High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed.

CHIEF COMMISSIONER, DELHI & ANR. v DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD. & ORS.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1959 of 1968
Neutral Citation:3 S.C.R. 658

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
  • Jaswant Singh
Judgment Date
1978-04-07
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Chief Commissioner, Delhi
  • ANR.

Respondents

  • Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.
  • Ors.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • R. P. Bhatt
  • • Girish Chandra

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Hardayal Hardy
  • • D. R. Thadani
  • • A. N. Goyal

Case Synopsis & Summary

This appeal concerns a notification issued by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi (1952) levying a registration fee on a mortgage deed securing a Rs. 2.50 crore debenture loan raised by the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. The mortgaged properties were mortgaged in favour of trustees who petitioned the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench, Delhi) challenging the validity of the notification and the exorbitant registration fee demanded under the notification. The High Court struck down the fee as an illegal impost that did not meet the essential conditions of a legal fee under the Constitution since the fee would form part of the State’s general revenues rather than being earmarked for a service rendered to the applicant. The principal argument by the appellant (Chief Commissioner, Delhi) was that registration provided an initial advantage by enabling the document to be used as proof of title, which constituted a service warranting a regulatory fee. However, even if such service existed, the second essential element—expenditure must be tied to the service and, accordingly, the fee must be earmarked and not diverted to general revenue—was not satisfied. Citing Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi, and the Salvation Army, the Court reaffirmed the two-element test for a valid fee. The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court’s order quashing the notification was upheld, with a remark that the issue was largely academic beyond certain periods.

Provisions of Law Cited

Constitution (fee within the meaning of the Constitution)Indian Stamp ActRegistration Department notification dated 15 December 1952

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Quid pro quo
  • Two essential elements for a fee: service and earmarking

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contended that the registration of the deed provided an initial advantage by making it admissible as proof of title, which constitutes a service that justifies a fee. If such service existed, the second requirement—funds being earmarked and utilized for the service’s maintenance—must be satisfied, i.e., the fee should not merge with the general revenue of the State. The maximum fee fixed (Rs. 100) was mentioned as immaterial to the overall principle, and reliance was placed on the two-element test established in Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi, and the Salvation Army decisions; however, the pleaded service could not be reconciled with earmarking to the registration department’s costs. The High Court’s dismissal of the appeal was urged to be incorrect only if the two elements could be satisfied, which the appellant argued was not proven to be the case.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents urged that the registration fee failed the constitutional test for a fee: there must be a service rendered (quid pro quo) and the amount collected must be appropriated to meet the costs of providing that service rather than being deposited in general revenues. They relied on earlier decisions confirming the two-element criterion and argued that the fee was more an impost than a fee because it did not meet earmarking and service-connection requirements; hence the notification was invalid.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Anr. v. The State of Orissa and Anr.1954 SCR 1046PositiveCited to establish the two essential elements of a fee (service and earmarking) and to show that a fee must be funded for a specific purpose rather than going to general revenue.
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay and Ors.1954 SCR 1055PositiveRepeated the two-element test for fee validity, reinforcing the need for service connection and earmarking of funds.
State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. The Salvation Army, Western India Territory1975 SCR 475PositiveAffirms the two-element framework and the requirement that fee proceeds are tied to the service rendered and not placed in general revenues.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

