High CourtDivision BenchAppeals dismissed.

Amit Chanchal Jha v. Registrar High Court of Delhi

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal Nos. 864-865 of 2012
Neutral Citation:[2014] 12 S.C.R. 424

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • T. S. Thakur
  • Adarsh Kumar Goel
Judgment Date
2014-12-12
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals dismissed. The conviction for criminal contempt stands, but the direction to report the matter to the Bar Council of India is set aside as unnecessary in light of the Court’s order.
Final Disposition
Appeals dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Amit Chanchal Jha

Respondents

  • Registrar High Court of Delhi
  • The Lady Advocate (identity not disclosed)

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • M.N. Krishnamani
  • • A. Sharan
  • • Vivek Singh
  • • Rajeev Yadav
  • • Aseem Chandra
  • • Avinash Tirpathi
  • • Raghvendra Tiwari

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Huzefa A. Ahmadi
  • • Geeta Luthra
  • • G. Ramakrishna Prasad
  • • Filza Moonis
  • • Purnima Bhat

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court judgment arises from two criminal contempt appeals filed by advocate Amit Chanchal Jha challenging a Delhi High Court order convicting him of criminal contempt for allegedly abusing a lady advocate during judicial proceedings before a Joint Registrar. The Joint Registrar noted that the lady advocate cried and reported being slapped; the matter was taken up by a Bench in chambers, and the appellant admitted the charge. The Delhi High Court held that his conduct interfered with judicial procedure and obstructed the administration of justice, convicting him of criminal contempt, sentencing seven days’ imprisonment, debarment from appearing before any court in Delhi for three months, and directing the matter to be reported to the Bar Council of India. The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that no show-cause notice was issued, that the in-court incident did not constitute contempt in the face of the court, and that his unconditional apology should purify the record. The High Court’s order also relied on the appellant’s vacillating stance in various affidavits and pleadings. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court acknowledges the seriousness of contempt and the need to protect public interest; however, it finds the apology not sincere enough to purge the contempt and, while upholding the conviction, sets aside the directive to report to the Bar Council. The appeals are dismissed, reaffirming the need for professional ethics and the Bar’s regulatory role.

Provisions of Law Cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, s.2(c)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • The course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with.
  • The sole purpose of contempt proceedings is to protect the public's rights by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented.
  • Apology must be genuine and sincere.
  • The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation; the Bar must maintain high professional standards.
  • Contempt powers should be exercised to preserve the dignity of the judiciary, but only when necessary to protect public interest.
  • Hard line judgments require that apologies offered in contempt proceedings be judged by their genuineness and timing.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant argued that the High Court’s conviction for contempt was not justified since no show-cause notice was issued and due process was not followed. He claimed the incident occurred in a chamber in the heat of adjournment and not in the presence of the Joint Registrar, so it could not be contempt in the face of the Court. He asserted that he immediately offered an unconditional apology and that the allegations against the lady advocate and the High Court had been disputed. He contended that there was no written admission of guilt and that the apology should purge the contempt, especially since he is a long-standing advocate and had already suffered punishment. He urged recall and setting aside the conviction; the Bar Council referral was unnecessary since the matter had been dealt with in court.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent’s counsel argued that contempt powers must not be lightly invoked, especially against a lawyer, and that mere apology cannot purge serious misconduct compromising the dignity of the court and the legal profession. They emphasized that the incident occurred in the face of the court, amid emotional intensity, and that the appellant vacillated in his statements, undermining procedural safeguards. While acknowledging the seriousness of the matter, they urged maintaining the conviction to deter similar misconduct and uphold public confidence in the judiciary. They suggested that the initial referral to the Bar Council of India was a reasonable measure to address professional accountability, though the Supreme Court ultimately set aside that directive as unnecessary.

Cited Precedents (12)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
R.K. Anand vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court2009 (11) SCR 1026PositiveCited to emphasize concerns about declining ethical and professional standards among lawyers and the need for discipline and reform in the profession.
