High CourtDivision BenchAppeals disposed of.

C.A. Sulaiman and Ors. v. State Bank of Travancore, Alwaye and Ors.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal Nos. 4241-4243 of 2000
Neutral Citation:2006 (Supp.) 4 S.C.R.

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Arijit Pasayat
  • S. H. Kapadia
Judgment Date
2006-07-25
Court Decision / Holding
The impugned High Court judgment is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The appeals are disposed of with no order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeals disposed of.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • C.A. Sulaiman and Ors.

Respondents

  • State Bank of Travancore, Alwaye and Ors.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Subramonium Prasad and Jay Kishor Singh

Counsels for Respondents

  • • P. Krishnamoorty, M.T. George, T.G. Narayanan Nair, A. Subhashini, D. A.V. Rangam, Roy Abraham and Himinder Lal

Case Synopsis & Summary

Challenge in these appeals is the High Court’s disposal of second appeals under Section 100 CPC without formulating any substantial question of law, as required by the statute. The respondents argued that the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 permits the High Court to decide a second appeal on a different substantial question of law, provided reasons are recorded. The Supreme Court held that the impugned Kerala High Court judgment does not show any formulated substantial question nor does it indicate that the second appeal was heard on such a question; therefore, the judgment cannot stand. The Court traced jurisprudence from Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal; Roop Singh v. Ram Singh; Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar; Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram; Joseph Severane v. Benny Mathew; Sasikumar v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair; and Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, to emphasize that under Section 100 CPC, the High Court’s jurisdiction is confined to appeals involving a substantial question of law, and that the memorandum must precisely state such question. The proviso to sub-section (5) is applicable only when a substantial question has already been formulated, allowing consideration of another substantial question with reasons. In light of these principles, the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The appeals are disposed of with no order as to costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 100 CPC (Second Appeal)Section 100(3)Section 100(4)Section 100(5)Proviso to Section 100(5)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Under Section 100 CPC, appeals lie to the High Court only if a substantial question of law is involved; the High Court must formulate such substantial question and hear the appeal on that question; the proviso to Section 100(5) allows hearing on another substantial question only if one has already been formulated.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants submitted that the High Court could not dispose of the second appeals without formulating the substantial question of law as required by Section 100 CPC, and that the order is unsustainable for lack of proper formulation and hearing on the defined question.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that although no precise question was formulated, the High Court could analyze the evidence and determine that the lower courts’ views were untenable, thus allowing the second appeals under the proviso to Section 100(5) with reasons.

