High Court of KeralaSingle JudgePetition dismissed; bail cancellation upheld; p...

Abdul Kareem v. State of Kerala

Case / Petition Number:CRL.MC NO.4477 OF 2023

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • Raja Vijayaraghavan V.
Judgment Date
2023-06-15
Court Decision / Holding
This petition is dismissed. The High Court upheld the cancellation of bail and declined to interfere with the Sessions Court’s order. It left open the possibility of the petitioner surrendering before the jurisdictional court and seeking regular bail on merits under the NDPS Act, as guided by applicable criteria.
Final Disposition
Petition dismissed; bail cancellation upheld; petitioner may surrender and seek regular bail on merits under the NDPS Act.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Abdul Kareem

Respondents

  • State of Kerala represented by Public Prosecutor, High Court of Kerala
  • Inspector of Police, Kollengode Police Station, Palakkad

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Adv. Ahamed Fazil

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Advocate General Office, Kerala
  • • Director General of Prosecution (AG-10)
  • • P. Narayanan, Senior G.P.A.
  • • Additional Public Prosecutor
  • • Sri Vipin Narayan, Sr. PP

Case Synopsis & Summary

Abdul Kareem, the sole accused in Crime No. 40/2022 of Kollengode Police Station, Palakkad, was enlarged on statutory bail with a condition not to commit any offence on bail. While on bail, he was arrested in a second NDPS case (Crime No. 221/2022) for allegedly transporting 64.180 kg of ganja in a BMW. The prosecution sought to cancel bail by filing an application in the Sessions Court under Section 439(2) CrPC, contending the accused had misused liberty and engaged in a similar crime, undermining the integrity of the bail system. The Sessions Court cancelled bail. The petitioner moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, arguing that mere involvement in a subsequent crime cannot justify withdrawal of bail, citing Godson v. State of Kerala and Renjith v. State of Kerala. The learned Advocate for the petitioner urged that cancellation requires supervening circumstances and that the prior order was not illegal or perverse. The Public Prosecutor relied on Madhya Pradesh cases and other Supreme Court precedents (Gurcharan Singh, Puran, Dolat Ram, etc.) to argue that misusing liberty constitutes valid grounds for cancellation, and that the difference between setting aside a perverse order and cancelling bail must be kept in mind. The High Court examined the authorities and concluded that misuse of liberty can justify cancellation; noting supervening facts post-bail, it upheld the cancellation and dismissed the petition, while clarifying the petitioner may surrender and apply for regular bail under NDPS Act on merits.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.Section 439 Cr.P.C.439(2) Cr.P.C.NDPS Act, 1985, Section 20(b)(ii)NDPS Act, 1985, Section 20(b)(ii)(C)Section 498 CrPC (old Code)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Distinction between setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order and cancellation of bail on the ground of misconduct or supervening circumstances.
  • Misuse of liberty as a ground to cancel bail (as enumerated in P. v. Madhya Pradesh) and reaffirmed in subsequent authorities.
  • Bail should be granted and cancelled in a judicious manner; not in a mechanical fashion.
  • Supervening circumstances warranting cancellation (as per Dolat Ram, Gurcharan Singh, Puran, Ranjit Singh) and the need for cogent reasons.
  • If no new circumstances exist after bail, the State may approach the High Court for cancellation under Section 439(2).

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioner contends that mere involvement in a subsequent crime cannot by itself justify cancellation of bail; reliance on Godson v. State of Kerala (2022 (2) KLD 447) and Renjith v. State of Kerala (2023 (2) KHC 310) was placed to urge that new criminal involvement alone is not sufficient to cancel bail. It was urged that the impairment of liberty requires supervening circumstances and that the prior bail order was not illegal or perverse; cancellation should not be automatic and must observe the distinctions laid down by higher courts. The counsel urged the Court to restrict cancellation to clear, exceptional facts and to consider the possibility of surrender for re-bail.

