A.V. Mohammadali v. Mathew Lawrence

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT:** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.N.RAVINDRAN** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. NARAYANA PISHARADI** **FRIDAY, THE 13TH DAY OF APRIL 2018 / 23RD CHAITHRA, 1940** **RFA.No. 78 of 2014 (AGAINST THE DECREE AND JUDGMENT IN OS 190/2010 OF PRINCIPAL SUB COURT, KOCHI DATED, 30-11-2013)** ## **APPELLANT/SOLE DEFENDANT:** **A.V. MOHAMMADALI, S/O.HAMSA, AGED 45 YEARS, AMBALATH VEETTIL HOUSE, ANGADI P.O, ANGADI AMSOM, OTTAPALAM, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.** **BY ADVS.SRI.JOHNSON MANAYANI SRI.JEEVAN MATHEW MANAYANI** ## **RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF:** **MATHEW LAWRENCE, AGED 40 YEARS, S/O.M.D LAWRENCE, UTHALAMOOTTIL HOUSE, UNIVERSITY ROAD, PALAYAM,TRIVANDRUM AT PRESENT RESIDING AT UTHALAMOOTIL HOUSE, OPPOSITE NAVAL MUSEUM, K.J HARSHAD ROAD, KOCHI-682 001.** **BY ADVS. SRI.C.R.SYAMKUMAR SRI.SOORAJ T.ELENJICKAL SMT.MARY RESHMA GEORGE SRI.K.ARJUN VENUGOPAL SMT.V.A.HARITHA SMT.SANDHYA R.NAIR SMT.P.M.MAZNA MANSOOR** **THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 12-03-2018, THE COURT ON 13.04.2018 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** ss **P.N. Ravindran & R.Narayana Pisharadi, JJ. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - R.F.A. No.78 of 2014 - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 13[th] day of April, 2018** ## **JUDGMENT** ## **R.Narayana Pisharadi,J** The appellant is the sole defendant in the suit O.S.No.190 of 2010 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Kochi. He has challenged the decree passed against him in that suit directing him to execute a sale deed in respect of the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff. 2. The suit is instituted for granting a decree for specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement allegedly executed by the plaintiff and the defendant for sale of the plaint schedule property by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The case of the respondent /plaintiff in the suit can be briefly stated as follows: On the basis of the agreement dated 11.9.2006, the defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff. At the time of the agreement with the plaintiff, the defendant had only agreed to purchase the plaint schedule property from its then owners. After the _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 2 agreement with the plaintiff, the defendant purchased the property in his name. The plaintiff paid Rs.50,000/- as advance towards sale consideration at the time of execution of the agreement between him and the defendant. The total sale consideration fixed as per the agreement was Rs.1,60,00,000/-. Subsequently, the plaintiff periodically paid amounts to the defendant towards sale consideration. He thus paid a total amount of Rs.55,00,000/- to the defendant extending the period of agreement from time to time. The period of the agreement was extended upto 31.3.2010 by the defendant by making endorsements on the agreement. But, the defendant never got ready to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff then sent a lawyer notice to the defendant demanding execution of a sale deed in respect of the plaint schedule property after receiving the balance consideration. The defendant did not send any reply to the lawyer notice. The plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the money required for the transaction was always ready with him. The plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 11.09.2006. 3. The defendant filed a written statement in the suit raising the following contentions. The plaint schedule property was purchased by _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 3 the defendant as per the assignment deed dated 16.9.2006. The plaintiff had purchased three motor vehicles from the defendant and he owed substantial amount to the defendant in that transaction. When the defendant entered into an agreement for purchasing the plaint schedule property from its owners, the plaintiff, who is a real estate broker, expressed his desire to purchase the property on the condition that the defendant shall evict the tenants from the building in the property. The plaintiff assured the defendant that he would pay the full sale consideration within six months from the date of execution of the agreement for sale. The defendant agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff for a consideration of 1.60 crores rupees. He purchased the requisite stamp paper on 21.4.2006 and entrusted it with the plaintiff for engrossing the agreement for sale. Accordingly, the plaintiff brought an agreement for sale and obtained the signature of the defendant in it. The plaintiff paid Rs.5,00,000/- as advance towards sale consideration. The defendant is illiterate in English. He had got the agreement read over to him and translated by the plaintiff before he put his signature in it. Subsequently, the plaintiff informed the defendant that he incurred heavy loss in the real estate business and that he would not be able to purchase the property