Sanjiv Datta, Dy. Secy., Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, In re.1995 (3) SCR 450PositiveUsed to support the view that the legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation and warrants exemplary conduct.
Bar Council of Maharashtra vs. M. V. Dabholkar1976 (2) SCR 291PositiveCited regarding canons of professional conduct and the Bar’s responsibility to uphold standards.
Pritam Pal vs. High Court of M.P.1993 (Supp) 1 SCC 529PositiveSupports that contempt powers should be exercised sparingly and only with due consideration to judicial integrity.
Pravin C. Shah vs. K.A. Mohd. Ali2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 675PositiveContains principles on sincerity and genuineness of apologies in contempt proceedings.
Morris v. Crown Office(1970) 1 All ER 1079PositiveQuoted for the principle that the course of justice must not be deflected.
Offutt v. U.S.348 U.S. 11 (1954)PositiveSupports the notion that contempt proceedings protect the majesty of law.
Jennison v. Baker(1972) 1 All ER 1006PositiveCited regarding the purpose of contempt proceedings.
Mulk Raj v. State of Punjab(1972) 3 SCC 839PositiveFour-Judge Bench guidance on the seriousness of apologies in contempt.
M. Y. Shareef v. Hon'ble Judges of the Nagpur High CourtAIR (1955) SC 19PositiveSupports that apology is not a blanket purge and must reflect contrition.
M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana(1991) 3 SCC 600PositiveCited in the context of evaluating apologetic conduct by a contemnor.
Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries(1980) 3 SCC 311Mentioned OnlyReferenced in the discussion, but not central to the decision.

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A # (2014] 12 S.C.R. 424. # AMIT CHANCHAL JHA _v._ REGISTRAR HIGH COURT OF DELHI (Criminal Appeal Nos. 864-865 of 2012) B ## DECEMBER 12, 2014 · [T.S. THAKUR AND ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.] · _Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: s.2(c)- Criminal contempt_ - _Allegation that appe1/ant-advocate abused_ a _lady advocate_ C _during judicial proceedings_ - _Matter taken up by the Bench in chamber_ - _Appellant admitting the charge_ - _Convicted for criminal contempt and punished to undergo imprisonment for_ 7 _days and debarred from appearing in court for 3 months and matter directed to be reported to the Bar Council of India for_ D _taking appropriate action_ - _Held: Appellant taking vacillating stand_ - _Apology tendered by appellant not sincere enough to be accepted_ so as _to set aside the conviction_ - _No reason to interfere with the impugned orders except to set aside the direction to refer the matter to the BC/._ E Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The stand of the appellant has been vacillating. He first made a statement before the Bench of the High Court on 13th January, 2012 admitting the F charge. He sought to partly withdraw the said stand by filing an application for recall. Thereafter, in his petition in this Co.urt, he tried to contradict not only the lady advocate but also the High Court. Thereafter, when the case came up for hearing and on joint request of the G counsel for the parties, the matter was adjourned, an affidavit was filed withdrawing all the allegations against respondent no.2. He however, did not withdraw the allegations against the High Court attributing incorrect 424 H ## AMIT CHANCHAL JHA _v._ REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 425 OF DELHI recording of facts in the order of the Bench and the Joint A Registrar. [Para 15] [631-H; 632-A-B] _R.K. Anand vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court_ (2009) 8 SCC 106:2009 (11) SCR 1026; _Sanjiv Datta, Dy. Secy., Ministry oflnformation_ & _Broadcasting, In re._ (1995) 3 SCC .619: 1995 (3) SCR 450; _Bar Council of Maharashtra vs. M. V. Dabholkar_ (1976) 2 sec 291: 1976 (2) SCR 48 - relied on. B > 2. The power of contempt should not be lightly initiated by the .court, particularly against a lawyer but the fact would remain that exercise of such power becomes C necessary in the interest of public and also in the interest of due administration of justice. In view of this, no ground to interfere with the impugned orders except to set aside the direction to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India. · [Paras 18, 21] [436-E-F; 440-F-G] . D _Pritam Pal vs. High Court of M.P._ 1993 (Supp) 1 SCC - 529 relied on. _Pravin_ C. _Shah vs. K.A. Mohd. Ali_ (2001) 8 SCC 650: 2001(3) Suppl. SCR 675 - held applicable. E ## Case Law Reference: 2009 (11) SCR 1026 relied on Para 16 1995 (3) SCR 450 relied on Para 17 F 1976 (2 'SCR 48 relied on Para 17 1993 (Supp) 1 sec 529 relied on Para 18 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 675 held inapplicable Para 19 G CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 864~865 of 2012. From the Judgment & Order of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi dated 13.01.2012 in Crl. Cont. No. 0112012 and H 426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 12 S.C.R. A 16.01.2012 in Crl. Misc. No. 753/2012. M.N. Krishnamani, A. Sharan, Vivek Singh, Rajeev Yadav, Aseem Chandra, Avinash Tirpathi, Raghvendra Tiwari for the Appellant. B Huzefa A. Ahmadi, Geeta Luthra, G. Ramakrishna Prasad, Filza Moonis, Purnima Bhat for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C **ADARSH KUMAR GOEL** J .. 