High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; proceedings to be disposed of i...

Chandu Naik & Ors. v. Sita Ram B. Naik & Anr.

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 308 of 1977
Neutral Citation:[1978] 2 S.C.R. 353

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • V. R. Krishna Iyer
  • N. L. Untwalia
Judgment Date
1977-12-06
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed; the Supreme Court held that section 8 of the Maharashtra Vacant Lands Act does not bar private disputes between private persons in eviction cases and that proceedings under section 145 CrPC are to be disposed of in accordance with sections 145 and 146 CrPC. The case was remitted to the Magistrate for expeditious disposal consistent with this judgment.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; proceedings to be disposed of in accordance with 145 and 146 CrPC; Magistrate instructed to proceed expeditiously and in light of the judgmentemanating directions.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Chandu Naik
  • and others

Respondents

  • Sita Ram B. Naik
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • C. P. H. Parekh

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Janendra Lal
  • • M. N. SiirojJ

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a Criminal Appeal under section 374(2) CrPC arising from a private dispute over possession of a hotel situated on disputed vacant land in urban Maharashtra. Respondent No. 1 alleged forcible dispossession from the hotel “Suresh Maharashtra Tea & Cold Drinks & Eating House” on land claimed as vacant land, owned and occupied by him. The Magistrate, on 29 July 1975, passed a preliminary order under section 145(1) CrPC and attached the property under section 146(1). After the Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorized Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 1975 came into force, the Act’s section 8 provided a bar of jurisdiction in eviction matters. The Magistrate then determined he lacked jurisdiction to proceed if eviction would be by the Competent Authority under the Act. The Bombay High Court upheld the Magistrate’s view. The Supreme Court held that the bar under section 8 does not apply to private disputes between private persons over possession of vacant land; 145 proceedings primarily aim to prevent breach of peace and declare possession for eventual eviction, not to evict directly. The Court concluded the proceedings did not abate and must be disposed of under sections 145 and 146 CrPC, with guidance to the Magistrate for expeditious disposal. The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted for disposal in light of this judgment.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 145(1) CrPCSection 146(1) CrPCSection 8 of the Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorized Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 1975Section 4 of the Maharashtra Vacant Lands Act, 1975Proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 145 CrPCSection 145(6-A) CrPC (interpreted as Sub-section 6(a) in the text)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Prevention of breach of the peace
  • Legal fiction treating dispossessed party as in possession on the date of the preliminary order under Section 145(1)
  • Bar of jurisdiction (section 8) as applied to eviction actions

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that the Maharashtra Vacant Lands Act, especially section 8, bars jurisdiction of courts in eviction matters coupled with a private dispute; eviction by a private party is not contemplated and a competent authority under section 4 would evict only in authorized cases, thus the private dispute should be allowed to proceed under the Code. They urged that the proceeding under section 145 is not a direct eviction but a proceeding to prevent breach of the peace and declare possession, with possible subsequent eviction in due course of law.

Contentions of Respondents

Respondents argued that the Act creates a bar to court proceedings in eviction matters involving vacant lands and that section 8 abates such suits; the matter should be controlled by the competent authority under the Act rather than by private eviction proceedings under sections 145 and 146 CrPC.

Diagnostic Tool

Beta

Does this judgment govern your specific facts?

Don't risk relying on a distinguishable precedent. Enter your facts or proposition below. We will test it against Chandu Naik & Ors. v. Sita Ram B. Naik & Anr. and instantly map out authorities that support, challenge, or govern your position.

Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

### \ # ' CHANDU NAIK & ORS. _v._ SITA RAM B. NAIK & ANR. _December_ 6, 1977 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND N. L. UNTWAL!A, JJ.] 353 _!vlaharashtra_ _Vacant Lands_ _(Prohibition of_ _Unauthorised_ _Occupiition_ _.and_ _Summary Eviction) Act,_ 1975, _whether a_ _bar_ _to the proceedings uls._ 145 _cf_ _the Criminal_ _Procedure_ _Code._ _Criminal Procedure Code (Act II of_ 1974), 1973, _s._ 145, _Scope_ _of-Guide-_ _.lines to_ _be_ _followed_ _by_ _the Magistrate._ On an application filed by respondent No. I on 29th July 1975 allenging that the appellants have forcibly dispossessed him from a hotel known as "Suresh Maharashtra Tea & Cold Drinks & Eating House" owned by him on the <lisputed land, the Magistrate passed a preliminary order u/s. 145(1) of the Cr. P. C. and attached the disputed property u/s. 146(1) of the Code. The appellants put in their written statements on 2-8-1975 and the case was being heard from time to time. On 11-11-1975, the Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorised Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 1975 was brought into force in the area where the disputed property is situated. The Act was passed to prohibit unauthorised occupation of vacant lands in the urban areas of the State of Maharashtra and to provide for summary eviction or persons from such lands. Section 8 of the Act provides for a bar of jurisdiction by courts. Since the hotel was constructed on 'a piece of vacant land in an "«rban area" within the meaning of the Act, the Magistrate passed an order on 21-1·77 tiling the view that in view of s. 8 of the Act, he ceased to have ju1i~diction to proceed with the case inasmuch as he will have to order eviction of the appellants from the disputed property if the case of the respondent was found to be true. The appellants filed a revision in the Bombay High Court against the said order, but failed. Allowing the appeal by special leave and directing the Magistrate to dispose <Qf the proceedings as per the guidelines indicated, the court. HELD : !. In the context of the Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorised Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 1975, the bar in s. 8 is not attracted to any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person from any vacant land started in relation to a dispute of possession between the private persons. The bar is attracted if the suit or proceeding concerns the eviction of any person from any vacant land by the competent authority. No suit or proceeding for eviction can be entertained by any court if the competent authority is entitled to evict the person u/s. 4. He will be entitled to evict any person if he is in unauthorised occupation of vacant land but not in the case of disputes between two private persons either of them claiming to be in authorised occupation. For deciding such a dispute, the competent authority does not come into the picture. [·355 E-F] 2. In substance and effect a proceeding u/s. 145 of the Code is not for the purpose of evicting any person from any land but is primarily concerned with the prevention of the breach of the peace by declaring the party found in posses· sion to be entitled to remain in possession until evicted therefrom in due course of law. [355 G] 3. Restoration of possession to the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed attracting the proviso to sub·section ( 4) -is in substance and in effect, putting back the party to possession for deciding his possession on the date of the pre~ Iiminary order made under sub·section (1). Although the party who forcibly and wrongfu1ly dispossessed the other party attracting the application of the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Code, has to be factually and physically evicted from the property, by a legal fiction it is only for the purpose of treating him in possession on the date of the preliminary order. [356 B-CJ A B c D E F H **A** **B** 354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978] 2 S.C.R. **4. In the instant case;** **the** **proceeding** **in** **question did not** **abate** **and** **it** **bas** **to** **be** **disposed of by** **the** **1fagistrate in accordance with** **the** **provisions** **of** **law** **contained in Sections 145** **and** **146** **of the Code.** **If** **the proceeding has so abated** **attachment** **order** **passed by** **the** **Magistrate on** **the** **29th July 1975** **could** **nof** **survive and the Magistrate could not allow** **it** **to continue.** **The Courts below** **ceedings. have committed The Courts below were wrong an** **error** **of law** **in** **applying the in** **the bar view of** **s. that 8** **to the the present proceedings pro** **[4 ]** **abated** **and** **the 1fagistrate** **had** **no jurisdiction to dispose** **it** **of** **in** **accordance** **with the.law** **in** **face of** **s.** **8 of the** **1975** **Act.** **[356 E-H,** **357** **A]** CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 308 of 1977. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23rd/25th of March 1977 of the Bombay High Court in Criminfil Revision Application No. 54 of 1977. **C** _P._ _H. Parekh_ for the appellants. _Janendm Lal_ for respondent No. I. _M._ _N. SiirojJ_ for respondent No. 2. Th~ Jndgment of the Court was delivered by **D** **E** **F** **G** **H** UNTWALIA, J. This is an appeal by special leave arising out of a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-hereinafter called the Code, initiated at the instance of respon· dent no. 1 (for brevity, hereinafter the respondent). The said respondent filed an application on the 29th **July,** 1975 against appellants 1 and 2 before the Magistrate alleging that there is a Hotel known as 'Suresh Maharashtra Tea & Cold Drinks & Eating House' on the disputed land which was owned by and in occupation of the respondent. The appellants forcibly dispossessed him from the Hotel on the 5th July 1975. The application under section 145 was filed initfally against appellants I and 2. But at the instance of appellant number 3 he was also subsequently joined as a party. to the proceediilg. The Magistrate passed a preliminary order under section 145 (1) of the Code on the 29th July, 1975 asking the parties to appear before him and put in their written statements. On the same date, however, he attached the disputed property under section 146(1) ot the Code. The appellants put in their written statements on the 2nd August J 975. Thereafter the case was heard by the Magistrate from time to time. The Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorised Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 1975-hereinafter called the Act, came into force replaciP.g an Ordinance promulgated earlier. The Act was deemed to have come into force in the area where the disputed property is situated on the 11th November 1975. It seems the Hotel was constructed and is situated on a piece of "vacant land" in an "urban area" within the meaning of the Act. The Act was passed. to prohibit unauthorised occupation of vacant lands in the urban areas of the State of Maharashtra and to provide for summary eviction of persons from such lands. The Competent Authority under the Act was empowered under section 4 _to_ evict persons from unautho ###### l CHAN DU NAIK _v._ SITA RAM ( _Untwalia,_ _J.)