Contentions of Respondents

The State contends that misuse of liberty is a valid ground to cancel bail, citing Madhya Pradesh cases (P. v. Madhya Pradesh) and the established line of Supreme Court authorities (Gurcharan Singh, Puran, Dolat Ram, Ranjit Singh, Deepak Yadav). It was argued that the accused engaged in a second NDPS offence after bail, violating a specific condition, and that this constitutes a serious misuse of liberty. The Public Prosecutor argued that based on supervening circumstances and the gravity of the NDPS charge, cancellation is warranted, and cited Edwin Thomas v. State of Kerala and related authorities to support procedural prudence in NDPS bail consideration.

Cited Precedents (10)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Godson v. State of Kerala2022 (2) KLD 447Mentioned OnlyCited by petitioner but not adopted by the court; the court relies on Madhya Pradesh and other authorities for the controlling rationale.
Renjith v. State of Kerala2023 (2) KHC 310Mentioned OnlyCited by petitioner but not followed by the court; used to illustrate contrasting views but not binding on the decision here.
P. v. Madhya Pradesh(not specified)PositiveCited as the primary controlling authority enumerating the circumstances under which bail can be revoked (misuse, etc.).
Gurcharan Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration)(1978) 1 SCC 118PositiveUsed to distinguish settings aside vs cancellation of bail; supports the principle that bail cancellation requires certain grounds.
Puran v. Rambilas and Another(2001) 6 SCC 338PositiveReinforces the distinction and grounds for cancellation of bail.
Abdul Basit alias Raju and Ors. v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Cahudhary and Another(not specified)PositiveCited in context of legal principle about cancellation of bail vs setting aside order.
Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P.(2013) 16 SCC 797PositiveAffirms the distinction between grant and cancellation of bail and the need for supervening circumstances.
Dolat Ram and Ors. v. State of Haryana(1995) 1 SCC 349PositiveAuthority for the principle that misusing liberty can justify cancellation of bail.
CBI v. Subramani Gopalakrishnan(2011) 5 SCC 296PositiveSupports grounds for cancellation including misuse of liberty.
Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P.(2022) 8 SCC 559PositiveProvides the bail-granting criteria relevant to NDPS context; cited to contextualize appropriate bail standards.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

