1957
_May,24_
#
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
AL. PR. RANGANATHAN CHE1TIAR
_v._
AL. PR. AL. PERIAKARUPPAN CHETTIAR
(and connected appeal)
(JAGANNADHADAS, B.P. SINHA and
GOVINDA MENON JJ.)
Will-Constructio~Disposition _to_ _adopted_ _son,_ _R-Adoption_
_invalid-Whether R. takes property_ _as_ persona designata. _£Jeetl_
_Construction-Trust,_ _whether_ _created-Language_ _of_ _deed_ _ambi-_
_guous-Subsequent_ _conduct_ _of parties-Burden_ _of proof_
P adopted A in 1914 but on account of the acute differences
which arose between them later, he made a second adoption of the
first appellant .in 1926 on the footing that such an adoption was
permitted by special custom in Nattukottai Chetti families. Jn
the partition suit filed by A for himself and on behalf of his minor
son, the first respondent, the validity of the second adoption was
challenged, but the matter was compromised by a Rajinama under
which P was directed to pay the plaintiffs therein Rs. 75,000 each
separately in lieu of their right to partition. Under the terms of
. para 3 of the Rajinama and the hundi executed by P in favour of
the first respondent, the amount was to be paid to the order of three
persons, _viz.,_ the father and mother of the first respondent and C,
and the amount itself was to be invested in the name of the first
respondent in Chetti firms to the order of P and C who were to be
in management. In 1929 P executed a will whereby he made
arrangements for certain religious gifts and charities and gave the
residue of the property to his ·wife for her life and thereafter t<>
his second adopted son, the first appellant. On attaining majority
in 1943 the first respondent filed two suits. The first was on the
footing that the amount of Rs. 75,000 which was given to him
under the Rajinama was constituted a trust for his benefit during
his minority under the trusteeship of P and C, that the money
was wrongfully appropriated by C, contrary to the terms of the
Rajinama, and that P as a co-trustee with C was equally responsible for C's breach of trust and that the first respondent was
entitled to have the amount aid out of the estate of P in the
hands of the appellant. The second suit was for the recovery of
the entire properties of P on the ground that the second adoption
was invalid and that the will executed by P was ineffective. It
was found that the adoption of the first appellant was invalid and
that the customary adoption set up by P was made for temporal
rather than spiritual purposes, and the question was whether,
notwithstanding his description as adopted son in the will in
several places, the intention was· that he was to take the property
as _persona_ _designata._ As regards the terms of para 3 of the
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 215
Rajinama the language used was ambiguous, whether the power
of investment was vested in both P and C, but looking at the
subsequent conduct of the parties it was found that it was C who
was authorised to collect the amount of the hundi and to arrange
for the investment of the same on the responsibility of the father
and mother of the first respondent.
_Held_ : (1) The question whether a disposition to a person is
intended as a _persona_ _designata_ or 'by reason of his filling a particular legal status which turns out to be invalid, depends on the
facts of the case and the terms of the particular document containing the disposition, and in the instant case, in view of the
exclusion of the validly adopted son and his heirs from succession and the conduct of the parties for over 14 years in allowing
the first appellant to retain the property, taking an overall picture
of the various provisions of the will, it was clear that the first
appellant was intended by the testator to take the property as
_persona_ _designata_ and that the will was therefore effective to
convey title to him.
_Nidhoomoni_ _Debya_ v. _Saroda_ _Pershad_ _Mookerjee,_ (1876) L.R.
3 I.A. 253 and _Fanindra_ _Deb_ _Raikat_ v. _Rajeswar_ _Das,_ (1884) L.R.
12 I.A. 72, referred to.
(2) Trusteeship is a position which is to be imputed to a
person on clear and conclusive evidence of transfer of ownership
and of the liability attached to such ownership on account of
confidence reposed, and on such liability having been accepted by
the alleged trustee, and in the present case there was no proof
that P became a trustee for the minor's fund and incurred liability
for C's breach of trust.
CIVIL, APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.
104 of 1954 and 169 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave . from the judgment and
decree dated November 13, 1950, of the Madras High
Court in A.S. No. 484 of 1947 arising out of the judgment and decree dated December 21, 1946, of the
Court of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai in Original
Suit No. 156 of 1944 and Appeal from the judgment
and decree dated September 17, 1952 and October 24,
1952, of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 243of1947
arising out of the judgment and decree dated December
21, in Original Suit No. 164 of the Subordinate Judge,
###### Devakottai in Original Suit No. 164.
_A. V._ _Vishwanatha Sastri and M.S.K. Aiyangar,_ for
the appellants in C.A. No. 104of1954.
1957
_Ranganathan_
_Che/liar_
v.
_Perlakaruppa1;_
_Che/liar_
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957
_**Ranganathan**_
_A._ _V._ _Vishwanatha Sastri and M._ S. _K._ _Sastri,_ for
the appellants in C.A. No. 169 of 1956.
_K.S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar_ and _R. Ganapathy Iyer,_
for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).
1957. May 24. The judgment of Jagannadhadas
and B.P. Sinha JJ. was delivered by Jagannadhadas J. Govinda Menon J. delivered a separate
judgment.
_**Chettiar**_
v.
_**,"'eriakaruppan**_
_**Chettiar**_
_.'agnnadhadasJ._ JAGANNADHADAS J.-These two are appeals against
two separate decrees of the High Court of Madras
arising out of two suits as between the same contesting
parties with reference to a connected set of facts.
Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1954 is before us by virtue of
special leave granted by this Court under Art. 136 (1)
of the Constitution. Civil Appeal No. 169 of 1956 has
come up by reason of certificate granted by the High
Court under Art. 133 (1) _(a)_ of the Constitution. The
parties to the litigation are Nattukottai Chetties, a
wealthy banking community in South India who, at
the time, were having large banking transactions in
Burma and other places in South-East Asia. One AL.
PR. Periakaruppan Chettiar (hereinafter referred to as
Periakaruppa) owned and possessed considerable properties. He adopted one AL. PR. Alagappa Chettiar
(hereinafter referred to as Alagappa) in or about the
year 1914. There arose acute differences between them
from about the year 1924 owing to the alleged wasteful
habits of Alagappa who ran into debts. This led to
criminal complaints between them, each against the
other, in 1926. (See Exs. P-5 and D-12). One of Alagappa's creditors obtained a decree against him and
attached Alagappa's half share in the family residential house including the site on which it was situated.
This resulted in a regular suit in which the question
at issue was whether the site was ancestral site and
whether the super-structure was co.nstructed out of the
###### ancestral funds. It was found that the site was ancestral. Periakaruppa maintained that the super-structure
which was substantial in value compared with the site
was built out of his self-acquired funds and was not
joint family property, while Alagappa and the attaching
S.C.R SUPREME COURT REPORTS 217
creditor contended to the contrary. The litigation 1957
went up to the High Court and the High Court accept- _Ranga;;;;;-han_
ed the contention of Periakaruppa and made a c~uiar
declaration that the site was ancestral ~d that the _Periak'aruppan_
###### super-structure was the s~lf-acqµisitimi 9f. Peria- c".:!!!!:'
karuppa. The judgment of the JJigh Coilrt was dated _Jagannadhadas_ _J._
November 19, 1926, and is reported inPeriq~arµppan v.
_Arunachalam(1)._ During the pendency of . this litigation in the High Court the adopted son. Alagappa
filed a suit on September 9, 1926, ori behalf of hi.mself
an(:1 his minor son by name AL. PR. AL. Periakaruppan Chettiar (hereinafter, for distinction, referred to as
junior Periakaruppa) represented by his ·Il1other and
###### next friend by name Muthayi Achi. . It has to be
mentioned that in or abQut June 47, 1926, Perii!-karuppa
purported to make a secqnd adoption of 1;1 •young
boy by name AL. PR. Ranganathan'Chettiar(hereinafter referred to as Ranganatha) on the footing that
such an adoption was permitted · by speci~l cust()m in
Nattukottai Chetti families. The suit 0.S. No. 114 of
1926 filed by Alagappa and his minor . sori, jµnior
Periakaruppa, was therefore filed as against Periakaruppa and his second adopted son Ranganatha, who
###### at the time was also a minor. It was for delivery of
a half share of the properties of the family on the
footing that all the properties were joint family pro~
perties and for a declaration that the second adoption was invalid. The first· defendant therein, Periakaruppa, filed a written statement col'ltestirig both these
. matters and claiming that all the suit properties in
their entirety were his self-acquisitfon and that the
plaintiffs had absolutely no rights therein and also
asserting that the second adoption was valid. Before
the suit proceeded to the stage of issues and trial, the
dispute Between the parties was compron;iised by a
_Rajinama_ brought about by fom _Panchayatdars,_ who
were all respectable members of the Nattukottai Chetti
community. Some of the questions that arise in the
present appeals centre round the proper construction
of some of the terms of this _Rajinama;_ which will be
###### noticed later. It is sufficient to state ~ this stage that
by that _Rajinama_ the two plaintiffs, Alagappa and his
(1) (1926) I.LR. 50 Mad. 582.
28
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]
_1957_ minor son, junior Periakaruppa, obtained Rs. 75,000
_Ranganathan_ each and Alagappa's wife Muthayi Achi, the mother
_Chettlar_ of the minor son and his nexf friend in the suit, was
Periak~~uppan to get a sum of Rs. 14,000 as her _Stridhan._ These
_Chettlar_ amounts were paid by means of four hundis,Rs. 25,000
_Jaga11nat1hadas_ _J._ and Rs. 50,000 for Alagappa, Rs. 75,000 for junior
Periakaruppa and Rs. 14,000 for the mother, Muthayi
Achi, on Nattukottai Chetti bankers of Periakaruppa
###### in Burma. It was one of the express terms of the
_Rqjinama_ that all the properties mentioned in the
plaint in that suit and other properties belonging _to_
the first defendant, Periakaruppa, were admitted to be
his self-acquisitions and that the plaintiffs therein had
no right and connection whatsoever in any of them
or in the charities founded by Periakaruppa and
in the properties belonging thereto or their manage###### ment, either in the lifetime of Periakaruppa or subsequent thereto. It was also one of the specific
terms of the _Rajinama_ that the plaintiffs should
remove themselves from the family house with all
their belongings and that the possession of the
##### aforesaid house be delivered to Periakaruppa. It
was also expressly stipulated that the petition then
###### pending for leave to appeal to the Privy Coµncil
against the judgment reported in _Periakaruppan_ v.
_Arunachalam(')_ was to be withdrawan. This compromise was certified to be for the benefit of the mmor
plaintiff concerned, as also of the minor defendant
Ranganatha and was accepted by the Subordinate
Judge before whom the compromise petition was filed.
As a result, the compromise was accepted by the court
on August 15, 1927, and the suit was dismissed in terms
thereof on the same date. About a year and a half
later Periakaruppa executed a will on April 4, 1929.
