High CourtConstitution BenchPetition dismissed with costs.

C. K. Achuthan v. The State of Kerala and Others

Case / Petition Number:Petition No. 103 of 1958
Neutral Citation:1959 SCR (Supp.) 787

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S. R. Das
  • S. K. Das
  • P. B. Gajendragadkar
  • K. N. Wanchoo
  • M. Hidayatullah
Judgment Date
1958-12-11
Court Decision / Holding
Petition dismissed with costs.
Final Disposition
Petition dismissed with costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • C. K. Achuthan

Respondents

  • State of Kerala
  • District Medical Officer (second respondent)
  • Co-operative Milk Supplies Society, Kannur (third respondent)

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • M. T. Paikeday
  • • Ganpat Rai

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sardar Bahadur
  • • M. R. Krishna Pillai

Case Synopsis & Summary

This case concerns contracts for the supply of milk to the Government Hospital at Kannur during 1948-49. The petitioner, C. K. Achuthan, and the third respondent, the Co-operative Milk Supplies Society, Kannur, tendered for the milk supply; the Superintendent accepted Achuthan’s tender and informed the Director of Public Health of the reasons. Subsequently, the contract with the petitioner was cancelled after a notice as per clause 20 of the tender, and the government announced a policy that contracts for supplies to Government medical institutions in Kannur District should be awarded to the Co-operative Milk Supplies Union based on prices fixed by the Revenue Department. The petitioner filed a petition under Article 32 alleging discrimination against him in comparison with the third respondent and infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 16(1), 19(1)(g) and 31. The respondents contended that none of these Articles applied to the facts. The Court held that none of the asserted fundamental rights were involved. It held that a contract for the supply of goods is not a contract of employment and the petitioner, being a supplier, was not a servant; thus Article 16(1) is not attracted. The government’s power to terminate under clause 20 and the right to seek civil remedies for breach were emphasized. The petition was dismissed with costs, since a government contract is not employment and Article 14 cannot shield the selection, while Article 31 does not apply to contract cancellation.

Provisions of Law Cited

Art. 14Art. 16(1)Art. 19(1)(g)Art. 31Art. 24Art. 26(2)Art. 29(2)(g)Art. 32Art. 226

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • A Government contract is not a contract of employment; the supplier is not a servant.
  • Art. 16(1) is confined to employment in service, not to contracts for supply of goods.
  • When one party is chosen over another, the aggrieved party cannot claim protection of Art. 14 (equality before law).
  • A breach of contract may give rise to damages or other civil remedies, not to fundamental rights protections.
  • Cancellation of a contract under contractual clauses (e.g., clause 20) is permissible if conducted according to the contract, and does not automatically violate Articles 14 or 31.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioner contends discrimination in the award of contracts for milk supply vis-a-vis the third respondent, claiming infringement of fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 16(1), 19(1)(g) and 31 and a right to equal employment opportunity. He argues that the State’s policy to favour cooperative milk unions by basing contracts on revenue-fixed prices deprives him of a fair opportunity and violates constitutional guarantees. The remedy under Art. 32 is sought to enforce these rights and prevent discriminatory practices in government contracting.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents submit that no fundamental rights are engaged by a contractual dispute over the award and cancellation of a milk-supply contract. They argue a contract for supply of goods is not a contract of employment, hence Art. 16(1) is inapplicable. Government selection of a supplier is permissible, and breach of contract may be remedied in civil courts by damages or specific performance, not by constitutional remedies. Art. 14 is not violated since government procurement decisions are not inherently discriminatory when made in good faith under contractual terms.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

