_ [19951 4 SCC 229 and _laxmi Chand_ v. _Gram Panchayat, Kararia,_ [199617SCC218, relied on. 1.3. The view taken by the High Court is wholly erroneous. It is not the <ase of the plaintiffs that the plaint soheduled property iS not covered H SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 7 S.C.R. 188 - A by the notification issued under Section 17 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act. As a matter of fact, there is no dispute that the land regarding which the suits have been filed is covered by the Notification. (196-E[ 1.4'. The ground for assailing the· Notification, namely, that notice B under sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Act was not served upon the plaintiffs and its effect could only be examined in a writ petition filed under · Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court and not by the Civil . Court. The j~dgments and orders passed by the High Court are, therefore, clearly illegal, hence set aside. The decrees passed by the trial Court C dismissing the suits are affirmed. [196-G, H; 197-A, Bl • . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8307 of2002. . . ., . ·From the Judgment and final Order dated 14\26.6.2001. of the High Court of Kamataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 406 of 2001. ' ·-•' D ## WITH Civil Appeal Nos. 831012002, 8308/2002, 8315/2002, 831112002, 83121 2002, 831412002, 83.13/2002 and 830912002 • Altaf Ahmed, S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar and Vijay Kumar for E . the Appellant. . . •. S.N. Bhat, D.P. Cbatiirvedi, N.P.S. Panwar and Sheela Goel for the . Respondent. ' . _Ex-Parle_ (C.'A. No. 8315/2002) F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G.P. MA THUR, _J:_ I. The .issue involved in these appeals, by special leave, is identical and, therefore, they are being disposed of by a common /' order. For the sake of convenience facts of Civil Appeal 8307 of 2002, G which has been filed challenging the judgment and decree dated 14.6.2001 passed by Kamataka High Court in R.F.A. No. 406 of2001, shall be stated. 2-3. The respondent K.S. Narayan filed Original Suit No: 5371of1989 in the court of City Civil Judge, Bangalore, praying that a decree for permanent • injunction be passed against the defendant Bangalore Development Authority, H their agents and servants restraining them from interfering with the plaintiffs COMMR .. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY r. K.S. NARA YAN [G.P. MA TIJUR . .I.] J 89 possession and enjoyment of the plaint scheduled property and from A demolishing any structure situate thereon. The case of the plaintiff in brief is as follows. The plaintiff purchased the property in dispute bearing No. 46, situated in Banasawadi village, K.R. Pura Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk from S. Narayana Gowda by means of a registered sale deed dated 17.6.1985. The erstwhile owners of the property had obtained conversion certificate from the Tehsildar and the property is situated in a lay out which is properly B approved by obtaining conversion for non-agricultural use from the competent authority. The plaintiff applied for mutation entries and the same was granted in his favour. The property in dispute was not covered by any acquisition proceedings as neither notice of acquisition had been received nor any award regarding the said property had been passed. The defendant had no right, C title or interest over the property but it was trying to dispossess the plaintiff from the same on the ground of alleged acquisition. The plaintiff issued a notice to the defendant on I 1.7.1989 calling upon it not to interfere with his possession and enjoyment of the property in dispute but no reply had been received. It was pleaded that the cause of action to file the suit arose on 11. 7 .1989, the date of the notice and also when the defendant tried to dispossess D the plaintiff from the disputed property. 4. The suit was contested by the defendant Bangalore Development Authority on the ground _inter alia_ that the plaintiff was not the owner of the property in dispute. S. Narayana Gowda, who is alleged to have executed the E sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on 17.6.1985, had no right, title or interest over the property in dispute and he could not have conveyed any title to the plaintiff. It was further pleaded that the disputed land had been acquired by the Bangalore Development Authority after issuing preliminary and final notifications in accordance with Bangalore Development Authority Act and the possession had also been taken over and thereafter it was handed over to F the Engineering Section on 22.6.1988 after completion of all formalities. The award for the land acquired had already been made and the compensation amount had been deposited in civil court under Sections 30 and 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. It was specifically pleaded that it was the defendant Bangalore Development Authority which was in possession of the plaint G scheduled property on the date of filing of the suit and, therefore, the suit for injunction filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. 