657 A B c D E. F G H ## ### CHIEF COMMISSIONER, DELHI & ANR. v DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD. & ORS. _April_ 7, 1978 [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ] _Fee-Conditions_ _to_ _be satisfied_ _to_ _be_ _a legal fee, within the_ _meaning_ _of_ _the_ _Constitution._ The Respondent Company floated debenture loan of Rs. 2.50 crores and to 'Secure the repayment of the said loan executed debenture trust deed dated 10th Dismissing the appeal by certificate, the Court HEID : A fee in order to be a legal fee n1ust satisfy two conditions : (a) There must be an element of _quid pro quo,_ i.e. the authority levying the fee ·must render some service for the fee levied however remote the service may be; and (b) That the fee realised n1ust be spent for the purpose of the imposi tion and should not form part of the general revenues of the State. [658 F-01 In the instant case, in view of the fact that it was ·not disputed that the fee Tealised by the Registration Department under the impugned notification dated 15-2-1952 was to form part of the general revenues of the State, the second <element of a fee was wholly wanting and the High Court was, therefore, right in striking down this notification. [658 G-H] _Mahant_ _Sri Jaga11nath Ran1anuj Das and_ _Anr._ v. _The State_ _of_ _Orissa_ _and_ _Anr._ [19541 SCR 1046, _Ratilal Panac1wnd_ _Gandhi_ v. _The State_ _of_ _Bombay_ _and_ _-Ors._ **[1954)** SCR at p. 1055 and _State_ _of_ _Malfarashtra_ _&_ _Ors._ v. _The_ _Salvation_ _Army,_ _Western India Territory_ [1975] 3 SCR 475 applied. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1959 of 1968. From the Judgment and Order dated the 7th May, 1964 of the Puniah High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi, in Civil Writ No. 227-D Qf 1962. _R.P. Bhatt_ and _Girish Chandra_ for the Appellant. _Hardayal Hardy, D.R._ _Thadani_ and _A .N._ _Goyal_ for Respondents _Sobhagmal Jain_ for the Intervener (The Slate of Rajasthan). _0._ _P._ _Rana_ _Inc_ the Intervener (State,,f U.P.). April, 1962, mortgaging certain properties of the Company for a considerat~on of Rs. 2.50 crores in favour of the trustees \Vho were petitioners before the High Court. Stan1ps to the extent of Rs. 2,50,00 /- were paid under the Indian Stamp Act and apart from that when the document was presented for registration, a registration fee of Rs. 1,25, 157.50 np. \Vere demanded as registration fee by the Sub-Registrar under a notification issued by the appe1lant, the Chief ·Com~ssioner of Delhi on 15th December, 1952. The registration fee was paid by the Respondents under compulsion, but the trustees filed a petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the notification and the exorbitant amount realised as registration fee as illegal levy not fulfi.11ing the essential conditions of a fee within the meaning of the Constitution. The plea of the trustees found favour with the High Court v,rhich held that the fee charged by the Registration Department under the notification was an illegal impost and ·could not be levied. The High Court accordingly quashed the notification. A B c D . E F G **H** 658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1978] 3 S.C.R. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment and order of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi dated the 7th May, 1964 and arises in the following circumstances : The respondent Company floated debenture loan of Rs. 2.50 crores and to secure the repayment of the said loan, executed debenture trust deed dated 10th April, 1962 mortgaging certain properties of the Company for a considera,tion of Rs. 2.50 crores iu favour of the trustees who were petitioners before the High Court. Further details have been given in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary to repeat them here. It appears that stamps to the extent of Rs. 2,50,300/were paid uuder the Indian Stamp Act and apart from that when the document was presented for registration, a registration fee of Rs. 1,25, 157.50 np were demanded as registration fee by the Sub-Registrar under a notification issued by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, which is the impugned notification in this case. The registration fee was paid by the respondents under compulsion but the trustees filed a petition in the High Court challenging the, validity of the notification and the exorbitant amount realised as registration fee. The short point taken before the High Court by the Respondents was that the registration fee levied under the notification dated 15th De<:ember, 1952 was an illegal levy as it did not fulfil the essential conditions of a: fee within the meaning of the Constitution. The plea of the trustees fouud favour with the High Court which held that the fee charged by the Registration Department under the notification was an illegal impost and could not be levied . The High Court accordingly quashed the notification and directed refund of the fee. The main point which arises for consideration in this case is as to whether or not the fee charged under the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner was a legal impost justified by the provisions of the Constitution. It is well settled that a fee in order t<:> be a legal fee, must satisfy-two conditions : (i) there must be an element of _quid_ _pro_ _quo_ that is to say, the authority levying the fee must render some service for the fee levied however remote the service may be; rev~nues **of** **the State.** In the instant case, it was not disputed before the High Court that the fee realised by the Registration Department under the notification above-mentioned was to form part of the general revenues of the State. It is, therefore, manifest that the second element of a fee was wholly wanting in this case and the High Court was, therefore, right in striking down the notification. Mr. Bhatt aphearing in support of the appeal, submitted that by virtue of the fact t at the document was registered, the respondents obtained initial advantage in using the document as all! _f._ .. ###### • "' (ii) that the fee realised must be spent for the purposes of the imposition and should not form part of the general ~ # / ' ... I ~ ,, # "' ~ ' ;.. ' ###### • _-·.I_ ##### **\T** bELHI COMMISSIONER _V._ D.C.G. MILLS _(Fazal_ _Ali,_ J.) 659 authentic piece of evidence as proof of title and this was, therefore. a **A** sufficient service rendered for the imposition of the fee. Even assuming that this was so, the second essential ingredient of a valid fee, viz. that the. fee .realised must be correlated with expenditure incurred on registration so as to be spent on maintenance of registration organisation, was not satisfied in this case and on this ground alone the fee could not be imposed. In _Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Anr._ v. _The State_ _of Orissa and_ _Anr.('),_ this Court observed as follows :- **S** 'Two, elements are thus essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place, it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly. But this by itself is not enough to make the imposition a fee, if the payments demanded for rendering of such services are not set apart or specifically app.ropriated for that purpose but are merged in the general revenue of the Stat(j to be spent for general public purposes". The same view was reiterated in _Ratilal Panachand Gandhi_ v. _The State_ _of_ _Bombay and_ _Ors.(')_ In a recent decision of this Court in the case of _State_ _of_ _Maharashtra_ _and_ _Q,,._ v. _The Salvation Army, Western India Territory('),_ this Court observed as follows : ''Thus two elements are essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place, it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accept either willingly or unwillingly and in the second place, the amount collected must be earmarked to meet the expenses of rende,ing these services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purpose". S. R. (I) [19541 S.C.R. P. 1046 (2) [1954] S.CR.P. 1055. (3) [1975] 3 S.C R 475. c E ####, ' ·• ' , In view of the long course of decisions of this Court, the view taken by the High Court was absolutely correct and we arn unable to find any error of Jaw. We understand that the notification has not been amended F and a maximum fee of Rs. _100/-_ has been fixed. Thus the point be**con1es** **more or** **less** **academic** **except** **for** **cases** **arising during** **a particular** period. For these reasons, therefore, we find no merit in this appeal which fails and is accordingly, dismissed without any order as to costs. _Appeal dismissed._