High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed.

A.P.S.R.T.C. v. M. Pentaiah Chary

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 3988 of 2007
Neutral Citation:2007 (9) S.C.R. 607

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S.B. Sinha
  • Harjit Singh Bedi
Judgment Date
2007-08-30
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • A.P.S.R.T.C. rep. by its Chief Law Officer

Respondents

  • M. Pentaiah Chary

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • A. Vinayagam
  • • S. Udaya Kumar Sagar

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Naveen R. Nath

Case Synopsis & Summary

The appeal concerns compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act following a bus‑hit accident that left M. Pentaiah Chary, a 38-year-old carpenter, permanently disabled and dependent on his family. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 85,000 with 12% interest; the High Court enhanced to Rs. 1,62,800 by applying a multiplier of 15. The appellant, A.P.S.R.T.C., challenged the multiplier, arguing for 12 and relying on Susamma Thomas and related precedents, and invoked Section 163-A, enacted in 1994, which prescribes a structured, final compensation framework for death or permanent disablement. The respondent contends against invoking discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136, citing Deepal Girishbhai Soni and other authorities. The Court recalls that Section 163-A creates a comprehensive scheme and is not interim; it emphasises that compensation under 166 varies with factors such as earning capacity, negligence, and the extent of disability, and that the multiplier is not a fixed rule but may be influenced by interest rates. The Court ultimately declines to exercise Article 136 jurisdiction, upholds the High Court’s order, and dismisses the appeal, with costs, noting that minimum compensation should reflect the sufferings of the victim. The decision rejects a broad re‑opening of quantum and confirms the need for case‑specific assessment within statutory guidelines.

Provisions of Law Cited

Motor Vehicles Act, s.63AMotor Vehicles Act, s.166Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 54 of 1994)Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles ActWorkmen's Compensation Act, 1923, s.2(1)Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Minimum compensation should be determined from the sufferings of the disability
  • Section 163-A provides a comprehensive, structured scheme and is not interim; it is full and final settlement
  • Multiplier and dependency considerations are not absolutes and depend on factors like interest rates and earning capacity
  • Courts should exercise Article 136 discretionary jurisdiction sparingly and in exceptional circumstances
  • Normal rate of interest and its impact on multiplier should be considered in assessing damages

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the correct multiplier should be 12, not 15, citing Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176 and subsequent cases. It argues that Section 163-A creates a structured, final scheme for compensation payable under the Second Schedule and that the Court should not rely on rigid multipliers; the emphasis should be on the victim’s sufferings and the earning capacity lost by permanent disability. It relies on K.G. Poovaiah (2001) 9 SCC 167 and Krishna Bala to show that the multiplier can be adjusted with changing interest rates and other factors. The appellant asserts the High Court’s enlargement of compensation to Rs. 1,62,800 was not justified; the Court should apply the recognised framework without overreaching.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent urges against invoking Article 136 and argues for adherence to recent precedents like Deepal Girishbhai Soni on the scope of discretionary jurisdiction. It contends that 163-A’s scheme is not to be treated as interim relief and C.T. 136 should be exercised only rarely. The respondent maintains that the High Court’s enhanced award should stand as a settled outcome within the statutory framework and that strong circumstances are required to alter multiplier rules.

Cited Precedents (6)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Susamma Thomas (Mrs) and Ors.1994 (2) SCC 176Mentioned OnlyCited in discussion of multiplier and interest but not treated as controlling rule; noted as not laying down absolute law.
Dr. K.G. Poovaiah v. General Manager/ Managing Director Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation2001 (9) SCC 167PositiveCited to illustrate assessment of loss of earning capacity and the impact on compensation.
U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. v. Krishna Bala and Ors.2006 (6) SCC 249PositiveDiscussed the influence of interest rates on the multiplier, supporting a flexible approach.
Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda2004 (5) SCC 385; AIR 2004 SC 2107Mentioned OnlyCited in the context of 136 jurisdiction; not adopted as controlling authority.
Trilok ChandraN/AMentioned OnlyReferenced regarding multiplier discussion; not treated as binding rule.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. CharlieN/AMentioned OnlyCited in relation to multiplier/interest considerations but not as controlling law.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

