High CourtSingle JudgeAppeals dismissed.

B. N. Srikantiah & Others v. The State of Mysore

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeals Nos. 120 & 121 of 1955

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Bhawati J.
  • L. Kapur
  • A. K. Sarjar
Judgment Date
1958-04-14
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeals dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Sanjeeva Rao
  • B. N. Srikantiah
  • Sidda
  • Kadaripathi (Kunta)
  • Hanumantha
  • Pujari Anantha

Respondents

  • The State of Mysore

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Krishnamurthy
  • • R. Gopalakrishnan

Counsels for Respondents

  • • G. Channappa, Assistant Advocate-General for the State of Mysore
  • • T. 111. Sen

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a Supreme Court decision arising from two criminal appeals under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, challenging Mysore High Court convictions in a murder case. Accused Nos. 1–6 were tried for forming an unlawful assembly with the common object to murder Anne Gowda; six were charged under s. 302 read with s. 34 for murder, while one was charged under s. 302/109 for abetment. The trial court acquitted some of the unlawful assembly charges, but convicted the appellants under s. 302, and convicted the sixth accused under s. 302/109. On appeal the High Court confirmed the appellants’ convictions under s. 302 and acquitted the sixth accused of s. 302/109. The appellants argued that the prosecution failed to prove which appellant delivered the fatal blow and that no charge under s. 34 had been framed, so there could be no conviction under s. 302/34; they contended that liability was personal and not collective. The State contended that common intention could be inferred from the evidence of preconcert, attacks with weapons, and the sequence of events, making liability under s. 302 as sharers in the offence proper. The Court examined the distinction between common object and common intention, the role of s. 34 as a rule of evidence, and the effect of omitting s. 34 in the charge. It held that the omission did not prejudice the accused and that the evidence supported their liability as sharers in the offence. Ultimately, the appeals were dismissed, upholding the conviction for murder and affirming the related liability principles.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 302 of the Indian Penal CodeSection 143 of the Indian Penal CodeSection 34 of the Indian Penal CodeSection 109 of the Indian Penal CodeSection 302/109 of the Indian Penal CodeSection 302/34 of the Indian Penal CodeSection 149 of the Indian Penal Code

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Common intention doctrine
  • Omission to specify s. 34 in charge is curable if no prejudice results (Willie Slaney)
  • Section 34 deals with doing of separate acts in furtherance of common intention (Barendra Kumar Ghosh)
  • Procedural laws subserve ends of justice and not to frustrate them (Willie Slaney)
  • Charge should convey the case; substance over ritual in criminal procedure (Bose J. remark)
  • Common object vs common intention distinction (Ohikkarange Gowda discussion)
  • Pulukuri Kotayya v King Emperor and Atta Mohammad v King Emperor as authorities on curability of procedural defects

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that since the prosecution did not establish which accused caused the fatal blow, none could be convicted under section 302 simpliciter. They argued there was no charge under section 34, so conviction under section 302/34 was unwarranted. They asserted liability was not joint and several, and that the lack of a protective charge under section 34 prejudiced them. They urged that the common object of the unlawful assembly did not automatically translate into individual liability without a clear showing of the specific role of each appellant.

Contentions of Respondents

The State argued that the evidence showed preconcert and a common intention to murder. The accused attacked the deceased with deadly weapons, pursued him, and sustained the assault until death, thereby acting in concert and as sharers in the offence. It contended that liability under section 302 can attach to all who participated under the common intention, and that section 34 is a rule of evidence rather than a separate offense; omitting it from the charge did not cause prejudice, as the accused had notice of being charged as sharers in the offence and were tried accordingly.

Cited Precedents (6)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
William Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh[1955] 2 S.C.R. 140PositiveCited to support that a defect in a charge can be curable if the trial substantially adheres to the required procedure and there is no substantial injustice.
Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor(2)PositiveUsed to illustrate curability of procedural defects under criminal procedure when no prejudice is shown.
Atta Mohammad v. King Emperor(3)PositiveCited for guidance on how procedural form should not defeat substantial justice and on the scope of charge framing.
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor(1)PositiveQuoted for the principle that section 34 deals with acts done in furtherance of a common intention; liability of sharers in the offence.
Rawalpenta Venkulu v. The State of Hyderabad(i)PositiveUsed to support that omission to add section 34 has academic significance absent prejudice.
Ohikkarange Gowda v. State of Mysore[1]Mentioned OnlyCited by appellants to argue about separate common intention; court notes it does not depart from Willie Slaney and is cited for contrast.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1959] _1958_ _April_ _i4_ B. N. SRIKAXT IAH & OTHERS _v._ THE STATE OF MYSORE (BHAOWATI, J·. L. KAPUR and A. K. SARJ\AR JJ.) _'!lfurder-Chargc_ _under_ _s._ _302_ _si1npliciter-Convicfion_ _u11dcr_ s. _302/34. u:hen perniissiblc-F'rej11dicc-Co1n1non_ _Intention-Indian_ _Penal Code_ (XLl' _of I86o),_ _ss._ _34 and 302._ Six persons \Vere charged under s. i43 Indian ]Jenal Code for being members of an unlavvful assen1bly the con1111on object of which \Vas to n1urder one Anne c;o\vda. J·'ive of then1 \Vere further charged under s. 302 Indian Penal Code for comn1itting murder by intentionally causing the death of Anne Gowda, and the sixth was charged under s. 302/ro9 India! Pe1rnl Code for abetment of rnurder. The trial Court acquitted all the six accused under s. 143, acquitte<l two of them but convicted the three appellants under s. 302, and convicted the sixth accused under s. 302/109. On appeal the High Court maintained the conviction of the appellants under s. 302 but acquitted the sixth accused under s. 302/rog. It was contended by the appellant that as the prosecution had not established which of the appellants had giyen the fatal blow none of them could be convicted under s. 302 simpliciter and that as no charge had been framed under s. 34 they could not be convicted under s. 302/34 Indian Penal Code : _Held,_ that the on1isSion to mentions. 34 Indian J>enal Code in the charge coulJ not affect the case unless prejudice '''as sho,vn to have resulted in consequence thereof. ~fhe charge '"as that the appellants and two others committed the murder by intentionally cansing the death of the deceased. The appellants had notice that they \Vere being tried as " sharers in the offence " and that their liability \Vas colJective and vicarious and not individual. The appellants had neither alleged nor shown that the omission to specify s. 34 in the charge had caus<'d them any prejudice. Common intention is a question of fact and is to be gathered from the acts of the parties. The evidenCe sho,ved that there \vas preconcert, that the appellants attacked the deceased \Vi th choppers i11juring him on the head, the neck, the shoulders and the forearms and that the appellants not only caused injuries to the deceased at the place \vhere they ·met hi111 but they also chase(l him when he tPied to run away to save him~elf and continued to assault him with the deadly wearons till he was dead. The conduct of the appellants, the ferocity of the attack, the weapons used, the situs of the injuries and their nature together \vith the fact that there was preconcert established that the common intention of the appellants was to murder the deceased. CRIMINAL APPELLA1'E JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 120 & 121 of 1955. ' , ' r ' ' _r_ ## ' .S.O;R. SUPltEME COURT ):tEPORTS 497 - Appeals from the judgment and order dated Decem-· _x95S_ her 16, 1954, of the Mysore High Court at Bang~l?re _B._ _N._ _Srikantiah_ 'in Criminal Appeals Nos. 49 and 50 of 1953 arrsmg _""othm_ out of the judgment and order dated May 19, 1953, of v. thlfCourt of the Third Additional Sessions Judge at _The_ _Stale_ _of_ ']3angalore in Bangalore Sessions Case No. 7 of 1953. _Mysore_ - _V._ _Krishnamurthy_ and _R._ _Gopalakrishnan,_ for the a,pj)ellants. : _G._ _Channappa, Assistant Allvocate-General for the_ _#tate of My-sore_ and _T._ _111._ _Sen,_ for the respondent. ; 1958. April 14. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by : KAPUR J.-'l'hese two appeals under Art. 134(l)(c) _Kapur_ _J._ of the Constitution arise out of the judgment and prder of the High Court of Mysore at Bangalore confirming the convictions and sentences pass13d upon the appellants who were aecused Nos. ' 2, :3 <tnd 4 respectively by the Third Additional District Judge, Bangalore. Accused Nos. 1, 5 and 6 who have been aec1uitted and the appellants were charged as follows: . **"l ........** +•···~···.11erebj.r **cl1arge** **J1ou** A~l **Sanjeeva** ., Rao, A-2 Srikantiah, A-3 8idda, A-4 Kidaripat.bi, A-5 .fianumantha and A-6 Pujari Anantha as follows: · . I. That you on or about tJrn 25th day of Augnst 1952 at Mayasandra in Magadi Taluk were members , ·Of an unlawful assembly the common object of whieh \'\'as to murder ·deceased Anne Gowda and therebv committed an offence punishable under section 143.0'f the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizanee of the Court of Sessions. 2. That you A-2 Srikantiah, A-3 Sidda, A-4 Kadaripathi, A-5 l:fanumantha and A-6 Pujari Anantha, on or about the 25th day of August 19,52 at Mayasandra in Magadi Taluk did commit murder by intentionally causing the death of Anne Gowda and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 302 • of · the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Sessions. 3. And that you A-1 Sanjeeva Rao on or about 498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] I ~ _r_ ' ## . _B._ _N._ _Srikantiah_ & _Others_ v. _The State_ _of_ _J\Iysore_ _Kapur_ _]._ the 25th day of August 1952 atMayasandra in Magadi Taluk abetted the commission of the offence of murder by A-2 to A-6 which was committed in consequence of your abetment and thereby committed an offence punishable unier sections 109 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Sessions.'' Thus all of them were charged with being members of an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was to murder the deceased, Anne Gowda. The appellants along with Hanumantha accused No. 5 and Pujari accused l'\ o. 6 were further charged with committing murder of Anne Gowda by intentionally causing his death .. No doubt the charge does not contain the words " in furtherance of the common intention of all" but short of that the charge is as •near them as it could be. Accused _No._ 1 Sanjeeva Rao was further ch~trged with abetting the offence of murder. The trial Court acquitted all the accused of the charge under s. 143 Indian Penal Code and accused Nos. 5 & 6 of the charge under s. 302 but he convicted accused Xo. 1 under s. 302/109 and the appellants under s. 302 and sentenced them all to transportation for life. They took an appeal to the High Court and the State appealed against the order of acquittal of accused Nos. _5_ & 6 and the order of acquittal under s. 143. The High Court acquitted accused No. 1 Sanjecva Itao of abetment of murder after the matter. was referred to a third fudge under s. 429 of the Criminal Procedure Code as there was a difference of op"inion between the two judges of the Division Bench hearing the appeal and thus the case of abetment set up by the prosecution failed. It upheld the acquittal of accused Nos. 5 and 6. The charge of unlawful assembly of wiiich the common object was the murder of Anne Gowda the deceased also failed because of the acquittal of Sanjeeva Itao accused l'\o. 1 Hanumantha accused No. _5_ and Pujari accused No. 6 thus leaving only the appellants. Their conviction for an off;ence under s. 302, Indian Penal Code and the sentence of transportation was upheld. The trial Court's finding against them wii.s _as follows; s.o.n. ffOPR:l!~ME CO.UR~ REPORTS 499 "So far as A-2 Srikantiah, A-3 Sidda and A-4 ,Kadaripathi alias Kunta are concerned, tJiere is ample evidence to show that they alone inflicted injuries on the deceased Anne Gowda and caused his death. Thus a prima facie case has been made out against them for the murder of Anne Gowda". The High Court in appeal said: "The evidence on the whole is consistent and in fact it is so consistent that it was being urged on behalf of the accused that each witness was repeating what the other says. Some of the important witnesses have been mentioned in the First Information Report and the inquest itself was over within 24 hours after fhe incident. Taking the consistent evidence of