by paying the _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 4 balance sale consideration and that he had no objection to the defendant selling the property to any other person. The defendant had already agreed to purchase another property utilising the consideration expected to be paid by the plaintiff. Therefore, he pressed the plaintiff for completing the sale transaction and to save him from incurring heavy loss. He insisted that the plaintiff should settle all accounts and pay him the amount of Rs.30,00,000/- due to him in the transaction relating to the sale of motor vehicles and then he would agree for recission of the contract. Accordingly, the plaintiff issued four cheques for Rs.7,50,000/- each to the defendant. The defendant then handed over the original agreement for sale to the plaintiff on 10.7.2006. The defendant presented the cheques in the bank. Two cheques issued by the plaintiff were encashed but the other two cheques issued by him were dishonoured. The plaintiff then requested the defendant to wait for payment of the amount of Rs.15,00,000/- (the amount covered by the two dishonoured cheques) till his financial condition improved. In the month of February, 2010 the plaintiff told the defendant that he was ready to purchase the property by paying the balance sale consideration of one crore and fifty five lakhs rupees. The defendant was then not ready to sell the property. A wordy altercation took place _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 5 between them. Thereafter, the plaintiff fabricated an agreement using another stamp paper and forged endorsements on the back page of the stamp paper to the effect that he paid the defendant Rs.30,00,000/- on 11.9.2006 and Rs.20,00,000/- on 12.12.2006 and he forged the signature of the defendant below such endorsements. The defendant has not received any amount from the plaintiff on the aforesaid dates. The plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief in the suit on the basis of the forged document. 4. The trial court framed necessary issues in the suit. During the trial of the suit, the plaintiff was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A7 documents were marked on his side. DW1 and DW2 were examined and Exts.B1 to B5 documents were marked on the side of the defendant. After appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court found that the plaintiff and the defendant had entered into Ext.A1 agreement for sale of the property, that it is not a forged document, that the plaintiff had paid Rs.55,00,000/- to the defendant as advance towards sale consideration, that the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that he is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement. Accordingly, the trial court passed a decree against the _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 6 defendant for specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement directing him to execute a sale deed in respect of the property in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the decree passed against him, the defendant has come up in appeal. 5. We have heard Advocate Sri.Johnson Manayani, learned counsel for the appellant and Advocate Sri.C.R.Shyamkumar, learned counsel for the respondent. We have also perused the records. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Ext.A1 agreement is a document forged by the plaintiff and that he is not entitled to get any relief on the basis of that document. Learned counsel reiterated the contentions raised by the defendant in the written statement. _Per contra_ , learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Ext.A1 agreement is a genuine document and that the defendant has received Rs.55,00,000/- from the plaintiff as advance towards sale consideration and that the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement by the defendant. 7. Ext.A1 is the agreement for sale of the plaint schedule property alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff and the _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 7 defendant. The date of this agreement is seen typed as 21.4.2006. But, this date is seen struck off and substituted by writing the date 11.9.2006. 8. There is no averment in the plaint that the agreement was got typed on a stamp paper with the date 21.4.2006 and that the date was subsequently corrected as 11.9.2006. The plaint also does not contain any averment as to the circumstances under which the date of the agreement, which was originally typed as 21.4.2006, was corrected as 11.9.2006. 9. The plaintiff was examined as PW1. He has stated in the affidavit filed in lieu of examination - in - chief that the agreement for sale of the property was prepared on 21.4.2006. He has further stated that on 10.4.2006, he had given a cheque for Rs.5,00,000/- to the defendant as advance towards sale consideration and that the defendant encashed the cheque on 22.4.2006. PW1 has stated that the defendant came only on 11.09.2006 to sign the agreement. He has stated that on 31.5.2006 he deposited Rs.5,00,000/- in the account of the defendant. He would further state that two cheques for Rs.7,50,000/- each, which he had given to the defendant in the month of July, 2006 were dishonoured and therefore, he immediately gave _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 8 Rs.15,00,000/- to the defendant. PW1 has also stated that again he gave Rs.10,00,000/- to the defendant and the agreement was signed on 11.9.2006 and then, the date typed as 21.04.2006 in the agreement was struck off and corrected as 11.09.2006. 