The genuineness and due execution thereof are not in
question. But the effect of that will is also one of the
main points in dispute. Periakaruppa died about
three months later _i.e._ on July 14, 1929, and his wife
Lakshmi Achi died within a year thereof on March 11,
1930. By the will, broadly speaking, Periakaruppa
made arrangements for certain religious gifts and
{<) (1926) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 580.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 219
charities and made arrangements for the management 1957
thereof and gave the residue of the property to his wife _Ranganashan_
Lakshmi Achi for her life and thereafter to his second _Chettiar_
adopted son Ranganatha. Ranganatha, who, some _Peru:k"aruppan_
tiine in or about the date of Lakshmi Achi's death in _Chettiar_
undisputed possession and enjoyment 1930, appears to have attained majority, has been of Periakaruppa's in _Jagannadhada3_ _J,_
properties ever since _till_ late in 1944. Alagappa's son
junior Periakaruppa attained majority in December,
1943, and filed two suits on November 11, 1944, in the
Subordinate Judge's Court of Devakottai, one numbered as O.S. 156of1944 and the other as O.S. 160 of
1944. O.S. No. 156 of 1944 was on the footing that
Rs. 75,000 which was given to him under the above
mentioned _Rajinama_ of the year 1927, was, under the
terms thereof constituted a trust for his benefit during
his minority under the trusteeship of Periakaruppa
himself, and· another person A.P.S. Chockalingam
Chettiar of Athangudi, (hereinafter referred to as
Chockalingam) the junior paternal uncle of the minor's
mother, Muthayi Achi, and that the money was
wrongly appropriated by Chockalingam owing to his
straightened circumstances. His case was that Periakaruppa as a co-trustee with Chockalingam was
equally responsible for breach of the trust and that
therefore he was entitled to have the moneys found
due on account, paid out of the estate of Periakaruppa
in the hands of Ranganatha as well as from the estate
of Chockalingam in the hands of his son. The second
suit O.S. No. 164 of 1944, was a suit to recover the
entire properties of Periakaruppa in the possession of
Ranganatha for himself and his father Alagappa who
was made the first defendant in the suit, on the ground
that Ranganatha's adoption was invalid, that the will
of Periakaruppa was ineffective and that the properties devolved on himself and his father Alagappa.
###### It may be noticed that so far as the father Alagappa
- is concerned the suit would _primafacie_ be time-barred
###### since it has been filed. about 15 years after the death
of Periakaruppa. The plaintiff junior Periakaruppa
however filed the suit on the footing that in view of
his minority for all this period until December, 1943,
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957
_**Ranganathan**_
_Chettlar_
v.
_**Periakaruppan**_
the suit was not barred. Hereinafter, for convenience,
the first suit O.S. No. 156 of 1944 will be referred to as
the trust suit, and the second suit O.S. No. 164 of
1944 will be referred to as the succession suit.
_Chettiar_ Jn the succession suit the main questions that arose
_Jagannadhadas_ _J._ for decision were:
(1) whether the adoption of Ranganatha as a
second adopted son was valid ;
(2) if not, whether the will was effective to convey
the property of Periakaruppa to Ranganatha after the
death of his wife Lakshmi Achi,. notwithstanding the
invalidity of his adoption;
(3) Whether in case the will was ineffective the
properties of Periakaruppa devolved on both Alagappa
and his son junior Periakaruppa together or on
Alagappa alone to the exclusion of junior Periakaruppa;
(4) if the devolution was on both together, whether the rights of junior Periakaruppa were barred by
reason of s. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Act
IX of 1908). This involved the further questions:
_(a)_ whether by and under the _Rajinama_
Alagappa and his son became divided in status _inter se_
so as to make _s._ 7 inapplicable.
(b) whet.her in case the devolution was on both
together as members of a joint family, s. 7 had application to the factual situation in the family.
So far as the adoption of Ranganatha was concerned
both the courts below, while holding that the adoption
as a fact was proved, have found against existence of
the custom pleaded as to its validity and hence concurrently found the adoption to be invalid. That
conclusion is no longer in dispute in this Court. As
regards the will both the courts held that the will was
ineffective to vest any title in Ranganatha though on
slightly different grounds. As regards question No. 4
relating to limitation, the two courts came to different
conclusions with the result that the trial court dismissed
the suit as barred by limitation, while the High Court
reversed it and granted a decree for the half share of
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 221
Periakaruppa's properties in favour of junior Periakaruppa holding that in respect of the other half share
the rights of Alagappa were barred and that Ranganatha acquired the same by his adverse, possession. As
regards question No. (3) and the subordinate questions
(a) and (b) of question No. (4), there appears to have
been no serious question raised in the trial court by
the defendant as to the exclusion of junior Periakaruppa
by Alagappa in the matter of succession to Penakaruppa's properties, or any serious questions raised
by the plaintiff as to the _Rajinama_ bringing about a
partition _inter se_ between the father Alagappa and his
minor son junior Periakaruppa and of Alagappa not
###### being the de facto manager of the family. It was
accodingly found by the trial court that both of them
succeeded as members of the joint family and that
therefore the minor, junior Periakaruppa, was barred
by virtue of s. 7 of the Limitation Act. When the
matter came up on appeal to the High Court, a question was raised that s. 7 would not be applicable in this
case unless it was further made out that the father
Alagappa was the _de_ _facto_ manager of the family
consisting of himself and his minor son of which it
is alleged there was no proof or finding. Both the
Judges allowed this point to be raised and called
upon the trial court to take evidence and submit a
finding in respect of that contention. The trial
court accordingly took evidence in regard thereto
and returned. a finding that on the evidence, both
the father and the minor son were living as mem- .
hers of a joint family and that the father was in
fact the _de_ _facto_ guardian. When the matter was
reheard by the same Bench of the High Court on the
return of the finding, the Bench did not go into the
correctness or otherwise of this finding, on the. view
###### that this finding was of no consequence, if it is found
that by virtue of the _Rajinama_ both the father and
the minor son became divided _inter_ _se._ The learned
Judges while realising that the finding was called for
on the undisputed assumption that the father and the
son were undivided in status, were of the opinion that
there was nothing to prevent them from . reopening
_19S1_
_Ranganathan_
_Chettiar_
v.
_Periakaruppa11_
_Chettiar_
_Jaganadhaau• J:_
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958)
_1951_ the same and held on a construction of the _Rajinama_
_Ranganatluzn_ that it brought about divided status _inter se_ between
Ch~:1ar the father Alagappa and his minor son junior Peria_Periakaruppan_ karuppa. In that view they found s. 7 of the
_chettiar_ Limitation Act had no application to the case and
_:'agQllnadlllldas_ _J._ came to the conclusion that the succession suit by
junior Periakaruppa was not barred by limitation in
so far as it related to his own share though barred in
respect of Alagappa's share. Hence the succession
suit ended in favour of junior Periakaruppa in respect
of a half share of the properties left by Periakaruppa.
As regards the trust suit the contentions raised were:
(1) that under the _Rajinama_ both Periakaruppa
and Chockalingam became trustees in respect of the
sum of Rs. 75,000 to be invested in Chetti firms as
provided in the _Rajinama;_
(2) that as a fact the amount was invested with
Chockalingam, one of the trustees themselves, conrtary
to the law;
(3) that such investment itself constituted breach
of trust for which· Periakaruppa was also responsible.
###### It appeared on the evidence that out of the trust
.amount, a sum of Rs. 30,000 was invested in the
purchase of a house at Athangudi in South India (the
place of Chockalingam) and that Alagappa and his
minor son, the jonior Periakaruppa, and his family
have been since that purchase on July 23, 1928, living
in that house. At the trial, therefore, credit was
given to this amount as being proper investment of
the trust funds in the matter of account-taking by
concession of the lawyer for junior Periakaruppa.
The defendant Ranganatha in addition to contending
that no trust was created, also contended that as a
result of subsequent transactions junior Periakaruppa
got the benefit not only of the purchase of the house
above referred to but also of a mortgage executed
in favour of himself and another by Chockalingam in
1930 for a lakh of rupees of which Rs. 70,000 was his,
of which he obtained the benefit, and that therefore
the alleged breach of trust must be taken to have been
waived and that in any case he was entitled to have
###### S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 223
the mortgage document as much as the purchase of the 1957
house to be taken into consideration for reducing his _Ranganathan_
liability in respect of the alleged breach of trust. _Chettlar_
These contentions were negatived by both the courts _Peria'karuppan_
with the result that there was a decree against Ranga- . _Chettiar_
natha and his minor son in respect of half the loss _Jagannadhadas_ _1._
occasioned by the breach of trust, payable out of the
half share pf Periakaruppa's properties in their hands.
The result of the two judgments of the High Court in
botlf the suits was against Ranganatha and hence the
two! present appeals before us by him.
It will now be convenient to take up first the consideration of the succession appeal. The points arising
therein have already ·been set out in the preliminary
narration and need no repetition. The main points
##### argued before us on this appeal are(1) The conclusion of the High Court that the will
###### of Periakaruppa was inetfective is erroneous and
Ranganatha, took under the will as _persona_ _designata._
(2) In case the will is held to be ineffective and in
the view taken by the High Court that Alagappa and
junior Periakaruppa became divided in status under
the _Rajinama_ the property of Periakaruppa devolved
on Alagappa to the exclusion of junior Periakaruppa
and hence the plaintiff has no right to sue. (3) The conclusion . of the High Court that the
_Rajinama_ brought about divided status _inter_ _se_
between the father Alagappa and the-minor son junior
Periakaruppa is erroneous and hence the suit is barred
by virtue of s. 7 of the Limitation Act.
A few other minor points have been raised on both
sides which, after consideration, appeared to be unsubstantial and we intimated our view at the hearing
and it is not necessary to refer to and deal with them
any further. We have heard elaborate arguments on
the above three points and have given our careful
###### consideration to them~ It is obvious that having
regard to the course of events in this family narrated
earlier the primary question for consideration is
whether or not thewill left by Periakaruppa has brought
###### about an effective disposition of his properties
M2SC _5_
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958}
###### 1957 in favour of Ranganatha. It is only if that has become
_Rancanathan_ ineffective that the other questions argued before us on
_Chettlar_ this appeal as set out above. arise for consideration ..
_Periak"druppan_ In view of the fact that the genuineness of the will is
_Chettiar_ not disputed ana no question arises as to the disposing
_Jagannati;,das_ _J._ capacity of Periakaruppa, the plaintiff in this case,
junior Periakaruppa, can succeed only if he disp!&ces
the will. He has accordingly raised three contentions.
1. That there is no effective dispositive clause in
the will. ###### 2. That the disposition, if any, in favour of
Ranganatha under the will was an attempt to create
an estate in _tail-male_ and hence invalid.
3. The disposition in favour of Ranganatha was
by reason of and on account of, his having been
considered by the testator as his duly adopted son, _i.e .•_
the . validity of the adoption was the basis and the
condition for the disposition. Sine!" that has now been
found to be invalid, the disposition fails.
Of these three questions the first two though upheld
by the trial court have been rejected by the High
Court. We agree with the reasoning of the High Court
on these two points and they do not call for any
further consideration. We are satisfied that there is
no substance in these contentions. The real question
that arises on a consideration of the will is whether
the disposition of the residue in favour of Ranganatha
contained therein was to him as a _persona_ _designata_ or
is dependent on his being a duly and validly adopted
son.