5. The parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their case before the trial court. The learned Xlll Additional City Civil H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R. 190 A Judge. Bangalore, decreed all the ten suits by the judgment and decree dated 30.1.1991. The Bangalore Development Authority, the appellant herein, preferred ten appeals against the judgment and decree of the trial court before the Karnataka High Court. The High Court held that though the plaintiffs had filed the suit claiming to have title and possession over the property in dispute but in fact their possession over the plaint scheduled property on the B date of the suit was not established. The plaintiffs had not claimed any relief for delivery of possession over the property. The High Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside judgment and decree of the trial court and remanded the suit for fresh decision with liberty to the plaintiffs to apply for amendment of the plaint for which purpose one month time was granted. It C was further mentioned in the order that if the plaintiffs did not apply for amendment within one month the trial court shall dismiss the suit. However, if the plaintiffs applied for amendment of the plaint, the defendant in each suit shall be given opportunity of filing further written statement and thereafter the suit shall be disposed of in accordance with law. D 6. After remand of the suit to the trial court the plaintiffs applied for amendment of the plaint. In the amendment application it was pleaded that the plaintiffs were owner in possession of the property but they were dispossessed on 22.6.1988. It was also pleaded that the defendant had dispossessed the plaintiffs from the plaint scheduled property without taking E proceedings for acquisition of the land and as such their dispossession was wholly illegal. The relief clause was also amended and it was prayed that it may be declared that the plaintiffs are owner of the property and a decree for possession be passed in their favour directing the defendant to deliver back the possession of the plaint scheduled property to them. The amendment application was filed on 31.8.2000. The defendant Bangalore Development F Authority filed an amended written statement and the principal pleas taken therein were that the suit was barred by limitation and the land in dispute having been validly acquired and possession having been taken over, the suit was liable to be dismissed. It was further pleaded that the defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the property since 22.6.1988 and the predecessors G of the plaintiffs had also taken part in proceedings for determination of compensation and making of award before the Special Land Acquisition Officer. After the pleadings had been amended the suits were tried by learned XVI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore. The parties did not adduce any further evidence and relied upon the evidence which had been adduced earlier. The trial court, relying upon the decision of this Court H in _Laxmi Chand_ v. _Gram Panchayat, Kararia,_ ( 1996] 7 SCC 218, held that COMMR., BANGALOREDEVELOPMENT AUTllORITI° i: K.S. NARAYAN [G.P. MATHUR. l.J 19 J validity or otherwise of the acquisition proceedings cannot be questioned A before the civil court and accordingly dismissed the suits. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court the plaintiffs preferred appeals before the High Cou11 under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code. The High Court held that the names of the plaintiffs who were the lawful owners of plaint scheduled property were not at all notified B and as two basic requirements of a valid acquisition of property were not satisfied, the acquisition was not binding upon the owners of the property. It was held that plaintiffs were not covered by the notification which had been issued regarding acquisition of the property and, therefore, the civil court was competent to entertain the suit. After recording a finding that no notice had C been served upon the plaintiffs, it was held that the acquisition proceedings were invalid. The appeals were accordingly allowed and the suits were decreed as prayed. Thus a decree for declaration of title and also for possession was passed in favour of the plaintiffs. 8. We have heard Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned senior counsel for the D appellants and Mr. S.N. Bhat learned counsel for the respondents. 9. The acquisition proceedings in question had been taken under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The relevant provisions regarding acquisition are Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, which are being reproduced below: - E "17. _Procedure on completion of scheme.-{!)_ When a development scheme has been prepared, the authority shall draw up a notification stating the fact of a scheme having been made and the limits of the area comprised therein, and naming a place where particulars of the scheme, a map of the area comprised therein, a statement specifying F the land which is proposed to be acquired and of the land in regard to which a betterment tax may be levied may be seen at all reasonable hours. (2) A copy of the said notification shall be sent to the corporation which shall, within Thirty days from the date of receipt thereof, G forward to the authority for transmission to the Government as hereinafter provided, any representation which the Corporation may think fit to make with regard to the scheme. (3) The authority shall also cause a copy of the said notification to H 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R. A c D E F be published in the Official Gazette and affixed in some conspicuous pa11 of its own office, the Deputy Commissioner's Office, the Office of the Corporation and in such other places as the authority may consider necessary. B (4) If no representation is received from the corporation within the time specified in sub-section (2), the concurrence of the corporation to the scheme shall be deemed to have been given. (5) During the thirty days next following the day on which such notification is published in the Official Gazette the authority shall serve a notice on every person whose name appears in the assessment list of the Local Authority or in the land revenue register as being primarily