Babu K.V. v. The Additional Licensing Authority cum Joint Regional Transport Officer, Office of the Regional Transport Officer, Thrissur, and The Deputy Transport Commissioner, Central Zone I, Thrissur

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** **MONDAY,THE 04TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2019 / 15TH MAGHA, 1940** ## **WP(C).No. 2273 of 2019** ## **PETITIONER:** **BABU K.V. AGED 50 YEARS S/O. VAREED, KIDANGAN HOUSE, MANALUR P.O, THRISSUR-680 617** ## **BY ADV. SRI.G.PRABHAKARAN** ## **RESPONDENTS:** > 1. **THE ADDITIONAL LICENSING AUTHORITY CUM JOINT REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER** **OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER, THRISSUR680 003** 2. **THE DEPUTY TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL ZONE I, THRISSUR - 680003.** **SRI BIMAL K.NATH, SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 04.02.2019, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **2** ## **JUDGMENT** The petitioner, who is the holder of a driving licence, bearing No.8/18098/1998 to ply autorickshaw, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P6 order dated 17.12.2018 of the 2[nd] respondent Deputy Transport Commissioner, who is the Appellate Authority, and also Ext.P4 order dated 21.11.2018 of the 1[st] respondent Joint Regional Transport Officer, who is the licensing authority, regarding suspension of his driving licence for the period from 22.11.2018 to 21.5.2019, invoking the provisions under subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 2. On 25.1.2019 the writ petition came for admission, the learned Senior Government Pleader sought time to get instructions. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 4. The sole issue that arises for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether any interference is warranted on Ext.P6 order of the 2[nd] respondent Appellate Authority, whereby Ext.P5 appeal filed by the petitioner challenging Ext.P4 order of the 1[st] respondent, suspending the driving licence of the petitioner for a **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **3** period of six months from 22.11.2018 to 21.5.2019, stands rejected. 5. The pleadings and materials on record would show that on 6.9.2018, while the petitioner was driving his autorickshaw bearing Registration No.KL-08/AP-849, the passenger by name Ravi fell down near Peringottukara Palace Bar at Kanjani Road, who succumbed to injuries while undergoing treatment in Jubilee Mission Hospital, Thrissur. In connection with the said incident, Crime No.586/2018 of Anthikkad Police Station was registered against the petitioner, as evidenced by Ext.P1 FIR, alleging offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code. After the registration of crime, the 1[st] respondent Licensing Authority issued Ext.P2 show-cause notice to the petitioner, under Section 19(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act to show cause why his Driving Licence shall not be cancelled. The petitioner submitted Ext.P3 objection. Thereafter, the 1[st] respondent passed Ext.P4 order dated 21.11.2018, whereby the licence of the petitioner stands suspended for the period from 22.11.2018 to 21.5.2019. 6. Challenging Ext.P4 order, the petitioner filed Ext.P5 appeal before the 2[nd] respondent. The appeal stands dismissed by Ext.P6 order of the 2[nd] respondent, confirming Ext.P4 order. Feeling **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **4** aggrieved, the petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition seeking various reliefs. 7. A reading of Ext.P6 order would show that the only reason stated in the said order for rejecting Ext.P5 appeal filed by the petitioner, is as follows: - **“** ¨ ¥MàW ËÏÜßW ØbàµøßAáµÏᢠ17/12/2018 ÄàÏîÄß ¥MàW ÕÞÆß çÈVµÞÝíºÏíAí ÙÞ¼øÞÏß Äæa ÍÞ·¢ ÕßÖÆàµøßAáµÏᢠæºÏñá. ¥MàÜá¢, çÈVµÞÝíºÞ æÎÞÝßµ{ᢠÉøßçÖÞÇߺîÄßW ÈßKᢠ¿ßÏÞæa èÜØXØí ¥çÏÞ·cÄ µÞÜÞÕÇß µáùÕí æºÏñí æµÞ¿áAáKÄßÈáÄAÄÞÏ µÞøÃBZ ²KᢠÄæK ¨ ¥çÄÞùßxß µÞÃáKßÜï.å¦ÏÄßÈÞW ¥Áà×ÃW èÜØXØßBí ¥çÄÞùßxß ÄãÛâøßæa ÄàøáÎÞÈ¢ ÖøßÕºîáæµÞIᢠ¨ ¥MàW ÄUßæµÞIᢠ§ÄßÈÞW ©JøÕÞµáKá. **”** ## 8. In **Santu Thomas v. Joint Regional Transport Officer,** **Vaikom [2018 (1) KHC 437]** , this Court held that satisfaction of the Licensing Authority, after giving the holder of such licence an opportunity of being heard, of the existence of any of the circumstances made mention in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is a pre-requisite to disqualify a person from holding a driving licence or to revoke **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **5** such licence under sub-section (1). Further, the licensing authority has to record reasons in writing for disqualifying a person for a specified period for holding or obtaining any driving licence to drive all or any classes or descriptions of vehicles specified in the licence, or for revoking any such licence. This Court held further that though an appeal under Section 19(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act