For a proper appreciation of this contention on both
sides, it is necessary to set out the relevent clauses in
the will.
"(1) I am now 68 years of age, taking into consideration the fact that I have been in indifferent health
for sometimes past I have decided to make an arrangement after my lifetime in regard to my properties
and in regard to the charities established by me and
accordingly I have executed this will whole-heartedly.
(2)All the immovable and movable properties
entirely, which belong to me as my own and which are
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 225
in my possession are my self-acquired properties. 19s
Excepting myself no other person has any interest or _Ranganathan_
right whatever in the said properties. _Chettiar_
##### (3) ....•............................, . . . . . . Periak~~uppan
Al agappan, [(4) ] [Sometime ] son - [bfacNk ] ac an [Ihtoodk ] upatt1 [as ] [1!1Y ] [Cf.h~sdter ] - i am aram [b(son) ] _[Jagann;;u;adai 1• ]_
Chettiar, and brought him up in my house and also
got him married. But the aforesaid Algappan conducted himself in immoral ways and had evil intentions and further fell into bad company and after
being duped brought into existence several documents
falsely and colourfully by making it appear that he
had borrowed debts to the tune of about one lakh of
rupees and also caused decrees to be passed in respect
of some of the above mentioned debts and estranged my
feelings and became inimical towards me, and left my
family and was living separately for the past about IO
years and he was also living in his father-in-taw's
house. .
(5) Thereafter while the aforesaid person had
instituted a suit O.S. No. 114 to 1926 against me in the
Sub-Court of Devakotta for his share in the properties
which were in my possession, some of our community
people acted as the panchayatdars and gave an award
in the above suit and a _rajinama_ was filed in the
Court, and all the amounts which were payable by me
according to the said _rajinama_ were already paid by
me entirely. Neither the aforesaid Alagappa Chetti
nor his heirs shall have any manner of right or interest
whatever in the properties which are now in my
possession and in the properties which might be
acquired hereafter.
(6) Subsequently I took in adoption Nachandupatti Ramanathan Chettiar's son, namely, Ranganathan, aged about 17! years, and he is living with me.
(7) to (12) ......................••..••...•
( 13) My adopted son Rangana~han and hi~ mal~
heirs shall after the lifetime of my wife Lakshmi Ach1
properly conduct the aforesaid charities. In order to
supervise and see whether Ranganathan conducts the
charities properly without any defect whatever, I have
'
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
_z957_ - appointed the following persons as the executors,
_Ranganathan_ - namely, (1) my son-in-law Arunachalam Chettiar, son
_Chettiar_ of Alagapuri .Alagappa Chettiar who is interested in
v. both myself and Ranganathan, the two sons of
Periaka.~ppan Kanadukathan AL .. K. Chandra Mouli Chettiar,
- _Chettiar_ namely, (2) Karuppan Chetty, (3) Peria Karuppan
Jagannadhrd~; _1._ Chetty, and (4) l\Iurugappan, son of Konapattu Subra
manian Chettiar. The said persons shall :_tccordingly
supervise (the performance of the charities) in a proper
manner .
. (14) I am entertaining a· desire that I should spend my lifetime and die at Tiruvarur alone. l\Iy
body shall not be cremated according to our caste custom, and a _samadhi_ (tomb) shall be erected for me,
and a la.mp shall be lit therein daily and a person shall
. be appointed to perform _Neivedhiyam_ (by preparing
food) with 1/4 measure of rice by· the big measure
daily. _Guru pooja_ shall be performed once a year in
the _Star_ in which I die, by distributing food to the
mendicants, and by spending an amount to the extent
of Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty) every year
by inviting my relations. _A_ sum of Rs. 15,000 (rupees
fifteen thousand) shall be sent for and obtained from
the Saigon firm from out of my own funds for the aforesaid _Tirupani_ (service) in the temple and my wife shall
conduct the aforesaid _Tirupani._ .The daily expenses
of the _Samadhi_ aforesaid and _Guru pooja_ et9,, shall be
met from the _Patasala_ charity funds and conducted.
(15) Apart from the properties which have been
set apart for the abovementioned charities and the
properties which have to be newly purchased hereafter
for the same, as my adopted son Ranganathan and
his male heirs have to take all the immovable and
mova:ble properties belonging to me and as the aforesaid adopted son namely Ranganathan is now a minor
the said Ranganathan shall after he attains majority
- and if he is of good behaviour (take in his possession)
the aforesaid properties after my lifetime and afterthe
lifetime of my wife Lakshmi Achi and enjoy them.
(16) In case the aforesaid Ranganathan does not
###### conduct himself pr_operly or if my wife Lakshmi A chi
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 227
does not like, the following two persons, namely, (1) t9H
K.AS.P.Rm. Ramaswami Chettiar, son of Athanguqi _Ranganathatt_
Palaniappa Chettiar, and (2) PL.T. Rm;. Ramaswami _Chmiar_
Chettiar, son of Karaikudi Thenappa Chettiar shall Periak~~appan
manage my properties after the lifetime of my wife _Chettiar_ .
Lakshmi Achi till Ranganathan comes of good _Jagannadhadas_ _:J._ _
behaviour. The amount which may be found just fot
family expenses shall be paid till such time when
the aforesaid Ranganathan begins to conduct himself
properly and when the properties are delivered in his
possession.
##### (17) ..•................•................••
(18) For the expenses of the maintenance right,
etc., of my wife Lakshmi Achi and for the necessary
expenses of pilgrimages to sacred places a sum of
Rs. 15,000 (fifteen thousand) dollars has been credited·
in her name in the Saigon firm, and she shall send for
and obtain the amount of interest alone got for the
said amount every year and spend it according to her
pleasure. My adopted son Ranganathan and his male
heirs shall take the principal amount.
##### (19) ............ ·.· ...•. ~· .......•.......•
(20) As regards the substantial tiled building
which belongs to me and which is in my own place
and which I am residing, and one bungalow building
built by me in the _Therodam veedhi_ (street in which
the chariot is drawn) in the said place, my wife shall
enjoy them after my lifetime and after her my adopted
son Ranganathan and his male-heirs shall perm~mently
and for ever enjoy the said buildings. Apart· from
enjoying the abovementioned two buildings, none of
them shall have any right to alienate them in any
manner.
##### (21) If apart from the matters specified by me
herein, it is necessary that any documents should be
brought into existence after my lifetime during the lifetime of my wife regarding the properties belonging to
me and regarding the charity properties and regarding
the family maintenance from time to time. I have
hereby given authority to my wife Lakshmi Achi
mentioned above to execute such documents regarding
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 the same. My adopted son Ranganathan shall perform
_Ranganathan_ the funeral obsequies for myself and for my wife.
#### chettw . (22) and (23) ......................••........
###### .Perlllk",;,uppan (Sd.) A. L. P.R. Periakaruppan Chetty."
_Chtttlilr_ In order to understand the background of this will, it
##### '"'""";;;n;,,,01 1 is necessary to recapitulate the previous family history
- which has already been adverted to at the commence
ment of this judgment. That is as follows. Periakaruppa
adopted Alagappa in or about 1914. He apparently
was a spendthrift in his habits and incurred many
debts. There developed ill-feeling between them which
led to mutual criminal complaints against each other
in 1926. One of his creditors obtained a decree and
attached the family house. This led to litigation
in which Periakaruppa asserted and succeeded in
establishing that the superstructure of the family
house, which was a costly one, was his own self-acqisition. During the pendency of this litigation Periakaruppa adopted for the second time, Ranganatha,
claiming to do so by way of custom in the Nattukottai
Chetti community. This led to a suit for partition by
Alagappa clai.ming all the properties to be joint properties and for a declaration that the second adoption
was invalid. This suit was at a very early stage
compromised on the terms that Alagappa and his son
were to take away as between themselves a sum of
Rs . 1,50,000 in cash and would have no claim of any
kind of any of the properties in the possession of
Periakaruppa and no claim to inte1;fere in any manner
with the various charities and religious endowments
which Periakaruppa made. The properties were all
admitted to be the self-acquisitions of Periakaruppa
and his right to alienate the property by will was
specifically recognised. Alagappa with his wife and
son was to clear out of the family house with all their
belongings. Alagappa got his share of the cash under
the _Rajinama_ by means of two hmidis one for
Rs. 25,000 and another for Rs. 50,000. They were
specifically delivered over, as recited in one of the
terms of the _Rajinama,_ to one Chockalingam who was
made responsible to discharge all the encumbered debts
so far incurred by Alagappa, from out of the moneys
:S.C.R SUPREME COURT REPORTS 229
.of those two hundis so as to make sure that no liability . _1957_
would arise out of the debts previously incurred by _Ranganathan_
###### Alagappa which might affect Periakaruppa. It is in Chetttar
evidence that after this compromise Alagappa and his _Pertak";,uppan_
family consisting of his wife and son cleared out of the _Chettiar_
original family house built by Periakaruppa and that Jagan~da~ _J._
they were living separate from Periakaruppa. Periakaruppa and his second adopted son Ranganatha
were presumably living together in that original family
house as stated in the will. This _Rajinama_ was on
August 15, 1927, and the will was executed on April 4,
###### 1929, i.e., a year and eight months thereafter. It may
be noticed at this stage that the _Rajinama_ while it
admits one of the 'points in controversy in suit, _viz.,_
that the property is self-acquired property of Periakaruppan, is silent about the other question at issue,
_viz.,_ as to the validity of the second adoption and in
fact the suit was terminated by a formal dismissal
thereof presumably leaving this disputed question at
large.
The will starts with an assertion that all the movable and immovable properties in his possession are
his self-acquired properties and that excepting himself
###### no other person has any interest or right therein. It
asserts that Alagappa conducted himself in immoral
ways, fell into bad company, brought into existence
several false and colourable documents and borrowed
debts to the tune of about a lakh of rupees and caused
decrees. to be passed in some of them and became
###### inimical towards him. It asserts that Alagappa left
his family and was living separately for the past about
ten years. Notwithstanding that he was an undisputed
adopted son, he referred to him in the will as
_'Abhimanaputra'_ (foster-son). In contrast with this he
states that Ranganatha was _taken_ in adoption by him,
that Ranganatha was at the time of the will about· 17!
years old and that he was living with him. Clauses 7
to 14 of the will ref er to various religious and charitable
endowments which he had made and the properties
###### which he gave to them. It also enumerates the
arrangements for their management By cl. 8 he makes
provision for the construction
1 [and maintenance ] [of ]
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19581
_19s1_ _Brahmana Veda_ _Patasala_ attached to the temple of
_Ranganathan_ Sri Sri Theagarajaswami in Thiruvarur. Clauses 8 and
_c1re11iar_ 9 set apart certain properties for the due maintenance
_Periak"druppaa_ of the said _Patasala._ Clause 10 relates to the establish_Chettiar_ ment of three charities in addition to the above
_Jazan;;;;;n;adas_ _J._ _Patasala_ charity, to be conducted and maintained
out of the income of the same properties as have been
set apart for the _Pata:Jala_ charity. In cl. 11 he states
that no person shall have any right to alienate or
encumber the properties set apart for the charities. By
cl. 12 he appoints his wife Lakshmi Achi as the manager to conduct the above charities after his lifetime.
