Aji Ram v. State

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT:** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.BHAVADASAN** **MONDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF JUNE 2013/27TH JYAISHTA 1935** ## **CRL.A.No. 1755 of 2006 ( )** **------------------------------------AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN SC 198/2003 of SESSIONS COURT,TRIVANDRUM. C.P. NO.26/02 OF JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT-III, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.** **..........** ## **APPELLANT(S)/ACCUSED NO.1** **----------------------------------------------** **AJI RAM, S/O.SIVARAMAN, T.C.14/1660 (1), FOREST OFFICE LANE, PALAYAM WARD THYCAUD VILLAGE (ACCUSED-1 IN S.C.198/2003 OF THE PRINCIPAL SESSIONS COURT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM).** **BY ADVS.SRI.KOTTOOR B. GOPALAKRISHNA PILLAI SRI.R.T.PRADEEP SRI.V. VIJULAL** **RESPONDENT(S): ----------------------------** **STATE REPPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROSECUTION, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.** **BY GOVT.PLEADER SRI.V.S.SREEJITH** **THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 17-06-2013, ALONG WITH CRL.A. NO.404 OF 2007 THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **tss** ## **P.BHAVADASAN, J.** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Crl.A. Nos. 1755 of 2006 & 404 of 2007 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 17[th] day of June, 2013 ## **J U D G M E N T** These appeals tell the tale of a coy young girl who went for tuition, was subjected to severe sexual assault and exploitation by the teacher which ultimately ended up with the student immolating herself. 2. The victim was the daughter of PWs 2 and 3. While in the 5[th] standard, she was sent for tuition to the first accused. It appears that the first accused took advantage of the innocence of the girl and began to sexually exploit her. Initially, the child did not know what was happening to her. Later, it so happened as could be discerned from the records that the girl developed an infatuation towards the accused which became an obsession later. When she realized that due to several reasons, the first accused was disinclined to marry her and that he will forsake her, she did the ultimate that is set herself on fire. Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-2-** 3. The incident occurred on 01.06.2001 at about 10.30 a.m.. PWs 2 and 3 had gone for work as usual. On that day, as per the materials now available, PW5 saw the victim crying and asked for the reason. The victim replied that there was no particular reason for her to cry. PW5 left the matter there. A short while thereafter, she claims to have heard shrieks from the house of the victim and she rushed to the spot to find the victim on fire. PWs 4 and 7 who were neighbours also had gathered there by that time and so also A2, the second accused who is none other than the mother of the first accused. As per the evidence on record now available, A2, PWs 1, 4 and 7 and two others took the victim to the hospital. She was admitted to the Medical College Hospital and she was first attended to by PW11 who was in the casualty section and who issued Ext.P9 certificate. PWs 2 and 3 were informed about the incident and they reached the Medical College Hospital. So did PW1, the paternal uncle of the victim. By about 3.45 in the noon, Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-3-** the victim breathed her last. PW1 went to the Museum Police Station and laid Ext.P1, First Information Statement. PW14 recorded the same and registered Ext.P1(a), FIR on the basis of the First Information Statement provided by PW1. Investigation was taken over by PW18. He conducted inquest and prepared Ext.P2, inquest report, prepared Ext.P3, scene mahazar and while preparing scene mahazar, he seized MO1 and Exts.P4 and P5 series of documents. Body was sent for postmortem. PW14, the doctor who conducted the autopsy, furnished Ext.P13 report. PW19, the successor to PW18 took over investigation. He seized two notebooks of the deceased, namely Ext.P17, as per Ext.P16 inventory. He also seized answer sheets of the deceased from the school as per Ext. P15, mahazar. He had S.S.L.C. book of the victim seized as per Ext.P18, mahazar. Finding that the offence of rape, abetment to suicide and the offence under the provisions of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act were made out, he filed Ext.P19 report Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-4-** incorporating Sections 376 and 306 IPC and Sections 3(1)(xi) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the two accused persons. He had the notebook etc sent for expert's opinion and PW13, the hand writing expert examined them and furnished Ext.P12 report. Objects were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory and Ext.P21 report was obtained. He recorded statement of witnesses, completed investigation and laid charge before the court. 4. The court before which the final report was laid, took cognizance of the offences. Finding that the case is triable by a Special Court, the said court committed the case to Special Judge for SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Thiruvananthapuram under Section 209 Cr.P.C.. On getting records and on appearance of the accused before the said court, the said court framed charges for the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 376 read with 34 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(xi) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. To the charge, the accused pleaded Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-5-** not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution therefore had PWs 1 to 19 examined and Exts. P1 to P21 marked. Ext.X1 was also marked from the prosecution side. The defence had D1 marked which is the portion of contradictory statement of PW7 under Section 161 Cr.P.C.. MO1 series were got identified and marked. 