the witnesses and the probabilities of the case it has to be stated that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as regards the incident has to be believed ". The High Court in appeal said: _B._ _N._ _Srikantiah_ & _Others_ v. _The State_ _of_ _Mysore_ _Hapur_ _]._ \ We have not had the advantage of a critical and analytical examination of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses by either of the courts below nor has the ()Vidence against each of the appellants been collated and therefore it was necessary for us to examine the evidence in some detail. ' The evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution shows that the deceased Anne Gowda and the party of Sanjeeva Rao accused No. **1** had conside1:'.able amount of enmity between each other. On the date of the occurrence, i. e., August 25, 1952, the deceasel'l had gone to Ramanagram where in a Magistrate's Court a case had been brought against him by accused No. **1.** After the case was over the deceased and P. W. l8 Gangabyriah who was a co-accused in the case and Putta P. _,V._ 20 who was a witness travelled by the bus which reached a place called Kudur at about 7 p.m. From Kudur the deceased accompanieq by his two companions and also P.vV. **17** Thimmappa and P.W. **19** Puttarangiah and P.,V. 21 Basavalingappa who ha.d gone for shopping to the shop of P.,V. **11** Subba **B11io,** started for their village Yollapore. When they reacl'!.ed the bund of the tank of Mayasandra, accused Nos. **1** and 5 and the appellants came from the opposite side. Accused No. **1** flashed his torch on to the I _B._ 1V. _Sriha11tiah_ & _Others_ v. _The_ _S'fate_ _of_ _Mysore_ _Kafntr_ _]._ 500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] deceased and his companions. Thereupon appellant No. 1 who is.the brother ofSaujee,·a Rao accused No. l gave a blow with his chopper which cut into two the torch which at the time was in the hand of P.W. 18 Gangahyriah and on the instigation of accused No. 1 to kill the deceased the appellants started their attack on him. Appellant No.:~ Sidda gave a blow from be. hind on the right side of the neck of the deceased with his chopper and accused No. 4 Kadaripathi aimed a blow on his head but to ward off the blow the deceased raised his hand and the blow fell on his hand. The deceased then ran towards the tank chasecl by the accused Nos. 1 m1d 5 and the appellants. Ho fell into a shallow water pit. Accused Nos. 5 and _6_ who were empty handed arc stated to have caught hold of him and the appellahts gave five or,;ix blows to the dcceaserl with choppern. Accused :\os. 5 and o•thon released him but the appellants continued the assn,ult with thei!' choppers aud caused 24 incised injuries. This story is supported by P.W. 17 Thimmappa, P.\V. 18 Gangabyriah, P.W. 19 Puttarangiah and P.W. 20 Putta and lastly P.W. 21 Basavalingappa. The First Information geport which was lodged at about 1 a.m., un August 26, \vas made by P.W. 17 Thimmappa arnl the whole• inciden1' is there set out along with the names of the accused as well as tho witnesses. When the house of Appellant No. 3 8idda was searched a blootlstained chopper ;\I. 0. 11 was produced by him before the Panchayatdars. 8imilarly the house of accused No. 4 [(adaripathi was also searched and tlmt appellant also prodnced a chopper there. As the prosecution has not proved that any of these choppers was stained with human blood it cannot get 1mlCh assistance from this recovery. The medical witness P.W. :l, fonnd as many as 24 injuries. _O{_ these injury No. G was described as follows: " A transverse incised wound in front of the neck 5 [11 ] long 2'!" [11 ] deep, cutting the skin, muscles, arteries, veins above the thyroid cartilege, pharynx and muscles in front of the vertebral column. On the right ### side . the wound . starts 2 [11 ] below . the lobule of the right _(_ #### ' . .. _J,._ ; # . ' ~·injury No. 5 is a fatal injury sufficient to cause death ............ All the other injuries taken as whole may be fatitl ". The prosecution has not proved as 'to who caused injury No. 5 nor has it specified the injuries caused by individual appellants. The question then arises; what is the offence which the appellants are guilty of, if any. Courts below have accepted the testimony of the witnesses which establishes that there 1vas enm.ity between the parties and that on the date of the occurrence the deceased had gone to the Magistrate's Court at Ramanagram for the case 'which had been "brought at the instance of acet.1sed No. 1. The evidence also shows tha,t on that date appellants 3 and 4 were seen. together at Kudur in front of the shop of P.W. 10 at about 6 p.m. When accused No. 3 was asked by Siddappa P.w·. 10 as to wlrnt had brought him there, his reply was that. " he was waiting for so1hebody who was coming by Renu'ka Bns Service". The testimony of P.YV. 11 on this point is that he saw accused Nos. 3 and 4 and another man about 5-30 p.n1. or 6 p.m. in front of his shop. He asked them why they had come. They replied that "they had con1e to see some persons coming by Renulrn Bus" and there -i,;; evidence to show that the deceased and his two companions had come from Ramanagram by this Bus Service at aboat 7 p.m. The evidence _.9f_ prosecution witnesses Nos. 17 to 21 also establishes tha"t when the deceased and his party anived near the bund of the tank the party of the accused came towards them. One of the accused Sanjeeva Rao (accused No. 1) flashed a torch and the others started attacking the deceased with choppers at the instigation of thM accused. Injuries were caused qn the head, the neck and the shoulders or on th_e right and left foreatms which must have been caused when the de .S.C.R . SUPREME COURT REPORTS 501 . ear, runs to the left and ends 2" below and 1 n behind _r958_ the lobule of the left ear ". All the other injuries were incised varying in degree of _B._ _N._ & seriousness. The medical \\ritness's opinion was that v. _B._ _N._ _Srikanlialt'_ & _Others_ v. _The_ _State_ _of_ _**/Vlysore**_ _J<apur_ _J._ ##### .. ceas~d tried to. save himself by raising his arm to prr;>tect his· head.. The common intention of the ~ . ### . _**B. N. Srikantiah**_ ' 502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS tl959J appellants ls clear from the fact that not only \vere they armed with deadly weapons which they used to cause injuries to the deceased at .the place where they first met him and his companions but they also chased him when he tried to run away to save himself and all of them continued assitulting him with these deadly weapons till he was dead. The evidence further shows that all of them took part in the assault. There w'ere 24 injuries on the person of the deceased and of them twenty one were incised. They are either on his head or the neck or the shoulders and on the forearms. All these except perhaps the last are vital parts of the body and anybody who causes injuries with weapons of the kind that the appellants used must be fixed with the intention of causing such bodily injury or injuries as would fall within S• 300 of the Indian Penal Gode. The question has then been raised that there was no charge under s. 34 and therefore the accused cannot be convicted of liability as sharers in an offence by the application of s. 34, i.e., in prosecution of the common intention of all. Now intention is a question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties and whoever caused injury No. 5 or the persons who caused the other injuries on the vital parts of the body could have had no other intention but of causing the death considering the nature and number of injuries and the weapons used. The omission to mention s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code in the charge cannnot affect the case unless prejudice iB shown to have resulted in consequence thereof. The charge was that the appellants and others were membern of an unlawful assembly, the common objeet of which was to murder the deceased. Although there is a difference in common object and common intention, they bQth deal " with combination of persons who become punishable as sharers in an offence", and a charge under s. 149, Indian Penal Code is no impediment to a conviction by the application of s. 34 if the evidence discloses the commission of the offence in furtherance of the common intention of all. In the second charge it was clearly stated that the appellants an4 accused ~os. 5 & 6 committed the &.. _**Others**_ v. _**The**_ _**State**_ _**of**_ _**Mysore**_ _**Kapur**_ _]._ _(_ 'r **S.C.R.