By cl. 13 he directs that his 'adop~ed son' Ranganatha
and his male heirs shall after the lifetime of his wife
Lakshmi Achi properly conduct the above-said charities.
He appoints three persons as executors to supervise the
management by 'Ranganatha'. By cl. 14 he expresses
a desire to spend the rest of his lifetime at Thiruvarur
and die there. He says that his body shall not be
cremated according to custom but that a _samadhi_
###### (tomb) should be erected for him and that a lamp is to
be lit there daily and that a person should be appointed
to perform _Neivedhiyam_ daily, of a specified quantity
of rice. By the same clause he also enjoins that
_Guru pooja_ should be performed once a year in the
star in which he dies by distributing food to the mendicants by spending Rs. 250 every year. He does not
specifically indicate who is to perform the _Guru pooja._
The context may well be taken to indicate that the
paid employee was to do it. He indicates that a sum
of Rs. 15,000 was set apart for the above purpose in a
Saigon firm and that it should be sent for and utilised
by his wife for the aforesaid _Tirupani._ This, in the
context, seems to refer to the construction of the
_Samadhi._ He also says that the daily expenses of the
_samadhi_ and the _Guru pooja_ expenses should be met
from the _Patasala_ charity funds. Thereafter come
the various provisions relating to the disposition of the
residue of his property. The effect of these provisions
in els. l 5 and 16 is that after this lifetime his wife
Lakshmi Achi should enjoy the residue and that thereafter the "adopted son Ranghanatha" is to take them
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 231
into his possession and enjoy them (after the death . t9S7
of himself and his wife) on his attaining majority and _Ranganathan_
###### if he is of good behaviour. It is specifically pro· Chettiar vided that if " the aforesaid Ranganatha" does not Periak~~uppan
conduct himself properly or if his wife Lakshmi _Chettiar_
Achi does not like (him ) two specified persons, _Jagann-;;;;;adas_ _J._
K.AS.P.Rm. Ramaswamy Chettiar and PL. T. Rm'.
Ramasami Chettiar should manage the properties
after the lifetime of Lakshmi Achi till "Ranganatha"
comes of good behaviour and that he should be
paid by them just enough for his family expenses
till such time when 'the aforesaid Ranganatha' begins
to conduct himself properly and that the properties
are to be delivered into his possession then. Under
cl. 18 the 'adopted son Ranganatha' should take the
princip~l amount of Rs. 15,000 set apart for his wife
Lakshmi Achi after her death. There is also cl. 20
which provides that the substantial tiled building
belonging to him which is in his own place and in
which he was residing and one bungalow built by him
in the _Therodum_ _Veedhi_ (Car Street) shall be enjoyed by
his wife after his own lifetime and that after her lifetime 'his adopted son Ranganatha" and his male
heirs shall permanently and for· ever enjoy the said
buildings. There. are a few other specific legacies in
cl~. 17 and 18 which require no notice. The scheme of
the will is clear, _viz.,_ that Periakaruppa wanted his
own wife to enjoy the properties and to manage the
charities so long as she was alive and that the adopted
son Ranganatha should do the same after her death,
that in respect of the charities he set up a committee .
of supervision over _his_ management (but not in respect ·of his wife's management) while as respects
enjoyment of the properties he specifically provided
that the adopted son Ranganatha should enjoy his
properties after he attains majority only if he is of good
behaviour and that so long as he was not of good
behaviour or his wife did not like him, he was to get
only some maintenance out of the propertief.. These
provisions are reminiscent of his past experience with
the first adopted son Alagappa and are obviously
inspired by the experience of bad conduct and wasteful
1957
_**Ra11ganatha11**_
_**Chettiar**_
_v._
_**Periakar11ppa11**_
_**Chelliar**_
_**Jagannadhadas**_ _**J.**_
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
ways which he thought the first adopted son was guilty
of. In the will he refers to "adopted son Ranganatha"
in quite a number of places and to "aforesaid Ranganatha" or to "Ranganatha" in some places. There
is no doubt that in what may be taken to be the
dispositive clause, cl. 15, he refers to him as "my
adopted son Ranganatha" though in the next connected
clause, cl. 16, he refers to him as "aforesaid Ranganatha" or as "Ranganatha". The question for
consideration is whether the validity of adoption was
the condition for the effectiveness of these dispositions.
The question as to whether a disposition in such
terms is to the person intended therein as a _persona_
_designata_ or by reason of his filling a particular legal
status which turns out to be invalid is one of some
difficulty and has been considered by the courts in quite
a large number of cases, some of which have been
cited before us. An elaborate consideration of these
various cases cannot finally determine the question
that arises in individual cases, which must ultimately
depend on its own facts and the terms of the particular
###### document containing the disposition. It is enough to
refer to two cases of the Privy Council cited before
us, _viz.,_ _Nidhoomoni Debya_ v. _Saroda Pershad_
_Mooke1jee_ (')and _Fanindra Deb Raikat_ v. _Rajeshwar_
_Das_ ('). As pointed out in the first case the question in
all such cases is whether the gift of the property by the
testator to a person who is referred to as having been
adopted is one which is dependent on whether all the
requisites of a valid adoption have been complied with
or whether it is to a designated person notwithstanding that it was desired and expected that the
requisites for a valid adoption were complied with.
As pointed out by their Lordships jn the second case
"the distinction between what is description only and
what is the reason or motive of a gift or bequest may
often be very fine, but it is a distinction which must
be drawn from a consideration of the language and the
surrounding circumstances". In that case their Lord
ships gave an illustration which is very apt for the
present case. It is as follows: ·
(1) (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 253. (2) (1884) L.R. 12 I.A. ;2,
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 233
###### "If a man makes a bequest to his "wife A. B.," 1957
believing the person named to be his lawful wife, and _Ranganathan_
he has not been imposed upon by her, a:nd falsely led _Chettiar_
to believe that he could lawfully marry her, and it Perlak~upppn
afterwards appears that the marriage was not lawful, _Chettiar_
it may be that the legality of the marriage is not _Jagannadhadas_ _J._
essential to the validity of the gift. Whether the
marraige was lawful or not may be considered to make
no difference in the intention of the testator."
Now in the present case learned counsel for the respondent very strongly relies on the repeated reference
to Ranganatha in the will in the dispositive clauses as
the adopted son and says that the disposition was
made in his favour by reason of the fact that he was
adopted and that he was believed to be duly and validly
adopted. He points out .that Periakaruppa was apparently a religious man as seen from the various
charitable and religious endowments he had made in
the will itself. He also placed stress on the fact that by
virtue of cl. 21 of the will, he directs that his adopted
son shall perform the _Putra krutyangal_ (ceremonies to
be performed by a son) for himself and his wife (after
their respective deaths). It is said that the performance of the various ceremonies after death by a person who was not a son in the eye of _sastras_ would be
abhorrent to any devout Hindu which Periakaruppa
clearly appears to be. This contention is not without
force. But taking an overall picture of the provisions
in the will and the background of the previous history,
it is not possible to say in this case that the validity of
the adoption was contemplated by Periakaruppa as the
<:ondition on which the validity of disposition should
depend. As has been previously pointed out the will has
been clearly inspired by his previous experience with
his first adopted son Alagappa. When Alagappa did in
fact challenge the validity of the second adoption in the
suit which he filed and asked for a specific declaration
in respect thereof by his plaint, that suit was allowed
to be merely dismissed and there was no reference
to the validity or otherwise of the second adoption in
the _Rajinama._ Apparently it left the question at large.
The will having been executed only within about one
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l958J
1957 year and eight months after the _Rajinama_ in the suit,
_Ra,,gana1ha11_ the testator Periakaruppa must have been conscious of
_Chettiar_ the fact that the second adoption was open to serious
_Periak"druppa11_ challenge. In this context the reference to Ranga_C'hettiar_ natha as the adopted son in the will as against the
_1,.1:,,,madhadas_ _J._ reference to Alagappa as a mere _Abhimanaputra_ may
indicate no more than that testator is anxious to make
it quite clear that he would acknolwedge Ranganatha
as his adopted son in preference to Alagappa and is
indicative of his clear intention that he desires him to
get his properties to the exclusion of Alagappa and his
minor son. That he is desirous of excluding by his will
Alagappa and his son is apparent from his very categorical statement in cl. 5 of the will that neither the
aforesaid Alagappa nor his heirs shall have any manner
of right or interest whatever in the properties which
were then in his possession and any properties which
may be acquired thereafter. The will itself is, therefore,
obviously intended to exclude them from succeeding to
his property. Being aware of the likelihood of the
challenge as to the validity of adoption of Ranganatha
he could not have intended the disposition to fail in the
contingency of the second adoption being held invalid
thereby letting in the very persons whom he wanted
to exclude. The provisions in the will which give the
property to Ranganatha, only if he is of good behaviour
seem rather to indicate that he attached greater
importance to the character of the boy rat)ler than to·
###### his legal st.atus as an adopted son. It is true that he·
contemplated ceremonies to himself and his wife after
their death being performed by the adopted son
Ranganatha. But it is noteworthy that he chose the
course of having his body enshrined in a tomb after
his death and making arrangements for worship being
conducted every day and _Guru pooja_ on the day of his
own annual _sradh_ day. This may well have been felt by
him to be a substitute for the regular annual _sradh_ by
an undisputedly valid adopted son whom he did not
like. It is also noteworthy that there is no indication
that he contemplated the _Guru pooja_ as having to be
done by Ranganatha, after the death of his wife. How
###### exactly the testator viewed the second adoption of
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 235
Ranganatha and the alleged custom enabling him
there unto may well be gathered from para. 8 of his
written statement in 0.S. 114 to 1926 which is as
follows:
1957
_Rahnganathan_
written statement in 0.S. 114 to 1926 which is as _Chettiar_
v.
follows: _Periakaruppan_
### . . hll fh l' Chettiar
"The al l egat1ons m paragrap - t e p amt are false. This defendant has really taken in adoption the _Jagannadhadas_ J.
2nd defendant. The aforesaid . adoption is valid in
accordance with the custom of Nattukottai Chettiars.
###### There are many differences in tlie matter of adoption
between Nattukottai Chettiars and other caste people
as stated below. Their custom alone can prevail in
the matter of the adoption taken by them and neither
the law nor the _Sastras_ can bind them. As adoption
is made among Nattukottai Chettiars only with the
intention that the adopted son should render them
help and assistance (1) those who make adoption pay
money to the parents Vagaira as price for the adopted
boy. (2) Netieher Dattaka Chandrika or Dattaka
##### Mimamsa can bind them. (3) If one person has two
###### wives, the two wives adopt two sons. ( 4) If the son of
a person dies leaving his widow, the father takes a boy
in adoption for himself, and the widowed dauther-in##### Jaw takes another boy in adoption. (5) If a grandson
by son is born to one person and the son dies, the aforesaid person takes a boy in adoption even when the
aforesaid grandson is Jiving. The customs with regard
to adoption among Nattukottai Chettiars are in, existence as stated above. (6) As the aforesaid Chettiars
are traders, a person can take in adoption another boy,
if the adopted son acts against the will of the adoptive
father without improving the property."