5. After the close of prosecution evidence, the accused were questioned under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., regarding the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against them. They denied the circumstances and maintained that they were innocent. The first accused stated that he had taken tuition classes to the deceased only till the 10[th] standard and the incident occurred 1½ to 2 years thereafter. He said, he did not know the reason for the suicide. He had no idea about what transpired after the victim ceased to come for tuition to him. He also pointed out that on the date of incident, his mother had also accompanied the victim to the hospital. The second accused Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-6-** stated that she is a neighbour of the victim and number of students used to come to her house for tuition. His son, the first accused was the tuition master. The victim had also come for tuition to him. It is stated that about 1 to 1½ years prior to the date of incident, Manju ceased to come for tuition and thereafter, she does not know what transpired. 6. Finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 of Cr.P.C., they were asked to enter on their defence. They chose to adduce no evidence. On an appreciation of the materials before it, the court below found that the statement alleged to have been made to PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 by the victim qualifies as dying declaration and also that Exts. P4 and P5 series of letters were in the handwriting of the victim and that these items of evidence are sufficient to show that the offences under Section 376 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(xi) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are made out as against the first accused. The second accused was found not guilty of any of the charges Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-7-** levelled against her and she was acquitted under Section 235(1) of Cr.P.C. 7. The State in its appeal, namely, Crl.A.No.404 of 2007 assails apart from the acquittal of the second accused of the charges levelled against her, also attacks the acquittal of the first accused for the offence under Section 306 of IPC and also seeks enhancement of sentence for the offence under Section 376 of IPC. 8. On the other hand, the first accused who stood convicted for the offences mentioned above, assails his conviction and sentence in appeal as Crl. A.No.1755 of 2006. 9. The State in its appeal contends that the court below was not justified in acquitting both the accused for the offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC. So also the evidence on record would indicate that A2 had called the victim by her caste name and if that be so, she could not have been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-8-** The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 taken along with Exts. P4 and P5 apart from the unholy relationship the first accused had with the victim, also showed the contempt which the accused had towards the victim because she belonged to a scheduled caste. Not only had the first accused exploited her sexually to the maximum but at a later point of time, he made it very explicit that he would not marry her. The second accused had also humiliated the victim with reference to her caste. This shows the complicity of both A1 and A2. The evidence shows that A2 having come to know about the unholy relationship which the first accused had with the victim, became furious and accused the deceased of being responsible for the same. The evidence of PW3 would show according to the learned Public Prosecutor that the victim was addressed by her caste name by the second accused and the first accused by his conduct made it very clear that he, after having exploited her, was not inclined to marry her. That had driven the victim to commit suicide and Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-9-** therefore, the acts of A1 and A2 fall within the ambit of abetment and they could not have been acquitted for the offences under Section 306 of IPC. Since the evidence shows that A2 had addressed the victim by her caste name and humiliated her by calling her caste name, her acquittal of the offence under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is also unsustainable. It is further pointed out that considering the nature of the acts committed by the first accused, the position in which he was placed and his attitude after the exploitation would indicate that he deserves a much severe punishment than what is meted out by the court below. On these grounds, the learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the State Appeal may be allowed. 10. In reply, the accused pointed out that by no stretch of imagination, the offence under Section 306 can be attracted. The accused had no inkling as to the act intended to be committed by the victim and therefore they could not Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-10-** be said to have aided or instigated the victim to do so. Merely because the second accused had taken objection to the relationship between the first accused and the victim and might have also humiliated the victim by calling her caste name, that does not result in aiding or instigating the victim to commit suicide. The conduct of A2 was also referred to and it was pointed out that not only she had tried to douse the fire but had also accompanied the victim to the hospital. If as a matter of fact, she had any role to play in the suicide committed by the victim, she would not have done the above acts. It is significant to notice according to the learned counsel appearing for the accused that the second accused, long before the incident, had cautioned