1. These appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 13th January, 2012 in Criminal Contempt No.1 of 2012 and order dated 16th January, 2012 in Criminal Miscellaneous No.753 of 2012 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.[1 ] · D 2. The appellant is an advocate practicing in Delhi High Court. On 13th January, 2012 he allegedly abused a lady advocate (identity not being mentioned) during the judicial proceedings before an Additional District Judge, posted as Joint Registrar in the High Court. The Joint Registrar noticed E that the lady lawyer was crying and she said that she was slapped by the appellant. The appellant also complained that he was also slapped. The Joint Registrar asked the lady advocate to sit in his chamber so that normalcy could be restored. The matter was mentioned by a group of lawyers F before the Acting Chief Justice. The matter was taken up by the Bench in chamber and the Joint Registrar produced the copy of proceedings recorded by him regarding the incident. However, the exact details of the incident are not mentioned in the order passed by the Bench on 13th January, 2012, in order G to maintain decency. On being confronted, the appellant admitted the charge. He was informed that his conduct involved criminal contempt and asked as to why show cause notice be not issued to him. He stated that he did not wish to"give any reply and was ready to face the punishment for the charge. H AMIT CHANCHAL JHA _v._ REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 427 OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] 3. After due consideration, the Division Bench headed by A the Acting Chief Justice held that the conduct of the appellant had caused interference with the judicial procedure and obstructed the administration of justice and was contumacious. The appellant appeared to be accustomed to use of brute force which was antithetic to the procedure established by law. Such B incidents could lead the young advocates shying away from the court. Accorpingly, the appellant was convicted for criminal contempt and was punished to undergo imprisonment for seven days and asked to do pro bono legal aid work for the inmates of the jail. He was debarred from appearing in any court in Delhi c for three months and the matter was directed to be reported to the Bar Council of India for taking appropriate action. 4. The appellant, thereafter, filed an application for recall of the order on the ground that the case did not fall in the definition of 'crlminal contempt' under Section 2(c) of the D Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The altercation between the two lawyers. had not taken place in the presence .of the Joint Registrar and thus it was not a case of contempt in the face of the Court. Moreover, the action of the appellant was not willful as it was at the spur of the moment. The appellant was regretful E and remorseful and had expressed regret without any loss of time. There was no chance of his repetition of the said act and he had not been issued notice to show cause against the punishment of debarment from the Court. He sought reconsideration of the order of imprisonment. The Bench did F not find any merit in the application. It was held that the appellant had the standing of about seven years and he had admitted the incident and had stated that there was no need of issuing notice to him. The indecent behaviour of physical abuse of a lady advocate was undisputed. The incident was in the face of G the court and during the judicial proceedings. If the plea of the appellant was to be accepted it will encourage litigants and their counsel to settle scores by use of force during the court proceedings. The appellant was given due opportunity but he did not wish to file any reply and wanted the matter to be H ## 428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R. A concluded. Moreover, he could have no explanation for his .behaviour. Accordingly, the application was dismissed on 16th January, 2012. 