liable to pay the property tax or land revenue assessment on any building or land which is proposed to be acquired in executing the scheme or in regard to which the authority proposes to recover betterment tax requiring such person to show cause within Thirty days from the date of the receipt of the notice why such acquisition of the bu ii ding or land and the recovery of betterment tax should not be made. (6) The notice shall be signed by or by the order of the Commissioner and shall be served. - (a) by personal delivery of if such person is_ absent or cannot be found, on his agent, or if no agent can be found, then by leaving the same on the land or the building; or - (b) by leaving the same at the usual or last known place of abode or business of such person; or - (c) by registered post addresses to the usual or last known place of above or business of such person. G 19. _Upon sanction, declaration to be published giving particulars of land to be acquired.-(1)_ Upon sanction of the scheme, the Government shall publish in the Official Gazette declaration stating the fact of such sanction and that the land proposed to be acquired by the authority for the purposes of the scheme is required for a public purpose. (2) The declaration shall state the limits within which the land proposed H COMMR., BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUIBORITY "· K.S. NARA YAN [G.P. MAIBUR,J.] 193 to be acquired is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its A approximate area and the place where a plan of the land may be inspected. (3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose and the authority shall, upon the publication of the said declaration, proceed to execute the scheme. B ( 4) If at any time it appears to the authority that an improvement can be made in any part of the scheme the authority may alter the scheme for the said purpose and shall subject to the provisions of subsections (5) and (6) forthwith proceed to execute the scheme as altered. (; (5) If the estimated cost of executing the scheme as altered exceeds, by a greater sum than five per cent the estimated cost of executing the scheme as sanctioned, the authority shall not, without the previous sanction of the Government, proceed to execute the scheme as altered. (6) If the scheme as altered involves the acquisition otherwise than by agreement, of any land other than that specified in the scheduled referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (I) of Section 18, the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 and of sub-section (I) of this section shall apply to the part of the scheme so altered in the same manner as if such altered part were the scheme." D E I 0. The provisions of Sections 17 and 19 are somewhat similar to the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Sub-section (5) of Section I 7 of the Act mandates that after the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette the authority shall, during the period of next thirty days, F serve a notice on every person whose name appears in the assessment list of the Local Authority or in the land revenue register as being primarily liable to pay the property tax or land revenue assessment of any building or land which is proposed to be acquired in executing the scheme or in regard to which the authority proposes to recover betterment tax. The person on whom the notice is served is entitled to raise objection regarding the proposed G acquisition within thirty days. I I. It is not in dispute that the notification under Section I 7 was published on 26.5. I 984 and the notification under Section 19 was published on 23. I 0.1986. The award was made on 26.5.1988 and thereafter possession was taken over by the Bangalore Development Authority on 22.6.1988. The H 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R. - A High Court has observed that the plaintiff K.S. Narayan purchased the property from Doddanna in the year 1964. This is clearly wrong as the specific case of the plaintiff in paragraph 3 of the plaint is that he purchased the property from S. Narayana Gowda on 17.6.1985. It is, therefore, obvious that the plaintiff purchased the property more than one year after the notification - B under section 17 of the Act had been published. In fact the plaintiffs in all the ten suits purchased the plaint scheduled property some time in the year 1985. The date of purchase of plaint scheduled property by the plaintiffs in the ten suits is mentioned in the first judgment of the High Court remanding the matter to the trial Court. Thus, there was no occasion for serving any notice upon the plaintiffs as required by sub-section ( 5) of Section 17 of the - C Act as their names could not have appeared in the assessment list of the Local Authority or in the land revenue register at the relevant time. Therefore, the whole basis on which the High Court held the acquisition proceedings to be invalid is erroneous and cannot be sustained. 