PW3 about the illicit relationship between the victim and the first accused and had warned her about the consequences. Even assuming that she was against the marriage of the first accused with the victim due to the caste to which the victim belonged, that by itself is insufficient either to attract the Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-11-** provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act or Section 306 of IPC. Nothing prevents the second accused, according to the learned counsel, from having her on views and there is no offence committed when A2 made it explicitly clear that she does not like the marriage between the first accused and the victim. To stretch it to a limit of inciting the victim to commit suicide and also to attract the provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act will be going too far and not intended by either of the provisions. As far as the first accused is concerned, it was pointed out that it is an admitted case of the prosecution that it was after 1½ years, after the victim had ceased to go for the tuition, that the incident had occurred. There is nothing to indicate that as on the date of incident or immediately prior to that, there was any act committed by the first accused which had either motivated or instigated the victim to do what she did. There is nothing to indicate in the evidence that the first accused was aware or had knowledge of the Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-12-** fact that the victim was inclined to commit suicide and he had incited her to do so. Therefore, it is contended that the acquittal under Section 306 of IPC of both the accused is fully justified and so also the acquittal of A2 for all the offences. 11. In the appeal by the first accused, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the findings regarding the offences under Section 376 of IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) of SC/ST(Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The learned counsel pointed out that the court below has placed heavy reliance on the testimony of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 and have come to the conclusion that the testimony given by them regarding the statement said to have been made to them by the victim qualified as dying declaration and that constitutes substantive evidence. The learned counsel assailed the findings on the ground that what is stated by the PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 are true, they would have found a reflection in either Ext.P1 or at least in Ext.P2 which was drawn up on a Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-13-** subsequent point of time. The absence of any mention of the act of rape or the act of cruelty alleged to have been committed by the first accused which had driven the victim for committing suicide, in either Ext.P1 or Ext.P2 shows in all probability, the dying declaration was a later development to suit the convenience of the prosecution. It was also contended that even as per the prosecution evidence, the victim had stopped going for tuition about 1½ to 2 years prior to the date of incident and there is nothing to show as on record now that there has been any sexual relationship between the two after she ceased to go for tuition with the first accused. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that had the victim been in a position to say what PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 claims to have heard, that would have normally found a place in Ext.P9, the certificate issued by PW11. That, no history is seen mentioned in Ext.P9 shows in all probability, the victim was unable to speak at that point of time. This is further fortified according to the learned counsel, by the Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-14-** evidence of PW1, who says that when he reached the hospital on getting information about the act committed by the victim, he found the victim in such a state that she was unable to speak. The learned counsel also drew attention of this Court to the fact that the prosecution has deliberately withheld the treatment records of the victim. The evidence is clear to the effect that the victim reached the Medical College Hospital by about 10.30 in the morning and she breathed her last at 3.45 in the noon. In the meanwhile, obviously, she would have been given some sort of treatment. No explanation is offered and no doctors are examined to show what exactly were the treatments given to the victim or what was the state of affairs. Without proving that she was capable of talking or responding, it may not be proper for this Court to accept the oral testimony of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 and come to the conclusion that the victim was capable of giving a dying declaration. The court below has not considered the dying declaration from these Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-15-** angles and has merely gone on to accept the statement made by PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 in a mechanical manner. If the dying declaration so spoken to by PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 are eschewed, then there is no substantive evidence regarding the offence of Section 376 of IPC alleged to have been committed by the first accused. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant also pointed out that it is true that Exts. P4 and P5 have been established to be in the handwriting of the victim. The learned counsel did not dispute that they contain a vivid story of what transpired between the two. But the learned counsel went on to point out that even if it is established, that is Ext.P4 and P5 are in the handwriting of the victim, that is only a corroborative piece of evidence and cannot form the basis of conviction. As already noticed, the dying declaration do not qualify to be substantive evidence, they are left with only Exts.P4 and P5 which cannot be treated as substantive evidence and on that basis also, the conviction Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-16-** cannot stand. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that it is not as if that the police came to know about the incident through Ext.P1. The evidence discloses that as soon as the victim set herself on fire, the police had information and they had reached at spot. If that be so, according to the learned counsel, one fails to understand how Ext.P1 could form the first Information Statement. This aspect also has been omitted to be noticed by the court below. Drawing attention to the evidence of PW11 and also PW14, it was pointed out that the victim had 100% burns and if that be so, it is inconceivable that she could speak or utter even a word. It is therefore contended that the conviction and sentence as far as the first accused for the offences under Section 376 of IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act cannot stand. 14. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that the court below has on an analysis of Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-17-** evidence, found that the testimony of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 are sufficient to show the reason for the suicide and also that the victim was capable of speaking after she had been admitted to the Medical College Hospital. Further evidence of the capacity of the victim to speak, while she was in the hospital, is proved through the evidence of PW11 and PW14 according to the learned Public Prosecutor, who say that even after sustaining such burns, the patient may be in a position to speak. 15. The fact that in Ext.P1, First Information Statement, the words spoken to by PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 as dying declaration made to them, does not find a place, cannot help the accused. Probably, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, the information furnished by the deceased might not have been conveyed to PW1 or when PW1 found the victim in a precarious condition, he might not have bothered to find out. But that cannot denude the evidentiary value of the dying declaration said to have been Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-18-** made to PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7. As regards the absence of the said fact in the inquest report, the learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the purpose of the inquest report is to ascertain the cause of death and not the reason for death. The Police Officer is not expected to find out why the death was caused but only to find out how the death was caused. True, the witnesses of the inquest report are relatives of the deceased. But the mere fact that those relatives have not spoken about the words relied on by the lower court in the testimony of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 does not mean that the dying declaration is a subsequent concoction. 16. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the fact that the police had come to the place initially, even admitting it to be so, does not mean that they had information about the entire incident. They came at the place on hearing about the incident and the immediate concern was to remove the victim to the hospital and that is what they had done. They had, at that point of time, no idea Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-19-** about what prompted the lady to do it and how it was done by her. Under that circumstances, if no information in the nature of First Information was given by those Police Officers, they could not be found fault with. 17. The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that there was no suggestion to PW11 or to PW14 that the medical records are deliberately withheld to the disadvantage of the accused. In fact, there is no suggestion to PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 that the victim was not in a position to speak to them. When there is no such challenge that the evidence of PW11 and PW14 are clear to the effect that a victim who has suffered to 100% degree of burns as in the case of the victim can speak, one need not doubt the veracity of the testimony of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7. 18. The learned Public Prosecutor also pointed out that the claim of the defence that Exts.P4 and P5 cannot be accepted as a substantive evidence, cannot stand. True, in earlier days, it was considered to be only an opinion Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-20-** evidence. But the law has undergone a sea change and present position is that if the expert's opinion is found convincing, cogent and credit worthy, the conviction can be based on the same. The learned Public Prosecutor pointed the evidence given by PWs 13 and 16 established beyond doubt that Exts .P4 and P5 are in the handwriting of the victim and they tell the tale. The evidence of PW14, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, is sufficient to show that there was sexual exploitation of the victim. It was pointed out that the assault had started long ago and going by Ext.P7, the date of birth of the victim is 13.04.1985. It is therefore clear that at the time when the assault took place, she was a minor. If that be so, nothing more remains to be considered. 19. The court below had placed reliance on the so called dying declaration said to have been made to PWs 2, 3, 4 and 5. Considerable criticism is levelled against the court below. