Anil Kumar v. State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** # **PRESENT** # **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR** ## **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.PRATHEEP KUMAR** **MONDAY, THE 5[TH] DAY OF AUGUST 2024 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1946** **CRL.A NO. 370 OF 2023** **CRIME NO.1924/2017 OF Pallithottam Police Station, Kollam** **SC NO.186 OF 2018 OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS COURT - V, KOLLAM APPELLANT/ACCUSED** **ANIL KUMAR AGED 40 YEARS, S/O ANTONY (C – 4529), CENTRAL PRISON AND CORRECTIONAL HOME, POOJAPPURA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM AND RESIDED AT QSSS COLONY, VELICHAM NAGAR - 97, PALLITHOTTAM CHERRY, KOLLAM WEST VILLAGE THROUGH THE SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON & CORRECTIONAL HOME POOJAPPURA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.** **BY ADV C.K.JAYAKUMAR** ## **RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT** - **1 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA.** - **2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, PALLITHOTTAM POLICE STATION – 691006.** ## **SMT.BINDU O.V. - PUBLIC PROSECUTOR** **THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24.7.2024, THE COURT ON 05.08.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** _Crl.App.370/2023_ 2 ## **P.B.SURESH KUMAR & C.PRATHEEP KUMAR, JJ.** -------------------------------------- Crl.Appeal 370 of 2023 ----------------------------------Dated : 5[th] August, 2024 ## **JUDGMENT** ## C.Pratheep Kumar, J. “ _Truth is stranger than fiction”_ : Lord Byron wrote in Don Juan published in 1823. It’s true even now, at least in this case. 2. In the dying declaration given to the Magistrate, she pleaded: _“Send my husband to jail. Teach him obedience. I want him back”._ She pleaded so, without knowing that her days are counted and also that the burn injuries inflicted by her suspicious husband on her body after pouring kerosene and setting her ablaze, in front of her 3 year old son, was more than 70%, more than sufficient to take away her life, in few days. Nothing short of an Angel could be so magnanimous to such a husband, who is solely responsible for her untold miseries, even when she was struggling for her life. (We wish to forget for a moment, the ground reality that it is because of the helplessness of a hapless Indian lady, in a patriarchal society) She could not cry even once, when the flame surrounded her, as she was born deaf and dumb. Lord Almighty chose not to listen to her prayers, may be because she had already suffered more than her _Crl.App.370/2023_ 3 due. Instead, He took her to her heavenly abode on the 7[th] day. 3. When she was born, her parents abandoned her, forcing her to spent her childhood in an orphanage at Kottayam. She was a beautiful girl. When the appellant, who is also a deaf and dumb, proposed to marry her, she wholeheartedly accepted him, married him in 2012, dreaming a lot. Destiny (if, any) has now put her husband in jail and their only son, now 10 years, has been forced to live without the love, affection, care and support of his parents, reminding us the childhood of his mother. (On inquiry, it was reported to us that now the child is a student in Standard V of Infant Jesus Anglo Indian School, Thangassery, Kollam and is in the guardianship of his uncle and aunt, father's sister). 4. The appellant/accused is the suspicious husband of deceased Moly. The prosecution case is that while they were living together as husband and wife in the residence in Q.S.S.S. Colony, Velicham Nagar, Kollam district, on 31.10.2017 at about 8.15 pm, the accused immolated to death his wife, the deceased, after pouring kerosene and setting her ablaze using match stick. In the above said incident, Moly sustained more than 70% burn injuries and while under treatment in the Medical college hospital, Kottayam, she succumbed to the injuries on 6.11.2017 at 11.35 am. 5. On the side of the prosecution, PWs1 to 27 were examined and Exts.P1 to P36 marked. No evidence was adduced by the accused. MO1 was _Crl.App.370/2023_ 4 identified. After evaluating the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty under Section 302 IPC, convicted and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.50,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo imprisonment for a further period of one year. There was also a direction to pay the fine amount, if realized, to the minor child. 6. This appeal has been preferred under Section 374(2) and 383 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, in Sessions Case No.186/2018 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge-V, Kollam. Aggrieved by the above judgment of conviction and sentence, the accused preferred this appeal raising various contentions. 7. Now the points that arise for consideration are the following : _(i) Whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the accused murdered Moly, as alleged ?_ _(ii) Whether the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence call for any interference by this Court ?_ 8. Heard both sides. 9. Points 1 & 2 :- At the time of the incident, the appellant along with his wife and child alone were residing in their one bedroom flat. It is one of the flats in the ground floor of a multi-storied apartment complex, in a fishermen _Crl.App.370/2023_ 5 colony. It has come out in evidence that the appellant had suspicion over the chastity of the deceased. Whenever he used to go out of the house, he used to lock his wife inside the flat. It is also alleged that two days before the incident also he had poured some kerosene on the nighty of the deceased. However, at that time, the dispute was some how resolved. On the ill-fated day, there was a celebration in connection with the local Church, which was over by 8.00 pm. 10. The prosecution relied upon the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 as well as the dying declaration of the deceased, to prove the charge. According to Sri.C.K.Jayakumar, the learned counsel for the appellant, the evidence of Pws 1 to 3 is not reliable and therefore, he prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence. On the other hand, Smt.Bindu O.V., the learned Public Prosecutor would argue that the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 as well as the dying declaration of the deceased are wholly reliable, unblemished and trustworthy. Therefore, she prayed for sustaining the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and to dismiss the appeal. 