_(_ _f.-_ A # A.P.S.R.T.C. REP. BY ITS CHIEF LAW OFFICER _v._ M. PENTAIAH CHARY ## AUGUST 30, 2007 (S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.) ;-- ## _Motor Vehicles Act:_ > _ss./63A and 166; Second Schedule-Motor accident-Permanent disability-Assessment of compensation-PersOIJ aged 38 years met wi(h_ C _accident-Became permanently disabled and lost earning capacityCompensation awarded by High Court-Plea for interference by Supreme Court-Held: Minimum compensation payable in a case of this nature should be consideredfrom sufferings of disability undergone by the victim-Case not fit and proper for Supreme Court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under_ D _Art. 136 of the Constitution-Workmen Compensation Act, 1923-s.2(1)Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 136._ ## _s. I 66-Compensation-Determining factors-Laid down._ Respondent, aged 38 years, working as carpenter in a company on a _ E _ monthly salary of Rs.4,500/-, met with an accident with the bus belonging to appellant-Corporation while he was riding on a two-wheeler. He suffered serious multiple injuries on various parts of his body and consequently became permanently disabled and lost his earning capacity. Respondent had six dependants viz. his parents, wife and three children. He filed application under s.166 of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming damages. Tribunal awarded F a sum of Rs.85000/- with interest at the rate of 12% p.a .. On appeal, High Court enhanced the compensation by RS.1,62,800/- after applying a multiplier of 15. In appeal to this Court, it was contended by the appellant-corporation that the correct multiplier applicable in this case is 12 and not 15 as appli~ G by the High Court. ## Dismissing the appeal, the Court H 607 ' ~. ## 608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 9 S.C.R A HELD: 1.1. The accident took place on 26.01.1995. A few months prior thereto, the Parliament inserted Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act by Act 54of1994 with effect from 14.li.1994. The said provision contains a non-obstante clause in terms whereof _inter a/ia_ the owner of the motor vehicle is made liable to pay, in the case of death or permanent disablement, B compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. (Para 911612-D, E) > 1.2. "Total Disablement" has been defined in Section 2(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 to mean "such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work C which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement". {Para 10) (612-E, F) 1.3. Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act evidently stands on a different footing. The extent of compensation payable thereunder may vary from case to case. Various other factors including contributory negligence, earning D capacity, extent of negligence on the part of one vehicle or the other, are relevant factors for computation of damages. Loss of property can also be subject matter of the claim petition. [Para ll) (612-F, G) _General Manager, Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum_ v. _Susamma Thomas (Mrs) and Ors.,_ (1994) 2 SCC 176; _Dr. K.G._ E _Poovaiah_ v. _General Manager/ Managing Director Karnataka State Road Transpprt Corporation,_ [2001) 9 SCC 167'and _U.P. State Road Transport Corpn._ v. _Krishna Bala and Ors.,_ [2006) 6 SCC 249, referred to. 2.1. One fails to visualise that in a case of this nature a claimant can be deprived of a reasonable amount of compensation despite the fact that he has F permanently lost his capacity to earn and remains dependant on others besides physical sufferance of such magnitude. (Para 13) {613-E) . . 2.2. This Court does not, however, intend to lay down a general law. The minimum compensation payable in a case of this nature should be considered G from the sufferings of disability undergone by the victim. This Court is not suggesting that in certain situations, the multiplier specified in the Second Schedule to the Act cannot and should not be altered but therefor there must· exist strong circumstances. [Para 14) (613-F) _Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors._ v. _United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,_ H _Baroda,_ (2004] 5 sec 385, relied on. _f--_ 609 ·- c ## A.P.S.RT.C. _v._ MPENTAIAHCHARY [S.B.SINHA,J.] 3. The present case is not a fit and proper case where discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution should be exercised. (Para 16) [614-B) CIVIL APPE~LATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3988 of2007. > From the final Judgment and Order dated 29.08.2006 of the High Court B of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Appeal Against Order No. 528 of2000 and C.M.A. No. 3350of1999. A. Vinayagam and S.Udaya Kumar Sagar for the Appellant. Naveen R. Nath for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by > S.B. SINHA, J. l. Leave granted. > 2. Whether jn the facts and circumstances of this case multiplier of' 15' D ought to have been applied by the High Court in its impugned judgment falls for consideration in this appeal which arises out of a common judgment and ~rder dated 29.08.2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh in Appeal against Order No. 528 of2000 and C.M.A. No. 3350of1999, ~ _-1-_ 3. Before embarking upon the said question, we may notice the basic E fact of the matter which is not in dispute. Claimant was aged about 38 years on the date of accident which took place on 26.01.1995. He was a carpenter working in a company. His monthly salary was said to be Rs. 4500/-. He had 15 years of experience in woodcrafts. His parents, wife, two daughters and one son were dependant on him. On the night of 25.0l.1995, he was coming F back to