** **SUPREME** **COURT** **REPORTS** 503 murder by intentionally causing the death of the deceased. No doubt it would have been better if in the charge s. 34 had been specified. But the mere omission to specify it cannot in the circumstances of this case have . any effect as no prejudice has been alleged or shown. As a matter of fact this question was never agitated in either of the Courts below. This Court in _Willie (Wil-_ _liam) Slaney_ v. _The State of Madhya Pradesh_ ( [1] ) has laid down the law in regard to tpe effect of a defect in a charge. In that case the charge was under s. 302, read with s. 34 and the conviction was under s. 302, -Indian Penal Code. It was there pointed out that procedural laws are designed to subserve the ends of justice and not to frustrate them and if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code but some irregularity occurs in the course of such conduct the irregularity is curable under s. 537, Criminal Procedure Code. See: _Pulukuri Kotayya_ v. _King Emperor_ (2). As was pointed by Viscount Sumner in _Atta Mohammad_ v. _King Emperor_ (3): _B._ _N._ _Srikantiah_ & _Others_ v. _The_ _St11te_ _of·_ _Mysore_ _J(apur_ _J._ "In the complet"e absence of any stibstantial. injustice, in the complete absence of anything that outrages what is due to natural justice in criminal cases, their Lordships find it impossible to advise His Majesty to interfere. " The object of a charge is to warn the accused person ' of the case he is to answer. It cannot be treated as if . it was a part of a ceremonial. Bose J. observed in - _William Slaney's_ _case_ ( [1] ) with reference to ss. 232 **(I)** and 535 of the Criminal Procedure Code where the words used are "by the absence of a charge" in s. 232(1) and " no charge was framed " in s. 535 : " We see no reason for straining at the 111eaning of these plain and emphatic provisions unless ritual and form are to be regarded as of the essence in crimi. nal trials. We are unable to find any ma~ic or charm in the ritual of a charge. It is the substance of these provisions that count and not their outward form. To hold otherwise is only to provide avenues of escape for the guilty and afford no protection to the innocent." (1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. rr40, rr65. (2) (1946) L.R. 74 I.A. 65, _75._ (3) (1929) L.R. _57_ I.A. 71, 76. 504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] _**B.**_ iV. _**S1·ikanfi(i/i**_ The imperfection iri the charge is curable provided no prejudice has been shown to have resulted because of it. The ·appellants had notice that they were being tried as " sharers in the offence" aiid their liability was collective and vicarious and not individual. No doubt they were charged under s. 149 of the Indian Penal & _**Others**_ v. _**1"/ic**_ _**State**_ _**of**_ _Mysore_ .• ' \ #### . _**1-i.apur**_ _**J.**_ Code with being members of an unlawful assembly the common object of which was murder of the decea"ed but they were also charged that they with accused Nos. 5 & 6 had committed murder b~· intentionally causing the death of the deceased. The prosecution led evidence to show that at least two of the appellants were waiting for the arrival of the evening .Bus by which the deceased and his companions \Yere travelling and that the appellants and others met them at the bund and there was a concerted attack by th"m followed by a chase and assault with choppers by all the appellants resulting in death because of 24 injuries of a serious nature given by the appellants collectively. Of these injury No. 5 individually and others cumulatively were stzfficient in the ordi1hry course of nature to cause death. Section 34 is only a ru lc of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. It means, that if two or more persons intentionally do .a thing jointly it is jnst the sannc as if each of them had done individually. As the Privy Council have pointed out in _Ba·rendra_ _Kumar Ghosh_ _v. ]( ing Ernperor_ (1 ), " Sect. 34 deals with the doing of separate acts, similiar or diverse, by several persons, if all are done in further- ance of a common intention, P.ach person is liable for the result of them all, as if he had done them himself.. ....... " The appellants' ddence was a total denial of taking part in the offence. When examined under s. 342 of the Criminal Proced.nre Code tlwy· stated that the prosecntion case was false. They did not state anything indicative of prejudice having