5. The appellant thereafter, filed these appeals. The lady 8[advocate was impleaded ][as ][a party to the proceedings. ] I 6. The contention raised in the appeals is that the impugned order of conviction was not justified as no show cause notice was given and due procedure was not followed. Altercation took place on account of unreasonable behavior of C the lady advocate in seeking adjournment and objecting to his presence along with the main counsel. The lady advocate scolded him and also slapped him and he slapped her back in a reflex reaction. Thereafter, she slapped him a number of times. The lady advocate falsely complained that the appellant D had slapped her. She had slapped him first. The appellant offered unconditional apology as per suggestion of the · Registrar after which he was again slapped. In the report of the Joint Registrar, the facts were not correctly mentioned. The appellant had also suffered swelling on his lips due to repeated E slaps which was clear from the prescription of the dispensary of the High Court. Thereafter, he was pushed hard by the counsel with whom the lady advocate was working and also abused. The appellant was informed to appear before the Court of the Chief Justice. He was advised by the members of F the Bar and on the assurance of the senior members that since he was not in a normal state' of mind, he should tender unconditional apology to defuse the matter reposing faith in the judiciary. The incident happened on the initiation of the lady lawyer who was solely accountable for the incident. The appellant could not put forward his version before the Chief G Justice. The order of the Joint Registrar was not shown to him. Number of advocates supported the lady advocate and the appellant was not allowed to speak. He was shocked by the order .of imprisonment passed against him in spite of l:lis unconditional apology. He was informed that terms of settlement H ## AMIT CHANCHAL JHA _v._ REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 429 OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] were going on but still he was taken into custody. Indecent A behavior recorded in order dated 13th January, 2012 was not correct. Application for recall was made by his wife but her submissions were not noted by the Court and Order dated 16th January, 2012 was passed without even acknowledging the presence of the appellant's wife. · B B 7. According to the appellant his unconditional apology was misconstrued and fair trial was denied to him. The High Court had fallen into grave error in ignoring the principles of fair procedure on an erroneous assumption that the appellant had pleaded guilty, without verifying the veracity of the said assumption and without proof of admission of the charge in written form. There was no written complaint by the lady advocate. The allegations constituting contempt are. required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The sentence was not suspended to enable him to take appropriate remedy. His mental conditio,n in surcharged atmosphere was not properly assessed. The appellant had not voluntarily admitted anything. He was not given any legal assistance. It was wrongly observed that appellant had not disputed indecent behavior and physical abuse as the appellant was never informed or aware of the allegations and came to know of the same only from the order of the Court. Specific notice of debarment was required to be served on him. Power of _suo motu_ ~ontempt could be exercised rarely. when the Court receives information from its own sources. In the present case, proceedings were at the instance of the complainant-lady advocate, represented by a team of lawyers. The proceedings were driven by personal enmity of senior associate of the lady advocate. The appellant was not allowed to file affidavit elaborating his defence. The appellant has also filed application for permission to file Annexures P4 to PS. Annexure P4 is a prescription from the dispensary and Annexures PS to PS are affidavits of advocates in support of the case of the appellant. C D E F G S. A counter affidavit has been filed by the lady advocate disputing the imputations concerning her. She has also H 430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 12 S.C.R. A mentioned details of the indecent assault of the appellant which we do not consider it appropriate to record. The appellant has filed a rejoinder affidavit reiterating the stand taken in the petition. 