High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed

Atamjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 516 of 2024
Neutral Citation:2024 INSC 84

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Vikram Nath
  • Satish Chandra Sharma
Judgment Date
2024-01-22
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed; Impugned Order set aside; the proceedings emanating from the Underlying Complaint (CC No. 6437 of 2017) are restored to the Trial Court for proceedings, with no order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Atamjit Singh

Respondents

  • State (NCT of Delhi)
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sudeep Sehgal
  • • Sandeep Singh

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Vikramjit Banerjee
  • • Mukesh Kumar Maroria
  • • Bharat Sood
  • • Saransh Kumar
  • • Vishnu Shankar Jain
  • • Shaurya Rai
  • • Madhav Sinhal
  • • Ms. Deeksha Ladi Kakar

Case Synopsis & Summary

Atamjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. is a criminal appeal arising from a cheque under Section 138 NI Act. The appellant contends that the High Court, in CRL.M.C. 556 of 2019, correctly quashed the summons against Respondent No.2 because, as of the date of the summoning order, the underlying debt and liability was time-barred. The underlying facts trace back to 2011 transactions among the appellant, Respondent No.2, and Accused No.2, culminating in a cheque dated 06.03.2017 for Rs. 20,00,000. The High Court concluded that, since no acknowledgment of the debt appeared between 2011 and 2017, the liability could not be enforced, thereby calling into question the validity of the summons. The Supreme Court, however, references Yogesh Jain v. Sumesh Chadha to redefine the scope of interference under 482 CrPC in proceedings under 138 NI Act. It holds that determining whether a debt is time-barred is a mixed question of law and fact that must be decided on evidence, not at the summons stage. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside, and CC No. 6437 of 2017 is restored to the Trial Court for proceedings, with no order as to costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.118Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.139Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Mixed question of law and fact
  • Time-barred debt is a matter of evidence; cannot be adjudicated at the summons stage under Section 482 CrPC