resulted as a consequence of a defoct in the charge. To every question put to them, theil; reply was that the prosecution evidence was false. One such question and the answer to it was: Q. "The witnesses have deposed that at about '(1) (192t) L.R. _32_ I. A. +o, 5r. \ . ·•. ~ ·8-30 on the night of 25th August, 1952, you along with the accused persons 1, 3, 4 and 5 came upon the tank bund holding a _matchu_ in the hand in order to hit Amie Gowda. V/hat do you' say regarding this matter ? _A._ This is absolutely false." In answer to another question as to whether he had assaulted the deceased with a chopper, appellant No. 1 stated that he never saw the deceased on that date and the evidence was false and the other two appellants just stated that the evidence for the prosecution was false. The form of the questions indi-· cates notice to the appella11ts that the prosecution,.,.·as relying on collective responsibility and their having acted with a comll1on int.ention. They did not plead prejudice due, to the 1-vant of s. 34 in the charge itself. The" judgment of the High Court does not indicate that any such objection was taken before it. The grounds of appeal taken in the High Court are not before us, but their applica.tion under Art. 134 (l)(c) m;:i,de to the High Court shows that objection .was taken as to the failure to specify s. 34 in the following words : S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS _505_ _B._ _N._ _Srikantiah_ & _Others_ v. _The State_ _of_ _Mysore_ _Kapur]._ " There is no charge framed in the case against accused 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6 for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It was, therefC1re, not a case in which accused 2, 3, 4 alone. could be convicted of the charge under Section 302 by resorting to the rule of common intention under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for two reasons, viz., _ (a) There is no charge under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code; (b) If it is implied, accused 5 and 6 are out of the grove and there is no evidence of any pijor conspiracy conducive to that requisite inference. .Further it will be seen from the evidence of the eve-witnesses it is not possible to predicate which blo; c11used by which instrument, by which accused resulted iJ1 death. Thocefore it is a case which accused 2, 3 and 4 are charged on individual responsibility alone for having caused murder punishable under Section 3021 India;n ### . . 506 SUPREME COURT IiEPORTS [1959] ' Penal Code individually. Neither the trial Court nor _B_ . _bl._ _Srikantiah_ it .is submitted the High Court has considered this & _othe..s_ aspect of the matter and has considered the individual v. responsibility of accused 2, 3 and 4 for their indivi_The_ _State_ _of_ **.clual** **acts"** .1.~f _ysore_ .. _(_ \ #### . _J{djntr_ _]._ \ and in their grounds of appeal filed in this Court the language is the same. Nowhere has it been alleged that as a result of omission to specify s. 34 in tile charge there was any prejudice and nothing is disclosed whether by the trend of cross-examination or by anything on the record to show that the appellants were misled by this omission in the charge. No case ' of prejudice has been alleged or established and there are no facts on the consideration of which the conclusion could be reached that the conviction under s. 302 is vitiated as a result of prejudice., This Court in _Rawalpenta Venkulu_ v. _'l'he State_ _of_ _Hyderabad_ (i), held that the omission to add s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code in a charge had only an academic significance where the accused had notice as to what they were being charged with. That was a case where in pursuance of a conspiracy to commit murder the accused after locking tho room in which the deceased was sleeping set fire to it and thus caused his death. The charge against the accused persons was onlv under s. 302 withouts. 