8 c D 9. When the matter came up for hearing on 24th November, 2014, after some hearing on joint request by learned counsel for the parties, the matter was adjourned to 8th December, 2014. Thereafter affidavit dated 28th November, 2014 was filed in this Court on 2nd December, 2014 stating as follows : _"1. That I withdraw all the averments, a/legations, statements etc. made against respondent No.2 in the present Criminal Appeal, Rejoinder Affidavit, Recall application dated 14.01.2012 filed in the Hon'ble High Court or any other application(s)lpleading(s)._ E _2. That I hereby tender my unconditional and unqualified apology to this Hon'ble Court and to the Hon'ble High Court in respect of the incident that has occurred in the Hon'ble High Court on 13.01.2012._ _3. That I hereby tender my unconditional and unqualified apology to the respondent No. 2 in respect of the incident that has occurred in the Hon'ble High Court on 13.01.2012._ . F _4. That the deponent most humbly prays that his apology is genuine and bonafide and may kindly be accepted by this Hon'ble Court and the deponent may kindly be purged of the contempt."_ G 10. An application has been filed by a lady advocate seeking direction to set up a Committee in accordance with theVishakha Guidelines. An application for impleadment has also been filed by 68 lady advocates on the ground that issue concerned the female members of the bar. H AMIT CHANCHAL JHA _v._ REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 431 OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] > 11. We have heard Shri M.N. Krishnamani, Senior A Advocate, Shri A. Sharan, Advocate appearing for the appellant and Shri Huzefa A. Ahmadi, Senior Advocate appearing for the lady advocate and perused the record. 12. Learned senior advocates appearing for the appellant have submitted that in view of affidavit tendering unqualified and unconditional apology by the appellant to the Court and to the lady advocate and withdrawal of allegations against the lady advocate, this Court may set aside the conviction of the appellant. He had already undergone imprisonment and the period of debarment from appearing in any courts in Delhiwas already over. The Court may also set aside the direction to report the matter to the Bar Council of India for taking appropriate action as such direction was unnecessary. B C 13. Shri Ahmadi, learned senior advocate for the lady advocate, on the other hand, submitted that mere tendering of D unconditional apology was not enough in a matter of this nature where dignity of the Court and of the lady advocate was involved. It is not a case where conviction ought to be set aside. He, however, stated that at this stage it may not be necessary to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India as the matter has E been dealt with by the Court in the course of considering the issue of criminal contempt. He submitted that this Court must dispel the impression that an advocate could commit a serious misconduct and then get away by mere tendering apology which in the circumstances could not be taken to be sincere. F E 14. We have given our anxious consideration to the sensitive issue raised before us in the matter. 15. We find substance in the submission of Shri Ahmadi that the apology tendered by the appellant is not sincere enough to be accepted so as to set aside the conviction. We have reproduced above the details of the proceedings from which it is evident that the stand ofthe appellant has been vacillating. He first made a statement before the Bench of the High Court on 13th January, 2012 admitting the change. He sought to partly H G . ## 432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R. A withdraw the said stand by filing an application for recall. Thereafter, in his petition in this Court the appellant tried to contradict not only the lady advocate but also the High Court. Thereafter, when the case came up for hearing and on joint request of the counsel for the parties, the matter was adjourned, B an affidavit has_ been filed withdrawing all the allegations against Respondent No.2. He has however, not withdrawn the allegations against the High Court attributing incorrect recording of facts in the order of the the Bench and the Joint Registrar. 16. This Court has earlier acknowledged the falling C"standards of certain members of the ·sar and it has become necessary to reiterate the said view on account of repeated instances which are being highlighted. In _R.K. Anand_ vs. _Registrar. Delhi High Court',_ this Court expressed its grave concern and dismay on the decline on ethical and professional D standards among lawyers as follows: _"331. The other important issue thrown up by this case and that causes us both grave concern and dismay is the decline of ethical and professional standards among iawyers. The conduct of the two appellants (one convicted_ E _of committing criminal contempt of court and the other found guilty of misconduct_ as _Special Public Prosecutor), both of them lawyers of long standing, and designated Senior Advocates, should not be seen in isolation. The bitter truth is that the facts of the case are manifestation_ F _of the general erosion of the professional values among_ - _lawyers at all levels. We