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the High Court correctly quashed the summons because the underlying debt was time-barred as of the date of the summoning order, relying on 2011 transactions and lack of acknowledgment. It also relies on Yogesh Jain v. Sumesh Chadha (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1706-1761 of 2022) to argue that time-bar classification is a matter of evidence and cannot be decided at the summons stage.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contend that the time-bar status is a mixed question of law and fact that requires evidence, and that the High Court correctly quashed the summons. They argue the appeal should allow the proceedings to advance to determine the liability.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Yogesh Jain v. Sumesh ChadhaCrl. Appeal Nos. 1706-1761 of 2022PositiveThe Court agrees with Yogesh Jain that whether a cheque relates to a time-barred debt is a matter of evidence and cannot be adjudicated at the summons stage under 482 CrPC.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1179 : 2024 INSC 84 ## **Atamjit Singh** ## **v.** ## **State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.** (Criminal Appeal no. 516 of 2024) 22 January 2024 **[Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]** ## **Issue for Consideration** Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate summoning Respondent No. 2 in relation to commission of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on the premise that as on the date of the issuance of the summoning order, the underlying debt and/or liability qua Respondent No. 2 was time barred. ## **Headnotes** **Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Scope of interference by the High Court in proceedings u/s.138 of the NI Act qua allegedly time barred debt at the stage of issuance of summons, whilst exercising its jurisdiction u/s.482 CrPC.** **Held:** Classification of the underlying debt or liability as being barred by limitation is a question that must be decided based on the evidence adduced by the parties – Question regarding time barred nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings u/s.138 of the NI Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be decided by the High Court exercising jurisdiction u/s.482 CrPC. [Para 7] ## **Case Law Cited** _Yogesh Jain v. Sumesh Chadha,_ **Crl. Appeal Nos. 1706-1761 of 2022 – relied on.** ## **List of Acts** Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [2024] 1 S.C.R. 1180 ## **Digital Supreme Court Reports** ## **List of Keywords** **Quashing; Summons; Summoning order; Debt; Liability; Time barred; Scope of interference; Limitation; Mixed question of law and fact.** ## **Case Arising From** CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.516 of 2024. From the Judgment and Order dated 06.09.2022 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC No.556 of 2019. ## **Appearances for Parties** Sudeep Sehgal, Sandeep Singh, Advs. for the Appellant. Vikramjit Banerjee, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Bharat Sood, Saransh Kumar, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Shaurya Rai, Madhav Sinhal, Ms. Deeksha Ladi Kakar, Advs. for the Respondents. ## **Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court** ## **ORDER** 1. Leave granted. 2. This is an appeal instituted at the instance of the original complainant of a complaint lodged under _inter alia_ Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the “ **NI Act** ”) (the “ **Underlying Complaint** ”) assailing an order dated 06.09.2022 passed by the High Court of Delhi (the “ **High Court** ”) in CRL. M.C. No. 556 of 2019 whereunder the High Court quashed an order dated 03.08.2017 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate -10, South-East, Saket Court (the “ **Trial Court** ”) summoning Mr. Amrit Sandhu Coaster/Respondent No. 2 in relation to the commission of an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act (the “ **Impugned Order** ”). 3. The High Court by way of the Impugned Order deemed it appropriate to quash the underlying proceedings on the principal premise that as on the date of the issuance of the summoning order, the underlying debt and/or liability qua Respondent No. 2 was time barred. [2024] 1 S.C.R.  1181 ## **Atamjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.** 4. _Prima-facie_ from the materials placed before us, it is revealed that pursuant to various transactions entered into by and between the (i) Appellant; (ii) Respondent No. 2; and (iii) Jasween Sandhu i.e., Accused No. 2 in the Underlying Complaint, allegedly pertaining to year 2011,the Appellant was owed a sum of approximately Rs.20,10,000/(Rupees Twenty Lakh Ten Thousand). Accordingly Respondent No. 2 issued a cheque bearing number 329623 dated 06.03.2017 drawn on Syndicate Bank, Branch West Punjabi Bagh, Central Market, New Delhi-110026 for a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakh) in favour of the appellant (the “ **Subject Cheque** ”). 5. Upon a perusal of the Impugned Judgement, it is disclosed that High Court has relied upon (i) the Assured Returns Agreement dated 16.09.2011; and (ii) other receipts issued by the Appellant to Respondent No. 2, all of which pertain to transaction(s) entered into in the year 2011 to conclude that in the absence of an acknowledgment of any underlying debt between 2011 and the date of issuance of the Subject Cheque i.e., 06.03.2017, the underlying debt could not be held to be legally enforceable debt or liability on account of being barred by limitation. Accordingly, in the aforesaid circumstances, the prosecution of Respondent No. 2 under Section 138 of the NI Act was held to be improper; and accordingly, by way of impugned judgment, the High Court quashed the summoning order issued by the Trial Court; and the Underlying Complaint. 6. At the threshold, it would be apposite to refer to decisions of this Court in _**Yogesh Jain v. Sumesh Chadha**_ , Criminal Appeal Nos. 1760-1761 of 2022 whereunder this Court has opined on the scope of interference by the High Court in proceedings under 138 of the NI Act qua an allegedly time barred debt at the stage of issuance of summons, whilst exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the “ **CrPC** ”). The operative paragraph in _**Yogesh Jain (Supra)**_ has been reproduced as under: - _“8. Once a cheque is issued and upon getting dishonoured a statutory notice is issued, it is for the Accused to dislodge the legal presumption available Under Sections 118 and 139 reply of the N.I. Act._ _**Whether the cheque in question had been issued for a time barred debt or not, itself prima facie, is a matter of evidence and could not have been adjudicated in an application filed by the Accused Under Section 482 of the CrPC.** ”_ [2024] 1 S.C.R. 1182 ## **Digital Supreme Court Reports** 7. From a perusal of legal position enunciated above, it is clear that the classification of the underlying debt or liability as being barred by limitation is a question that must be decided based on the evidence adduced by the parties. We agree with aforesaid opinion. Undoubtedly, the question regarding the time barred nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be decided by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. 8. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the Impugned Order is set aside. The proceedings emanating from the Underlying Complaint i.e., CC No. 6437 of 2017 is restored to the file of the Trial Court. 9. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of. No order as to costs. _Headnotes prepared by:_ Bibhuti Bhushan Bose _Result of the case:_ Appeal allowed.