11. PWs 1 to 3 are three ladies and neighbours of the deceased, who, on hearing the noise rushed to rescue her house first and sent her to the hospital, forthwith. Those three ladies gave evidence almost in identical manner, in tune with the prosecution case. They would swear that at about 8.15 pm, when they heard the noise of some utensils falling down from the flat of the deceased, they immediately rushed to the said flat and knocked the front _Crl.App.370/2023_ 6 door. The door was not opened. They looked inside the flat, after opening the window doors and saw the appellant pouring kerosene on the body of the deceased and torching using a match stick. Immediately they pushed open the front door of the flat, reached near the deceased who was standing at the kitchen, poured water on her body and put off the fire. Thereafter, when they tried to take the deceased to the hospital, the appellant obstructed them and tried to push the deceased again into the flame. Then they pushed the appellant away and taken the deceased out of the flat, after covering her body in a sheet, and took her to the District Hospital, Kollam in an auto-rickshaw. From there she was taken to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam. However, she succumbed to the burn injuries on 6.11.2017. 12. In this context, it is also to be noted that immediately after the incident, PWs 1 to 3 had given their 164 Cr.P.C statement to the Magistrate and those statements were marked during the examination of PWs 1 to 3 as Exts.P1 to P3 respectively. In the above 164 Cr.P.C statement they have given evidence almost in tune with the evidence given before the court and as such, the same will corroborate their evidence before the court. PWs1 to 3 also identified MO1 as the Can from which kerosene was poured by the appellant on the body of the deceased. PW8 who is a relative of the accused also deposed that in the morning on 31.10.2017 he had seen the appellant purchasing kerosene and returning home with MO1 Can in his hand. _Crl.App.370/2023_ 7 13. At the time of evidence, the stand taken by the appellant is that while the deceased was cooking food in the kitchen, somehow fire caught on her dress and on seeing the same, the appellant was only trying to put off the fire by pouring water. However, it was misunderstood by PWs 1 to 3 as well as the police and a false case was registered against him. 14. The evidence of PWs 1 to 3 to the effect that the accused had suspicion over the chastity of his wife was admitted by the accused himself on several occasions during his examination under Section 313 (1)(b) Cr.P.C. He also admitted that due to suspicion, he used to lock his wife inside the house, whenever he goes out of the house. However, he clarified that he has no allegation that his wife had any illicit relationship with anybody else. 15. The prosecution has mainly relied upon Ext.P7 dying declaration of the deceased recorded on 1[st] November, 2017. The dying declaration was given by the deceased through finger spelling to PW10, the interpreter. He in turn translated the same to the Magistrate (PW26). In the dying declaration she told the Magistrate that her husband is a drunkard who regularly used to quarrel with her and assault her. He does not used to pay for the household expenses. He poured kerosene on her body and set her ablaze using match stick. According to her, when the neighbouring ladies tried to save her, her husband tried to push her towards the flame. He also has not accompanied her to the hospital. Even at that time she told the Magistrate that her husband is also a _Crl.App.370/2023_ 8 deaf and dumb and also that she still needs her husband, after he gets the lessons of obedience from the jail. 16. Ext.P7 dying declaration was proved through the evidence of PW26, PW14 and PW10. PW26 is the Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration. PW14 is the doctor who certified the physical and mental condition of the deceased as per Ext.P10 certificate. PW10 is the interpreter who translated the dying declaration given by the deceased through finger spelling method. From the evidence of PW26 it is revealed that before recording the declaration, he had ensured that the deceased is fit enough to give the declaration voluntarily. He also obtained Ext.P10 medical certificate from PW14, the Doctor to ensure that the deceased was in sound health, both physically and mentally. PW10, the Doctor, deposed that the deceased was in good health while giving the statement. 