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant in Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-21-** Crl.A.1755/2006 has already been referred to. One must remember here that PWs 2 and 3 are the parents of the victim and PWs 4 and 7 are their neighbours. The evidence of PWs 4 and 7 clearly show that hearing the shrieks of the victim when they reached the house, they found the victim on fire. Their evidence also show that the second accused was trying to douse the fire. The testimony of PWs 4 and 7 also indicate that they along with A2 and others had taken the victim to the hospital. PWs 4 and 7 say that they asked the victim as to why she had resorted to such a step and she replied that she has been spoiled by the first accused and she could not bare it any more and that she did it deliberately to end her life. As already noticed, there can be no dispute regarding the fact that PWs 4 and 7 had accompanied the victim to the hospital. PWs 2 and 3, the parents reached the hospital on getting information. They too say the same thing as PWs 4 and 7 said. Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-22-** 20. The question is whether the victim was capable of giving the dying declaration and whether the statement made by PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 qualify the dying declaration. It is true that in Ext.P9 drawn up by PW11, there is no mention about the act committed by the first accused or in other words, it does not show the history of the incident. It is also true that the prosecution had not produced the treatment records to show as to what exactly were the treatment administered to the victim from 10.30 a.m., in the morning till she breathed her last at 3.45 in the noon. But the evidence of PWs 11 and 14, the doctors who attended to the victim, when she was brought to the hospital initially and the doctor who conducted the postmortem respectively, clearly show that even after suffering the degree of burns as mentioned in the records that victim would be able to speak. PW11 has stated that he did not take any steps to have a dying declaration recorded, but he remained satisfied by saying that he had informed the police. Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-23-** 21. As already noticed, there is no suggestion to PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 that the condition of the victim at the relevant time was such that she was unable to speak and they had an oblique motive to speak falsehood before the court. In fact, there is no challenge in this regard at all. When these facts are taken note of, it could not be said that the victim was in such a position that she was unable to say about the act committed by the first accused which had driven her to commit suicide. 22. The evidence shows that the second accused had cautioned PW3 about the unholy relationship with the victim had with A1. A2 also told PW3 that she had asked the victim not to come for tuition further. PW3 would say that she had cautioned her daughter but she did not pursue the matter further. 23. One fact is very clear from the evidence, that is PWs 2 and 3 were aware of the illicit relationship between the victim and the first accused long before the incident. In Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-24-** fact, PW3 had direct knowledge from the second accused as she had warned her about the consequences thereof. Incidentally, it may also be noticed that the evidence of PW3 is to the effect that on a day when she returned home from the office, she saw the victim crying and on enquiry, she was told that the victim had developed an obsession for A1 and A1 had informed her that he would not marry her, also because of her caste. That means, PW3 was also aware of the fact that the marriage between the first accused and the victim was unlikely to take place. 24. However, that may not have much of a bearing on the issue involved in this case. So far as the law relating to a dying declaration is concerned, it is well settled. If found credit worthy and it is found that the victim concerned was capable of giving such a statement, it forms substantive evidence. The mere fact that it does not find reflection in the FIR by itself is not a ground to reject the dying declaration. It was so held in **State of U.P.** v. **Krishna** Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-25-** ## **Master & Ors.** [AIR 2010 SC 3071]. 25. The principle is that if the dying declaration is found to be convincing and cogent enough and it is found that the victim is capable of giving the same, it can form the sole basis [see the decision in **Krishan v. State of Haryana** ((2013) 3 SCC 280)]. 26. It is a misnomer that a dying declaration has to be in writing. An oral dying declaration is as good as declaration in writing. Of course, one is slightly perturbed by the acts of the Police men who had occasion to reach the place of incident soon after the incident and also the acts of PW11, the doctor who had attended to the victim when she was brought to the Medical college hospital and who knew the precarious condition in which the victim was placed. There was no attempt from their side to have the dying declaration recorded. But laches on their part cannot tell upon the veracity of the evidence given by PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7. Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-26-** 27. In the decision reported in **Bable Alias Gurdeep Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh** [AIR 2012 SC 2621], it was held that an oral dying declaration is as good as any other dying declaration and that even if it was to a relative or interested person, that by itself is not a ground to reject the same. 28. PWs 2 and 3 speak about what was told to them by the victim, after the victim had reached hospital and PWs 2 and 3 had reached the hospital after getting information about the mishap. On the other hand, PWs 4 and 7 had occasion to meet the victim soon after the incident and they were instrumental in removing the victim to the hospital. The statement to them was on the way to the hospital. It is here that one has to notice the entry in Ext.P9 and the evidence of PW11 to the effect that at the time when the victim was brought to the hospital, she was conscious and oriented. PW11 is definite that the patient was capable of speaking at the time of his examination. It is true that the Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-27-** evidence of PW11 shows that he was almost sure that the victim would not survive. But even though he did not take any steps to have the dying declaration recorded, he informed the matter to the police. In this regard, one may now refer to the evidence of PW14, the doctor who conducted autopsy in the body of the victim. In cross examination, in no less terms PW14 has stated that he had no occasion to notice anything while conducting postmortem to show that the victim was incapable of speaking before death. But he fairly said that since he had no occasion to meet the victim before death, he could not positively say that she was in a state in which she could give a dying declaration. But he followed it up by saying that according to some of the medical literature which he has read, such a patient can be conscious till death. He also says that he convinced of the same from his experience also. 29. Therefore, going by the medical evidence now available on record, it could not be said that the victim was Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-28-** unable to speak or was not in a position to give any statement. PW1, the paternal uncle who gave the First Information Statement had come to the scene much later. It is significant to notice that the condition of the victim was worsening as time passed by. The statements of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 are soon after the incident, before the condition worsening to such a state that she was unable to speak. What ever that be, one fact is very clear from the evidence of PWs 11 and 14 that even if a victim had suffered 100 degree burns as is spoken to by PW11, the patient could speak. Viewed in this context, there is no reason to disbelieve PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 in this regard. Therefore, none of the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused to doubt that the dying declaration stands scrutiny. 30. The next item of evidence that is heavily relied on by the court below is Exts. P4 and P5. It is no doubt true that Ext.P5 is a diary alleged to have been maintained by Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-29-** the victim. While Ext.P4 series are loose sheets which contained scribblings by the victim. 31. It cannot be disputed on going through Ext.P4, one gets a clear picture of what had transpired between the victim and the first accused. That there was sexual exploitation or abuse or whatever you may call the acts by the first accused of the victim is very evident and clear. Initially, it would appear that the victim did not know what was happening to her. But somewhere in between, a hope kindled in her that the first accused would marry her. There was sexual contact between the two in plenty. All the time, the victim believed that the first accused would marry her. It came to her as a rude shock, when the first accused disclosed that he could not marry the victim due to several reasons including the caste which she belonged and also due to the opposition of his mother who is the second accused. Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-30-** 32. The victim then felt humiliated and she did not want to survive. She could not bare the agony and ultimately she set herself on fire. That writings contained in Exts.P4 and P5 are in the handwriting of the victim is amply proved by the testimony of PWs 13 and 16. PW13 is the scientific expert who had examined the handwriting and PW16 is the teacher who had occasion to value the answer sheets of the victim. Therefore, the two modes of proving the handwriting have been fulfilled by the prosecution. One by expert opinion and one by the teacher, who is familiar with the handwriting. 33. Even assuming that the dying declaration is not true, the question then arises, if the contents of Exts.P4 and P5 are found to be that in the handwriting of the victim, whether that would itself is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the first accused is guilty of the offences alleged against him. ## Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-31-** 34. The learned counsel appearing for the first appellant/first accused contended on the basis of the decision reported in **Bhagwan Kaur v. Shri Maharaj Krishan Sharma and others** [AIR 1973 SC 1346] that the handwriting expert's opinion is the mere opinion and cannot form the basis of the conviction at all. 35. As rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, much water has flown under the bridge since then. Views have undergone considerable change. Whether, expert's opinion can form the basis of the conviction considering the decisions reported in **Magan Bihari Lal** v. **State of Punjuab** [1977 2 SCC 210], **Mani Ram** v. **State of Rajasthan** [1993 (Supp) 3 SCC 18], **Malaykumar Ganguly** v. **Dr. Sukumar Mukherji and Others** [2009 (9) SCC 221], **Murarilal.** v. **State of Madhya Pradesh** [AIR 1980 SC 531], **Fakhruddin** v. **State of Madhya Pradesh** [AIR 1967 SC 1326], **Magan Bihari Lal** v. **State of Punjuab** AIR 1977 SC 1091, **Gopal Mohan K.** Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-32-** v. **S. Govindan Nair** [2011 (2) KHC 920] and unreported decision of this Court in Crl.A.No. 760 of 2009 dated 13.09.2012. In the unreported decision referred to above, this Court had occasion to examine the law laid down in the decision reported in **Fakhruddin** v. **State of Madhya Pradesh** [AIR 1967 SC 1326] till date and after having evaluated the various decisions, came to the conclusion that an expert's opinion if found to be cogent and convincing enough and inspires confident in the mind of court, can form basis of conviction. 