find today lawyers indulging in practices that would have appalled their predecessors in the profession barely two or three decades ago. Leaving aside the many kinds of unethical practices indulged in_ . G _by_ a _section of lawyers we find that even some highly successful lawyers seem to live by their own rules of conduct._ · ## _xxxxxxxx_ H 1. (2009J a sec 1 os. ## AMIT CHANCHAL JHA _v._ REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 433 OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] _333. We express our concern on the falling professional_ A _norms among the lawyers with considerable pain because we strongly feel that unless the trend_ is _immediately arrested and reversed, it will have very deleterious consequences for the administration of justice in the country. No judicial_ system _in a democratic_ B _society can work satisfactorily unless it_ is _supported by_ a _Bar that enjoys the unqualified trust and confidence of the people, that shares the aspirations, hopes and the ideals of the people and whose members are monetarily accessible and affordable to the people._ c c ## _xxxxxxxx_ _335. Here we must_ a/so _obseNe that the Bar Council of India and the Bar Councils of the different States cannot escape their responsibility in this regard. Indeed the Bar_ D _Council(s) have very positively taken up a number of importantissues concerning the administration of justice in the country. It_ has _consistently fought to safeguard the interests of lawyers and it_ has _done a lot of goodwork for their welfare. But on the_ issue _of maintaining high_ E _professional standards and enforcing discipline among lawyers its performance hardly matches its achievements in other areas. It_ has _not shown much concern even to_ see _that lawyers should obseNe the statutory norms prescribed by the Council itself. We hope and trust that_ F _the Council will at least now sit up and pay proper attention to the restoration of the high professional standards among lawyers worthy of their position in the judicial_ system _and in the society."_ F 17. We may also recall the observations of this Court in _Sanjiv Datta, Dy. Secy., Ministry of Information_ & _Broadcasting, In re"',_ that the legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who G H 2. (1995) 3 sec 619. ## 434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R. A belong to it are its honourable members. The honour as a legal profession has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the Court. The lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others in his profession as well as in private and public life. The society has right to B expect from him ideal behavior. This Court observed : c D E F G H _"20. The legal profession is_ a _solemn and serious occupation. It is_ a _noble calling and all those who belong to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had by acquiring merely the qualification of technical competence, the honour as_ a _professional has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the court. The legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do, affects not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the civilised society. Both as_ a _leading member of the intelligentsia of the society and as_ a _responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself as_ a _model for others both in his professional and in his private and public life. The society has_ a _right to expect of him such ideal behaviour. It must not be forgotten that the legal profession has always been held in high esteem and its members have played an enviable role in public life. The regard for the legal and judicial systems in this country_ is _in no small measure due to the tireless role -played by the stalwarts in the 'profession tci strengthen them. They took their profession seriously and practised it with dignity, deference and devotion. If the profession is to survive, the judicial system_ ffas _to be vitalised. No service will be too small in making the system efficient, effective and credible. The casualness and indifference_ . _with which_ some _members practise the profession are certainly not calculated to achieve that purpose or to enhance the prestige either of the profession or of the institution they are serving. If people lose confidence in_ - ## AMIT CHANCHAL JHA _v._ REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 435 OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] _the profession on account of the deviant_ ways _of_ some A _of its members, it is not only the profession which will suffer but_ also _the administration of justice_ as a _whole. The present trend unless checked_ is _likely to lead to_ a _stage when the_ system _will be found wrecked from within before it_ is _wrecked from outside. It is for the members_ B _of the profession to introspect and take the corrective steps in time and_ also _spare the courts the unpleasant duty. We_ say _no more."