This seems to indicate that in his view such a customary adoption was made for temporal rather than
for spiritual reasons. Taking an overall picture of the
various provisions in the will, it appears to be reasonably clear that Ranganatha notwithstanding his description as adopted son in the will in several places,
. was intended by the testator to take the property as
_persona_ _designata_ and that the will was therefore
effeetive to convey title to him to residue of properties
left by Periakaruppa after his death.
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
195 [7 ] No question has been raised that the condition in
_Ranganathan_ the will that Ranganatha is to take the property only
_Chettlar_ if he is of good ~onduct .and .beha".iour, has operated
_Periak"druppan_ to prevent the title vestmg m him and it may be
_Chettiar_ doubtful whether if a clear intention ol the testator can
_Jagannadliadas_ _J._ be gathered from the will, to bequeath the residue to
Ranganatha as _persona designata_ the condition of good
conduct and behaviour would be valid to prevent the
vesting of the title
We have, therefore, come to a clear conclusion that
Ranganatha obtained title to the properties of Periakaruppa under the will. This is i11 accord with the
Gonduct of Alagappa for over 14 years after the death
of Periakaruppa and his wife, in keeping silent and
allowing Ranganatha to enjoy the properties without
laying any claim to the property on the ground of the
invalidity of the will and the invalidity of the adoption, thereby indicating how he understood the will.
In this view the other questions raised in this appeal
do not call for consideration.
This appeal, _i.e.,_ Civil Appeal No. 169 of 1956, is
accordingly allowed with costs throughout and the
plaintiff's suit dismissed.
The questions that arise for decision in the trust appeal
may now be taken up for consideration. The plaintiff in
the trust suit also is junior Periakaruppa. There were
five defendants in the suit. First and second defendant
are Ranganatha and his minor son. The third defendant is the son of Chockalingam. The fourth and fifth
defendants are the father, Alagappa and Muth,ui Achi
mother of junior Periakaruppa. The plaintiff's case as
set out in the plaint is,tj:lat buy the terms of the corr.promise in 0.S. No. 114 of 1926 on the file of the
Subordinate Judge of Devakottai "Periakaruppa and
Chockalingam were constituted joint trustees for himself who was then a minor and that they were enjoined
the duty of having the amount invested from time to
time in Chetty firms, that the above terms were
accepted by all the parties concerned including Periakaruppa and that consequently ~?th Peri.a~aruppa and
Chockalingam accepted the pos1t10~ of JO!Il~ trust~es
for the plaintiff for duly safeguarding and improving
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 237
his moneys". He alleges that the "said trustees were, 1 [9] s [7 ]
therefore, bound to see to the proper investment of _Ranganathan_
the said moneys in reliable and sound Chetti firms and _'.Chettiar_ '
for their accumulation with accrued interest during . Periak~~uppa11
the plaintiff's minority and to pay the accumulation _Chettiar_
to the plaintiff on his demand on his attaining _Jaga1111adhadas_ _J_
majority." He says further in the plaint that he
learned after attaining majority that the entire amount
was appropriated by Chockalingam for discharging
his own personal debts and that he made it appear as
if he had credited the trust amount in his own firm,
that eventually when his firm became involved ·
{financially) he (Chockalingam) appears to have
executed of his own accord a simpie mortgage dated
May 3, 1930, _(i.e._ during the minority of junior Periakaruppa) of his house at Athangudi (in South India,
. together with a small item of property in Burma in
favour of the plaintiff and another creditor for a sum
of Rs. 1,00,000 of which Rs. 70,000 was intended to be
the plaintiff's money and the other Rs. 30,000 of the.
other creditor. The plaintiff further says in his plaint
that the house which was the main item of !lecurity in
the mortgage had no marketable value, that the mortgage was a one-sided affair and that he repudiates the
same. He claims accordingly that both the trustees
Periakaruppa and Chockalingam were bound to render
to him an account of the trust amount and if they had
not properly invested it they were bound to repay it
to the plaintiff with interest. He alleges that the
trustees were bound to invest the amount in securities
authorised by law and that they were bound to invest
the moneys in sound third party Chetti firms. He also
alleges that Periakaruppa knew at the time the
involved circumstances of his co-trustee and either
colluded within or failed in his duty to protect the
plaintiff's interests. He accordingly claims that Periakaruppa jointly with Chockalingam were liable for the
gross breach of trust in respect of the said amount.
He further alleged that on the death of Periakaruppa
on July 14, 1929, and of Chockalingam in September/
October, 1934, he the plaintiff was entitled to recover
the amount due to him from the estate of Periakaruppa
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 in the hands of defendant No. 1 and of Chockalingam
_**Ranganat/Jan**_ in the hands of defendant No. 3.
_**Chettiar**_
v. The first defendant filed, along with his minor son
_**Periakaruppan**_ the second defendant, an elaborate written statement
_**Cht•ltiar**_ the substance of which was that Periakaruppa
_lagannadlmdas_ _J._ was not constituted a trustee nor did he accept or
assume the position of or acted as a trustee for the
plaintiff in respect of the sums mentioned in the plaint.
He states that, on the other hand, the only persons
who were competent to act on behalf of the plaintiff
were his guardians or his parents and the _Rajinama_
conferred no right on Periakaruppa to-override any
acts done by plaintiff's legal guardians on behalf of the
plaintiff's moneys. It is further stated that there was
nothing improper on the part of Chockalingam
with the plaintiff's father and mother in realising the
same under the hundi (for Rs. 75,000 due to junior
Periakaruppa) and handing it over to Rangoon A.P.S.
Firm (Chockalingam's firm) for being invested. He
further states that the said firm was in a flourishing
and solvent condition then and during all the time
Periakruppa was alive, and that there was absolutely
no negligence or improper motive on the part of any
body in entrusting to the said firm for investment or
in investing in the said firm, the money realised of
the said hundi drawn by Periakaruppa. It was further
stated that the first defendant therein understood that
out of the side moneys with Chockalingam's firm a sum
of Rs. 30,000 was withdrawn by the parents and
guardians of the plaintiff and invested the same _bona_
_fide_ in the purchase of a house for the benefit of the
plaintiff on July 23, 1928, which was proved to be in the
possession of the plaintiff and continued to be so and
that the plaintiff must be taken to have ratified the
said purchase. The written statement also states that in
or about the year 1930 after the death of Periakaruppa
there were some· disturbances in Burma and that the
parents and guardians of the plaintiff, with a view to
safeguard the interests of the plaintiff completely
and effectively, wanted from the said Chockalingam
security of landed property and thus obtained the
mortgage referred to in the plaint of his residential
1957
_**Ranganat/Jan**_
_**Chettiar**_
v.
_**Periakaruppan**_
_**Cht•ltiar**_
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 239
house and bungalow at Athangudi and of the business 195 [7 ]
premises of Chockalingam at Bogale in Burma. The _Ranganathan_
written statement proceeds to say that the plaintiff is _Chettiar_
·bound by the acts of his parents and guardians in enter- Periaka;~ppa"
ing into such an arrangement made in his interest and _Chettiar_
###### for his benefit. It is also further stated that onJagann;;n;adas
February 17, 1936, the house and bungalow of Cnocka- .
lingam at Athangudi which was the subject matter of the mortgate above mentioned, were purchased in court
auction by Alagappa the father of junior Periakaruppa
for a small sum of Rs. 1,000 subject to the mortgage and
that this course was adopted as a means of realising
the amount due to the plaintiff on the mortgage deed
without the necessity to incur any costs of a suit. It
is thus claimed that the mortgage as well as the subsequent purchase of equity of redemption were all transactions by Alagappa for the benefit of his minor son
and acting for him and that the plaintiff is not entitled
to repudiate these transactions. The third defendant,
son of Chockalingam, also filed a written statement
denying that there was any trusteeship or acceptance
thereof by his father, that the relations between the
minor represented by his mother and father on one
side, and Chockalingam on the other side, with whom
the moneys were kept was solely one of creditor and
debtor. and that the minor's money . was properly
invested with Chockalingam and that by then he was
###### in a flourishing condition, that the hypothecation of
May 3, 1930, was more than sufficient to cover the
debt due and that the properties covered by the mortgage were brought to sale in court auction. subject to.
the mortgage and were purchased by the plaintiff's
father acting in his interest, that one of the properties
so purchased has been resold and the sale proceeds
realised by the plaintiff, that the other property is still
in possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff and that
therefore there was no loan outstanding. He further
says that. the remedy, if any, of the p~aintif! was
against hts father and mother and not against himself.
The suit was decreed in the trial court by ordering
## defendants 1 to 3 to pay a sum of Rs. 1,39,672-13-6
with interest from out of the assets of Periakaruppa
M2SC61-6
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]
1957
_**Ranganathan**_
_**Chettiar**_
v.
_**Periakaruppan**_
_**Che/liar**_
_**Jagan11adl:adas**_ _**J,**_
and Chockalingam in their hands. Now, it does not
appear that the third defendant appealed against this
decree either to the High Court or to this Court. His
liability under that decree is not, therefore, in any
way affected by the subsequent proceedings on appeal
to the High Court and this Court and it is unnecessary
to refer to him or his liability in what follows.
The contention of the plaintiff's counsel that Periakaruppa and Chockalingam constituted joint trustees
for the sum of Rs. 75,000 payable to him under the
comproniise dated August 15, 1927, is one that is
founded on the terms of the compromise. It is necessary therefore to set out the relevant terms thereof.
"I. As settled by the four Panchayatdars, _viz.,_ (I)
N. AR. Arunachalam Chettiar of A. Muthupattanam,
(2) SP. AR.S. Chidambaram Chettiar of Athangudi,
(3) M.T.A.M. Muthiah Cheftiar of Kottaiyur and (4)
RM. AL. Alagappa Chettiar of A. Muthupattan~.m
directing the first defendant to pay to the plaintiff's
separately in respect of the right claimed by the
plaintiffs in the suit filed by the plaintiffs herein for
partition on the ground that they are also entitled to
a share in the properties mentioned in the plaint in
this suit, the first defendant has executed 3 hundis
mentioned hereunder and issued on the 29th Ani,
Prabhava (13th July 1927) in the names of the
plaintiffs for Rs. I,50,000 _i.e.,_ Rs. 75,000 to the first
plaintiff and 7 5,000 to the second plaintiff with instructions to separately pay to the afforesaid plaintiffs and
accordingly the plaintiffs have, at any time hereafter
no right and future connection whatever either in the
properties mentioned in the plaint in this suit, or in
any other property in the possession of the first defendant, or in any property that the first defendant shall
hereafter acquire. The first defendant alont shall, as
he pleases, enjoy as usual the aforesaid entire properties, as himself-acquired properties with all Swatantram
and right and powers of al'ienaticn such as gift,
exchange, sale, etc. The first defendant has the right
also to alienate the aforesaid entire properties either by
a will or otherwise.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 241
2. The :first defendant shall for the hundis Nos. I 1957
and 2 out of the 3 hundis for Rs. 1,50,000 mentioned _Ranganarltan_
in paragraph 1 herein, pay the principal· of Rs. 75,000 _Cltettiar_
and interest within Purattasi of this Prabhava year _Periakar:ppan_
(16th October 1927). The principal of Rs. 75,000 under _Chettiar_
the remaining hundi No. 3 shall be paid within _the1aga1111adl1adasJ._
30th Panguni of the year Prabhava (11th April 1928).