is provided under an order of the licensing authority under Section 19(1), an order issued by the licensing authority on a printed/cyclostyled proforma with some insertions here and there by filling the blanks makes the appellate jurisdiction nugatory and ineffective inasmuch as, such an order passed in a mechanical exercise of power will be of little assistance to the appellate authority while analysing the reasoning essential to such a decision. Paragraphs 6 to 12 of the said judgment read thus; “6. Section 19 of the Act deals with the power of the licensing authority to disqualify a person from holding a driving licence or to revoke such licence. As per subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Act, if a licensing authority is satisfied, after giving the holder of a driving licence an opportunity of being heard, that he (a) is a habitual criminal or habitual drunkard; or (b) is a habitual addict to any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance within the meaning of the Narcotic Drugs and **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **6** Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; or (c) is using or has used a motor vehicle in the commission of a cognizable offence; or (d) has by his previous conduct as driver of a motor vehicle shown that his driving is likely to be attended with danger to the public; or (e) has obtained any driving licence or a licence to drive a particular class or description of motor vehicle by fraud or misrepresentation; or (f) has committed any such act which is likely to cause nuisance or danger to the public, as may be prescribed by the Central Government, having regard to the objects of the Act; or (g) has failed to submit to, or has not passed, the tests referred to in the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 22; or (h) being a person under the age of eighteen years who has been granted a learner's licence or a driving licence with the consent in writing of the person having the care of the holder of the licence and has ceased to be in such care, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, make an order (i) disqualifying that person for a specified period for holding or obtaining any driving licence to drive all or any classes or descriptions of vehicles specified in the licence; or (ii) revoke any such licence. Rule 21 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 provides that for the purpose of clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act, the Commission of the acts made mention in clauses (1) to (25) of Rule 21 by a holder of a driving licence shall constitute nuisance or danger to public. 7. As per sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act, any person aggrieved by an order made by a licensing authority under sub-section (1) may, within thirty days of **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **7** the receipt of the order, appeal to the prescribed authority, and such appellate authority shall give notice to the licensing authority and hear either party if so required by that party and may pass such order as it thinks fit and an order passed by any such appellate authority shall be final. The appellate authority notified under sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act is the Deputy Transport Commissioner. 8. The provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act makes it explicitly clear that, for disqualifying a person for a specified period for holding or obtaining any driving licence to drive all or any classes or descriptions of vehicles specified in the licence, or for revoking any such licence, the satisfaction of the licensing authority, after giving the holder of such licencee an opportunity of being heard, of the existence of any of the circumstances made mention in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) is a prerequisite. Further, the licensing authority has to record the reasons in writing for disqualifying a person for a specified period for holding or obtaining any driving licence to drive all or any classes or descriptions of vehicles specified in the licence, or for revoking any such licence. 9. In the instant case, Ext.P3 proceedings of the respondent dated 27.10.2017 is on a printed/cyclostyled proforma with some insertions here or there and by filling the blanks, whereby the petitioner is disqualified under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act from holding driving licence bearing No.40/2480/2005 for a period of one year, from 27.10.2017 to 26.10.2018. Ext.P3 **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **8** proceedings, shows a mechanical exercise of power by the licensing authority and as such, the same is vitiated by total non-application of mind. The mandatory prerequisites for an order under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act, consistent with the principles of natural justice, are missing in Ext.P3. 