10. The evidence of PW1 regarding the circumstances under which the date of Ext.A1 agreement was corrected as 11.9.2006 cannot be believed. His evidence in that regard has no basis in the pleadings in the plaint. The plaint does not contain any averment as to the circumstances under which the date of the agreement was originally typed as 21.4.2006 and subsequently corrected as 11.09.2006. 11. Order VI Rule 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 states the basic and cardinal rule of pleadings. It declares that the pleading shall contain the material facts and not the evidence. It mandates that every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. 12. Pleadings and particulars are necessary to enable the court _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 9 to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Pleadings are more helpful to the court in narrowing down the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned about the question in issue so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence in the suit. The purpose of pleadings and issues is to ascertain the real dispute between the parties and to narrow the area of conflict between them. 13. It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond his pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. ## 14. In **Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College : AIR 1987 SC 1242** , the Supreme Court has held as follows: _“It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party_ _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 10 _should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that inspite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal”._ ## 15. In **Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul: AIR 1966 SC** ## **735** , the Constitution Bench has held as follows: _"If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere_ _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 11 _fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is : did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence,would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another."_ ## 16. In **Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs Assistant Charity** ## **Commissioner: A.I.R 2004 SC 1801,** it has been held as follows: _“There cannot be any compartmentalization, dissection,_ _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 12 _segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities”._ 17. In the instant case, even if the pleadings in the plaint are construed as a whole, it cannot found that the plaintiff has put forward a case that the agreement for sale of the property was prepared on 21.04.2006 and that he paid Rs.30,00,000/- to the defendant before the date 11.09.2006 and that the date of the agreement was corrected as 11.09.2006 and it was on that date the agreement was executed by the parties. The averment in the plaint is that the plaintiff paid Rs.5,00,000/- as advance towards sale consideration at the time _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 13 of the agreement. The plaintiff has got no plea that he paid Rs.30,00,000/- towards sale consideration before the date 11.9.2006. His plea is only that he paid a total amount of Rs.55,00,000/- to the defendant towards sale consideration. When the plaintiff produced along with the plaint, an agreement for sale of property which contained corrections with regard to the date of the agreement, it was incumbent upon him to plead the circumstances under which such corrections were made in the agreement. 18. Moreover, the endorsement on Ext.A1 agreement is that the defendant received an amount of Rs.30,00,000/- from the plaintiff on 11.9.2006. There is neither plea nor proof that the plaintiff paid Rs.30,00,000/- to the defendant on 11.9.2006. 19. However, the unreliability of the evidence of the plaintiff regarding the circumstances under which the date in Ext.A1 agreement was corrected as 11.09.2006 does not lead to the conclusion that the defendant did not execute it. The defendant has admitted in the written statement that he executed an agreement on 21.4.2006 for sale of the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff. DW2 was the manager of the defendant. He is a witness to the execution of Ext.A1 agreement. He has given evidence that Ext.A1 is the agreement _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 14 executed by the plaintiff and the defendant. DW2 has also stated that when he signed Ext.A1 agreement as a witness, there was no correction as seen in the first page of that document. The defendant was examined as DW1. In examination - in - chief he has stated that Ext.A1 is a document forged by the plaintiff with the assistance of K.L. George (DW2). But, K.L. George (DW2), his own witness, has given evidence that Ext.A1 is the agreement executed by the plaintiff and the defendant though there was no correction in the first page of that document when he signed it as a witness. DW2 was not treated as a hostile witness by the defendant. When a witness examined by a party has given evidence against that party and when the witness is not cross examined by the party with the leave of the court, the evidence given by such witness binds the party. The opposite party can take advantage of the evidence given by such a witness. 20. Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act states that the Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross - examination by the adverse party. A plain reading of the section makes it clear that it does not make any distinction between civil and criminal cases. It only vests discretion in the Court to permit the person, who calls a witness, to put _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 15 any question which can be put in cross - examination by the adverse party. Such a request can be made in civil as well as in criminal cases. If statements are made contrary to the interest of the party producing the witness in examination-in-chief itself then the witness has to be declared hostile in the common parlance. Such a contingency is contemplated under Section 154 of the Evidence Act.The law of evidence is not different for criminal or civil cases (See Bimla Devi v. Rambhajan Mahto : AIR 2006 Patna 168). After taking oath, a witness is bound to give true and correct answers to the questions put to him. When the party who summons the witness finds that the witness is not giving a true version, then the need for cross examination of the witness by that party would arise. Once that contingency arises, it is for him to make a request to the Court for necessary permission as contemplated under Section 154 of the Evidence Act. This procedure is not confined to criminal cases but applicable to civil cases also (See Thankamani v. Prabhakaran : 2001 (1) KLT 776). 21. In this connection it is to be noted that the plea of the defendant in the written statement is that in the year 2010 the plaintiff forged another agreement and that it is the agreement produced by the plaintiff. Ext.A1 agreement is prepared on a stamp paper _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 16 purchased on 21.04.2006 in the name of the plaintiff. Therefore, it is highly probable that it is the same agreement which was signed by the defendant on 21.04.2006. It is highly improbable that the plaintiff has fabricated an agreement in the year 2010 by using a stamp paper purchased by him on 21.04.2006. It is highly improbable that the plaintiff purchased a stamp paper on 21.04.2006 and that he kept it till the year 2010 and then he fabricated an agreement using it. This is a circumstance which gives credibility to the evidence of DW2 that Ext.A1 is the agreement executed by the plaintiff and the defendant. 22. On appreciation of the evidence of PW1, DW1 and DW2 in the light of the pleadings of the parties, the conclusion possible is that Ext.A1 agreement was executed by the plaintiff and the defendant on 21.4.2006. 23. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the plaintiff paid Rs.5,00,000/- to the defendant as advance towards sale consideration at the time of execution of the agreement. There is also no dispute with regard to the fact that, after the date 21.4.2006, the plaintiff had issued four cheques for Rs.7,50,000/- each to the defendant. The plea of the defendant is that two cheques out of the _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 17 aforesaid four cheques were encashed and the other two cheques were dishonoured. In other words, the defendant has admitted the fact that he had received a further amount of Rs.15,00,000/- from the plaintiff after the date 21.4.2006. 24. Admittedly, two cheques for Rs.7,50,000/- each issued by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant were dishonoured. However, PW1 has given evidence in examination-in-chief that he gave Rs.15,00,000/- to the defendant on dishonour of the aforesaid cheques. His evidence in that regard in examination – in - chief has not been successfully challenged in the cross examination by the defendant. 25. PW1 has also given evidence in examination-in-chief that on 13.9.2006 and on 15.9.2006, he paid Rs.5,00,000/- each to the defendant by cheque. He has also stated that he gave Rs.10,00,000/to the defendant on 12.12.2006 in cash. His evidence in this regard also has not been successfully challenged in the cross examination by the defendant. 