17. At the time of evidence, a contention was taken by the appellant that PW10, who interpreted the dying declaration given by the deceased is not a competent person. However, PW10 deposed that he is working as teacher in Valakam Vocational higher secondary school for the last 20 years where he is teaching deaf and dumb students. We do not find any grounds to disbelieve the evidence of PW10 and his competency as an interpreter. The dying declaration recorded by PW26 with the help of PW10 and marked as Ext.P7 is, in tune with the evidence of PWs1 to 3. _Crl.App.370/2023_ 9 18. The law is well settled that dying declaration can be taken as basis for entering into a conviction, if it is found to the satisfaction of the court to be voluntary and trustworthy. As in the case of English Law, in India there is no necessity that the person who gives the dying declaration shall be a person expecting imminent death, while giving the above statement. In the decision in **Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan** (2000) 1 SCC 310, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid down the principle of evaluation of any dying declaration in paragraph 18 as follows :- _“Now we proceed to examine the principle of evaluation of any dying declaration. There is distinction between the evaluation of dying declaration under the English Law and that under the Indian Law. Under the English Law, credence and the relevancy of a dying declaration is only when person making such statement is in hopeless condition and expecting an imminent death. So under the English Law for its admissibility, the declarant should have been in actual danger of death at the time when they are made, and that he should have had a full apprehension of his danger and the death should have ensued. Under the Indian Law the dying declaration is relevant whether the person who makes it was or was not under expectation of death at the time of declaration. Dying declaration is admissible not only in the case of homicide_ _Crl.App.370/2023_ 10 _but also in civil suits. Under the English Law, the admissibility rests on the principle that a sense of impending death produces in a man's mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man under oath. The general principle on which this species of evidence are admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak only the truth. If evidence in a case reveals that declarant has reached this state while making a declaration then within the sphere of the Indian Law, while testing the credibility of such dying declaration weightage can be given. Of course depending on other relevant facts and circumstances of case”._ 19. The principles to be borne in mind while appreciating the evidentiary value of a dying declaration were enumerated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision in **Atbir v. Govt.of NCT of Delhi,** AIR 2010 SC 3477, in paragraph 22 as follows: “ _The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that,_ _(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court._ _Crl.App.370/2023_ 11 _(ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination._ _(iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration._ _(iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence._ _(v) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence._ _(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction._ _(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected._ _(viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded._ _(ix) When the eye - witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail._ _(x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and_ _Crl.App.370/2023_ 12 _free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration”._ 20. In the decision in **State of Rajasthan v. Ganwara,** (2019) 13 SCC 687 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that dying declaration can be sole basis for conviction if it is free from doubt and inspires full confidence of the court in it's truthfulness and correctness. In paragraph 8 the court held: “ _It is well settled and needs no reiteration at our hands that dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction. At the same time, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations that adds weight to the prosecution case, but their qualitative worth is what matters. The settled legal principle is that dying declaration should be free from slightest of doubt and shall be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its truthfulness and correctness. The Court must exercise great caution while considering the weight to be given to a dying declaration, particularly when there are more than one dying declaration”._ 21. In the decision in **Mukesh and Another, v. State for NCT of Delhi and Others** , AIR 2017 SC 2161, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a dying declaration need not necessarily be by words or in writing. It can be by _Crl.App.370/2023_ 13 gestures or by nod. Dying declaration recorded on the basis of nods and gestures is not only admissible, but also possesses evidentiary value, the extent of which shall depend upon who recorded the statement. In paragraph 188 the court held as follows: _“Appreciating the third dying declaration recorded on the_ _basis of gestures, nods and writings on the base of aforesaid pronouncements, we have no hesitation in holding that the dying declaration made through signs, gestures or by nods are admissible as evidence, if proper care was taken at the time of recording the statement. The only caution the Court ought to take is that the person recording the dying declaration is able to notice correctly as to what the declarant means by answering by gestures or nods. In the present case, this caution was aptly taken, as the person who recorded the prosecutrix's dying declaration was the Metropolitan Magistrate and he was satisfied himself as regards the mental alertness and fitness of the prosecutrix, and recorded the dying declaration of the prosecutrix by noticing her gestures and by her own writings”._ 22. In this case the dying declaration was given to a competent judicial Magistrate, using finger spelling method, as the victim is deaf and dumb. PW10, a well experienced teacher in the field interpreted the same to the _Crl.App.370/2023_ 14 Magistrate. On a perusal of Ext.P7 dying declaration it is crystal clear that the deceased is too naive, rustic, and natural, unable to tell any lies, so that we could trust and believe her words blindly. It is voluntary, natural to the core, free from any disabilities. There is absolutely no grounds to disbelieve the above dying declaration, which is cent percent reliable and trustworthy. In the above circumstance, the sole dying declaration of the deceased is sufficient enough to base the conviction against the appellant. 