10. In **Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Woolcombers Workers Union, [(1974) 3 SCC 318]** the Apex Court, while considering the challenge made against an award under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 held that the giving of reasons in support of their conclusions by judicial and quasi judicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unconscious unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimise the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal bias or unfitness in the conclusion. The authority will adduce reasons which will be regarded as fair and legitimate by a reasonable man and will discard irrelevant or extraneous considerations. Second, it is a well known principle that justice should not only be done but should also appear to be done. Unreasoned conclusions may be just but they may not appear to be just to those who read them. Reasoned conclusions, on the other hand, will have also the appearance of justice. Third, it should be remembered that an appeal generally lies from the decisions of judicial and quasi judicial authorities to the Apex Court by special leave granted under Article 136. A judgment which does not disclose the reasons, will be of **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **9** little assistance to the Court. The Court will have to wade through the entire record and find for itself whether the decision in appeal is right or wrong. Therefore, the Apex Court emphasised that judicial and quasi judicial authorities should always give the reasons in support of their conclusions. 11. In **Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department v. Shukla and Brothers, [(2010) 4 SCC 785]** the Apex Court held that, the principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires that the judgment of the Court should meet with this requirement with higher degree of satisfaction. 12. Though an appeal is provided under subsection (3) of Section 19 of the Act before the appellate authority, Ext.P3 proceedings of the licensing authority, which is under challenge in this Writ Petition, virtually makes the appellate jurisdiction nugatory and ineffective, inasmuch as, such an order passed in a mechanical exercise of power will be of little assistance to the appellate authority while analysing the reasoning essential to such a decision. Therefore, no purpose will be served by **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **10** relegating the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy provided under sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act against an order issued by the licensing authority under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act on a printed/cyclostyled performa with some insertions here or there and by filling the blanks.” 9. A reading of Ext.P6 order passed by the 2[nd] respondent would not indicate as to whether the Appellate Authority has arrived at a satisfaction as to the existence of any of the circumstances made mention in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as the satisfaction of the Licensing Authority/Appellate Authority of the existence of any of the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 is a pre-requisite for disqualifying a person for a specified period for holding or obtaining any driving licence to drive all or any classes or descriptions of vehicles specified in the licence, or for revoking any such licence. In such circumstances, this writ petition is disposed of by setting aside Ext.P6 order dated 17.12.2018 of the 2[nd] respondent Deputy Transport Commissioner, who is the Appellate Authority, and directing the said respondent to re-consider Ext.P5 appeal filed by the petitioner and pass appropriate orders thereon, strictly in **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **11** accordance with law, with notice to the petitioner and after affording him an opportunity of being heard, taking note of the law laid down by this Court in **Santu Thomas's case (supra)** . Necessary orders in this regard shall be passed as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. ## **Sd/-** ## **ANIL K.NARENDRAN JUDGE** okb //True copy// P.A. to Judge **W.P(C) No.2273/19** **12** ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:** **EXHIBIT P1** **TRUE COPY OF THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT DATED 7.9.2018** **EXHIBIT P2** **TRUE COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 27.10.2018.** **EXHIBIT P3** **TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 1ST RESPONDENT DATED 21.11.2018** **EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER WITH ITS NO. L 3/9770/2018 ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT DATED 21.11.2018** **EXHIBIT P5** **TRUE COPY OF THE APPEAL MEMORANDUM DATED 29.11.2018** **EXHIBIT P6** **TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT WITH ITS NO.C/4027/2018/CZ1 DATED 17.12.2018** **RESPONDENTS' EXTS: NIL**