_ In _Bar Council of Maharashtra_ vs. _M.V. Dabholkar,_ it C was observed : _"15. Now to the legal_ issue _bearing on canons of professional conduct. The rule of law cannot be built on the ruins of democracy, for where law ends tyranny begins. If such be the keynote thought for the very_ D _survival of our Republic, the integral bond between the lawyer and the public_ is _unbreakable. And the vital role of the lawyer depends upon his probity and professional lifestyle. Be it remembered that the central function of the legal profession is to promote the administration of_ E _justice. If the practice of law_ is _th£.!S_ a _public utility of great implications and_ a _monopoly is statutorily granted by the nation, it obligates the lawyer to observe scrupulously those norms which make him worthy of the confidence of the community in him_ .as a _vehicle of justice_ - _social_ F _justice. The Bar cannot behave with doubtful scruples or strive to thrive on litigation. Canons of conduct cannot be crystallised into rigid rules but felt by the collective conscience of the practitioners_ as _right:_ .. _"It must be_ a _conscience alive to the proprieties_ G _and the improprieties incident to the discharge of_ a _sacred public trust. It must be_ a _conscience governed by the rejection of self-interest and_ H 3. (1976J 2 sec 291. ## 436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R. ,_ A B c D _selfish ambition. It must be_ a _conscience propelled by_ a _consuming desire to play_ a _leading role in the fair and impartial administration of justice, to the end that public confidence may be kept undiminished at all times in the belief that we shall always seek truth and justice in the preservation of the rule of law. It must be_ a _conscience, not shaped by rigid rules of doubtful validity, but answerable only to_ a _moral code which would drive irresponsible Judges from the profession. Without such·_ a _conscience, there should be no Judge" [Hastings, Hon John_ S. _: Judicial Ethics_ as _it Relates to Participatfon in_ - _Money-Making Activities Conference on Judicial Ethics, p. 8. The School of Law, University of Chicago (1964)]."_ _-and, we may add, no lawyer. Such_ is _the high, standard set for professional conduct_ as _expounded by courts in this country and elsewhere."_ E 18. We are conscious of the fact that the power of contempt should not be lightly initiated by the Court, particularly against a lawyer but the fact remains that exercise of such power becomes necessary in the interest of public and also in F the interest of due administration of justice. This aspect was considered in _Pritam Pal_ vs. _High Court of_ M.P.4, wherein reference was made to catena of decisions and it was observed: _"48. In Morris v. Crown Office [(1970) 1 ALL ER 1079] at_ G _page 1081, Lord Denning, M.R.,said: (All ER p. 1081)_ _"The course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who strike at it strike at the very foundations of our society."_ H -----4. 1993 (Supp) 1 sec 529. AMIT CHANCHAL JHA _v._ REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 437 OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] _49. In the_ same case, _Lord Justice Salmon spoke: (ALL ER p. 1087)_ A _"The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our courts the power effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or_ B _prevented."_ _50. Frankfurter, J. in Offutt v. U.S. [348 US 11 (1954)] expressed his view_ as _follows: (U.S. p. 14)_ _"It is_ a _mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in_ C _its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage."_ _51. In Jennison v. Baker [(1972) 1 ALL ER 997] it is stated: (All ER p. 1006)_ D _"The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope."_ _52. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the bench in Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries [ (1980) 3 sec 311] citing those two decisions in the_ cases _of Offut and Jennison stated thus: .(SCC p. 315, para 7)_ E • ... _it may be necessary to punish_ as _a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a_ F _mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and_ a _real interest,_ G _and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is_ so _administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the dlle._ H ## 438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R. - A _administration of justice and,_ so, _it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury_ as _the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but to protect and to_ - B _vindicate the right· of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with."