3. The Sridhanam amount of Rs. 14,000 of Muthayi
Achi, mother of the second plaintiff, and the second
plaintiff's amount of Rs. 75,000 out of the aforesaid
amount of Rs. 1,50,000 under the hundis, shall be
invested in Chetti houses in the name of the second
plaintiff to the order of Periakaruppan Chettiar, the
first defendant, and to the order of A.P.S. Chockalingam Chettiar of Athangudi, the junior paternal
uncle of the aforesaid Muthayi Achi, and the aforesaid
two persons shall be in management. The .signature
letters and accounts pertaining to the aforesaid
amounts shall be with the aforesaid Chockalingam
Chettiar.
#### 4 to 9 ................................... .
10. As A.P.S. Chockalingam Chettiar is liable for
the discharge of the encumbrances that have been
created by the fist plaintiff as mentioned in para
graph 4 herein, the first plaintiff Alagappa Chettiar
has endorsed on the undermentioned first and second
hundis that they are payable to the order of the aforesaid Chockalingam Chettiar and they have been
delivered to the aforesaid Chockalingam Chettiar.
###### It is therefore prayed that the Court may be pleased
to record the razinamah in the suit and to dismiss this
suit.
###### _Details of the hundis._
I. The hundi for Rs. 50,000 issued on the 29th Ani
###### of the year Prabhava (13th July, 1927) directing Rangoon Thamappan PL. T. RM. Karuppan Chettiar to
pay money with Rangoon nadappu interest.
###### 2. The hundi for Rs. 25,000 issued on the 29th Ani
of the year Prabhava (13th July, 1927) directing Rangoon M.A.M.S. Meiyappa Chettiar to pay money
with Rango.on nadappu interest.
.31
57
_**anganatha11**_
_**Chettiar**_
v.
_**PeriakaruppaH**_
_**Chettiar**_
_**Jagan11adhadas**_ _**J.**_
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
3. Hundi for Rs. 75,000 issued on the 29th Ani of
the year Prabhava (13th July, 1927) directing Rangoon RM. P.A. Muthiah Chettiar to pay money with
Rangoon nadappu interest."
The whole argument for the plaintiff is based on the
provision contained in para 3 that the _Sridhanam_
amount of Rs. 14,000 of Muthai Achi, mother of the
second plaintiff (which, it is said, has been given up by
the plaintiff's mother in his favour) and the second
plaintiff's amount of Rs. 75,000 out of Rs. 1,50,00(}
under the hundis, shall be invested in Chetti houses in
the name of the second plaintiff to the order of Periakaruppa Chettiar and to the order of A.P.S Chockalingam Chettiar of Athangudi. This provision-it is
contended, shows that the money under the hundi
meant for the minor was to be invested, by Periakaruppa and Chockalingam in Chetti houses in the name
of the plaintiff but to their order. It is said that the
amount so invested was, therefore, payable to themselves or to their order and that they were charged
wirh the duty of seeing that the money was properly
invested by operating on the minor's deposit in their
joint names and changing the investments when found
###### necessary. It is urged that, therefore, both of them
were constituted thereby as the legal owners of the
amount, the beneficial ownership remaining with the
minor and that to this legal ownership was attached
the obligation of seeing to the proper investment of the
money and the augmentation of fund by the addition
of substantial interest obtainable from reliable Chetti
firms. In order to determine whether this contention
is correct, it is necessary to notice the terms of the
relevant hundi of the same date as the _Rajinama._
This and other hundis issued by reason of the _Rajinama_
must be taken to be part of the _Rajinama_ inasmuch as
they were referred to therein by description under
the heading "Details of the hundis". Learned counsel
for the respondent, junior Periakaruppa, urges that
for this purpose it is the _Rajinama_ alone that has to be
looked into but not the terms of the hundi. We are
unable to agree with this contention. We have no
doubt that the _Rajinama_ and the hundis are integrally
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 243
·one and must be read together. The hundi dated 1957
August 15, 1927, for Rs. 75,000 issued by Periakaruppa _Ra11ganathan_
for the benefit of junior Periakaruppa as part of the _Chettiar_
_Rajinama_ is as follows: _Periak:;uppan_
"Credit to minor Periakaruppa Chetti, son of _Cltmiar_
AL. PR. Alagappa Chetti of A. Muthupattanam-· _Jaga1111adbada•_ _J._
Debit to AL. PR. Periakaruppan Chettiar.
Out of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000 payable by me
according to the razinamah entered into in O.S. No.
114 of 1926 of the file of the Sub-Court, Devakotta, on
the 29th Ani of this year (13th July, 1927) ........... .
. . . . the amount towards your share for improving
the same by making investments in Chetti firms for
interest in your name and to my order and to the
order of Athangudi A.P.S. Chockalingam Chettiar, is
Rs. 75,000. Rangoon RM. P.A. Muthiah Chetti shall,
on demand, pay money for this sum of Rs. 75,000
together with Rangoon nadappu interest from the 29th
Ani of this year (13th July, 1927) to. the order of the
three _viz.,_ (I) AL. PR. Alagappa Chetti, (2) Muthayi
Achi, mother and guardian of minor Periakaruppan
Chetti, son of the aforesaid person, and (3) A.P.S.
Chockalingam Chettiar of Athangudi, and debit it in
my account with endorsement of payment made
herein.
Sd. _AL. PR. Periakaruppan Chettiar."_
Now taking para 3 of the _Rajinama_ and this hundi
together,. it is clear that the banker of Periakaruppa
one RM. P.A. Muthiah Chetti of Rangoon was to pay
this amount to the _order_ of the three persons, Alagappa,
Mttthayi Achi, and Chockalingam and that the said
amount was to be invested in the name of the minor in
###### Chetti firms to the order of Periakaruppa and Chocka1ingam. Now it is the contention of the learned counsel
for junior Periakaruppa that the word 'order' used iil
both these places has the same meaning as in the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (XXVI of 1881) and
that therefore .what is contemplated is that the money
under the hundi was in the first instance payable by
Muthiah Chetti on whom it was drawn on the joint
signatures of an the three persons named in the hundi
1957
_**Ranganatlian**_
_**Che/liar**_
v.
_**Periakaruppan**_
_**Chettiar**_
_**Jagannadhadas**_ _**J,**_
### .
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
_i.e.,_ Alagappa, Muthayi Achi and Chockalingam and
that what is further contemplated is the investment
of that money by Periakaruppa and Chockalingam
in Chetti firms in the name of junior Periakaruppa
to the joint order of both of them. On this view,
it is said that both these persons have the power to
draw the money so invested whenever they choose and
have the control of the money and in that sense have
the legal ownership of the money vested in themselves notwithstanding that the amount is invested in
the name of the minor to indicate his beneficiary
ownership. Learned counsel for the appellant Ranganatha contends that this is not the proper interpretation of the word 'order' as used in reference to the
joint names of Periakaruppa and Chockalingam. He
refers us to certain cases of the Madras High Court
which recognised the practice of Chetti firms receiving
deposits in the name of a particular person to the
_maral_ of certain other person or persons and that the
idea of _maral_ is merely to indicate that the change of
investment was to be made with the consent of the
_maraldar_ without in any way affecting the ownership
of the person in whose name the money is deposited.
According to the cases on which he relies, the _maraldar_
has no right to operate on the account and withdraw
###### the money. It has been pointed out to us on the other
side that the material word used in this context both
in para 3 of the _Rajinama_ and in the hundi itself is
###### 'order' and not 'maral'. It is also urged that the
word _maral_ has acquired no such settled meaning, as
the appellant ascribes to it. There are decision
showing that the question as to what the word _maral_
means is one that must depend on the proof in each
particular case of usage of that word by the
Nattukottai Chetti firms. This has been laid down by
the Privy Council in _Arunachalam·_ v. _Vairavan_ (') and
in _Muthuraman_ v. _Periannan_ ('). In view of these
decisions and the fact to which our attention has been
drawn that there is no pleading in this case as to the
meaning of the word _'maral'_ or that the word _'order'_
in the context of this case has been used in the sense
(I) A.T.R. 1929 P.C. 254, 256. (2) A.LR. 19>4 Mad. 621,622.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 245
of _maral,_ we are not prepared to uphold the contention 1957
that the word 'order' in this case can be given the _Ranganathan_
meaning which is. attributed to the word _'maral'_ in _Che11iar_ some of the cases which have been cited to us for the _Periak:;uppan_
###### appellant. It does not, however, follow that the word Chettiar
'order' in this case in its application to the two per- _Jagannadhadas_
sons Periakaruppa and Chockalingam, is used in the
sense which it has under the Negotiable lnst(uments
Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, junior
Periakaruppa, relies on s. 13(1 ), Explanation (iii), taken
with ss. 8, 9, and 78 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
He urges that in the case of a negotiable instrument
the person who is indicated as the 'orderdar'
(if that word may be used in this context) is the holder
thereof and is the person who is entitled to receive the
amount thereunder and to give a discharge in respect
thereof and that, therefore, he is virtualJy the legal
owner thereof. If, as held in _Krishnashet_ - _bin Ganshet_
_Shetye_ \i. _Hari Va(jibhatye_ (1) the Negotiable · Instruments Act, (in the absence of any local usage. to the
contrary) applies to hundis, what is urged above may
well be applicable to the money of the original hundi
for Rs. 75,000 drawn on Muthiah Chetti and specifically payable on demand to the order of the three persons, Alagappa, Muthayi Achi and Chockalingam. But
the position as regards the amount so collected, and
the:eafter invested in the name of junior Periakaruppa
is not necessarily the same. It is true that para 3 of
the _Rajinama_ and the narration in the relevant hundi
clearly show that the amount af the hundi (apparently
after realisation thereof) is to be invested in Chetti firms
in the name of minor Periakaruppa and that such
investment is to be to the order of both Periakaruppa
and Chockalingam. This is obviously nothing more
than a deposit in the name of the minor after such
collection. The investment would presumably be
###### covered by an ordinary deposit receipt in the nci.me of
the minor. A deposit receipt of that kind does not fall
within the definition of 'negotiable instrument' under
s. 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. There is no
autpority for showing that such a deposit receipt is a
(\) (1895) I.LR. 20 Born. 488. .
