Ansar Ali v. Jaleel P.K., Best Trading Co., Thankakunju @ Thankachan, United India Insurance Co. Ltd.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** ## **WEDNESDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2020 / 23RD MAGHA, 1941** ## **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** **AGAINST THE AWARD IN O.P.(MV) NO.714/2005 DATED 01-03-2010 OF MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,PERUMBAVOOR** ## **APPELLANT:** **ANSAR ALI, S/O.ALI, AGED 26 YEARS, MARATHUPARAMBU HOUSE, PALAPRASSERY,, CHENGAMANAD P.O., ALUVA TALUK, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.** **BY ADV. SRI.G.BALAMURALEEDHARAN (PARAVUR)** ## **RESPONDENTS:** |**1**|**JALEEL P K.,**| |---|---| ||**BEST TRADING CO.,**| ||**EDAMUTTOM P.O., PIN 680 568,**| ||**THRISSUR DISTRICT.**| |**2**|**THANKANKUNJU @ THANKACHAN,**| ||**S/O.CHERIYAN,**| ||**INCHIKKAL HOUSE,**| ||**CHUVANNA MANKURAVUMPADAM,**| ||**PEECHY P.O., PIN 680 653,**| ||**THRISSUR DISTRICT.**| |**3**|**UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD.,**| ||**BRANCH OFFICE, SOUTH JUNCTION,**| ||**CHALAKKUDY P.O., PIN 680 307,**| ||**THRISSUR DISTRICT.**| ||**R3 BY SRI.P.K.MANOJKUMAR,STANDING COUNSEL,**| ||**UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.**| **THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 12.02.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -2- ## **JUDGMENT** The appellant who is the claimant in O.P.(MV) No.714 of 2005 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor, a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, claiming compensation on account of the injuries sustained by him in a motor accident, alleged to have occurred on 21.02.2005, while he was driving a mini lorry bearing registration No.KL-8/T-2247 through Aluva-Ernakulam National Highway, from north to south. Going by the averments in the claim petition, when the lorry reached Muttom, a Torus lorry bearing registration No.KL-8/T-757, owned by the 1[st] respondent, driven by the 2[nd] respondent and insured with the 3[rd] respondent, which was proceeding in the very same direction suddenly turned to right, at high speed, without signal. At that time, the mini lorry driven by the appellant hit on the Torus lorry and he sustained injuries. Alleging that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of Torus lorry by the 2[nd] respondent driver, claim petition was filed before the Tribunal claiming a total compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- under various heads. **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -3- 2. Before the Tribunal, respondents 1 and 2 remained absent and they were set ex-parte. The 3[rd] respondent insurer filed written statement admitting insurance coverage of the Torus lorry involved in the accident; however, denying negligence alleged against the 2[nd] respondent. The insurer contended that the Torus lorry was proceeding in front of the mini lorry driven by the appellant, in a reasonable speed, with due care and caution, and there was no negligence on the part of the 2[nd] respondent driver. The insurer contended that the accident occurred due to the sole negligence of the appellant and the mini lorry hit on the back of Torus lorry. The insurer further contended that the Police registered crime against the 2[nd] respondent for the reason that the appellant sustained injuries in the accident. 3. Before the Tribunal, Exts.A1 to A7 were marked on the side of the appellant and the doctor who issued Ext.A5 disability certificate was examined as PW1. On the side of the respondents, Exts.B1 and B2 were marked. 4. After considering the pleadings and materials on record, the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the appellant **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -4- failed to prove the rash and negligent driving of Torus lorry by the 2[nd] respondent driver. Accordingly, the claim petition was dismissed. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal, the appellant is before this Court in this appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and also the learned Standing Counsel for the 3[rd] respondent insurer. Despite service of notice, none appears for respondents 1 and 2. 7. The issue that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the finding of the Tribunal that the appellant failed to prove rash and negligent driving of Torus lorry by the 2[nd] respondent can be sustained. 8. In **Venugopala Panicker v. Unnikrishna Panicker and others [2015 (2) KHC 621]** , a Division Bench of this Court held that standard of proof required to prove negligence in a claim petition is different from the standard of proof required in a criminal case. In a claim petition before the Tribunal, the standard of proof is much below than what is required in a criminal case as well as in a **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -5- ## civil case. Paragraph 18 of the said decision reads thus; “18. The Apex Court as well as this Court has held in umpteen number of cases that, the standard of proof required to prove negligence in a claims petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is different from the standard of proof required in a criminal case. In **Sherin J. Thankom v. Thankom and others (2014 (3) KLT 44)** a Division Bench of this Court, to which one among us (Anil K. Narendran, J.) was a party, held that, in deciding matters arising out of accident cases the Tribunal should bear in mind the caution struck by the Apex Court that a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is neither a criminal case nor a civil case. In a claim before the Tribunal the standard of proof is much below than what is required in a criminal case as well as in a civil case. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment read thus; “ **14.** In Kusum Lata and others v. Satbir and others (2011 (3) SCC 646) the Apex Court held as follows; It is well known that in a case relating to motor accident claims, the claimants are not required to prove the case as it is required to be done in a criminal trial. The Court must keep this distinction in mind. Later, in Parameshwari v. Amir Chand and others (2011 (11) SCC 635) the Apex Court reiterated that, in a road accident claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are not attracted. In Parameshwari's case (supra), the Apex Court had taken note of the observation made in its earlier judgment in Bimla **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -6- Devi and others v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others (2009 (13) SCC 530) that, the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and that standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. **15.** Prima facie we find that the reasoning given by the Tribunal in the impugned common award is in conflict with the principle laid down in the judgments of the Apex Court referred to above. In deciding matters arising out of accident cases the Tribunal should bear in mind the caution struck by the Apex Court that a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is neither a criminal case nor a civil case. In a claim before the Tribunal the standard of proof is much below than what is required in a criminal case as well as in a civil case. No doubt before the Tribunal, there must be some material on the basis of which the Tribunal can arrive at or decide things necessary to be decided for awarding compensation. In such circumstances, we hold that the reasoning given by Tribunal in the impugned common award, in order to reject the claim petitions filed by the appellants are unsustainable and the said common award is liable to be set aside in these appeals.” 9. In **N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd v. Karumai Ammal** **[(1980) 3 SCC 457]** , the Apex Court held that, in accident cases, the Tribunals must take special care to see that **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -7- innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. It was held that save in pain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances, where it is fairly reasonable and that, the Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. 10. In **Sunita v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation [AIR 2019 SC 994]** , the Apex Court held that strict principles of rules in a criminal case will not be applicable in a claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and further that, the standard to be followed in such case is one of preponderance of probability rather than one of proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is nothing in the Motor Vehicles Act to preclude citing of witness in a motor accident claim, who has not been named in the list of witnesses in the criminal case. What is essential is that the opposite party should get a fair opportunity to cross examine the concerned witness. Once that is done, it will not be open to them to complain about any prejudice caused to them. If there was any doubt to be cast on the veracity of **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -8- witness, the same should have come out in cross examination. 11. The document marked as Ext.A1 is the charge sheet in Crime No.209 of 2005 of Aluva Traffic Unit, a crime registered in connection with the motor accident, which occurred on 21.02.2005, involving the vehicles in question, in which the 2[nd] respondent driver of the Torus lorry was charge sheeted by the Police for rash and negligent driving. The document marked as Ext.A3 is the scene mahazar. Exts.B1 and B2 are the reports of the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector in respect of the vehicles involved in the accident. 12. In **New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Pazhaniammal and others [2011 (3) KHC 595]** a Division Bench of this Court held that as a general rule, production of the police charge sheet is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. If police charge sheet does not satisfy their judicial conscience, Tribunals can reject it and can call upon the parties to adduce oral evidence to establish the alleged negligence. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment read **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -9- ## thus: “7. In this context we feel it appropriate to refer to the practice adopted by many Tribunals in the State. Wherever a crime has been registered in respect of the accident and the investigation has culminated in the filing of a charge – sheet by the police, such charge – sheet is filed and the same is reckoned as sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the indictee. The practice has not received formal judicial approval and hence some Tribunals insist on oral evidence in support of negligence invariably. This consumes a lot of judicial time and the heavily over worked Tribunal spends its time on unnecessary oral evidence of negligence. We would certainly not want the Tribunals to be prisoners of the conclusions of police officers. If the Tribunal finds it suspicious, it can insist for better evidence. But as a general rule it can safely be accepted that production of the police charge – sheet is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence for the purpose of a claim under S.166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. A system cannot feed itself on a regular diet of distrust of the police. Prima facie, charge – sheet filed by a police officer after due investigation can be accepted as evidence of negligence against the indictee. If any one of the parties do not accept such charge – sheet, the burden must be on such party to adduce oral evidence. If oral evidence is adduced by any party, in a case where charge – sheet is filed, the Tribunals should give further opportunity to others also to adduce oral evidence and in such a case **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -10- the charge – sheet will pale into insignificance and the dispute will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence. In all other cases such charge – sheet can be reckoned as sufficient evidence of negligence in a claim under S.166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We mean to say that on production of such charge – sheet the shifting of burden must take place. It is not as though we are not conscious of the dangers and pit falls involved in such an approach. But we feel that adoption and recognition of such practice would help to reduce the length of the long queue for justice before the Tribunals. The judicial recognition of the practice will help the Tribunals to ensure the optimum use of judicial time at their disposal for productive ventures. 8. We do not intend to say that collusive charge – sheets need be accepted. Wherever on the facts of a given case the Tribunals feel that the police charge – sheet does not satisfy their judicial conscience, the Tribunals can record that the charge – sheet cannot be accepted and can call upon the parties, at any stage, to adduce oral evidence of the accident and the alleged negligence. In such a case, the issue of negligence must be decided on the other evidence, ignoring the charge – sheet.” 13. In **Shajahan U.S. v. Sundaresh G. Pai and another [2019 (3) KHC 412]** , this Court held that, in a proceeding under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is not necessary for the claimant to plead and proof the manner **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -11- in which the accident took place, for sustaining the claim for compensation. In terms of the amended provisions, contained in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Tribunal is empowered to treat the information received under Section 158 of the Act as an application for compensation under the Act and to grant compensation to the victims on that basis. In other words, the claim petition filed under the Act is not an adversarial lis in its traditional sense, but only a proceedings in terms of, and regulated by the provisions of the Act, which is a complete code by itself. The approach of the Tribunal in dealing with the application for compensation under Section 166 of the Act shall be with a view to discover the true facts, namely, whether there was a motor accident and also whether the accident occurred on account of the negligence of the driver of the vehicle, for it is the obligation of the Tribunal in terms of the Act to give compensation to the victims of motor accidents, notwithstanding whether there is even an application for the said purpose. If materials available on record are not sufficient for the Tribunal to discover the true fact, the Tribunal cannot stop the proceedings there, but shall **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -12- make an endevour to discover the fact by calling for additional materials from parties. 14. In the instant case, both sides have not chosen to adduce any oral evidence, instead the charge sheet and other documents were marked. In view of the law laid down in **Pazhaniammal** , production of Ext.A1 charge sheet is _prima facie_ sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the 2[nd] respondent driver of Torus lorry, for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. If Police charge sheet does not satisfy the judicial conscience, the Tribunal should have called upon the claimant to adduce oral evidence to establish the alleged accident and also the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. 15. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the reasoning of the Tribunal in dismissing the claim petition filed by the appellant/claimant cannot be sustained. In such circumstances, this appeal is disposed of by setting aside the impugned award passed by the Tribunal and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for reconsideration, after affording an opportunity to both sides to **MACA.No.1254 OF 2010(C)** -13- adduce further evidence. The appellant and the 3[rd] respondent insurer shall appear before the Tribunal on **16.03.2020** . The Tribunal shall reconsider the matter with notice to respondents 1 and 2. Since the claim petition is of the year 2005, the Tribunal shall finally dispose of the matter, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of appearance of parties. Sd/- **ANIL K. NARENDRAN JUDGE** bpr