his house. When he was riding on a two-wheeler, he met with the accident having been hit by a bus belonging to the appellant -corporation. He was thrown on the road and dragged to a distance of IO to 15 yards. He suffered serious multiple injuries, viz., fracture of left hand (humour); fracture of left eight ribs; rupture of spleen; loss of skin and rupture of left hand; injury to haemolhorex; injury to spinal cord, injury to nerve of contracting to G spleen; blunt injury to left forehead; injury to thoracic lumber; blunt injury to thigh; rupture of left calf muscle, bruises all over the body; closed brain injury with blackouts. He underwent an operation. A steel rod was inserted in his fractured hand. lie became permanently disabled and lost his earning capacity. - H --\ 610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 9 S.C.R. A He filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short "the Act") claiming, a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- as damages. The,Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 85,000/- with interest at 12% p.a. > 4. Respondent preferred an appeal thereagainst. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment granted further compensation to him for a B sum of Rs. l ,62,800/- in addition to the awarded compensation of Rs. 85,000/-. 5. Applicatien of the multiplier in a structural form was provided in the Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Act. Benefit of applying such structural formula was considered by this Court in _General Manager,_ C _Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum_ v. _Susamma Thomas (Mrs) and Ors.,_ [1994) 2 SCC 176] wherein this Court opined: D "14. The considerations generally relevant in the selection of multiplicand and multiplier were adverted to by Lord Diplock in his speech in Mallett's case where the deceased was aged 25 and left behind his widow of about the same age and three minor children. On the question of selection of multiplicand Lord Diplock observed: E F G H "The starting point in any estimate of the amount of the "dependency" is the annual value of the material benefits provided for the dependants out of the earnings of the deceased at the date of his dea~h. But...there are many factors which might have led to variations up or down in the future. His earnings might have increased and with them the amount provided by him for his dependants. They might have diminished with a recession in trade or he might have had spells of unemployment. As his children grew up and became independent the proportion of his earnings spent on his dependants would have been likely to fall. But in considering the effect to be given in the award of damages to possible variations in the dependency there are two factors to be borne in mind. The first is that the more remote in the future is the anticipated change the less confidence there can be in the chance of its occurring and the smaller the allowance to be made for it in the assessment. The second is that as a matter of the arithmetic of the calculation of present value, the later the change takes place the less will be its effect upon the total award of damages. Thus at {titerest rates of 4 1/2 per.cent the present value of an annuity for 20 years of which the first ten years are at Pounds 100 per annum and the second ten years at Pounds 200 per annum, is about 12 years' A.P.S.R. T.C. _v._ MPENTAIAHCHARY [S.B.SINHA,J.] 611 purchase of the arithmetical average annuity of Pounds 150 per annum, . A whereas if the first ten years are at Pounds 200 per annum and the second ten years at Pounds 100 per annum the present issue is about 14 years' purchase of the arithmetical mean of Pounds 150 per annum. If therefore the chances of variations in the "dependency" are to be reflected in the multiplicand of which the years' purchase is the multiplier, variations in the dependency which are not expected to take B place until after ten years should have only a relatively small effect in increasing or diminishing the "dependency" used for the purpose of assessing the damages." 6. Placing strong reliance upon the observations made therein, the C learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant - corporation would submit that the correct multiplier which should have been applied in this case was '12'. Reliance was also placed on _Dr. K.G. Poovaiah_ v. _General Manager/ Managing Director Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation,_ [200 I) 9 D SCC 167 wherein this Court opined: "5 ... However, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of earning capacity is very much on the lower side. The injury to the right hand, which has left a permanent disability and which has affected the functioning of the limb and in particular the fingers, is a E serious handicap to a medical practitioner. Patients would be reluctant to go to him for treatment and, therefore, the loss of earning capacity would be substantial. Even if we were to assume that it would reduce his earning capacity by 50% and even if we go by his earnings at the date of the accident, the monthly loss would come to Rs. 1500 i.e. Rs. 18,000 per annum. If this monthly loss of earning is multiplied by IO F years purchase factor the compensation would work out to Rs. 1,80,000. To that must be added the compensation allowed under certain other heads, namely, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, medical expenses, etc. The total amount comes to Rs. 2,38,000." 