12. The other point which requires consideration is whether a civil suit - D is maintainable to challenge the acquisition proceedings. This question is no longer res integra. In two decisions of this Court it has been clearly held that the civil court cannot go into the question of validity or otherwise of the notifications issued under Sections 4( 1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In _State of Bihar_ v. _Dhirendra Kumar._ [ 1995] 4 SCC 229, it was held as under:- - E "3. The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether ad interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising the - F power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements contained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publication envisaged under the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration - G under Section 6, the public purpose gets crystallized and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorize the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Section I IA now prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 y_ears from the last date of publication envisaged under Section 6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Govt. needs - H COMMR , BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUIBORITY 1•. K.S. NARAYAN (G.P. MA IBUR, l.] J 95 possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power under A Section 17(4) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the parties under Section 9 and on expiry of J 5 days, the State is entitled to take immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise, it would take possession after the award under Section J 2. Thus, it B could be seen that the Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9 of CPC stands excluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Section 4 and C declaration under Section 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable." Same view was taken in _laxmi Chand_ v. _Gram Panchayat, Kararia,_ [1996] 7 sec 218 and the relevant portion of paras 2 and 3 of the report is being D reproduced below:- " .............................. It is seen that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 gives jurisdiction to the Civil Court to try all civil suits, unless barred. The cognizance of a suit of civil nature may either expressly or impliedly be barred. The procedure contemplated under the Act is E a special procedure envisaged to effectuate public purpose, compulsorily acquiring the land for use of public purpose. The notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act are required to be published in the manner contemplated thereunder. The inference gives conclusiveness to the public purpose F and the extent of the land mentioned therein. The award should be made under Section 11 as envisaged thereunder. The dissatisfied claimant is provided with the remedy of reference under Section 18 and a further appeal under Section 54 of the Act. If the Government intends to withdraw from the acquisition before taking possession of the land, procedure contemplated under Section 48 requires to be G adhered to. If possession is taken it stands vested under Section 16 in the State with absolute title free from all encumbrances and the Government has no power to withdraw from acquisition. 3. It would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance H 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SU?P. 7 S.C.R. A B of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. The Civil Court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the Constitutional Coutts, _viz.,_ the High Court and the Supreme Court under their plenary power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively with self-imposed restriction on their exercise of extraordinary power. Barring thereof, there is no power to the Civil Court." 13. It may be pointed out that the trial court dismissed the suit relying upon the decision of this Court in _laxmi Chand_ v. _Gram Panchayat, Kararia_ C (supra). The High Court distinguished the aforesaid decision by observing as under: - D "The ratio would be applicable when only the person aggrieved is covered by the notification directly or as nominee. However, when a person is not covered by the notification and without reference to him any notification issued would not be binding and in a such situation it would not prevent the aggrieved person from approaching the civil court. It is a salutary principle that the decree rendered in a civil proceedings binds the parties to the proceedings and the persons claiming through them. This principle would equally apply to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act." E 14. In our opinion the view taken by the High Court is wholly erroneous. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that the plaint scheduled property is not covered by the notification issued under Section 17 of the Act. As a matter of fact, there is no dispute that the land regarding which the suits have been filed is covered by the notification. The main ground on which the suits have F been filed is that the notice as required by sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Act was not served upon the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are claiming title to the property and are seeking the relief of possession on the ground that the notification has been rendered invalid on account of non servir.e of notice upon them under sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Act. The plaintiffs are G clearly assailing the validity of the acquisition proceedings. It is not their case that the plaint scheduled property is outside the purview of the land regarding which the notification under Section 17 had been issued. The ground for assailing the notification, namely, that notice under sub-section (5) of Section 17 of the Act was not served upon the plaintiffs and its effect could only be examined in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before H COMMR .. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 1· K.S. NARAYAN [G.P. MA TIJUR. J.) J 97 the High Court and not by the civil court. The judgments and decrees passed A by the High Court are, therefore, clearly illegal and have to be set aside. 15. In the result the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the High Court, which are subject-matter of challenge in the present appeals, are set aside and the decrees passed by the trial court on 29.3.200 I dismissing the suits are affirmed. No order as _to_ B costs. S.K.S. Appeals allowed.