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 document to which the notions of Negotiable Instru_Ranganat!UJJ1_ ments Act as to the use of the word 'order' and the
_Chettiar_ legal implications thereof would be applicable. On the
Periak~ruppan other hand there appears to be authority to the
_Chettiar_ contrary. See _Sethna_ v. _Hemmingway(')_ and _In_ _re_
_'"'l!annadhadas_ _J._ _Travancore National and Qui/on Bank Ltd.(')._ Both
these cases indicate that a deposit receipt is not a
negotiable instrument. It is true that in the language
of the hundi, at both places, _i.e.,_ (I) where the hundi is
to be cashed, and (2) at the place where the cash so
collected is to be invested, the same word 'order' is
used with reference to different sets of persons. It is,
therefore, suggested that they have to be understood
in the same sense. But the hundi, though intended
for the minor and credited to him, is not drawn
specifically in favour of the minor but only to the
-0rder of certain named individuals, while the investment is to be made specifically in the name of the
minor indicating that he is the owner thereof. J t would
be begging the ql\estion to say that the orderdars
in this context are the legal owners and that hence
this indicates only his beneficial ownership. It appears
to us reasonably clear that merely because para 3
of the _Rajinama_ and the narration in the relevant hundi ·
both contemplate the amount of hundi on realisation
to be invested in Chetti firms in the name of the minor
to the order of both Periakaruppa and Chockalingam, it
does not _ipso_ _facto_ follow as a matter of Jaw that both
of them are authorised to operate on it in the sense
that they can withdraw the money and have the
control of it in the same way as a person, to whose
order a bill of exchange or a cheque is payable, can
have. While it is true that the appellant Ranganatha
has not made out that the word 'order' is used in the
sense of the word _'maral'_ and has not pleaded or
proved what _maral_ or <;>rder in this case means, the
plaintiff has not equally made out that the word 'order'
in para 3 of the _Rajinama,_ in its application to
Periakaruppa and Chockalingam in the contest,
authorises them to obtain absolute control of the
money deposited. But it is urged that this is implicit
0) A.l.R. 1914 Born. 286, 287. (2) A.LR. 1940 Mad. 157, 159.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 247
in the language of para 3 which refers to investment 1957
and management. Undoubtedly under the terms of _Rangana1ha11_
the _Rajinama_ the amount is to be invested in Chetti _Chettiar_
firms in the name of the second plaintiff and the two Periaka~~ppan
persons, Periakaruppa and Chockalingam are to be _Clzettiar_
associated with the investment, by its being designated _Jagamiadhadas 1._
as being to their order, whatever that may mean, and
they are also enjoined and associated with it in the
following terms.
_"lruvarghalum me/ parthu varavendiyadu"_
This clause which is in Tamil language has been
translated in the official translation as "the aforesaid
two persons shall be in _management."_ Two out of us in
this Bench who have a fairly working acquaintance
with Tamil language are not satisfied that 'management' is a correct translation for the word _'me/ parthu.'_
What the clause contemplates is _'me/ parve'_ which
literally means 'over-seeing'. It conveys the idea of
'supervision' and does not imply the capacity to
operate on the deposit. But it is suggested that the
relevant clause taken as a whole indicates that both
together have the power of investment and reinvestment as indicated by the use of the phrase in Tamil,
_viz.,_ ' _kaduthu vangi',_ which means 'giving and taking',
_i.e.,_ 'lending and taking back.' This 'phrase is generally
used to indicate 'investing'. But it is not very clear
in the structure of the sentence in which this phrase
occurs that it is the two persons Periakaruppa and
Chokalingam that are to do this 'investing'. The
word _'iruvarkalum'_ in this sentence follows _'koduthu_
_vangi'_ and precedes _'me/ parthu varavendiyathu'_ and
indicates rather that their joint responsibility relates
to only _'me/ parvai'_ and not _'koduthu vangal'._ In a
matter like this, however, relating not merely to the
meaning of a particular word such as _'me/ parthu'_ as
above but to the contextual meaning of an entire
clause in which a particular phrase like _'koduthu vangi'_
is used, we do not wish to base the decision on our own
impression. as to the implication of that phrase in the
context and would prefer to go by the official English
translation which is as follows:
_1957_
_**Ranganathan**_
_**Chettiar**_
v.
_**Periakaruppon**_
_**Chettiar**_
_**Jagannadhadas**_ _**J.**_
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958)
#### "The amount .......... shall be invested in Chetti
houses in the name of the second plaintiff, to the order
of Periakaruppan Chettiar, the first defendant, and to
the order of A.P.S. Chockalingam Chettiar of Athangudi, the junior paternal uncle of the aforesaid
Muthayi Achi, and the aforesaid two persons shall be
in management."
But even this does not indicate that the power of investment is vested in them but only _'me! parve'_ which, in
our view, has been wrongly translated as 'management'.
Taking the whole of this clause carefully we are not
satisfied that the language clearly indicates that the
power of operating in respect of the deposit by way of
withdrawing the amount and being in control thereof
is vested in Periakaruppa and Chockalingam. All that
the language indicates with certainty is that these
two persons are specially enjoined to supervise the
investments and that they are "orderdars", whose
meaning has not been made out. In such an ambiguous
situation as to the meaning of the words used and the
intention of the parties thereto, it is permissible to
look into and consider what the contemporaneous.
actings of the parties are which may be treated as
virtually part of the same transaction.
The hundi for Rs. 75,000 for the benefit of junior
Periakaruppa dated August 15, 1927, was, according
to para 2 of the _Rajinama,_ payable by April 11, 1928.
There is an endorsement on the hundi signed by
Alagappa, .Muthayi Achi and Chockalingam dated
May 31, 1928, to the effect that the money due under
that hundi is to be paid to Rangoon A.P.S. Firm
(which means Chockalingam's firm) together with
interest thereon. On the terms of the hundi the interest
was payable from July 13, 1927, on which date the
_Panchayatdars_ appear to have settled the terms of
the _Raiinama._ This shows that the amount was
actually drawn on the signatures of the three persons
and was intended to be collected by Chockalingam's
firm at Rangoon. The hundi also bears a note signed by
Chockalingam's agent, A.P.S. Somasundaram, that the
principal and interest of the hundi amounting to·
Rs. 80,726-15-3 was received through another banker
S.C.R SUPREME COURT REPORTS 249
named KM. CN. Somasundaram Chetti as per letter of 1957
Periakaruppa to KM. CN. Somasundaram Chetti on _Ranganatha11_
###### April 10, 1928. It is in the evidence of this A.P.S. Chettiar
Somasundaram, clerk of Chockalingam, who was _Periak;;uppair_
examined as P. W. 2 on commission, that after its _Chertiar_
withdrawal the ~oney was in fact credited on or. about _Jagant;JhadasJ_
June 19, 1928, m the accounts of A. P. S. Firm at
Rangoon in the name of junior Periakaruppa, to the
order of (senior) Per'iakaruppaand Chockalingam _under_
_the directions_ _of_ _Chockalingam._ It is the evidence of ·
this Somasundaram that Chockalingam directed him to
invest the amount in Rs. 4,000 or Rs. 5,000 in reliable
and sound Chetti firms, presumably meaning thereby
that the idea was to keep the money in the A.P.S.
Firm provisionally until he was able to invest the
money safely by distributing it over several reliable
Chetti firms in comparatively small sums. That this
was the real intention of everybody concerned in
entrusting the money to the A.P.S. Firm is confirmed
by what is narrated in Ex. P-4, a receipt issued
in favour of Periakaruppa, for the total sum of
Rs. 75,000 collected in respect of the two hundies
for the amounts of Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 25,000 respectively, belonging to Alagappa under the compromise.
That receipt shows the collection of a sum of
Rs. 76,274-1-9 being the principal and interest of the
two hundies, and recites also some other matters. It
ends with the following significant narration :
"We shall obtain money for the hundi for
Rs. 75,000 of minor Periakaruppa Chettiar and for
the hundi for Rs. 14,000 credit it in the firm of
Rangoon A.P.S. invest it in our Nattukottai Chetti
firm~ for thavani to the order of (J) AL. PR. Periakaruppan Chetti of A. Muthupattanam, and {2) A.P.S.
Chockalingam Chetti of Athangudi, and deliver the
copy of the aforesaid debit and credit account, and
copies of the signature letters."
This is signed by A.P.S. Chockalingam Chettiar as the
power agent of AL. PR. AL. Alagappa Chettiar and
also by Muthayi Achi for herself and for mihor
Periakaruppan Chetti. This narration in the receipt
3:!
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 indicates quite clearly that it was the father and the
_Ra11gana1han_ mother of the junior Periakaruppa that took the
_Chettiar_ responsibility of authorising the A.P.S. firm to collect
_Periak;;uppan_ the hundi amount and of investing it in other Nattu_Chefliar_ kottai Chetti firms for _thavanai._ The intention clearly
_laga1111adhadas_ _J._ appears to be that it is Chockalingam that was to
collect the money on the hundi and it was Chockalingam that was to arrange for th.e investment of the
same (on the legal responsibility of Alagappa and
Muthayi Achi, the natural guardians of the minor).
This is exactly what is borne out as to what happened
thereafter as appears from the evidence of Chockalingam's clerk, Somasundarma, P.W. 2. This seems
really to indicate that what the parties throughout
intended was that while the collection of the money
under the hundi was to be under the signature of all
the three, _viz.,_ Alagappa, Muthayi Achi and Chockalingam, the agency actually to collect was to be the
firm of Chockalingam in Rangoon and it is that firm
that was to arrange for distributing the money over
various other Nattukottai Chetti firms by way of safe
and good investments on the implied authority of the
natural guardians,, _viz.,_ the father and mother. This
obviously would take some time and during this time
Chockalingam's firm would naturally have to be in
charge of the funds. It appears reasonably clear, however, that a long term investment in Chockalingam's
firm as such was _not_ contemplated. This may be
inferred from the wording in para 3 of the _Rajinama_
which says that "the signature letters and accounts
pertaining to the aforesaid amount shall be with the
aforesaid Chockalingam Chettiar. In the context this
obviously means that the deposit receipt and the
###### periodical accounts relating to that deposit by way of
addition of interest and so forth were to be in the
custody of Chockalingam. Thus Chockalingam was
the person primarily intended to collect the money and
to be in charge of the investment, that pending final
investment Chockalingam was to have temporary
custody of the amount. The point to be noted about
this subsequent conduct of the persons concerned is
that in respect of these various matters Periakaruppa
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 251
docs not at all come into the picture. The narration 1951
in the receipt, Ex. P-4, which recites under the two _Ranganatha( .._
signatures thereto, of Chockalingam as agent of Alag- _Cliettiar_
appa and Muthayi Achi as guardian, is that they Periakaru~pqn
undertake to obtain the money and invest it in Nattu- _Cliettiar_
###### kottai Chetti firms for thavanai. It does not indicate Jagannadliadas J.
that it will be so invested on the instructions or consent
also of Periakaruppa. Nor does Somasundaram, P.W.2,
in his evidence give any indication that the collection
by and investment in, Chockalingam's firm was actually
done under the instructions of Periakaruppa or that it
was thereafter contemplated that in splitting the
amount into smaller sums, it would have to be under
instructions of Periakaruppa also .. There is no evidence
that Chockalingam sent his instructions to his clerk
Somasundaram with the knowledge and consent of
Periakaruppa or in collaboration with him. lt is also
significant that the only further act of reinvestment
which was made during Periakaruppa's lifetime, _viz.,_
the purchase of a house for Rs. 30,000 at Athangudi
in the name of junior Periakaruppa and of which the
minor is admittedly enjoying the benefit, does not
appear to have been with the knowledge or consent of
Periakaruppa. Thus looking at the actings of the
parties concerned, there is nothing to show that the
parties understood the term in para 3 of the _Rajinama_
as laying on Periakaruppa the responsibility of actually
making investments and reinvestments for that
purpose to operate and withdraw the amounts from the
banker or bankers with whom the hundi money after
collection was to be invested.