26. Moreover, when examined as DW1, the defendant has not denied receipt of a total amount of Rs.55,00,000/- from the plaintiff. The evidence of the plaintiff regarding payment of Rs.55,00,000/- to _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 18 the defendant cannot be disbelieved for want of pleadings in that regard. The plaint contains an averment that the plaintiff paid a total amount of Rs.55,00,000/- to the defendant towards sale consideration. Absence of pleading is only with regard to the dates on which the amounts were paid. Though the defendant has got a plea that the plaintiff owed him substantial amounts in a transaction relating to sale of three motor vehicles and that the amount paid by the plaintiff was in discharge of that liability, there is absolutely no evidence to substantiate this plea. 27. Strictly speaking, the plaintiff has not proved the endorsements allegedly made by the defendant on the obverse of the first page of Ext.A1 agreement regarding receipt of money. The plaintiff has not given any evidence that the defendant has signed below the endorsements on Ext.A1 agreement. He has not given any evidence that the defendant signed below the endorsements in his presence or that he saw the defendant affixing his signature below the endorsements. However, the evidence of the plaintiff regarding payment of Rs.55,00,000/- to the defendant remains unchallenged by the defendant. As noticed earlier, when examined as DW1, the defendant has not disputed receipt of the amount of Rs.55,00,000/- _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 19 from the plaintiff. It is also to be noted that the defendant did not send any reply to Ext.A5 lawyer notice sent to him by the plaintiff which contained a recital that he had paid the defendant Rs.55,00,000/towards sale consideration. From these circumstances, it has been proved that the defendant had received Rs.55,00,000/- from the plaintiff towards sale consideration. 28. The question now arises whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals with discretion as to decreeing specific performance. Section 20 (1) of the Act provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is a discretion of the court and it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The court would take into consideration circumstances of each case, conduct of the parties and recitals in the sale agreement. Even circumstances outside the contract have to be _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 20 taken into consideration. 29. In the instant case, the period for performance of Ext.A1 agreement was six months from the date of execution of the agreement. The plaintiff instituted the suit for granting a decree for specific performance only on 05.10.2010 on the premise that validity of the period of agreement was extended from time to time till 31.03.2010. The plaintiff has not disclosed the reason for extension of the period of the agreement from time to time for a total period of more than three years. The fact that time for performance of the contract was extended for a long period is to be kept in view while considering the question whether discretion is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff (See Nanjappan v. Ramasamy : (2015) 14 SCC 341). It is also to be noted that the plaintiff did not disclose in the plaint the entire facts and circumstances relating to the execution of Ext.A1 agreement. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, in our view, it is not appropriate to grant the discretionary relief of specific performance to the respondent/plaintiff. As compared to the respondent, the appellant will suffer significant hardship if a decree for specific performance is granted against him. Considering the circumstance of passage of time and the hardship that would be _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ 21 caused to the appellant, we find it inequitable to grant the discretionary relief of specific performance in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. There is no proof of any loss or injury caused to the defendant by the non-performance of Ext.A1 agreement. In such circumstances, it is only proper to grant a decree for refund of the amount of Rs.55,00,000/- received by the defendant from the plaintiff. 30. The plaintiff has claimed interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount paid by him to the defendant. However, the date of payment of certain amounts by the plaintiff is not disclosed either in the plaint or in the evidence given by the plaintiff. Considering this aspect, we find it proper to award interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the last date of payment of money by the plaintiff to the defendant, that is 12.12.2006, till the date of the suit and thereafter, at the rate of 6% per annum till the date of realisation. 31. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The decree for specific performance of Ext.A1 agreement passed by the lower court is set aside. The plaintiff is allowed to realise an amount of Rs.55,00,000/- (Rupees fifty five lakhs only) from the defendant with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date 12.12.2006 till the date of the suit and thereafter, at the rate of 6% per annum till the 22 ## _**R.F.A. No.78 of 2014**_ date of realisation. The plaint schedule property shall be a charge for the decree debt. The parties shall suffer their respective costs in the appeal. _Sd/-_ **(P.N. Ravindran, Judge)** _Sd/-_ **(R.Narayana Pisharadi, Judge)** _//True Copy//_ _P.A.to Judge_ ss