Cited Precedents (7)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal[2000] 1 SCC 434PositiveCited to affirm the essential requirement under Section 100 CPC to formulate a substantial question of law before deciding a second appeal; without formulation, reversal is impermissible.
Roop Singh v. Ram Singh[2000] 3 SCC 708PositiveReiterates that High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is confined to substantial questions of law and not mere questions of fact.
Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar[2003] 1 SCC 430PositiveCited to reinforce the limited scope of second appeals to substantial questions of law.
Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram and Ors.[2004] 6 SCC 359PositiveAffirms the requirement to formulate the substantial question and hear the appeal on it as per Section 100.
Joseph Severane and Ors. v. Benny Mathew and Ors.[2005] 7 SCC 667PositiveCited to support the procedural rule that second appeals are to be heard on formulated questions of law.
Sasikumar and Ors. v. B. Kunnath Chellappan Nair and Ors.[2005] 12 SCC 588PositiveAdditional authority reinforcing formulation requirement for second appeals.
Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar[1994] 6 SCC 591PositiveUsed to illustrate longstanding principles on statutory interpretation of Section 100 CPC.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A ## C.A. SULAIMAN AND ORS. _v._ ## STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE, ALWAYEE AND ORS. ## JULY 25, 2006 ## B ## [ARIJIT PASA VAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] _Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section JOO-Second Appeal-Disposed of by High Court without formulating or hearing on any substantial question_ C _of_ la~Propriety _of-Held, improper._ The question which arose for consideration in the present appeals is as to whether the High Court erred in disposing of thr. second appeal without formulating the substantial question or questions of law, as mandated by Section 100 CPC. D E Respondents raised plea that though no substantial question of law was formulated before the second appeals were adjudicated, yet that is permissible, because proviso to sub-section (5) of Section I 00 permits the High Court to decide a second appeal on a different substantial question of law subject to recording of reasons. ' Disposing of the appeals and remitting the matter to High Court, the Court HELD: I. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show. that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, • F so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained. (154-F-G( _/shwar Dass Jain_ v. _Sohan Lal._ (200011 SCC 434; _Roop Singh_ v. _Ram Singh,_ (20001 3 SCC 708; _Kanhaiyalal_ v. _Anupkumar,_ (20031 I SCC 430; G _Chadat Singh_ v. _Bahadur Ram and Ors.,_ [200416 SCC 359; _Joseph Severane and Ors._ v. _Benny Mathew and Ors.,_ (20051 7 SCC 667 and _Sasikumar c.nd Ors._ v. _Kunnath Che/lappan Nair and Ors.,_ 12005( 12 SCC 588, relied on. H 2. The plea about pro,·iso to sub-section (5) of Section JOO instead of supporting the stand of the Respondents rather goes against them. The I~ C.A. SULAIMANv. STATEBANKOFTRAVANCORE, ALWAYEE[PASAYAT,J.J J 53 proviso is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The expression "on any other substantial question of law" clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law already formulated and then only another substantial question of law which was not formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case involves such question. 1156-C-DI CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 4241-4243 of 2000. From the Judgment and Order and dated 17.11.1997 of the High Court C of Kerala at Ernakulam in S.A. Nos. 311, 517 and 885 of 1988. ## Subramonium Prasad and Jay Kishor Singh for the Appellants. P. Krishnamoorty, M.T. George, T.G. Narayanan Nair, A. Subhashini, D A.V. Rangam, Roy Abraham and Himinder Lal for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court allowing the E Second Appeals filed by the respondents by a common judgment. By the impugned judgment the judgment and decree of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court were set aside. It is not necessary to set out the factual details in view of the limited submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. F Learned coun5el for the appellants submitted that the High Court was not justified in disposing of the Second Appeals without formulating the substantial question or questions of law, as mandated by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'Code'). G Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that though the High Court has not formulated the questions of law as required, yet on analyzing the evidence, it concluded that the views expressed by the courts below were not tenable in law. That is why the Second Appeals were allowed. It is further submitted that though no substantial question of law was H 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A fo1mulated before the Second Appeals were adjudicated, yet that is permissible, because proviso to sub Section (5) of Section I 00 permits the High Court to decide a Second Appeal on a diffi:rent substantial question of law subject to recording of reasons. Section I 00 of the Code deals with .. Second Appeal". The provision B reads as follows: ## c .. JOO (I) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the Hi5!1 Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed _ex-parte._ D (3) In an appeal under this section, the memoran::Ium of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. E F (5) The appeal sh~jl be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the Second Appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained. G In _!shwar Dass Jain_ v. _Sohan Lal,_ [2000] I SCC 434 this Court in para I 0 has stated thus: ..... H "10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate 155 C.A. SULAIMANI'. STATE BANKOFTRAVANCORE, ALWAYEE[PASAYAT, J.] A court without doing so." Yet again in _Roop Singh_ v. _Ram Singh,_ (2000] 3 SCC 708 this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads: "7. It is to be reiterated that under Section I 00 CPC jurisdiction of B the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section I 00 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter, the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the C time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact finding courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as D to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the .naterial on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession it is for him to establish by cogent and E convincing evidence to show hostile animus Page 1532 and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in conve11ing permissive possession into adverse possession _Thakur Kishan Singh_ v. _Arvind Kumar,_ (1994] 6 sec 591. Hence the High Court ought not to have interfered with the F findings of fact recorded by both the courts below. The position has been reiterated in _Kanhaiyalal_ v. _Anupkumar,_ (2003] 1 sec 430. In _Chadat Singh_ V. _Bahadur Ram and Ors.,_ (2004] 6 sec 359, it was G observed thus: "6. In view of Section I 00 of the Code the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions involved in the appeal as required under Sub-section (3) of Section I 00. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question of H 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A law is involved, it shall formulate that question under Sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in Sub-section (5) of Section JOO." The position was highlighted by this Court in _Joseph Severane and Ors._ v. _Benny Mathew and Ors.,_ [2005] 7 SCC 667 and _Sasikumar and Ors._ v. B _Kunnath Chellappan Nair and Ors .._ [2005] 12 SCC 588]. The plea about proviso to sub-section (5) of Section I 00 instead of supporting the stand of the respondents rather goes against them. The proviso is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been fonnulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, C the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The expression "on any other substantial question of law" clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law already formulated and then only another substantial question of law which was not formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case D involves such question. Under the circumstances the impugned judgment is set aside, we remit the matter to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The appeals are disposed of on the aforesaid tenns with no order as to costs. B.B.B. Appeals disposed of.