High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed in the limited sense of remittin...

CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BHOPAL AND ORS. v. MIS. LEENA JAIN AND ORS.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 5074 of 2006
Neutral Citation:SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Arijit Pasayat
  • Lokeshar Singh Panta
Judgment Date
2006-11-20
Court Decision / Holding
The appeal is allowed to the extent of remitting the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration in light of Uma Devi’s case, with no orders as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed in the limited sense of remitting for fresh consideration in view of Uma Devi; no costs awarded; matter to be decided by High Court under Uma Devi framework.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhopal and others

Respondents

  • Ms. Leena Jain and others

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • D. Vikas Singh
  • • Shiva Lakshmi
  • • Amrita Narayan
  • • Pritesh Kapoor
  • • B. V. Balaram Das

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Amitesh Kumar
  • • Lakshmi Raman Singh

Case Synopsis & Summary

This appeal concerns the regularization of contractual Data Entry Operators who claimed permanent status after a long period of service. The respondents were engaged as Data Entry Operators on a contract and paid hourly, asserting regularization due to lengthy service. The Central Administrative Tribunal directed the employer to consider regularization; a writ petition filed by the employer before the Madhya Pradesh High Court was dismissed, prompting this appeal. The Supreme Court, however, reiterates that regularization cannot override the constitutional framework governing public employment. It relies on Uma Devi v. State of Karnataka, emphasizing that while ad hoc or temporary/casual appointments may occur in exigencies, permanent absorption should follow proper recruitment procedures and should not be presumed from extended service alone. The judgment underscores that accepting temporary employment with known terms does not create a legitimate expectation of permanent appointment, nor does it authorize a blanket scheme for regularization. It cautions against creating a new mode of public appointment and affirms that mandamus cannot compel permanent absorption absent a legal right and duty. In consequence, the Court remits the matter to the High Court to decide afresh in light of Uma Devi, and allows the appeal to that limited extent without costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals' Act, 1985Article 14 of the Constitution of India

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Theory of legitimate expectation
  • Mandamus requires a legal duty and a legal right
  • Constitutional scheme for public employment