7. Reliance has also been placed on _U.P. State Road Transport Corpn._ G v. _Krishna Bala and Ors.,_ [2006] 6 SCC 249 wherein it was held: "13. In Susamma Thomas case it was noted that the normal rate of interest was about 10% and accordingly the multiplier was worked out. As. the interest ratP. is on the decline, the multiplier has to H 612 (2007] 9 S.C.R. A c ## SUPREME COURT REPORTS ## B consequentially be raised. Therefore, instead of 16 the multiplier of 18 as was adopted in Trilok Chandra appears to be appropriate. In fact in Trilok Chandra case, after reference to Second Schedtiie'to the Act, it was noticed that the same suffers from many defects. It was pointed out that the same is to serve as a guide, but cannot be said to be invariable ready reckoner. However, the appropriate highest multiplier was held to be 18. The highest multiplier has to be for the age group of 21 years to 25 years when an ordinary fodian citiZen starts independently earning and the lowest would be in respect of a person in the age group of 60 to 70, which is the nonnal retirement age. (See: _New India Assurance Co. Ltd_ v. _Charlie)"_ 8. As against this,. the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent would submit that this is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and in particular having regard to a recent decision of this Court in _Deepal Girishbhai So,;i and Ors._ v. _United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda,_ (2004] 5 ,sec 385: AIR (2004) SC 2107. D 9. We have noticed hereinbefore that the accident took place on 26.0l.1995. A few months prior thereto, the Parliament inserted Section 163-A of the Act by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994. The said provision contains a non-obstante clause in tenns whereof _inter a/ia_ the owner of the motor vehicle is made liable to pay, in the case of death or E pennanent disablement, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. I 0. "Total Disablement" has been defined in Section 2(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 to mean "such disablement," whether of F a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of perfmming at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement". 11. Section 166 of the Act evidently stands on a different footing. The extent of compensation payable thereunder may vary from case to case. G Various other factors including contributory negligence, earning capacity, extent of negligence on the part of one ve~icle or the other, are relevant factors for computation of damages. Loss of property can also be subject matter of the claim petition. 12. In _D(!epal Girishbhai Soni_ (supra), this Court observed: H 613 A.P.S.RT.C.v.M.PENTAIAHCHARY[S.B.SINHA,J.] "Section I63A was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a _A_ section of the people whose annual income is not more thaP Rs. 40,000/- having regard to the fact that in terms of Section l63A of the Act read with the Second Schedule appended thereto; compensation is to be paid on a structured formula not only having regard to the age of the victim and his income but also the other factors relevant B therefor. An award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in full and final settlement of the claim as would appear from the different columns contained in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. The same is not interim in nature. The note appended to column l which deals with fatal acddents makes the position furthermore clear stating that from the total amount of compensation one-third thereof is to reduced in C consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself had he been alive. This together with the other heads of compensation as contained in columns 2 to 6 thereof leaves no manner of doubt that the Parliament intended to lay a comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of adequate compensation to a section of victims who would require the amount D of compensation without fighting any protracted litigation for l'roving that the accident occurred owing to negligence on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle or any other fault arising out of use of a motor vehicle." 13. We, therefore, fail to visualise that in a case of this nature a claimant can be deprived of a reasonable amount of compensation despite the fact that he has permanently lost his capacity to earn and remain dependant on other besides physical sufferance of such magnitude as to why the multiplier suggested by the Parliament should not be accepted. E F 14. We do not, however, intend to lay down a general law. We wish to point out that minimum compensation payable in a case of this nature should be considered from the sufferings of disability undergone by the victim. We are not suggesting that in certain situations, the multiplier specified in the Second Schedule cannot and should not be altered but therefor there must exist strong circumstances. In the year 1995, the rate of interest was lower G than the rate of interest taken into consideration in _Susamma Thomas_ (supra). Application of multiplicative factor should also be considered from that angle. _Susamma Thomas_ (supra) or the other decisions relied upon _by_ the learned counsel, do not lay down any law in absolute terms. H 614 [2007) 9 S.C.R. ## SUPREME COURT REPORTS A 15. In _Krishna Bala_ (supra), the Division Bench considered that the amount of compensation will have to be determined having regard to the fact as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. Rate of interest, therefore, was a relevant.factor. B 16. Furthermore, in a case of this nature, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit and proper case where we should exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 17. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal C which is dismissed accordingly. Appellant shall bear the costs of the respondents. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-. B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.