36. In the case on hand, it has already been found that the statement spoken to by PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7 constitute substantive evidence and even assuming that corroborative evidence is required, that is furnished by Exts.P4 and P5. Therefore, the finding of the court below that the first accused had committed the offences under Section 376 of IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act stands confirmed. Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-33-** 37. Coming to the appeal by the State, the learned Public Prosecutor emphasized that the second accused had addressed the victim by her caste name. Therefore, she could not escape from the offence fall within the ambit of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 38. At the outset itself, it may be mentioned that mere calling of caste name by itself is not a ground to attract the provisions of the Act. It has to be in public view. One has to only refer to the evidence of PW3 to discard the contentions in this behalf. PW3 in no less terms says that on both the occasions, the caste name was called inside the house of PW3 which means that it was not in the public view at all. Therefore the court below has justified in finding that the second accused had not committed the act under the provisions of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 39. Coming back to the issue regarding Section 306 of IPC, it was very vehemently contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that the act of the first accused in declining to Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-34-** marry the victim thereby driving her to commit suicide and fuel was added by A2 by her conduct before, during and after the incident would clearly indicate that they abetted her to commit suicide. The conducts of the accused are abhorrent and they showed no concern for the victim. Referring to the evidence of PW4, it was pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor that while the victim was about to breath her last, she expressed her desire to be in the lap of A2, which was declined by A2. The court below, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, was wrong in coming to the conclusion that there was no part played by the accused persons contributing in the suicide of the victim. 40. Well, one has to remember that the court has to be governed by principles of law and not by emotions. In order to attract Section 306 of IPC, which has to be established by the prosecution that the person accused of having committed the offence had knowledge or was in the know that the victim is going to commit suicide. It need not Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-35-** be immediate. It may develop over a period of time. But nexus and proximity are two essential ingredients to constitute the offence. In fact, this question was considered in the decision reported in **Purushothaman** v. **State of Kerala** [1989 (1) KLT 521], **Rajan** v. **State of Kerala** [1994 (1) KLT 179], **Kishori Lal** v. **State of M.P.** [2007 (3) KLT 259], **Sohan Raj Sharma** v. **State of Haryana** [2008 (2) KLT 287] and **Mohan** v. **State of Tamil Nadu** [2011 (2) KLT SN 59]. It will be only necessary to refer to the decision reported in **Mohan** v. **State of Tamil Nadu** [2011 (2) KLT SN 59] wherein it was held as follows: “In order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear _mens rea_ to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide.” 41. It is true that the evidence discloses that the first accused after having sexually exploited the victim, made it Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-36-** known to her that he was not inclined to marry her though he gave several reasons. The second accused made it explicit that she was not in favour of the first accused marrying the victim mainly because the victim belonged to the Scheduled Caste. But are these by themselves sufficient to attract Section 306 of IPC? 42. Certainly not. There is nothing to indicate that the accused persons had any knowledge of the intention of the victim. Without that knowledge, it could not be said that they had either aided or instigated the victim to do what she did. That means, essential ingredients to attract Section 306 of IPC are not established in the case on hand. Merely because, some acts on the part of A1 and A2 might appear to be cruel and inhuman, that does not lead the conclusion that they instigated or abetted to commit suicide. Much more evidence is required to reach that conclusion. The criterion has already been referred to. Viewed thus, the finding of the court below that the offence under Section 306 Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-37-** of IPC is not made out and is only to be sustained. 43. Coming to the question of sentence awarded to the first accused for the offence punishable under Section 376, it is seen that he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of which he has to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. 44. The incident is certainly worrying and disturbing. The act of the first accused by no stretch of imagination can be supported. He was clever enough to have his lust satiated and then throw the victim to her fate. But one cannot omit to note that the incident had taken place in 2001 and 12 years have elapsed and things might have changed. 45. Considering the passage of time and various other facts it is felt that no interference is called for with the sentence awarded by the court below both under Section 376 and Section 3(1)(xi) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Crl.A. Nos. 1755/2006 & 404/2007 **-38-** Act. The result is that both these appeals are without merits and are liable to be dismissed. Sd/- **P.BHAVADASAN JUDGE** ds //True Copy// P.A. To Judge