# **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT`** ``` THEHONOURABLEMR.JUSTICERAJAVIJAYARAGHAVANV THURSDAY,THE15[TH]DAYOFJUNE2023/25THJYAISHTA,1945 CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` AGAINSTTHEORDERINS.CNO.641/2022OFADDITIONALDISTRICT COURT&SESSIONSCOURT-IV,PALAKKAD/IIIADDITIONALMACT, PALAKKAD ``` ## **`PETITIONER/RESPONDENT/ACCUSED :-`** ``` ABDULKAREEM,AGED48YEARS S/O.IBRAHIM,KOTTAPARAMBILCVEEDU, KARUPATHALKULATHUR,KULATHUR, MALAPPURAM-,PIN-679338 ``` ``` BYADVE.C.AHAMEDFAZIL ``` ## **`RESPONDENT/PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT :-`** - **`1 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, PIN - 682031`** - **`2 INSPECTOR OF POLICE KOLLENGODE POLICE STATION, PALAKKAD -, PIN - 678506`** ``` BYADVS. ``` ``` ADVOCATEGENERALOFFICEKERALA DIRECTORGENERALOFPROSECUTION(AG-10) P.NARAYANAN,SENIORG.P.ANDADDL.PUBLICPROSECUTOR() ``` ``` SRI.VIPINNARAYAN,SR.PP ``` ``` THISCRIMINALMISC.CASEHAVINGCOMEUPFORADMISSIONON 15.06.2023,THECOURTONTHESAMEDAYPASSEDTHEFOLLOWING: ``` ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 2 ``` ## **ORDER** The petitioner herein has preferred this petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C seeking to quash the order dated 31.05.2023 in Crl.M.P.No.1922 of 2023 in S.C.No.641 of 2022, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Palakkad. By the order impugned, the learned Sessions Judge took note of the fact that the petitioner got himself involved in a subsequent crime and thereby has misused the liberty. 2. Short facts are as under : The petitioner herein is the accused in Crime No.40 of 2022 of Kollengode Police Station, Palakkad. In the aforesaid case, he is accused of having committed offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The prosecution's allegation was that he had transported 4.060 kilograms of ganja in a vehicle bearing Registration No.KL-56-Q-7950. 3. The learned Sessions Judge considered the bail application and granted statutory bail to the petitioner by Annexure-A1 order. In the said order, the learned Sessions Judge had imposed the condition that the petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail. While on bail as aforesaid, the petitioner was again arrested for having transported 64.180 ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 3 ``` kgs of ganja in a BMW car bearing Registration No.KL-05-AA-8822. He was arrested and Crime No.221/2022 of Walayar Police Station was registered inter alia under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. 4. The petitioner states that for the failure of the prosecution to submit the final report within the statutory period of 180 days, statutory bail was granted to the petitioner. While so, the aforesaid application is filed by the Inspector of Police before the Court of Sessions seeking to consider the bail in the earlier crime. The learned Sessions Judge taking note of the fact that the petitioner herein had misused the liberty allowed and cancelled the bail by the impugned order. 5. Sri.Ahamed Fazile C, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge cannot be sustained. According to the learned counsel, this Court in **Godson v. State of Kerala** [2022 (2) KLD 447] and also in **Renjith v. State of Kerala** [2023 (2) KHC 310] has held that mere involvement in the subsequent crime is no reason to cancel the bail. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the aforesaid submissions. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **P. v.** ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 4 ``` **Madhya Pradesh and Another[1]** has enumerated the circumstances when bail could be cancelled and one of the conditions stated therein is the misuse of the liberty granted to the petitioner by the court by involving in subsequent crimes. It is further urged that the petitioner was initially involved in a case involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs, and after being enlarged on bail, he was again found in possession of Ganja Hashish oil. The learned Public Prosecutor has also relied on the law laid down by a learned Single Judge in **Edwin Thomas v. State of Kerala[2]** , and it was argued that if the accused continuously misuses his liberty and gets involved in subsequent crimes, that is sufficient reason to cancel the bail. 7. I have considered the submissions advanced. 8. The issue to be decided is whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified in revoking the bail granted to the petitioner for abusing the freedom granted to him. 9. While granting statutory bail in Crime No. 40/2022 of the Kollengode Police Station, Palakkad, the learned Sessions Judge imposed various conditions. Condition No. 5 reads as under: “(5) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.” > 1 (2022 SCC Online SC 552) > 2 > [2023 KHC Online 206] ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 5 ``` 10. Admittedly, the petitioner got himself involved in Crime No.221/2022 of Walayar Police Station was registered inter alia under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The learned Sessions Judge took note of the fact that the petitioner, in violation of the bail condition, got involved in a similar crime. 11. In this context, it would be apposite to note the subtle difference between the setting aside of an unjustified, illegal, or perverse order by a superior court and the concept of canceling the bail by the court granting bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or because of some new facts requiring such intervention. In **Gurcharan Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration.)[3]** , the Apex Court had occasion to observe that the concept of setting aside the unjustified, illegal, or perverse order is totally different from the concept of canceling the bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or because of some new facts requiring such cancellation. It was observed as follows in paragraph No.16 of the judgment as under: **16.