34. On the evidence tho int~ntion to kill was held proved as each one of the appellants had actively contributed to setting fire to the room by putting lighted matches to it while the deceased had been trapped in it and " each one of thmn therefore severally and in pursuance of the common intention brought ·about the same result by his own act." In the trial Court the Sessions Judge had explained the charge as follows: " You am charged of the offence that you with the assistance of the other present accused with common intention .............................. " :P'rom this the Court came to the conclusion that the accused had clear notice that they were being charged with the offence of committing murder in pursultnce of their common intention and, therefore, the omission _r958_ _B._ _N._ _Srikantiah_ & _Others_ v. _The_ _State_ _of_ _Mysore_ _Kapur_ _]._ S.C.R. SUPR~ME COURT R~PORTS 507 of s. 34 in the charge had· only academic significance and had in no way misled the accused. Thus the accent was on whether the accused were misled -or not or any prejudice resulted froin the omission in the charge and on the facts and circumstances of that case this Court was of the opinion that they were not and there was no prejudice. - _Ohikkarange Gowda_ v. _State of Mysore_ ( [1] ), was relied upon by the appellants' counsel. In that case the accused persons were charged as follows : " That you on or about the 18th day of April, 1951, at Talkad were member of an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object or intention or such as you know to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object or intention, namely; in killiJJ.g Putte Gowda, caused the death o'f Putte Gowda a.nd Nanje Gowda, and you are thereby under s. 149 read with s. 34 Penal Code, guilty of causing the said murders, an offence punishable under s. 302, Penal Code and within the cognizance of the Court of Sessions." The Sessions Judge found that .the common object of the unlawful assembly or the intention of the accused was not merely to assault Putte Gowda but also to kill him. The High Court on appeal held that there was no evidence to prove or establish any plan for concerted action or any common object to kill that individual. But it was of the opinion that the people of the' locality were annoyed with Putte Gowda and the common object of the assembly as a ·whole wa~ to give severe and open chastisement only. The person who W'as stated to have given the fatal injury to Putte Gowcl.a was acquitted by the High Court on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the other two accused were held guilty for severely assaulting•the deceased and guilty of murder. In this Court it was contended that on the findings given by the High Court in regard to the common object of the unlawful assembly, the conviction under s. 302/34 or s. 149 was unsustainable and that the_manner in which the charges under s. 149 and 34 were mixed up·it could not be said that the (r) A.LR. 1956 S.C. 73r. _**B.**_ _**N.**_ _**Srihantiah**_ 508 SUPREME CO-UR'!' REPORTS [1959] accused had a reasonable opportunity of meeting the charges against them. This Court observed that "on the finding of the High Court none of the mem. hers of the unlawful assemblv had the intention of killing Putte Gowda." It also held tlmt the way in which the charge was framed gave the aecused no effective notice of the case they had to meet. In theSf e ircumstances the case of separate common intentfon of three persons was distinct from the common ouject of the other members of the unlawful assembly and, therefore, the question was not whether the specific charge under s. 34 was or was not necessary but whether a reasonable opportunity of meeting the case of some of the accused having '' separate common intention different from that of others of the unlawful assembly, was given and as the finding was tbat it had not been given the conviction of the two accuser! for offence under s. 302/34 was nnsustai1rnble. That case has not laid down a rule different from _Willie_ _(William) Slaney's case(')._ It merely emphasises that in the case of imperfection of a charge if prejudice is shown a conviction of an accused would be insupportable. In the present case the common intention of the appellants is indicated by their conduct, the ferocity of the attack, the weapon used, the situs of the injuries and their nature and there was preconcert as shown by the evidence of P. vVs. 10 and 11. They have therefore been rightly convicted of murder as " sharers in the offenee ". We would, therefore, dismiss these appeals. _Appeals dismissed ._ . '') [ r955J _z_ S.C.l\. Il40, uG5. _**<§.Others**_ v. _**The Stale**_ _of_ _**lllysore**_ _**Kapur**_ _]._ t •