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that the respondents were not departmental employees and their grievances could not be adjudicated by the CAT. They submitted that long rendition of service does not create a right to regularization and that reliance on earlier decisions directing regularization misapplies the law. Regularization would undermine the constitutional framework for public employment and could amount to a promise of permanent status without following the proper selection process and PSC involvement. They argued that Uma Devi’s case requires fresh consideration and that the matter should be decided in accordance with established recruitment norms and constitutional principles, not by ad hoc absorption based on length of service.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued for regularization on the ground of long service as contractual Data Entry Operators, claiming that their prolonged placement and work-equivalent service justify absorption. They urged that the CAT’s direction to consider regularization should be upheld and that the court should recognize legitimate expectations arising from long‑standing engagement, particularly where the posts are in nature of permanent duties. They maintained that their lack of formal departmental status should not bar consideration for regularization given the length of service and the administrative need.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Uma Devi and Ors.[2006] 4 SCC 1PositiveCited as the controlling authority on regularization; the Court remits the case for fresh consideration in light of Uma Devi’s framework.
Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College1962 Supp. 2 SCR 144PositiveCited to support the principle that mandamus cannot compel permanent absorption absent a legal right or duty; forms the classical basis for not mandating permanent status.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BHOPAL AND ORS. _v._ _MIS._ LEENA JAIN AND ORS. NOVEMBER 20, 2006 [ARIJITPASAYAT ANDLOKESHWARSINGHPANTA,JJ.] ## _Service Law:_ _Regularization-Claim of, by contractual employees on the ground of having worked for considerable length of time-Tribunal directing employer_ C _to consider their case-Writ petition by employer dismissed-On appeal, held, matter requires consideration in the light of decision in_ Uma Devi's _case-Remitted to High Court._ Respondents had been working as Data Entry Operator on contract basis D and were paid on hourly basis. They claimed regularization on the ground that they had been working since long period. Tribunal directed the appellant for considering their case. Aggrieved appellant filed writ petition before High Court, which was dismissed. Hence the present appeal. > Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to High Court for fresh E consideration in the light of decision in _*Uma Devi's_ case, the Court. HELD: While directing that appointments, temporary or casual be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that _the_ concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person _who_ accepts an F engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain - not at arms length - since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appreciate to Jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that G a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the Court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that _the_ parties were H 169 -- 170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. A not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A person who enters a temporary employment or engages as a contractual or casual worker and whose engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or B contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in consultation with Public Service Commission. [171-G; 172-A-B; G-H; 173-A-B) _*Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors._ v. _Uma Devi and Ors.,_ [2006) c 4 sec 1, relied on. ## CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.5074of2006. From the Judgment and Order dated 16-7-2003 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in W.P. No.197411998. D Vikas Singh, A.S.G., Shiva Lakshmi, Amrita Narayan, Pritesh Kapoor and B.V. Balaram Das for the appellants. Amitesh Kumar and Lakshmi Raman Singh for the Respondents. E The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ## ARIJIT P ASAY AT, J. Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 1974of1998. F Appellants had challenged the composite order dated 13. lL 1997 passed in OA No. 691 of 1995 and O.A. No.89 of 1996 passed by the Central . Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, at Jabalpur (in short the 'CAT'). The respondents moved the CAT under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals' Act, 1985 (in short the 'Act') seeking regularization of their services. G Stand of the respondents before the _CJ\..T_ was that they have been performing their duties as Data Entry Operators on contract basis and were being paid at a rate of Rs. I 0 per hour up to the maximum of Rs.50 per day. Since they have been working since a long period they sought for regularization placing reliance on the factum of long rendition of service. H In response, present appellants contended that the respondents were CHIEF COMMNR. OF INCOME TAX, BHOPAL 1·. LEENA JAIN [PASAYA T, J.] 171 not departmental employees and their grievances cannot be agitated before the CAT. Placing reliance on some other decisions by the CAT, the stand of the present appellants was turned down and direction was given for considering the cases of appointment on regular basis. A writ petition was filed before the High Court, which was dismissed by the impugned order. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the decision of the High Court is contrary to law as laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court .in _Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors_ v. _Uma Devi and Ors._ [2006] 4 SCC l. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that since the CAT had relied on an earlier C judgment, High Court rightly did not find any distinguishable feature, and the appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. > The question of regularization on the ground of long rendition of service was the subject matter in _Uma Devi's case_ (supra). The said issue has D been elaborately dealt with in the judgment. It was _inter alia_ held as follows: "33. It is not necessary to notice all the decisions of this Court on this aspect. By and large what emerges is that regular recruitment should be insisted upon, only in a contingency an _ad hoc_ appointment can be made in a permanent vacancy, but the same should soon be E followed by a regular recruitment and that appointments to nonavailable posts should not be taken note of for regularization. The cases directing regularization have mainly proceeded on the basis that having permitted the employee to work for some period, he should be absorbed, without really laying down any law to that effect, after discussing the constitutional scheme for public employment. F ## xxx ## xxx 45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain - not at arms length - since he might have been searching for some 172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. A B c D E F G employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the Page 1946 constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not pennissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the H 1 73 CHIEF COMMNR. OF INCOME TAX, BHOPAL _v._ LEENA JAIN [PASAYA T,J.] theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when A an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held B out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 52. Normally, what is sought for by such temporary employees when[c ] ·they approach the court, is the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the employer, the State or its instrumentalities, to absorb them in permanent service or to allow them to continue. In this context, the question arises whether a mandamus could be issued in favour of such persons. At this juncture, it will be proper to refer to the decision D of the Constitution Bench of this Court in _Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur_ v. _The Governing Body of the Nalanda College_ (1962] Supp: 2 SCR 144. That case arose out of a refusal to promote the writ petitioner therein as the Principal of a college. This Court held that in order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it E must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce ~t. This Classical position continues and a mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees directing the Government to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the F State has a legal duty to make them permanent." In view of what has been stated in _Uma Devi's_ case (supra), we deem it proper to remit the matter to the High Court to consider the case afresh in the light of the said decision. G The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no orders as to costs. D.G. Appeal allowed. ' .• H