23. The appellant is a fisherman. He is residing in a fishermen colony. The witnesses of PWs 1 to 3 are also residing in the same colony. It is an apartment complex. Each unit in the colony has a single bed room, a hall and a kitchen. It is also revealed that in each floor, there are four flats. Therefore, they are natural and probable witnesses. From the evidence of PWs1 to 3 it is revealed that they are all residing very close to each other . At about 8.15 pm on 31.10.2017, while hearing the noise of utensils falling down in the residence of the appellant, all of them ran towards the house along with CW1 and directly saw the heinous incident. 24. It is true that the prosecution could not examine CW1, who is another neighbour of the accused and the deceased, who was there along with Pws 1 to 3 to rescue the deceased. The reason for her non-examination is not forthcoming. In the above circumstance, the FIS was marked as Ext.P17, through PW25, the SHO. Since CW1 was not examined, Ext.P17 was not _Crl.App.370/2023_ 15 proved. However, PWs 1 to 3 in categorical terms deposed evidence supporting the prosecution. Though they were cross-examined, nothing material could be brought out to discredit their testimonies. 25. PW13 is the Professor in Surgery and Chief of S2 unit of Medical College hospital, Kottayam, who had treated the deceased from 31.10.2017 to 6.11.2017 and proved Ext.P9 case sheet relating to the treatment given to the deceased. According to him, there was more than 70% burns on the body of the deceased and severe burns were on the backside of her body. PW19 was the Assistant Professor and Deputy Police Surgeon, Department of Forensic Medicine, Medical College hospital, Kottayam, who had conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased and issued Ext.P14 postmortem certificate. He also deposed that the deceased died of the burns over 70%. He also deposed that most of the burns were on the backside of the deceased. The above medical evidence of PWs 13 and 19 is in tune with Ext.P8 dying declaration and the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 to the effect that the appellant poured kerosene from behind the deceased and set her ablaze. Moreover, there was nobody else in the house when the above incident occurred other than the three year old child. PW12 was the Casualty Medical Officer (CMO), District hospital, Kollam, who had first examined the deceased at about 8.37 pm on 31.10.2017 and issued Ext.P8 certificate. He also deposed that there was more than 70% burns on the body of the deceased and therefore, she was immediately referred to the _Crl.App.370/2023_ 16 Medical College hospital, Kottayam. 26. From the evidence of PWs 12, 13 and 19, it is revealed that there was more than 70% burns on the body of the deceased and according to PW19, she died of the burns. PW13, the Professor of surgery, Medical college hospital, Kottayam, who treated the deceased also deposed that 70% burns is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Moreover, according to him, 70% of burns will definitely result in causing the death of the victim. 27. At the time of evidence PWs 2 and 3 deposed that when they forcefully pushed open the front door of the house of the appellant to save the deceased, they saw the accused eating noodles using a spoon. At first we found it difficult to believe that a husband having senses could behave in such a strange manner, after setting his wife ablaze. The appellant has no case that he is suffering from any kind of mental illness. During the examination of the appellant under Section 313 (1)(b) of Cr.P.C, he admitted that he was eating noodles when PWs 1 to 3 and CW1 forcefully opened the door and entered inside his house. 28. Altogether 103 questions (Many of them are repetitions and unnecessary) were seen put to the appellant during the examination under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. On a meticulous perusal of those questions and the answers given to those questions by the appellant, it can be seen that, the appellant answered those questions after understanding each question _Crl.App.370/2023_ 17 thoroughly. It is also seen that, to those questions had given very rational answers and has not simply denied the questions, as is done by the accused persons, generally. At the same time, it can be seen that, he had denied crucial questions relating to the incriminating substances put to him. For questions relating to his relationship with the deceased, he had given correct answers, without making any attempt to hide his suspicion against her character. Since he had given very rational answers to so many questions put to him during the examination under Section 313 (1)(b) Cr.P.C, and such a contention was not raised either before the trial court or before us, the defence of insanity does not arise in this case. 29. In this case there is the direct evidence of Pws 1 to 3 and Exts.P1 to P3 to corroborate Ext.P7 dying declaration. Therefore, from the evidence of PWs1 to 3, which is further corroborated by Exts.P1 to P3 namely S.164 Cr.P.C. statements and Exts.P7 dying declaration, the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant has caused the death of his wife by immolation. 30. Now, the question to be considered is whether the facts proved by the prosecution brings the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of murder contained in S.300. In order to get the correct answer to that question, the most crucial factor is to ascertain the actual intention of the accused at the time of commission of the offence. Since it is the state of mind _Crl.App.370/2023_ 18 of the accused, we will not get any direct evidence to prove the same. Instead, we will have to depend upon the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence . 31. The distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder was considered by the Apex Court as well as this court in a plethora of decisions. In the celebrated decision in **State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another,** AIR 1977 SC 45, in paragraph 21 the Apex Court held that: _“From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder,' on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in S.299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of S.300, Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the Court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of_ _Crl.App.370/2023_ 19 _'murder' contained in S.300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable under the first or the second part of S.304, depending respectively, on whether the second or the third Clause of s.299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes, within any of the Exceptions enumerated in s. 300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' punishable under the First Part of s.304, Penal Code.”_ 32. In the decision in **Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab** , AIR 1958 SC 465, the Apex Court had occasion to consider how the intention of the assailant is to be inferred. In paragraph 16 & 17 the court held that: _“The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If be can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention_ _Crl.App.370/2023_ 20 _to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question._ _It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of the injury. For example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of the circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, then of course the offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all. His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not One of law but one of fact”_ 33. In this case the incident occurred while the deceased was cooking dinner for the family. At that time he came from behind with MO1 Can containing kerosene and poured it on the backside of her body and set her ablaze. He had collected kerosene in MO1 in the morning itself. He had also prevented Pws 1 to 3 and CW1 from rescuing her. When they tried to save her, he again pushed her towards the flame. He also has not accompanied her to the _Crl.App.370/2023_ 21 hospital. At the same time he admitted that he has suspicion about her chastity. Due to suspicion, he even used to close the doors, windows and air holes in the house and lock his wife inside the house, as and when he goes out. There is absolutely no evidence to prove that there was even any slightest provocation from the side of the deceased. Therefore, his above act was a premeditated one. From the above conduct of the appellant, his intention is very much clear. It is undoubtedly, to cause the death of his wife. Since, by doing the above act, death of his wife was caused, his above act amounts to culpable homicide amounting to murder coming under clause 1 of S.300, punishable under Section 302 IPC. 34. Even if it is assumed that the appellant had no intention to cause the death of his wife, since he had poured kerosene on her body and set her ablaze, it is evident that he had at least the intention to cause bodily injury to his wife. Since he had poured kerosene from a Can on her body and set her ablaze, it is common knowledge that the bodily injury likely to be caused thereby will be severe enough to cause her death. Therefore, it can be concluded that the bodily injury intended to be inflicted by the accused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of his wife. Viewed in that angle, the act of the accused will come under clause 3 of Section 300 of IPC, and as such it amounts to murder punishable under Section 302 IPC. 35. Since there was no provocation from the side of the deceased and the appellant committed the aforesaid act in a premeditated manner with the _Crl.App.370/2023_ 22 intention either to cause her death or to cause such bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause her death, Exceptions to Section 300 are not applicable in this case. In the above circumstances, we do not find any irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court, so as to call for any interference. 36. In the light of the above reasons, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is liable to be confirmed and this Crl.Appeal is liable to be dismissed. Points 1 & 2 answered accordingly. 37. In the result, the Crl.Appeal is dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. **NB –** 38. Before parting with, one word of solace to the innocent child who lost his mother for ever and father during his childhood and adolescence, at the age of 3, for no fault of his own. In the impugned judgment there is a direction to pay the fine amount of Rs.50,000/-, if realized, to the minor child, as compensation. There is no chance for realising the fine amount, as the accused who is his father is a poor fisherman and he is in jail since 2017. 39. Based on our inquiry, a report was filed by the SHO, Pallithottam police station, stating that now the child xxx is studying in Standard V-A in Infant Jesus Anglo Indian School, Thangassery, Kollam, under the guardianship of his uncle Sri.Sunil and aunt Smt.Mary Latha, his father's sister. In the above _Crl.App.370/2023_ 23 circumstance, there will be a direction to the Chairman, DLSA, Kollam, to take necessary steps to determine and disburse the reasonable compensation payable to the child, as provided under the Victim Compensation Scheme. The Registry shall forward a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, DLSA, Kollam, forthwith, for necessary follow up action. **Sd/- P.B.Suresh Kumar, Judge** **Sd/- C.Pratheep Kumar, Judge** Mrcs/sou/25.7.