** Section 439 of the new Code confers special powers on High Court or Court of Session regarding bail. This was also the position under Section 498 CrPC of the old Code. That is to say, even if a Magistrate refuses to grant bail to an accused person, the High Court or the Court of Session may order for grant of bail in appropriate cases. Similarly under Section 439(2) of the > 3 (1978) 1 SCC 118] ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 6 ``` new Code, the High Court or the Court of Session may direct any person who has been released on bail to be arrested and committed to custody. In the old Code, Section 498(2) was worded in somewhat different language when it said that a High Court or Court of Session may cause any person who has been admitted to bail under sub-section (1) to be arrested and may commit him to custody. In other words, under Section 498(2) of the old Code, a person who had been admitted to bail by the High Court could be committed to custody only by the High Court. Similarly, if a person was admitted to bail by a Court of Session, it was only the Court of Session that could commit him to custody. This restriction upon the power of entertainment of an application for committing a person, already admitted to bail, to custody, is lifted in the new Code under Section 439(2). Under Section 439(2) of the new Code a High Court may commit a person released on bail under Chapter XXXIII by any Court including the Court of Session to custody, if it thinks appropriate to do so. It must, however, be made clear that a Court of Session cannot cancel a bail which has already been granted by the High Court unless new circumstances arise during the progress of the trial after an accused person has been admitted to bail by the High Court. If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an accused person to bail, the State has two options. It may move the Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arisen which were not earlier known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that Court. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior Court under Section 439(2) to commit the accused to custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail and there are no new circumstances that have cropped up except those already existed, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again and it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of the bail. This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Session vis-a-vis the High Court. 12. It was held that the State has two options when the accused has been granted bail by the Court of Session. It may move the same ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 7 ``` Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arisen which were not earlier known to the State. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior Court under Section 439(2) of the Code, to commit the accused to custody. However, when the State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail, and there are no new circumstances that have cropped up except those already existed, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again, and it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of the bail. 13. The same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in **Puran v. Rambilas and Another[4]** . It was held as follows in paragraph No. 11 of the judgment: **11.** Further, it is to be kept in mind that the concept of setting aside the unjustified illegal or perverse order is totally different from the concept of cancelling the bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or because of some new facts requiring such cancellation. This position is made clear by this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1978) 1 SCC 118: In that case, the Court observed as under: “If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an accused person to bail, the State has two options. It may move the Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arisen which were not earlier known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that court. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior court under Section 439(2) to commit the accused to custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge > 4 [(2001) 6 SCC 338] ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 8 ``` granting bail and there are no new circumstances that have cropped up except those already existing, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again, and it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of the bail. This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Session vis-à-vis the High Court.” ## 14. In **Abdul Basit alias Raju and Ors. v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir** **Cahudhary and Another[5]** , the Apex Court relying on the observations in **Gurcharan Singh** (supra) and **Puran** (supra), had observed as follows in paragraph No. 19 of the judgment: **19.** Therefore, the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order is different from the concept of cancellation of a bail on the ground of accused's misconduct or new adverse facts having surfaced after the grant of bail which require such cancellation and a perusal of the aforesaid decisions would present before us that an order granting bail can only be set aside on grounds of being illegal or contrary to law by the court superior to the court which granted the bail and not by the same court. ## 15. In **Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P.[6]** , the Apex Court had occasion to reiterate the position as regards the distinction between the parameters for grant of bail and cancellation of bail and also the distinction between the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order and cancellation of an order of bail on the ground that the accused has > 5 (2014) 10 SCC 754 > 6 (2013) 16 SCC 797 ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 9 ``` misconducted himself or certain supervening circumstances warrant such cancellation. It was held as follows in paragraph No. 19 of the judgment. **19.