##### (l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 787 C. K. ACHUTHAN _v._ THE STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS., ## (S. R. DAS, c. J., s. K. DAS, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and M. HIDAY.A.TULLAR, JJ.) _Fundamental Rights, Infringement of-Contract for_ supp~y _of_ _goods_ _to_ _Government-Whether a contract of_ employment-Can~clla­ _tion of contract and grant_ _to_ _another-Whether discriminatory-Con-_ _stitution of India, Arts. z4, z6(z), z9(z)(g),_ _JI._ For the supply of milk to the Government Hospital at Cannanore for the year 1948-49, the petitioner and the third res~on­ dent, the Co-operative Milk Supplies Society, Cannanore, had submitted tenders, and the Superintendent who scrutinised them accepted that of the petitioner and communicated to1 the Director of Public Health the reasons for the decision. Subsequently, the contract to the petitioner was cancelled after giying the requisite notice in terms of cl. 20 of the tender, and he 'was informed that it was the policy of the Government that in the matter of supply to Government medical institutions in Cap.nanore District, the Co-operative Milk Supplies Union was to be given contracts on the basis of prices fixed by .the Revenue Department. The petitioner contended, in a petition filed uJllder Art. 32 of the Constitution, that there had been discrimination against him _vis-a-vis_ the third respondent, that he was denied equal opportunity of employment under the State, and that the fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 16(1), 19(1) (g) and 31 had been infringed. _Held,_ that none of the fundamental rights were involved in the present case. A contract which is held from Government stands on no different footing from a contract held from a private party and when one person is chosen rather than another the aggrieved paFty cannot claim the protection of Art. 14· ' A contract for the supply of goods is not a contract of employment and the petitioner who was supplying milk to the State hospital was in no sense a servant and no question of employment _qua_ servant arose. Article 16 (1) was therefore _pot_ attracted 1;o the case. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 103 of 1958. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights. ##### M. T. Paikeday and Ganpat Rai, for the petitioner. Sardar Bahadur, for respondent No. I. M. R. Krishna Pillai, for respondent No. 3. _Dtcember_ _II._ _**Achuthan**_ 788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. 1958. December 11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ##### v. HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is a petition under Art. 32 _**Slate**_ _**of Kerala**_ of the Constitution by one C. K. Achuthan, who claims to have held a contract for the supply of milk and _Hidayatullah_ _J .._ other articles of diet for the year 1958-1959 but whose contract for supply of milk is said to .have been cancel.led by the District Medical Officer (second respondent herein). The contract for the supply of milk has now been given to the thi~d respondent, the Co-operative Milk Supplies Society, Cannanore. v. _**Slate**_ _**of Kerala**_ ##### From the petition, it appears that the petitioner held contracts for the supply of milk to the Govern##### ment Hospital at Cannanore (Kerala State) ever since 1946, and that previous to this, his brother in the same business held similar contracts from 1936. ##### In 1957, a "uniform procedure for fixing up con tracts " was adopted, and by a notification, conditions for acceptance of tender were laid down. The petitioner as well as the third respondent submitted their ##### respective tenders, which were to be opened by the Superintendent of the Hospital in the presence of interested parties. We need not refer to all the conditions under which tenders were to be accepted, except #### those which have a bearing upon this matter. It was ##### stated in the conditions that no tender. marked at " current market rates " would be accepted, and fur##### ther that in the supply of milk, preference would be given to approved Co-operative Milk Supply Unions and Societies, if their tender was within a margin of 5 per cent. over the market rate or the lowest tendered rate, whichever was less. All persons making tender for · ##### the contract had to produce a certificate of solvency and tax clearance certificates, and to make a deposit with the tender. ##### On January 20, 1958, the tenders which were sub mitted were scrutinised and the tender of the petitioner for the supply of milk was accepted and that of #### the third respondent rejected. It appears that the Superintendent (respondent No. 2) communicated to ##### the Director of Public Health, her reasons for accept ing the tender of the petitioner and not &ooopting that (1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS,789 of the third respondent. Certain correspondence ~hen _1958_ ensued between the Director of Health Services and _Achuthan_ the second respon ent, d as a resu t o w ich 1 f h the peti- v. tioner was informed that the contract for the supply of _State_ _of Kerala_ milk given to him was cancelled. He was informed ##### that it was the policy of Government that in the mat- Hidayatullak J. ter of supply to Government medical institutions in Cannanore District the Co-operative Milk Supplies Union was to be given contracts on the basis of prices ##### fixed by the Revenue Department. It appears ~hat some more correspondence between the Director of Health Services and the second respondent ensued, and it was pointed out to the second respondent that action should have been taken under Cl. 20 of the conditions of the tender and the contract only cancelled ##### after giving a month's notice to