_ 3 55 rised occupation of vacant lauds. Section 8 of the Act which pro- A vides for a bar of jurisdiction of courts reads as follows : "No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit, prosecutiou or other proceedings in respect of the eviction of any person from any vacant land under this Act or in respect of any order made or to be made or any action taken or to be taken by the Competent Authority in exercise of the B powers conferred by or under this Act or to gfant any stay or injunction in respect of such order or action. If any such suit or other proceedings in respect of eviction of any person from any vacant land is pending on the appointed date in any Court, it shall abate; and it shall be lawiul for the Competent Authority to evict such person from unauthorised occupation of the vacant land under the provi- C sions of this Act and to remove and forfeit any property from such land as provided in this Act." The .Magistrate in his order dated the 21st January 1977 passed in the proceeding aforementioned took the view that in view of section 8 of the Act, he ceased to have jurisdiction to proceed with the case, in as much as he will have to order eviction of the appellants D from the disputed property if the case of the respondent was found to be true. The appellant filed a revision in the Bombay High Court from the said order of the Magistrate but failed. The High Court agreed with the view taken by the Magistrate and dismissed the tevision. Hence this appeal. In our opinion the Courts below have committed an error of law E in applying the bar of section 8 to the present proceeding. firstly in the context of the Act the bar is not attracted to any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person from any vacan~t land started in relation to a dispute of possession between two private persons. The bar is attracted if the suit or proceeding concerns the eviction of any persons from any vacant land by the Competent Authority. In other words, no suit or proceeding for eviction can be F entertained by any court if the Competent Authority is entitled to evict the person under sect.ion 4. He will be entitled to evict any person if he is in unauthorised occupation of vacant land, but not In the case of dispute between two private persons, either of them claiming to be in authorised occupation. For deciding such a dispute, the Coll)petent Authority does not come into the picture. Secondly, in substance and in effect a proceeding under section 145 of the Code G is not for the purpose of evicting any person from any land but is prima'.ily concerned with th.e preventi.on of the breach of the peace by <leclarmg the party found m possession to be entitled to remain in possession until evicted therefrom in due course of law. The proviso to sub-section ( 4) of section _145_ states : "Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been ·forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed withi11 tw~ months next before the da.te on which the report of a pohce officer or other information was received by the 10-Ill4SCl/77 ' H ............ : '\ A ---:-~-;-, '...,.....-:-· '"': I\ ·w- _/_ ·,;. SUPREME COURT REPORTS - [1978] 2 S.C.R. Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1) ." _r_ ·' #### • ##### • Sub-section 6(a) treats the party dispossessed within the period pro-. vided for in the proviso to sub-section ( 4) as being in possession of the disputed land on the date of the order. made under sub-section (l). · Restoration. of possession to the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed attracting the proviso to sub-section ( 4) is, in substance and in effect, putting back tl1e party to possession for deciding his possession on the date of the preliminary order made under sub~ section (1). Although the party who forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed the other party attracting the application of the proVIso to sub-section ( 4) of section 145 of the Code has to be factually and /physically evicted from the property, by a legal fiction it is only for the purpose of treating him in possession on the date of the preliminary order. Hence the corirts below were wrong-in their view that the proceeding abated and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to diSpose it of in accordance with the Jaw in face of section 8 of the Act. If the proceeding had so abated the attachment order passed by the .Magistrate on the 29th July, 1975 could not survive and the Magistrate could not allow if to ·continue as he has done in this case. We; therefore, hold that the proceeding in question in this ·case did not abate and it has to be disposed of by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of Jaw contained in sections 145 and 146 of the Code. For the guidance of the Magistrate, we think it expedient in the interest of justice to indicate briefly as to how the Magistrate is to proceed for disposin_g of the proceeding. The Magistrate, in the first instance, will try to conclude tl1e proceeding in accordance with the various provisions of section 145 of the Code. If he is able to declare the possession of either party on consideration of the evidence adduced or to be adduced before him . he would· do so. In that even the other party will be. forbidden from creating any disturbance of the possession [including the deemed possession. in case the application of the proviso to sub-section ( 4) is.found necessary] of !he party declared in possession. The Magistrate, then, will have to withdraw the attachment in accordance with the proviso to sub-section ( 1) of section 146, because, as · per his order declaring a party in possession there would be no longer any ~likelihood of the breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dis ·pute; 'The party not found in possession by the Magistrate will have to seek the redress of his grievance, if any, elsewhere. If, however. the Magistrate decides that none of the parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the order made under sub-section (1) of section 145 or if he is unable' to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in possession of the subject of dispute he need not lift the attachment until a compe_tent court had determined the rights of the parties as provjded for in section 146 (1). In such a situation ## l c D E F ·G CHANDU NAIK _v._ SITA RAM _(Untwalia,_ _J.)_ 35 7 recourse, if necessary, may be taken to sub-section (2) of section 146 A of the Code either by the Magistrate or a Civil Court, as the case may be. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal, set aside the orders of the courts belq.v, send back the case to the Magistrate and direct him to proposed to dispose it of in the light of this judgment as expeditiously as possible, because considerable delay has already B occurred. S.R. _Appeal allowed_