** It needs no special emphasis to state that there is distinction between the parameters for grant of bail and cancellation of bail. There is also a distinction between the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order and cancellation of an order of bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or certain supervening circumstances warrant such cancellation. If the order granting bail is a perverse one or passed on irrelevant materials, it can be annulled by the superior court. We have already referred to various paragraphs of the order passed by the High Court. We have already held that the learned trial Judge has misconstrued the order passed by the High Court. However, we may hasten to add that the learned Single Judge has taken note of certain supervening circumstances to cancel the bail, but we are of the opinion that in the obtaining factual matrix the said exercise was not necessary as the grant of bail was absolutely illegal and unjustified as the court below had enlarged the accused on bail on the strength of the order passed in Ranjeet Singh v. State of M.P. [Ranjeet Singh v. State of M.P., MCRC No. 701 of 2013, order dated 1-2-2013 (MP)] remaining oblivious of the parameters for grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC. It is well settled in law that grant of bail though involves exercise of discretionary power of the court, yet the said exercise has to be made in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. 16. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court as above, the courts are to bear in mind that there is a distinction between the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal, or perverse order and cancellation of an order of bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or due to the happening of certain supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation. Insofar as the cancellation of ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 10 ``` bail by the superior court on the ground that the order passed by the court granting bail is unjustified, illegal, or perverse, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in **Dolat Ram and Ors. v. State of Haryana[7]** shall govern the same. It was observed therein that rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted have to be considered and dealt with on a different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding, is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail, once granted, should not be canceled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. Insofar as the cases in which the application for cancellation of bail is filed for misusing > 7 (1995) 1 SCC 349 ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 11 ``` liberty, the fact to be taken note of by the court is whether the conditions have been violated and that the supervening circumstances warrant the cancellation of bail (See **CBI v. Subramani Gopalakrishnan** , [(2011) 5 SCC 296]). 17. In **P. v Madhya Pradesh** (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has adverted to all the past precedents and has encapsulated the circumstances under which bail granted to the accused under S.439 (1) of the Cr. P. C. can be revoked. They are - a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other criminal activity; - b) If he interferes with the course of the investigation; - c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence; - d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses; - e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings; - f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smooth investigation; - g) If he is likely to flee from the country; - h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going underground and/or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency; - i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety. - j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which are considered unconducive to a fair trial. ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 12 ``` 18. The Apex Court has emphatically stated that misuse of the liberty granted is sufficient enough ground to cancel the bail once granted. 19. As the petitioner has misused the liberty granted to him, the learned Sessions Judge was well justified in canceling the bail. In that view of the matter, the impugned order does not warrant any interference. However, it is made clear that the above order shall not stand in the way of the petitioner surrendering before the jurisdictional court and seeking regular bail. If any such application is filed, the same shall be considered in the light of the principles governing the grant of bail under the NDPS Act and also as reiterated in **Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P.,[8]** which lays down that the relevant conditions for grant of bail are: - (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; - (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; - (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; - (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; - (v) character, behavior, means, position and standing of the accused; - (vi) likelihood of the offense being repeated; - (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and > 8 (2022) 8 SCC 559) ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 13 ``` (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. Appropriate orders shall be passed on its merits, untrammeled by any of the observations above. This petition is dismissed. Sd/- SMA **RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V., JUDGE** ``` CRL.MCNO.4477OF2023 ``` ``` 14 ``` ## **`APPENDIX OF CRL.MC 4477/2023`** ## **`PETITIONER ANNEXURES :-`** ``` AnnexureA1TRUECOPYOFTHEORDERDATED25.03.2022IN CRL.M.P.NO.945OF2022PASSEDBYTHE SESSIONSCOURT,PALAKKAD AnnexureA2TRUECOPYOFTHEFIRSTINFORMATIONREPORTIN CRIMENO.221OF202OFWALAYARPOLICE STATIONDATED21.05.2023 AnnexureA3TRUECOPYOFTHESAIDREPORTDATEDNIL SUBMITTEDBYINSPECTOROFPOLICE,KOLLANGODE POLICESTATIONTOSESSIONSCOURT,PALAKKAD Annexure4TRUECOPYOFTHEAPPLICATIONDATEDNIL(MAY 2023)INCRL.M.P.NO.1922OF2023ONTHE FILESOFADDITIONALSESSIONSCOURT-IV, PALAKKAD AnnexureA5TRUECOPYOFTHEOBJECTIONDATED25.05.2023 INCRL.M.P.NO.1922OF2023ONTHEFILESOF ADDITIONALSESSIONSCOURT-IV,PALAKKAD AnnexureA6TRUECOPYOFORDERDATED31.05.2023IN CRL.M.P.NO.1922OF2023PASSEDBY ADDITIONALSESSIONSCOURT-IV,PALAKKAD ```