High CourtDivision BenchPartly Allowed

Babla @ Dinesh v. State of Uttarakhand

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 1349 of 2012
Neutral Citation:[2012] 7 SCR 477

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • H. L. Dattu
  • Chandramauli Kr. Prasad
Judgment Date
2012-09-04
Court Decision / Holding
The appeal is partly allowed. The appellant is held to be juvenile on the date of the offence under the Juvenile Justice Act and Rules. The conviction for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC is upheld, but the sentence is set aside. The appellant is to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
Final Disposition
Partly Allowed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Babla @ Dinesh

Respondents

  • State of Uttarakhand

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • T. N. Singh
  • • Vikas K. Singh
  • • H. L. Srivastava

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Mukesh Verma

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court appeal concerns whether the appellant, Babla alias Dinesh, could be treated as a juvenile on the date of the offence (1 December 1991) for purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Trial Court, with the High Court confirming the conviction. The appellant’s plea of juvenility was not raised at trial, and no evidence in defence was adduced in that regard. The High Court rejected the juvenility claim on the ground that the issue had not been raised earlier. The Court, however, held that a plea of juvenility can be raised for the first time at the appellate stage, following Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar and other lines of authority. An inquiry under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007 was conducted by the Additional Sessions Judge, which concluded the appellant was about 10–15 years old at the time of the offence. The Supreme Court accepted this report and determined that the appellant fell within the Juvenile Justice Act provisions (2(h) of the 1986 Act and 2(k) of the 2000 Act). Because the appellant had already served more than three years of the maximum term under Section 15, the Court sustained the conviction but set aside the sentence and directed release forthwith. The appeal was partly allowed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, s. 2(h)Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, s. 2(k)Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12Indian Penal Code, 1860, ss. 302/149Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 147Section 15, Juvenile Justice Act

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • res integra (no longer res integra)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that he was a juvenile on the date of the offence (1.12.1991). The plea of juvenility can be raised at the appellate stage under Lakhan Lal and related precedents, and the Rules, 2007, Rule 12, provide a procedure to determine age through an inquiry. The report showing age arrested between 10–15 years, accepted by the Court, establishes juvenile status under s. 2(h) of the 1986 Act and s. 2(k) of the 2000 Act. Since the appellant has already served more than three years under Section 15, the sentence should be set aside while maintaining conviction. The decision aligns with the protective aims of the Juvenile Justice regime and mirrors jurisprudence in Bhola Bhagat, Umesh Singh, and Lakhan Lal, ensuring procedural safeguards for juveniles even when the issue is raised late.

Contentions of Respondents

The plea of juvenility was not raised during trial, and no evidence was presented to suggest juvenile status. The trial and High Court relied on established law applicable at the time of the offence. The 1986 Act and 2000 Act must be interpreted in light of the record and the typical age assessment protocols, notwithstanding Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, which was invoked only subsequently. The court should not disturb the conviction on an unraised issue, and the sentence ought to reflect the applicable law and the offence, with the protection of juveniles considered within the statutory framework.

Cited Precedents (6)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar2011 (1) SCR 770; (2011) 2 SCC 251PositiveUsed to justify raising the pleas of juvenility at the appellate stage, treating such pleas as admissible and non-waived.
Umesh Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar2000 (6) SCC 89PositiveSupportive precedent that where juvenility is raised, the court may adjust sentences accordingly while upholding conviction.
Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar1997 (8) SCC 720; 1997 (4) Suppl. SCR 711PositiveAuthoritative guidance supporting reduction of sentence when juvenile status is established.
Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal1984 Supp SCC 228; 1984 SCR 803PositiveEarlier authority cited in the line of decisions on juvenility and trial of juveniles.
Bhoop Ram v. State of UP1989 (3) SCC 1PositiveUsed as part of the rationale for re-evaluating the sentence in light of juvenile status.
Pradeep Kumar v. State of U.P.1995 Supp (4) SCC 419PositivePart of the precedential chain allowing for reconsideration of sentences in juvenile contexts.

Diagnostic Tool

Beta

Does this judgment govern your specific facts?

Don't risk relying on a distinguishable precedent. Enter your facts or proposition below. We will test it against Babla @ Dinesh v. State of Uttarakhand and instantly map out authorities that support, challenge, or govern your position.

Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A (2012] 7 S.C.R. 477 ## BABLA @ DINESH ## _v._ STATE OF UTTARAKHAND (Criminal Appeal No. 1349 of 2012) # SEPTEMBER 04, 2012 [H.L. DATTU AND CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, JJ.] B _JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT 2000:_ c ss. _2(k) and 15_ - _Plea of juvenility_ - _Held: Can be raised_ - _even before Supreme Court for the first time The report of Addi. Sessions Judge concluding that the appellant was aged about 10-15 years on the date of commission of the offence (i.e. 1.12.1991) is accepted -Appellant is, thus, juvenile within_ 0 _the expression uls 2(h) of 1986 Act and_ s. _2(k) of 2000 Act_ - _Appellant has undergone the actual period of more than 3_ - _years out of the maximum period prescribed u/s 15 While sustaining the conviction, the sentence awarded to him by courts below is set aside_ - _Juvenile Justice Act, 1986_ - _s.2(h)_ E - _Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007_ - _r. 2_ - _Penal Code, 1860_ - s. _3021149._ The appellant, who was one of the accused before the trial court, was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life u/s 302/149 IPC. The High Court F confirmed the judgment rejecting the plea of juvenility of the appellant on the ground that it was not raised before the trial court and no evidence was adduced in defence. ## Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The High Court has erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that no evidence was adduced and no suggestion was made to the witnesses regarding juvenility of the appellant during the trial. The issue of 477 G H [2012] 7 S.C.R. ## 478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - A raising the plea for determination of juvenility for the first time at the appellate stage is no more res integra. This Court in Lakhan Lal's* case, taking note of its previous decisions on this point has allowed such plea raised before this Court for the first time. [para 9) (481-F-G] ## B _Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar_ 2011 (1) SCR 770 = (2011) 2 SCC 251; _Umesh Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar,_ (2000) 6 SCC 89; _Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar,_ 1997 (4) Suppl. SCR 711 = (1997) 8 SCC 720; _Gopinath Ghosh v. State of WP._ 1984 SCR 803 =1984 Supp SCC 228; and _Bhoop Ram_ C _v. State of UP._ (1989) 3 SCC 1; and _Pradeep Kumar v. State_ - _of UP.,_ 1995 Supp(4) sec 419 relied on. 1.2 Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the Additional Sessions Judge has conducted inquiry by 0[following the procedure prescribed under the Juvenile ] Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and submitted his report dated 03.12.2011, wherein, it is concluded that the appellant was aged about 10-15 years on the date of the commission of the offence i.e. 1.12.1991. The report is accepted. Accordingly, this Court E holds that the appellant was juvenile within the meaning of the expression uls 2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and s. 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and the Rules framed thereunder on the date of commission of the offence. The F Jail Custody Certificate, produced by the appellant suggests that he has undergone the actual period of sentence of more than three years out of the maximum period prescribed u/s 15 of the Act. In the circumstance, while sustaining the conviction of the appellant, the G sentence awarded to him by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court is set aside. [para7 and 12) [481-C-D; 483-F-G] Case Law Reference: H 2011 (1) SCR 770 relied on para 9 BABLA @ DINESH _v._ STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 479 ||2000 (6)sec89<br>relied on|para 9|A| |---|---|---|---| ||1997 (4) Suppl. SCR711relied on|para 9|| ||1984 SCR 803<br>relied on|para 9|| ||1989 (3)sec1<br>reliedon|para 9|B| ||1995 (4) Suppl. SCC 419 relied on|para 9|| |•·|CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal|CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal|| |No.|1349of2012.||| From the Judgment & Order dated 21.07.2009 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No. 1481 of 2001 (Old No. 1852 of 1995). C T.N. Singh, Vikas K. Singh, H.L. Srivastava for the Appellant. D Mukesh Verma, (For Jatinder Kumar Bhatia) for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H.L. DATTU, J. 1. Leave granted. E 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.1481 of 2001 dated 21.07.2009. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has confirmed the Order of conviction and sentence of the appellant passed by the Trial Court under F Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'the IPC'). 3. The appellant was one of the accused before the Trial Court for the alleged offences punishable under Section 302 read with Sections 149 and 147 of the IPC. The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 18.10.1995 in Sessions Trial No. 39 of 1992, convicted and sentenced the appellant for rigorous imprisonment of two years under Section 147 and imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section 149 G H 480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 7 S.C.R. A IPC, both sentences to run concurrently. Aggrieved by the order so made, the appellant and others approached the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital by way of criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Cr.P.C.') on various grounds. B 4. Before the High Court, apart from others, the learned counsel for appellant raised the contention that the appellant was juvenile on the date of the commission or occurrence of the offence, i.e. on 01.12.1991. The said contention was rejected by the High Court on the ground that it was not raised C before the Trial Court and no evidence has been adduced in defence and no suggestion had been made to the witnesses during the trial and that the appellant admitted his age as 20 years at the time of recording his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C .. In conclusion, the Court has observed: D "11. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that appellants Gadha and Sabia, were minors on the day of the incident. But no such suggestion was made to any of the witnesses nor is any evidence adduced in defence. Rather the accused _I_ appellants Gadha and Sabia have disclosed their age 20 years on the day when their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded also makes out the case that their age was more than 16 years on the day of the incident. It is pertinent to mention here that on the day of the incident, and during the trial, Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, was applicable to the cases of Juveniles and not Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000." E F 5. After issuing notice to the opposite parties in the special G leave petition, by our Order dated 18.04.2011, we had directed the learned Sessions Judge or his nominee to conduct an inquiry into the question of the age of the appellant on the date of commission of offence and to submit a report as envisaged under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of H Children) Rules, 2007 (for short 'Rules, 2007). BABLA@ DINESH _v._ STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 481 [H.L. DATTU, J.] 6. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the inquiry report was submitted before this Court, but the same was not accepted, as it was merely based on the opinion of an individual doctor which was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Rule 12 of the Rules, 2007. Therefore, by our Order dated 01.11.2011, we had, once again, directed the learned Sessions Judge to conduct an inquiry as prescribed under Rule 12 of the Rules, 2007 and submit his report. A B 7. Pursuant to the directions issued by us, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has conducted inquiry by following the prescribed procedure under the Rules, 2007 and submitted C his inquiry report dated 03.12.2011, wherein, it is concluded that the appellant was aged about 10-15 years on the date of the commission of the offence i.e. 01.12.1991. Therefore, the appellant is juvenile within the meaning of the expression under Section 2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and Section 2(k) D of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. D 8. This report is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent-State. E 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis. We have also carefully perused the judgment and order passed by the High Court. We are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that no evidence was adduced and no suggestion was made to the F witnesses regarding juvenility of the appellant during the trial. In our opinion, the issue of raising the plea for determination of juvenility for the first time at the appellate stage is no more res integra. This Court in _Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar,_ (2011) 2 SCC 251, has allowed such plea raised before this Court for G the first time and, taking note of its previous decisions on this point, has observed thus : "The fact remains that the issue as to whether the appellants were juvenile did not come up for consideration for whatever reason, before the Courts below. The question H 482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R. A 8 c D E F G H is whether the same could be considered by this Court at this stage of the proceedings. A somewhat similar situation had arisen in _Umesh Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar,_ (2000) 6 SCC 89 wherein this Court relying upon the earlier decisions in _Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar,_ (1997) 8 SCC 720, _Gopinath Ghosh v. State of WP._ 1984 Supp SCC 228 and _Bhoop Ram v. State of UP.,_ (1989) 3 sec 1, while sustaining the conviction of the Appellant therein under all the charges, held that the sentences awarded to them need to be set aside. It was also a case where the appellant therein was aged below 18 years and was a child for the purposes of the Bihar Children Act, 1970 on the date of the occurrence. The relevant paragraph reads as under (Umesh Singh case, SCC, pp.93-94, para 6) : "6. So far as Arvind Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 659 of 1999 is concerned, his case stands on a different footing. On the evidence on record, the learned Counsel for the appellant, was not in a position to point out any infirmity in the conviction recorded by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. The only contention put forward before the court is that the appellant is born on 1- 1-67 while the date of the incident is 14-15-1980 and on that date he was hardly 13 years old. We called for report of experts being placed before the court as to the age of the appellant, Arvind Singh. The report made to the court clearly indicates that on the date of the incident he may be 13 years old. This fact is also supported by the school certificate as well as matriculation certificate produced before this Court which indicate that his date of birth is 1- 1-1967. On this basis, the contention put forward before the court is that although the appellant is aged below 18 years and is a child for the purpose of the Bihar Children Act, 1970 on the date of the occurrence, his trial having been conducted along with other accused who are not children is not in accordance with law. However, this BABLA @ DINESH _v._ STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 483 [H.L. DATTU, J.] contention had not been raised either before the trail court A or before the High Court. In such circumstances, this Court in _Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar,_ 1997 (8) SCC 720, following the earlier decision in _Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal,_ 1984 Supp. SCC 228 and _Bhoop Ram v. State of UP.,_ 1989 (3) SCC 1 and _Pradeep Kumar v._ B _State of U.P.,_ 1995 Supp(4) sec 419, while sustaining that the sentences awarded to them need to be set aside. In view of the exhaustive discussion of the law on the matter in Bhola Bhagat case, we are obviated of the duty to examine the same but following the same, with respect, c we pass similar orders in the present case. Conviction of the appellant Arvind Singh is confirmed but the sentence imposed upon him stands set aside. He is, therefore, set at liberty, if not required in any other case." 10. We are in respectful agreement with the view D expressed by this Court in the aforesaid decision. 11. We have carefully perused the report dated 03.12.2011 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Since the report is made after holding due inquiry as required under the Act and the Rules, we accept the same. Accordingly, we hold that the appellant was juvenile, as envisaged under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, on the date of commission of the offence. E 12. The Jail Custody Certificate, produced by the appellant suggests that he has undergone the actual period of sentence of more than three years out of the maximum period prescribed under Section 15 of the Act. In the circumstance, while sustaining the conviction of the appellant for the aforesaid offences, the sentence awarded to him by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is set aside. Accordingly, we direct that the appellant be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appeal is partly allowed. F G R.P. Appeal Partly allowed. H