the petitioner. In furtherance of these instructions, the second respondent issued a notice in terms of Cl. 20 of the tender, and cancelled the contract after the notice period. The present petition has been filed to question the ### several orders referred to above. It may be pointed ##### out that previous to this, the petitioner had applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution to the High Coutt of Kera.la, but his petition (0. P. No. 201 of 1958) was rejected by Raman Nayar, J., on June 6, 1958. A Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed by Koshi, ##### C. J., and Vaidialingam, J. (A. S. No. 354 of 1958 decided on July 7, 1958). The High Court held that the present matter was no more than a. breach, if any, of the contract by the State Government, and that ~he appropriate remedy was to file a civil suit and not to proceed under Art. 226. #### It appears that· no special leave to appeal was sought from this Court against the above orders, ahd the matter has been brought for adjudication, not by way-of appeal but directly under Art. 32 of the Constitution as an infringement of the fundamental right ##### of the petitioner. The contention of the petitioner in ·this behalf is that he is entitled to an equal treatment in the eye of law, and that there has been discrimin11#### tion against him vis-a-vis, the third respondent. IJe claims protection under Arts. 14, 16(1), 19(l)(g) aijd _**AeAuthan**_ v. _**Stale of K11ala**_ _**Ilidayatullah**_ _]_ . 790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. ##### 31 of the Constitution. In our opinion, none of these Articles can be made applicable to the facts of the present case. No doubt, the petitioner claims to have succeeded in obtaining the contract from the Government, and the third respondent failed to do so. But even if he held the contract, the petitioner did not acquire an absolute right to be continued in that contract, because power was reserved by the Government under CL 20 to terminate the contract after giving a month's ##### notice. Whether the exercise of that power in the present case was regular or legal, is not a matter on which we are called upon to pronounce, because adjudication of such dispute can appropriately take place only before the ordinary Civil Courts, where ##### evidence can be gone into and eJ<amined at length. The gist of the present matter is the breach, if any, of the contract said to have been given to the petitioner which has been cancelled either for good or for bad reasons. There is no discrimination, because it is perfectly open to the Government, even as it is to a private party, to choose a person to their liking, to fulfil contracts which they wish to be performed. ##### When one person is chosen rather than another, the aggrieved party cannot claim the protection of Art. 14, because the choice of the person to fulfil a particular contract must be left;to the Government. Similarly, a contract which is held from Government stands on no different footing from a contract held from a pri##### vate party. The breach of the contract, if any, may entitle the person aggrieved to sue for damages or in appropriate cases, even specific performance, but he cannot complain that there has been a deprivation of the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, such as is contemplated by Art. 19(l)(g). Nor has it been shown how Art. 31 of the Constitution may be invoked to prevent cancellation of a. contra.ct in exercise of powers conferred by one of the terms of the contract itself. ##### The main contention of the petitioner before us was thus under Art. 16(1) of the Constitution, and he claimed equal opportunity of employment under the (1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 791 State. To begin with, a contract for the supply of _z95B_ goods is not a contract of employment in the sense in _Achuthan_ which that word has been used in the Article. i The v. petitioner was not to be employed as a servf!,nt to _State_ _of Rerala_ fetch milk on behalf of the institution, but was a contractor for supplying the articles on payment of' price. _Hidayatullah_ _J._ He claimed to have been given a contract for supply of milk, and did not claim to be an employee of the State. Article 16(1) of the Constitution, both in its terms and in the collocation of the words, indicates ##### that it is confined to "employment" by the St11.te, and has reference to employment in service rather than as contractors. Of course, there may be cases in which the contract may include within itself an ele##### ment of service. In the present case, however; such a consideration does not arise, and it is therefore not necessary for us to examine whether those cases are covered by the said Article. But it is clear that 1every person whose offer to perform a contract of supply is refused or whose contract for such supply is breached cannot be said to have been denied equal opportunity ##### of employment., and it is to this matter that th~s case is confined. Looking to the facts of the case, it is manifest that the petitioner was supplying, or in other words, filelling milk and other articles of diet to the State for the use of hospitals and similar institutions. He was in no ##### sense a servant, and no question of employmeQt qua servant arose. In these circumstances, it is plain that Art. 16(1) of the Constitution is not attracted to the facts. ##### In our opinion, the petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution is wholly misconceived. No fundannental right is involved. At best, it is a right to take the matter to the Civil Court, if so advised, and to claim damages for breach of contract, if any. The petition accordingly fails, and is dismissed with costs. #### Petition dismissed. I