Anu George v. Ninan Kurian

## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ``` PRESENT ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN ``` ``` & ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN ``` ``` MONDAY, THE 22[ND] DAY OF AUGUST 2022 / 31ST SRAVANA, 1944 ``` ``` RCREV. NO. 138OF 2020 ``` ``` AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.03.2020 IN R.C.A.NO.17 OF 2018 OF ``` ``` RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (DISTRICT COURT), PATHANAMTHITTA CONFIRMING THE ORDER DATED 30.07.2018 IN ``` ``` R.C.P.NO.23 OF 2014 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (PRINCIPAL ``` ``` MUNSIFF-II), THIRUVALLA. ``` ## **`REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT:`** ``` MRS.ANU GEORGE, AGED 47 YEARS WIFE OF SRI. GEORGE VARGHESE, VILAKKUPATTATHIL, RAILWAY STATION P.O, PUNNAKUNNAM MURI, KUTTAPUZHA TALUK, THIRUVALLA TALUK, THIRUVALLA-689 111 ``` ``` BY ADVS. ANIL S.RAJ SRI.SHIBU JACOB SMT.K.N.RAJANI SRI.RADHIKA RAJASEKHARAN P. SMT.ANILA PETER SMT.C.PRABITHA SRI.SAJEN THAMPAN ``` ## **`RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:`** ``` MR. NINAN KURIAN, AGED 52 YEARS SON OF SRI. KURIAN, AMPRAYIL HOUSE, NADUVILE MURI, THALAVADY P.O, THALAVADI VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA-689 572 ``` ``` BY ADVS. SRI.P.B.SAHASRANAMAN SRI.T.S.HARIKUMAR ``` ``` THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 22.08.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 2 ## **O R D E R** ## Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Principal Munsiff-II), Thiruvalla, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule shop room. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is that of the wife of the landlord, who was examined as PW4, for starting a tuition centre. The landlord has also sought for an order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act alleging arrears of rent. 2. Before the Rent Control Court, the tenant entered appearance and filed objection, opposing the order of eviction sought for. On the side of the landlord, PWs 1 to 4 were examined and Exts.A1 to A14 were marked. On the side of the tenant, RWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exts.B1 and B5(e) were marked. Register of Fair Rent of the building issued by the Tahsildar, Thiruvalla, was marked as Ext.X1. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court found that the need projected in the R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 3 Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Sections 11(3) of the Act is bona fide; that the provisions under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application on the facts of the case; and that the tenant is not entitled to protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. By the order dated 30.07.2018, the Rent Control Court granted an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act and the tenant was directed to handover vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlord within sixty days from the date of that order. However, the order of eviction sought for under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act was declined. 3. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.17 of 2018 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (District Judge), Pathanamthitta, invoking the provisions under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. That appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 02.03.2020 of the Appellate Authority, thereby confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(3) of the Act. 4. Challenging the order dated 30.07.2018 of the Rent 4 R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 Control Court in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014 and the judgment dated 02.03.2020 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.17 of 2018, the tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. 5. On 25.08.2020, when this Rent Control Revision came up for admission, this Court issued notice before admission to the respondent. In I.A.No.1 of 2020, this Court granted an interim order staying the operation of judgment dated 02.03.2020 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Pathanamthitta in R.C.A.No.17 of 2018 as well as the order dated 30.07.2018 of the Rent Control court, Thiruvalla in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014, for a period of six weeks. The said interim order, which was extended from time to time, was extended till 14.08.2022. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord. 7. The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the order of eviction granted by the authorities below, concurrently, under Section 11(3) of the Act. 5 R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would contend that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction is not bona fide. The contentions raised by the tenant were not properly considered by the authorities below. On the applicability of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the learned counsel for the tenant would contend that the landlord is having a residential building, as pointed out by the tenant and also another shop room, were not properly considered. The case of the tenant under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is not disputed in the oral testimony of the landlord’s wife, who was examined as PW4. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondentlandlord would contend that, it was after considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the authorities below have granted order of eviction, concurrently, under Section 11(3) of the Act. In exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act, no interference is warranted, since the findings of the authorities below are neither perverse nor patently illegal. 10. Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(1), notwithstanding anything to the contrary R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 6 contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 11. In **Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476]** the Apex Court reiterated that, R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 7 as laid down in **Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001)** **5 SCC 705]** bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 12. In **Nalakath Saidali Haji v. Kalluparamba Musthafa** **and others [2015 (4) KHC 815]** a Division Bench of this Court relied on the law laid down in the decisions of the Apex Court referred to supra. The Division Bench also noticed the law laid down R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 8 by the Apex Court in **Kizhakkayil Suhara v. Manhantavida Aboobacker (dead) by Lrs. [(2001) 8 SCC 19]** that, not merely the need of the landlord but also the need of the dependants for whom eviction is sought, should be established to be bona fide. On the facts of the case on hand, the Division Bench noticed that, neither the Rent Control Court nor the Appellate Authority has considered the need put forward by the landlord in accordance with the principles laid down in the decisions referred to supra and in the manner in which, the same ought to have been considered. Both the authorities were influenced by the fact that the landlord was holding an employment visa. The Division Bench noticed that, there is absolutely no evidence available on record regarding the nature of the employment visa that the landlord was holding or the terms subject to which the said visa has been issued to him. The conclusions of both the authorities below are based on the admission made by the landlord, while he was cross-examined as PW1. Nothing precludes the landlord from going abroad for employment. The case of the landlord in the Rent Control Petition is that, he has left his employment abroad and has come back to his native place. The fact that he is still holding an employment visa, does not militate against R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 9 the bona fide need pleaded by the landlord. 13. In **Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra. 14. In **Regy V. Edthil v. Hubert Leslie D'Cruz [2016 (2) KLJ 164]** a Division Bench of this Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705]** , wherein the Apex Court held that, in order to order eviction on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord, the statutory requirement is that there must be an actual pressing need, not a mere whim or fanciful desire; it must be in praesenti and also the landlord must not be in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the town or city concerned. In the said decision, the Division Bench relied on the decision of the Apex Court in **Shiv Sarup Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** , wherein it was held that, the term 'bona fide' or 'genuinely' refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The phrase 'required bona fide' is suggestive of Legislative intent is an outcome of a sincere and R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 10 honest desire, in contra distinction with a mere desire, by the Rent Control Legislation. In **Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592]** , a Division Bench of this Court held that, when the landlord has clearly admitted in his evidence that vacant rooms are in his possession, he has to attribute special reasons for not occupying it, as the need mentioned under Section 11(3) of the Act cannot be a mere desire. On the facts of that case, since there was no sufficient opportunity given in the absence of plea, the Rent Control Petition was remitted to the Rent Control Court to enable the landlord to adduce evidence on that aspect and for fresh consideration by the Rent Control Court. Therefore, if there is admission on the part of the landlord of coming into possession of vacant rooms, unless special reason is given for not occupying the same, the need cannot be said to be bona fide and he is not entitled to get an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. 15. In **Gireeshbabu T.P. v. Jameela and others [2021** **(5) KHC SN 30]** a Division Bench of this Court in which one among us (Anil K. Narendran, J) was a party, held that, in order to satisfy the requirement of Section 11(3) of the Act, a bona fide need must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire of the landlord in R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 11 contradistinction with a mere pretext on the part of the landlord for evicting the tenant, claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. Once, on the basis of the materials on record, the landlord has succeeded in showing that the need to occupy the premises is natural, real, sincere and honest, and not a ruse to evict the tenant from the said premises, the landlord will certainly be entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act but, of course, subject to the first and second provisos to Section 11(3). 16. In **George T.I. v. K.L. Stanley [2013 (4) KHC 543]** , this Court, following a line of decisions, held that, prior experience is not a pre-requisite for a person to start a business. In the said decision, it was held as follows; “The last contention is want of previous experience. Going by the decisions of this Court and the Apex Court, previous experience cannot be insisted to test the bona fide need of the landlord, as it is not a requirement for anybody to conduct a business that he should have previous experience.” (underline supplied) 17. In the instant case, the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is that of the wife of the landlord to conduct a tuition R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 12 centre in the petition schedule shop room. Ext.A11 certificate would show that she is having required educational qualification. The contention of the tenant was that the landlord is well employed abroad and he or his wife has no necessity to conduct a tuition centre in the petition schedule shop room. Such a contention by the tenant can only be repelled as untenable. The wife of the landlord as PW4 has categorically stated that she had earlier worked as a teacher in Gulf. Now, she is unemployed and therefore she wants to conduct a tuition centre in the petition schedule shop room. Ext.A7 teaching experience certificate was produced before the Rent Control Court to show that PW4 is having teaching experience. PW4 has also deposed that she was working as a teacher in Mar Thoma Residential School, Thiruvalla. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the authorities below arrived at a conclusion that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition is bona fide. The said finding of the authorities below are neither perverse nor patently illegal and it cannot also be said that, while arriving at such a finding, the authorities below have committed any manifest error. 18. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 13 building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. 19. In **M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal [(2001) 2 SCC 355]** the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement was sought for under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In the said decision, the Apex Court relied on the law laid down in **Ram Narain Arora v.** **Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC 141]** , wherein it was held that the question whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a question which is intermixed with the question regarding bona fide requirement. Whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a defence for the tenant. Whether the other accommodation is more suitable than the suit premises would not solely depend upon pleadings and non-disclosure by the landlord. The landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed materials before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court found that, even R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 14 though the landlord has not mentioned about the other two premises, the material in respect of the other two premises was placed before the Rent Controller as well as before the High Court, thus no prejudice has been caused, and the parties have squarely dealt with this question. 20. In **Vasantha Mallan v. N.S. Aboobacker Siddique [2020 (1) KHC 21]** the question that arose before a Division Bench of this Court was whether a landlord is bound to plead under first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the availability of vacant building in his possession and seek to explain special reason for nonoccupation of such premises, in a proceeding initiated for eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Division Bench held that the initial burden to prove that landlord is in possession of vacant building, if any, is only upon the tenant unless the landlord himself admits any such vacant building to be in his possession. Only when the primary burden of proof in this behalf is discharged by the tenant, the burden shifts to the landlord to show otherwise or that the vacant premises are not suited to his needs. He can successfully discharge his part of the burden by adducing evidence either through his own testimony or others or in any other legal manner. R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 15 Law does not require the landlord to plead that he is in possession of any vacant building and has special reasons for its non-occupation. It is up to the tenant alone to take up the contention and prove that landlord is in vacant possession of premises. 21. In **Vasantha Mallan** , relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in **M.L. Prabhakar [(2001) 2 SCC 355]** the Division Bench held that, it is not incumbent on the landlord to disclose in his pleading availability of vacant building in his possession. The non- disclosure of vacant premises cannot be picked up as a reason or circumstance to doubt the bona fides of the claim of the landlord put forward under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Division Bench made it clear that it is not obligatory for the landlord to disclose in his pleadings the details of the vacant buildings available in his possession. Nor does first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act insist the landlord to plead that the buildings available in his possession are not sufficient to meet his requirements. These are matters of evidence rather than pleadings. Failure of the landlord to disclose availability of buildings in his possession and plead special reasons for not occupying them, cannot be taken as a valid and legal ground for rejecting the claim of the landlord as not bona fide. What could R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 16 at the most be said is that it might be a fair and reasonable conduct if the landlord disclosed in his pleadings the details of buildings in his possession and simultaneously explained the reason for nonoccupation of the premises for his alleged needs. 22. Insofar as the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is concerned, the objection filed by the tenant in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014 contains a vague plea on the availability of other buildings in the locality, which would satisfy the need projected in the Rent Control Petition. Though it has come out in evidence that the landlord has another building and a house in Thiruvalla Town, the said premises and the house, which situate near the Railway Station has been leased out to other tenants. The petition schedule shop room is situated near S.C.S. School and the private bus stand, which is in the heart of Thiruvalla Town, which is a convenient place to conduct a tuition centre. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the authorities below concluded that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is not attracted in the facts of the case on hand. The said finding of the authorities below are neither perverse nor patently illegal and it cannot also be said that they have committed a manifest error while arriving at such a finding. R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 17 23. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 24. In **Ammeer Hamsa v. Ramabhadran and another [2019 (2) KHC 465]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is trite law that both limbs under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are conjunctive and the burden of proof is on the tenant. Thus, the legal position has been settled by a long line of decisions and the courts below have rightly placed reliance upon those decisions. Vide: **Narayanan Nair** **v. Pachumma [1980 KLT 430]** , **Prasannan v. Haris [2005 (2)** **KLT 365]** , **Vineethan v. Fathima and others [2016 (1) KHC** **631]** . In view of the legal position well settled by the aforesaid decisions, the landlord is not required to plead or prove other sources of income of the tenant. That apart, income is a fact which remains exclusively in the knowledge of each person only and another person cannot adduce evidence to prove income. Merely on R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 18 the reason that the landlord has stated that the tenant has other sources of income and he is not mainly depending upon the income from the business carried on in the tenanted premises, for his livelihood and he failed to prove so, the tenant cannot escape from the burden of proof cast on him under the first limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Where the statutory provision itself explicitly imposes the burden of proof on a party to the lis, there cannot be any variation whatever be the pleadings of the other party in that respect. The second proviso to Section 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, granting protection to the tenant. When the second proviso itself imposes the burden of proof on the tenant, the question whether the landlord has pleaded or proved the facts constituting the said proviso is insignificant and irrelevant. Even if the landlord pleaded so, the burden of proof will not be shifted to him. Since the second proviso to Section 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, which would dis-entitle the landlord to get the order of eviction under Section 11(3), the burden of proof, under the said proviso is always on the tenant and unless the burden of proof under the second proviso is discharged satisfactorily, the tenant is not entitled to get protection under the R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 19 said proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 25. Insofar as the 2[nd] proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is concerned, the tenant could not succeed in his attempt to prove that there is no other suitable buildings in the locality to shift his business. The tenant is conducting a travel agency in the petition schedule shop room. It has come out in evidence that a tenant is a councilor of Thiruvalla Municipality, from the year 2010 onwards. The tenant did not make any enquiry regarding availability of suitable buildings in the locality and the tenant has also not made any attempt to prove that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from the business conducted in the petition schedule shop room. In the absence of any reliable materials, the authorities below concurrently found that the tenant is not entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. The findings of the authorities below on the above aspect is neither perverse nor patently illegal and it cannot also be said that the authorities below have committed a manifest error while arriving at such a conclusion. 26. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 20 Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion. ## 27. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana** **[(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 21 obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it - cannot mean that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 28. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [(1999) 7** **SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 22 High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 29. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re- appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional - court will not be entitled to re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 23 appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 30. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. ## 31. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019** **SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 24 backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The High Court - could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 32. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority while ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority under Section 11(3) of the Act. 33. The learned counsel for the petitioner–tenant would submit that, considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic the tenant may be granted a period of R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 25 ## one year for vacating the premises. 34. On the above request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, the learned counsel for the respondentlandlord would submit that a reasonable period of six months may be granted to the tenant for giving vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room, on condition that the tenant shall clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent and continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default. 35. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would submit that the tenant is prepared to clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent, within a time limit that may be fixed by this Court and he shall continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default, till he gives vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms to the landlord. 36. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision is dismissed declining interference on the order of eviction granted by the courts below under Section 11(3) of the Act; however by granting six months' time to the petitioner-tenant, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the respondent-landlord, considering the situation prevailing in the R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 26 Country on account of Covid 19 pandemic, subject to the following conditions; - (i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that she will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the petitioner-landlord within six months from the date of this order and that, she shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule shop rooms and further that she will conduct any business in the petition schedule shop room only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities; - (ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default; - (iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondenttenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant R.C.Rev. NO.138 of 2020 27 possession of the petition schedule shop room will stand cancelled automatically and the petitionerlandlord will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction. **Sd/-** ## **ANIL K. NARENDRAN JUDGE** **Sd/-** **A. BADHARUDEEN JUDGE** bkn/-