Learned Judges of the High Court were greately influenced by the assumption that it could not have been the
intention of Periakaruppa to allow a spendthrift like
Alagappa to handle the funds of the minor for purposes
of investment or change of investment and that
therefore it must have been intended that both the
persons Periakaruppa and Chockalingam were to
have that power and that this was what was meant by
directing that the minor's money must be invested "to
the order of Periakaruppa and Chockalingam." 'It is
true that the handling of the minor's funds by his
_**Ranganathan**_
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]
father Alagappa alone was not likely to have been
contemplated. But that does not necessarily mean
that Periakaruppa took upon himself the responsibility
for such handling either by himself or jointly with
Chockalingam. On the other hand it looks as though
that it was Chockalingam that took such responsibiliiy.
Though not himself a _panchayatdar_ he must have
helped to bring about the compromise on the side of
Alagappa, Muthayi Achi and junior Periakaruppa.
This is indicated by his having signed the _Rajinama_
as a witness thereto. The entire set-up of the _Rajinama_
and the subsequent actings show that all the parties
concerned including Periakaruppa himself had confidence in Chockalingam who was no other than the·
paternal uncle of Muthayi Achi, the mother of the
minor. In fact even as regards the sum of Rs. 75,000
payable to Alagappa himself under the two hundies it
was Chockalingam alone that was constituted virtually
the trustee for collecting the said hundi amounts and
paying thereout the debts which had by then been
incurred by Alagappa. This is clear from the fact
appearing in paras 4 and JO of the _Rajinama._ Para JO
says that the plaintiff Alagappa has endorsed on the
two hundies belonging to him that they are payable to
the order of Chockalingam and it further recites that
the hundies have been delivered to the aforesaid
Chockalingam. Tt is specifically stated in that para
that Chockalingam was liable for the discharge of
encumbrances that have been created by the first
plaintiff therein (Alagappa). This was reiteration of
what was stated in para 4 which says that whatever
be the encumbrances created by the first plaintiff in
respect of any property mentioned in the plaint in the
suit, the aforesaid Chockalingam shall discharge them
without any liability whatever to the first defendant.
###### It is clear that Periakaruppa was willing to trust
Chockalingam completely even in respect of a matter
which would directly affect him, _viz.,_ the dicharge of
Alagappa's debts incurred by way of encumbrances, so
as to relieve him from all liabilities for such debts. It is
unreasonable, therefore, to assume that he was not
prepare<l to leave the responsihility for the collection
_**Chettiar**_
v.
_**I'**_ _**!riakaruppan**_
_**Chettiar**_
_**J**_ _**J)la11nadhadas**_ _**J.**_
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 253
and investment of the minor's funds also with Chocka- 1957
lingam but that he undertook a joint responsibility _Rangana1ha11_
with him in resp~ct of the same. Undoubtedly para 3 _Chettiar_
of the _Rajinama_ indicates that the amount was to be _Periakar:Ppan_
deposited to the order of Periakaruppa as also Chocka- _Chettiar_
lingam and that both together are to have _'me/ parve' Jagannadhados.'._
(supervision). But whatever may be the connotation
of this provision, it does not appear to us, with great
respect to the learned Judges of the High Court,
reasonable to attribute to Periakaruppa the undertaking of the responsibility of a trustee on its basis.
Trusteeship is a position which is to be imputed to a
person on clear and conclusive evidence of transfer of
ownership and of the liability attached to such ownership on aacount of confidence reposed, and on such
liability having been accepted by the alleged trustee.
There is no clear and conclusive proof of any of these
elements in the present case so far as Periakaruppa is
concerned.
Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied
upon a statement in the affidavit of Muthayi Achi,
mother of junior Periakaruppa dated August 6, 1927,
in respect of the application for compromising the
litigation on behalf of the minor in which it is stated
as follows:
"The first defendant (meaning Periakaruppa) has
given a _hundi_ for Rs. 75,000 to 'my junior paternal
uncle A.P.S. Chockalingam Chettiar on behalf of the
minor 2nd plaintiff in accordance with the award of
###### the Panchayatdars. It has been settled that the aforesaid amount of Rs. 75,000 should be deposited in
Chetti firms in the name of the aforesaid minor, to the
order of the 1st defendant and the aforesaid A.P.S.
Chockalingam Chettiar and improved."
###### It is urged that when the hundi itself has been handed
over to Chockalingam, as this affidavit indicates, the
very property belonging to the minor must be taken
to have been delivered over to Chockalingam as one of
the two persons in whose order the money was to be
deposited and that this, in law, amounts to transfer
of ownership to one, on behalf of both, with the
obligation attached and that the acceptance thereof
1957
_**Ranganathan**_
_**Chettiar**_
v.
_**l'eriakaruppan**_
_**Chettiar**_
Ja.~annadhadas _**J.**_
254 SUPRME COURT REPORTS (1958]
must be assumed in view of the fact that the whole
of the _Rajinama_ including this term was agreed to by
Pcriakaruppa along with the others. It is quite clear,
however, in this case that the mere delivery of the
hundi to Chockalingam cannot be treated as itself
transfer of ownership of the money which was to be
collected in respect thereof. Paras l and 2 of the
_Rajinama_ itself are in substance as follows:
"That the Panchayadars _directed the.first defend-_
_ant_ (Periakaruppa) _to_ _pay_ _to the plaintiffs_ a total of
l,50,000, and that the first defendant accordingly
executed three hundies in the names of the plaintiffs."
Thus by virtue of the direction to pay, the compromise
brought about between Pcriakaruppa on one side and
Alagappa and junior Periakaruppa on the other
###### the relationship of debtor and creditor. lt is obvious
that until the hundies are realised that relation would
continue. There is no transfer of ownership till then.
(See _In re Beaumont, Beaumont_ v. _Ewbank('))._ Further,
as has already been noticed, the hundi issued by
Periakaruppa in respect of junior Periakaruppa's
share of Rs. 75,000 was originally issued upon Muthiah
Chettiar of Burma but was ultimately realised through
one KM. CN. Somasundaram Chetti on a letter
written by Periakaruppa to him. This indicates that
for some reason or other the hundi could not be cashed
on the original banker and had to be realised through
another banker. In this state of facts it is not feasible
to say that the mere handing over to Chockalingam of
the original hundi drawn on Muthiah Chettiar on the
date of the compromise itself (as mentioned in the
affidavit of Muthayi Achi) can be treated as transfer
to Chockalingam of the very property of junior Periakaruppa under the Rajinama. The trust, therefore, if
any, in respect of that amount must attach only after
realisation of the amount and by reason of the acting
of the parties subsequent thereto imprying acceptance
of the obligations under the trust. The mere fact that
Periakaruppa agreed to all the terms of the _Rajinama_
does not constitute such acceptance. ft iS at best only
indication of a prospective willingness to accept. As
already stated there is absolutely no evidence of an
(l) (1902] J Ch. 889.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 255
already stated there is absolutely no evidence of an 1957
actual acceptance after the hundi was cashed and the _Ranganathan_
amount was in fact treated by Chockalingam as an _Chettiar_
###### investment in his firm. Indeed even if it be assumed Periak;;uppa11
that Periakaruppa 'became a joint trustee with Chocka- _Chettiar_
lingam in respect of the amount belonging to the _Jagannadhadas J_
minor it does not follow that Periakaruppa was responsible for the breach of trust in this case, committed
obviously by Chockalingam only. As already stated
it appears quite clearly that collection by Chockalingam of the minor's hundi and his keeping custody
thereof in his on firm until the amount is regularly
invested in other Chetti firms was a matter which was
under the initial contemplation of everybody . concerned and in particular of the father and the mother who
are his natural guardians. That this was the position
as late as July, 1928, is quite clear from the evidence
of Chockalingam's clerk, Somasundaram, P. W. 2.
Periakaruppa died in July, 1929, about an year later.
There is absolutely nothing to indicate that the
provisional retention of the amount in Chockalingam's
firm for that period, was unreasonable or that Periakaruppa had any notion that Chockalingam was
financially in embarrassed circumstances and that he
made use of the funds. It is true that, under law the
investment of funds by a trustee with himself would
constitute breach of trust. But before a co-trustee
can be made liable therefor some kind of knwoledge
or connivance or gross negligence or the like contributing factor on his part has got to be made out.
###### It may be that in this case the minor's funds have
been frittered away by the embarrassed circumstances
of Chockalingam in whom everybody seems to have
##### reposed confidence. If that was in fact what happened, it may be unfortunate for the minor. But that
cannot be any reason for affecting Periakaruppa or his
estate with the liability for Chockalingam's breach on
an assumed construction of what appears at best to
be equivocal and ambiguous language in the _Rajinama._
The burden is on the plaintiff junior Periakaruppa to
make out clearly that by the _Rajinama_ Periakaruppa
became a trustee for the minor's fund and incurred
M2SC-61-7
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 liability therefor for his co-trustee's breach. At the
_Ranzanathan_ time of the compromise the minor was less than two
_Chettlar_ years in age. Periakaruppa was more anxious to get
Pol#k;,.~ppan rid of all his liabilities arising from his son's past and
_Chettlar_ wanted his son's family to clear out bag and baggage
_Jagannadhadas J._ from the family house . In such a situation if he was
anxious for the minor boy's welfare to the extent of
taking responsibility for his money on himself though it
be jointly with Chockalingam, clearer and decisive
language was to be expected. In our opinion this has
not been made out. Hence this suit of the plaintiff,
junior Periakaruppa, also fails, against Ranganatha
and his minor son.
The appeal is accordingly allowed and the suit is
dismissed as against defendants 1 and 2 with costs
throughout. #### GovINDA MENON J.- I am in perfect agreement
with the reasoning and conclusions contained. in the
judgment of my learned brother B. Jagannadhadas J.
in Civil Appeal No. 169 of 1956, and I agree that the
appeal be allowed with costs.
In Appeal No. 104of1954, I have considerable doubt
##### regarding the construction of cl. (3) of Exhibit P.1. If
Periakaruppa and Chockalingam were entrusted with
the duty of investment, there can be no doubt whatever that they are constituted trustees. The _Tamil_
expression _'Koduthu-Vanghi'_ clearly signifies investment, but the question is who is to make the invest##### ment. If Periakaruppa and Chockalingam have
merely to supervise the investment, as the _Tamil_
expression _'Mel-Parthu'_ means, and not actually invest
the amount then the view taken by my learned brothers is right. I am inclined to think that the duty
of investment is cast on Periakaruppa and Chockalingam, but as this is a matter which is not free from
doubt, not without hesitation, I agree with the order
passed by my learned brothers.
_Appeals allowed._