_ 19. As regards, the apology we may recall the observations of this Court in _Pravin C. Shah_ vs. _K.A. Mohd._ C _Ali5_ that: - "28. _xxxxxx It is not enough that he tenders an apology. The apology tendered should impress the court to be genuine and sincere. Xxxxx_ - D 29. _This Court has held in M. Y. Shareef v. Hon'ble Judges of the Nagpur High Court [AIR (1955)_ SC _19] that_ - _"an apology is not_ a _weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate_ as a _universal panacea, but it is intended_ - E _to be evidence of real contriteness". (AIR p. 23, para 10)_ - _Ahmadi, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana [ (1991) 3_ sec _600] while considering an apology_ - F. _tendered by an advocate in_ a _contempt proceeding has stated thus: (SCC p. 603, para 2)_ - _"And here is_ a _member of the profession who has repeated his performance presumably because_ - G _he was let off lightly on the first occasion. Soft justice is not the answer- not that the High Court_ - - _has been harsh with: him what I mean is he cannot be let off on an apology which is far from sincere. His apology was hollow, there was no_ - ------ - H 5. (2001) a sec 650. ## AMIT CHANCHAL JHA _v._ REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 439 OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.] _remorse_ - _no regret_ - _it_ was _only_ a _device to_ A _escape the rigour of the law. What he said in his affidavit_ was _that he had not uttered the words attributed to him by the learned Judge; in other words the learned Judge_ was _lying_ - _adding insult to injury_ - _and yet if the court finds him_ B _guilty (he contested the matter tooth and nail) his unqualitled apology may be accepted. This_ is _no apology, it_ is _merely_ a _device to escape." 30. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Mulk Raj v. State of Punjab ((1972) 3 SCC 839] made the following_ C _obseNations which would throw considerable light on the question before us:_ (SCC _p. 840, pata 9)_ "9. _Apology_ is _an act of r;;ontrition. Unless apology_ is _offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace apology_ is _shorn of penitence. If apology_ is D _offered at_ a _time when the contemnor finds that the court_ is _going to impose punishment it_ ceases _to be an apology and it becomes an act of_ a _cringing coward. The High Court_ was _right in not taking any notice of the appellant's expression of_ E _apology 'without any further word'. The High Court correctly said that acceptance of apology in the_ case _would amount to allow the offender to go away with impunity after having committed_ gross _contempt._ " F _31. Thus am.ere statement made by_ a _contemnor before court that he apologises_ is _hardly enough to amount to purging himself of the contempt. The court must be satisfied of the genuineness of the apology. If the court_ G is so _satisfied and on its_ basis _accepts the apology_ as . _genuine the court has to make an order holding that the contemnor has purged himself of the contempt. Till such an order_ is _passed by the court the delinquent advocate would continue to be under the spell of the interdict contained in Rule 11 of the Rules._ H H SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 12 S.C.R. 440 B c D E A _32. Shri Sadrul Anam, teamed counsel for the respondent Advocate submitted first, that the respondent has in fact apologised before this Court through the counsel engaged by him, and second is that when this Court observed that "this course should set everything at rl,lst" it should be treated as the acknowledgement made by this Court that the contemnor has purged himself of the guilt._ _33. We are unable to accept either of the said contentions. The observation that j'this course should set everything_ . _at rest" in the judgment of this Court cannot be treated as anything beyond the scope of the plea made by the respondent in that case. That apart, this Court was certainly disinclined to accept the apology so tendered in this Court which is clearly manifested from the outright repudiation of that apology when this Court said thus:_ > _"We regretfully will not be able to accept his apology at this belated juncture, but would rather admonish the appellant for his conduct under our plenary powers under the Constitution, which we do hereby."_ 20. The above observations aptly apply to th~ present case. F G 21. In view of the .above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned orders except to set aside the direction to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India as such direction is unnecessary in view of the order which we have passed. · 22. Subject to the above, the appeals are dismJssed. Devika Gujral Appeals dismissed. Appeals dismissed.